State v. Omar Vega-Larregui (085288) (Mercer County & Statewide) ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                                        SYLLABUS
    This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
    Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
    Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
    State v. Omar Vega-Larregui (A-33-20) (085288)
    Argued March 15, 2021 -- Decided April 28, 2021
    ALBIN, J., writing for the Court.
    As a temporary emergency response to the easy transmissibility of the deadly
    airborne coronavirus, the Supreme Court authorized grand jury presentations in a virtual
    format, first in a pilot program and later on a statewide basis. In this appeal, defendant
    Omar Vega-Larregui and various amici curiae organizations claim that the virtual grand
    jury format -- and therefore the lack of an in-person proceeding -- violates the right to a
    grand jury presentation and other constitutional provisions. They also claim that the
    Supreme Court does not have the constitutional authority to order temporary virtual grand
    jury presentations for the duration of the pandemic.
    On March 9, 2020, Governor Philip Murphy declared a Public Health Emergency
    and State of Emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court canceled all
    new civil and criminal jury trials until further notice on March 12, 2020, and all grand
    jury sessions and the selection of new grand jury panels on March 17, 2020.
    To keep the criminal and civil justice system functioning, by April 24, the
    Judiciary had turned to technology and conducted more than 12,000 virtual proceedings.
    The Court established the Working Group on Remote Grand Jury Operations to examine
    whether, and if so, how, grand jury proceedings could resume in a virtual format while
    in-person gatherings are suspended because of COVID-19. The Working Group
    recommended that grand jury operations resume in certain counties in a virtual format in
    a manner that upholds the solemnity and secrecy of those proceedings and safeguards the
    rights of defendants, victims, jurors, and the public.
    On May 14, 2020, the Court issued an Order authorizing a virtual grand jury pilot
    program to begin in Bergen and Mercer Counties. The Order instructed that “[g]rand
    juries empaneled before March 16, 2020 and still within their term of service may
    reconvene in a virtual format.” It further directed that the standard grand jury charge
    would be supplemented by a special charge and an oath of secrecy adapted to the virtual
    format. The supplemental charge reminds the jurors of the gravity of their obligation and
    warns that, if they violate their oath of secrecy or any other rule governing the grand jury
    proceeding, they could be held in contempt and face “serious consequences,” including
    1
    potential fines and jail time. The May 14 Order also advised that the Judiciary would
    “provide restricted-use devices (laptops or tablets) and related items” to any grand juror
    who is “able to participate in virtual proceedings but requires technological support” and
    would give training to the grand jurors “on the virtual courtroom process.”
    In June 2020, the Court expanded the two-county grand jury pilot program to
    include virtual grand jury selections and authorized virtual State Grand Jury proceedings.
    On July 24, 2020, the Court took the virtual grand jury pilot program statewide. In-
    person grand jury selection and sessions remain suspended.
    As of January 29, 2021, the Judiciary had provided over 150 tablets (with
    broadband internet capacity when necessary) to allow potential jurors to participate in
    virtual grand jury selections and jurors to participate in virtual grand jury sessions. Any
    grand juror without access to a computer or tablet is provided one by the Judiciary.
    Jurors serving on State Grand Juries are instructed to interrupt or wave at their screens if
    they have any technical problems, and Deputy Attorneys General and grand jury staff
    monitor grand jurors’ screens to assist with any problems.
    Judiciary staff, moreover, ensure that grand jurors comply with the secrecy
    requirements of virtual grand jury sessions. Before each session, a staff member checks
    in with the jurors, has them perform with their electronic devices a 360-degree scan of
    their environments to confirm the privacy of their locations, and reminds them to turn off
    their cell phones or other devices.
    In August 2019, defendant was arrested and charged with three drug-related
    offenses and with two disorderly persons charges. A Superior Court judge placed
    defendant on pretrial release. On February 13, 2020, a twenty-three-person grand jury
    panel was selected. The grand jury convened in person for orientation and for three
    sessions in February and March. Further sessions were canceled due to the pandemic.
    On June 18, 2020, the grand jury reconvened in a virtual format. Beforehand, the
    jury manager inquired of all of the grand jurors whether they had the capacity to fulfill
    their service in virtual sessions, and five grand jurors were given tablets with internet
    capacity to ensure their continued service. Judiciary staff then assisted all grand jurors
    with a Zoom trial run, and the grand jurors received further instructions at an orientation.
    Over three sessions in June and early July, they heard eight presentations.
    On July 9, 2020, the grand jury met for its fourth Zoom session, at which the
    prosecutor presented defendant’s case. Before each virtual session, the grand jury staff
    conducted a check-in process with each juror. As part of that process, using their
    computers or tablets, grand jurors were required to perform a 360-degree scan of their
    location to assure staff of the privacy of their environment. In addition, at each session,
    the jurors were administered the supplemental oath of secrecy.
    2
    The Court reviews in detail the presentation of the case against defendant,
    including questions asked to confirm whether the jurors had questions or technical issues.
    After some questions, the grand jurors were asked to raise their hands; after others, a lack
    of response was treated as agreement. At certain points, people speaking were recorded
    as “unidentified speakers.” After deliberating, the grand jury indicted defendant on four
    counts. The grand jury foreperson conducted pre- and post-deliberation technology
    checks to ensure that the grand jurors had not experienced any technical problems that
    affected their ability to hear and/or observe the proceedings or their ability to deliberate
    and vote.
    Defendant pleaded not guilty and later moved to dismiss the indictment on the
    basis that the virtual grand jury presentation did not “adhere to constitutional norms” and
    that the State failed “to present clearly exculpatory information” during the presentation.
    More particularly, defendant argued that this Court exceeded its constitutional
    rulemaking authority by convening a virtual grand jury. On January 13, 2021, in
    accordance with Rule 2:12-1, this Court certified directly for its review only defendant’s
    constitutional challenge to the grand jury presentation in the virtual format.
    HELD: The Court has the constitutional authority to make rules and procedures for all
    courts of this state, including the grand jury; the Court’s authorization of a virtual format
    for the selection of grand jurors and grand jury presentations during a lethal pandemic
    does not violate the State Constitution’s separation of powers. There is no support for the
    facial constitutional challenge to the temporary use of the virtual grand jury during the
    current public health crisis, and virtual grand jury proceedings do not facially violate the
    fundamental fairness doctrine. In individual cases where a defendant claims that an
    alleged error or defect undermined the fairness of the proceeding, a challenge may be
    mounted. But in this case, no error undermined the integrity of the grand jury
    proceeding; nor is there a basis for the dismissal of the indictment.
    1. Article I, Paragraph 8 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person
    shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of
    a grand jury.” The Court traces the history of the right to a grand jury presentation and
    the roles that grand juries play in the criminal justice process. The Court’s temporary
    suspension of in-person grand juries and jury trials was a public health imperative, but
    that suspension delays the criminal justice process with serious implications for the
    accused, whether detained or released pretrial, and the State. The question is whether all
    of the essential attributes of the right to a grand jury presentation can be preserved
    through a virtual format so that the grand jury can function and fulfill its historic purpose
    in the midst of an unprecedented public health emergency. In answering that question, it
    must be remembered that the framers of our State Constitution, like the framers of the
    Federal Constitution, created a founding charter “intended to endure for ages to come,
    and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” See McCulloch
    v. Maryland, 
    17 U.S. 316
    , 415 (1819). (pp. 28-32)
    3
    2. The grand jury is a judicial, investigative body, serving a judicial function and is an
    arm of the court. In New Jersey, the Judiciary exercises supervisory authority over grand
    juries to ensure that grand jury proceedings are fundamentally fair. See N.J. Const. art.
    VI, § 2, ¶ 3. The Court’s constitutional administrative authority extends to the power to
    issue rules and directives governing the grand jury and cannot be circumscribed by
    legislation. Grand juries are also the subject of legislation that, in many instances,
    overlaps with the court rules, and the Court acts with restraint when such legislation
    advances a significant governmental purpose and does not interfere with the Court’s
    administration of the court system. Here, in authorizing grand juries to operate in a
    virtual format for a temporary period during an unprecedented public health emergency,
    the Court is exercising a quintessential judicial power that is not in any way in conflict
    with legislative enactments concerning the grand jury. Where a grand jury convenes is a
    matter of procedure; internet access and technological know-how are not qualifications
    for jury service, see N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1, in light of the Judiciary’s provision of internet
    access, equipment, and technological support to the jurors. (pp. 32-37)
    3. Defendant and his supporting amici allege that the very nature of a virtual grand jury
    session is incompatible with the secrecy requirements mandated by Rule 3:6-7 and
    N.J.S.A. 2B:21-3. But one of the foundations of our jury system is that the jury is
    presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions. Grand jurors are given repeated
    reminders about the sanctity of the proceedings and serious penalties they would face for
    a violation of their oath of secrecy, and Judiciary staff monitor compliance. Defendant
    and amici have set forth no basis for concluding that virtual grand jurors are less
    trustworthy than other jurors. (pp. 37-39)
    4. To establish a prima facie claim that the grand jury selection process violated the fair-
    cross-section requirement or the right to equal protection, a defendant must show
    substantial underrepresentation of a constitutionally cognizable group. Defendant and
    amici have provided no evidence that the grand jury in this case did not represent a fair
    cross-section of the community. Not only has the selection process remained largely
    unchanged, but the grand jurors here were selected when in-person grand juries were still
    in session. Had the Court not followed health-safety protocols and kept in place in-
    person grand juries during the pandemic, it is not likely that vulnerable populations, such
    as the elderly and those with underlying conditions, would have appeared for service at
    the risk of their lives. In-person grand juries -- not virtual grand juries -- would have
    likely caused the underrepresentation decried here. New Jersey has not been alone in
    crafting temporary remedies -- consistent with constitutional rights -- to keep the criminal
    justice system moving as new cases mount and old cases stagnate; five of the seventeen
    other states with grand juries have acted likewise. (pp. 40-43)
    5. That New Jersey used a pilot program to ensure the efficacy of virtual grand juries did
    not create an impermissible classification and advanced a legitimate constitutional
    objective, thus satisfying the rational-basis test for such a program. (pp. 44-45)
    4
    6. Virtual grand jury proceedings comply with the essential tenets of the fundamental
    fairness doctrine. Defendant and amici point out the various technological problems that
    can arise during a virtual grand jury proceeding -- or any virtual proceeding for that
    matter -- and claim that a virtual proceeding “does not capture all of the cues so vital to
    judging credibility.” But grand jurors are extensively trained to participate in virtual
    grand jury sessions and advised to report technical problems to Judiciary staff. And
    Judiciary staff and prosecutors patrol and monitor the virtual grand proceedings to detect
    and correct technological issues. As to credibility determinations, judges make them in
    remote proceedings in many contested matters, and the grand jury process is not a mini-
    trial where issues related to credibility are decided. Because the virtual process may not
    be perfect does not mean that it is not mostly effective or unconstitutional. Certainly,
    technological glitches or defects will require individually tailored solutions. A defendant
    will not be without a remedy if such problems render grand jurors not present or
    informed about the evidence during a virtual session. (pp. 45-49)
    7. Turning to the virtual grand jury proceeding in this case, a review of the transcript
    leads the Court to conclude that, viewed in its entirety, the proceeding did not violate the
    fundamental fairness doctrine or defendant’s constitutional right to a fair grand jury
    presentation. At times, as in typical in-person grand jury presentations, the prosecutor
    relied on silence as an answer. That was offset here by the training the jurors received,
    the monitoring by Judiciary staff, and the foreperson’s pre-deliberation check. But in the
    future, to remove any doubt about a virtual grand juror’s response to a question, the
    prosecutor should require a clear indication for the record, such as an audible response or
    a showing of hands. As to comments by an “unidentified speaker” about whether the
    jurors could see the indictment, the record, the jurors’ experience, and the foreperson’s
    post-vote technology check refute the contention that those comments reveal that the jury
    could not see the indictment. Nevertheless, going forward all persons speaking on the
    record should identify themselves or be identified. Everyone participating in the virtual
    grand jury process should remember that the record must clearly reflect who is speaking
    and the responses to any questions. All in all, defendant received a grand jury hearing
    that comported with basic tenets of fundamental fairness and the constitutional right to a
    fair grand jury presentation. (pp. 49-52)
    8. Virtual grand juries are a temporary measure invoked to meet an extraordinary, life-
    threatening public health crisis, and the Court reviews relevant statistics. (pp. 52-54)
    The motion to dismiss the indictment is DENIED, and the matter is
    REMANDED to the trial court.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON,
    FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE
    ALBIN’s opinion.
    5
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    A-33 September Term 2020
    085288
    State of New Jersey,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    Omar Vega-Larregui,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    On direct certification by the Supreme Court from
    the Superior Court,
    Law Division, Mercer County.
    Argued                      Decided
    March 15, 2021               April 28, 2021
    John S. Furlong argued the cause for appellant (Furlong
    and Krasny, attorneys; John S. Furlong, on the brief).
    Randolph E. Mershon, III, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
    the cause for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer
    County Prosecutor, attorney; Randolph E. Mershon, III,
    of counsel and on the brief).
    Matthew S. Adams argued the cause for amicus curiae
    Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey
    (Fox Rothschild, attorneys; Matthew S. Adams, of
    counsel and on the brief, and Marissa Koblitz Kingman
    and Marc M. Yenicag, on the brief).
    Brian J. Neary argued the cause for amicus curiae New
    Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar
    1
    Association, attorneys; Kimberly A. Yonta, President, of
    counsel, and Brian J. Neary and Christopher J. Keating,
    on the brief).
    Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, argued
    the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New
    Jersey (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney;
    Carol M. Henderson, of counsel and on the brief).
    JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.
    The Constitution must operate not just in the best of times, but also in
    the worst of times. The framers of our Federal and State Constitutions
    established a structure of government and system of justice to endure for the
    ages -- even through crises and perils they could not have envisioned. The
    fundamental rights guaranteed by our Constitution have been stress-tested
    during a civil war, two world wars, an economic depression, and now a once-
    in-a century pandemic.
    The question in this case is whether, in the throes of the current
    pandemic, we have been faithful to one of those rights provided in our State
    Constitution -- that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense,
    unless on . . . indictment of a grand jury.” N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 8.
    Beginning in March 2020, the public health threat of COVID-19 became
    a dire reality for the residents of New Jersey. As of March 9, 2020, there were
    eleven reported presumed positive cases of COVID-19 and no reported deaths
    2
    in this state. Just two months later, as of May 5, there were over 130,000
    positive cases that resulted in at least 8,244 deaths and mounting
    hospitalizations. The easy transmissibility of this deadly airborne coronavirus
    led the Governor to exercise emergency powers to limit public gatherings and
    the Supreme Court to issue public-safety Orders temporarily suspending jury
    trials and grand jury presentations. Requiring grand jurors, particularly older
    ones and those with underlying conditions, to appear in person in a forum
    where social distancing was not practicable would have recklessly put at risk
    the lives of those willing to perform their civic duty.
    Without grand jury presentations, defendants subject to pretrial detention
    or pretrial release would have been denied their right codified in Article I,
    Paragraph 8 of the New Jersey Constitution. As a temporary emergency
    measure, the Supreme Court authorized grand jury presentations in a virtual
    format, first in a pilot program and later on a statewide basis.
    Defendant Omar Vega-Larregui and various amici curiae organizations
    claim that the virtual grand jury format -- and therefore the lack of an in-
    person proceeding -- violates the right to a grand jury presentation and other
    constitutional provisions. They also claim that the Supreme Court does not
    have the constitutional authority to order temporary virtual grand jury
    presentations for the duration of the pandemic.
    3
    The arguments advanced by defendant and amici are not supported by
    the record in this case. Indeed, the defects attributed to the virtual format are
    almost wholly based on supposition and speculation. To be clear, this Court
    has the constitutional authority to make rules and procedures for all courts of
    this state, including the grand jury, which is an arm of the court. Part three of
    the Rules of Court extensively details the procedures governing grand juries .
    Those procedures were adopted pursuant to this Court’s constitutional
    rulemaking and supervisory authority. We reject the contention that this
    Court’s authorization of a virtual format for the selection of grand jurors and
    grand jury presentations during a lethal pandemic violates our State
    Constitution’s separation of powers.
    This Court has utilized technology to preserve, not to undermine, the
    constitutional right of defendants to a grand jury presentation. The virtual
    grand jury format -- a temporary measure to meet a public health emergency --
    has not sacrificed any core principle animating the constitutional right to
    indictment by grand jury. The selection of grand jurors for a virtual setting is
    no different than for an in-person setting. Every grand juror who does not
    have the technical capacity to participate is provided the necessary equipment
    and training by the Judiciary. Defendant and amici have presented no
    4
    evidence that those selected for grand jury service in a virtual setting do not
    represent a cross-section of the community.
    The grand jurors in this case were drawn pre-pandemic, before the use of
    virtual grand juries, and sat for a period in person before transferring to a
    virtual format. Therefore, the general challenge to the virtual selection of
    grand jurors is not even applicable here.
    The Judiciary has closely monitored the administration of the virtual
    format to ensure the integrity of the grand jury proceedings. We acknowledge
    that errors sometimes will occur in court proceedings, including in a grand jury
    presentation, whether in the in-person or virtual format. In individual cases
    where a defendant claims that an alleged error or defect undermined the
    fairness of the proceeding, a challenge may be mounted.
    In the case before us, we do not see any error that undermined the
    integrity of the grand jury proceeding; nor do we see a basis for the dismissal
    of the indictment. Moreover, we do not find support for the facial
    constitutional challenge to the temporary use of the virtual grand jury during
    the current public health crisis. Accordingly, we hold that the presentation of
    defendant’s case to a virtual grand jury did not violate his constitutional rights,
    and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
    5
    I.
    A.
    On March 9, 2020, Governor Philip Murphy declared both a Public
    Health Emergency and a State of Emergency in response to the COVID-19
    pandemic -- a pandemic that, over the last year, has killed more than 22,500
    residents of New Jersey and more than 560,000 persons in the United States.1
    See Exec. Order No. 103 (March 9, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 549(a) (Apr. 6, 2020).2
    COVID-19 is a highly contagious and deadly virus that is spread airborne from
    person to person, often by a cough, a sneeze, or even talking. It causes acute
    respiratory illnesses and has led to countless hospitalizations, patients hooked
    up to ventilators, and deaths -- and has left many survivors with long-term
    unresolved health issues.
    New Jersey was at the epicenter of the pandemic in the early days of the
    outbreak. In the first two months after the issuance of the Governor’s first
    executive order, more than 8,000 New Jersey residents had succumbed to
    1
    See N.J. Dep’t of Health, New Jersey COVID-19 Dashboard: Cases and
    Trends, https://www.nj.gov/health/cd/topics/covid2019_dashboard.shtml (last
    visited Apr. 21, 2021); Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, COVID Data
    Tracker, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
    2
    Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:13-3(b), Governor Murphy has extended the Public
    Health Emergency each month since, most recently on April 15, 2021. See
    Exec. Order No. 235 (Apr. 15, 2021).
    6
    COVID-19, and hospitals were inundated with patients infected by the virus.
    The Governor’s initial executive orders required the closure of schools, day -
    care centers, and non-essential businesses, and curtailed large gatherings to
    slow the spread of the virus. See, e.g., Exec. Order 107 (Mar. 21, 2017).
    In response to this unprecedented public health crisis caused by the
    person-to-person spread of the virus, this Court on March 12, 2020 canceled
    all new civil and criminal jury trials until further notice, and on March 17
    canceled all grand jury sessions and the selection of new grand jury panels. In
    Omnibus Orders issued on March 27 and April 24, 2020, the Court continued
    the suspension of grand jury empanelment dates and grand jury sessions, and
    all new civil and criminal jury trials.
    To keep the criminal and civil justice system functioning, by April 24,
    the Judiciary had turned to technology and conducted more than 12,000 virtual
    proceedings by video and telephone conferences, including motions, settlement
    discussions, arraignments, and detention hearings. After issuing the April 24
    Order, the Court established the Working Group on Remote Grand Jury
    Operations (Working Group) “to examine whether, and if so, how, grand jury
    proceedings could resume in a virtual format while in-person gatherings are
    7
    suspended because of COVID-19.”3 Sup. Ct. of N.J., Notice and Order
    -- Supreme Court Authorization of Virtual Grand Jury Pilot Program, at 1-2
    (May 14, 2020).
    “The Working Group recommended that grand jury operations resume in
    certain counties in a virtual format in a manner that upholds the solemnity and
    secrecy of those proceedings and safeguards the rights of defendants, victims,
    jurors, and the public.”
    Id. at 2.
    On May 14, 2020, the Court issued an Order
    authorizing a virtual grand jury pilot program to begin in Bergen and Mercer
    Counties.4 At the time, statewide, 1,400 defendants were detained pretrial in
    county jails and many defendants were on pretrial release, all waiting for their
    cases to be presented to a grand jury.
    The Court’s May 14 Order instructed that “[g]rand juries empaneled
    before March 16, 2020 and still within their term of service may reconvene in
    a virtual format.” It further directed that the standard grand jury charge would
    3
    The Working Group was composed of representatives from the Attorney
    General’s Office and the Office of the Public Defender, designees of the
    County Prosecutors Association of New Jersey, the American Civil Liberties
    Union, the New Jersey State Bar Association, and the private defense b ar, as
    well as judges and court staff.
    4
    From March to May 14, 2020, New Jersey courts had conducted “more than
    23,000 virtual proceedings involving more than 189,000 participants .” Sup.
    Ct. of N.J., Notice and Order -- Supreme Court Authorization of Virtual Grand
    Jury Pilot Program, at 1-2 (May 14, 2020).
    8
    be supplemented by a special charge and an oath of secrecy adapted to the
    virtual format. The supplemental charge and supplemental oath of secrecy, in
    relevant part, instruct grand jurors that they must (1) participate from a private
    location and shield their computer or tablet from the view of others and, unless
    alone, use headphones or earbuds so that others cannot overhear the
    proceedings; (2) “not allow other persons to see, hear, or otherwise observe the
    grand jury proceeding”; (3) advise the “prosecutor immediately if [they]
    believe someone can see or hear the proceeding” or if they “have a technical
    problem, such as loss of audio or video”; (4) not communicate with other
    grand jurors except during deliberations; (5) not communicate or share
    information with anyone, at any time or through any medium, about the grand
    jury proceeding; and (6) not audio- or video-record, photograph, or broadcast
    the proceedings, or allow anyone else to do so. 5
    The supplemental charge reminds the grand jurors of the gravity of their
    obligation and warns that, if they violate their oath of secrecy or any other rule
    5
    At the Court’s request, Acting Director of the Administrative Office of the
    Courts Judge Glenn A. Grant prepared the supplements to the jury charge and
    oath of secrecy.
    9
    governing the grand jury proceeding, they could be held in contempt and face
    “serious consequences,” including potential fines and jail time. 6
    The May 14 Order also advised that the Judiciary would “provide
    restricted-use devices (laptops or tablets) and related items” to any grand juror
    who is “able to participate in virtual proceedings but requires technological
    support” and would give training to the grand jurors “on the virtual courtroom
    process.”
    The May 14 Order stated that the remote grand jury format would
    proceed “only with the consent of the defendant.” It quickly became apparent,
    however, that the consent requirement had “inhibited bringing cases before . . .
    ready grand juries.” Additionally, in the three weeks preceding June 4, the
    number of defendants detained pre-indictment had increased from 1,400 to
    1,540. In view of the increasing number of criminally charged defendants
    6
    A judge gives the traditional charge and supplemental charge to the grand
    jury before it convenes for the first time in a virtual format. At each
    subsequent session, the prosecutor is expected to remind the grand jurors of
    the requirements of maintaining secrecy, preventing access by others, and
    never photographing, recording, broadcasting, or otherwise sharing records of
    the grand jury proceeding. The grand jurors are also advised again of the
    criminal consequences of violating the oath of secrecy.
    A Directive was issued on September 30, 2020, clarifying the
    “operational requirements for administration of the supplemental grand jury
    charge and oath [of secrecy]” for grand jurors empaneled during the virtual
    phase.
    10
    detained or released and awaiting a grand jury presentation, on June 4, 2020,
    the Court declared that remote grand jury sessions would proceed without a
    defendant’s consent.
    In June 2020, the Court expanded the two-county grand jury pilot
    program to include virtual grand jury selections and authorized virtual State
    Grand Jury proceedings. On July 24, 2020, the Court took the virtual grand
    jury pilot program statewide, announcing that grand jurors in participating
    counties would “be summoned for new grand jury selections starting on or
    after September 21, 2020.” Over the next several months, Passaic and Atlantic
    Counties joined the ranks of vicinages conducting virtual grand jury
    proceedings.
    By October 8, 2020, in-person grand jury sessions had been suspended
    for six months and the number of defendants detained in county jails awaiting
    a grand jury presentation had climbed to more than 2,700 (a number excluding
    defendants on pretrial release) -- and there was no possibility of a presentation
    except in those counties conducting virtual grand juries. That day, the Court
    “announce[d] a comprehensive plan to ensure that all counties have a grand
    jury panel equipped and ready to convene in a virtual format” by December 1,
    2020.
    11
    We also authorized Assignment Judges and County Prosecutors to
    convene in-person grand juries in accordance with public safety guidelines and
    Judiciary policies. That plan ran aground just a few weeks later as a second
    deadly wave of COVID-19 swept over New Jersey and the nation, rendering
    in-person grand jury sessions a public health hazard. Accordingly, on
    November 16, 2020, the Court again suspended in-person grand jury
    proceedings and directed that all grand jury panels continue to convene in a
    virtual format.
    In-person grand jury selection and sessions remain suspended as of this
    Court’s most recent Omnibus Order. Sup. Ct. of N.J., Eleventh COVID-19
    Omnibus Order (Mar. 23, 2021). Virtual grand juries are now convened in all
    twenty-one counties and have returned indictments, no-bills, and partial no-
    bills in the course of more than 6,000 presentations.
    B.
    Certifications submitted by the Judiciary’s statewide Manager of Jury
    Programs Brian McLaughlin; the Mercer Vicinage’s Jury Manager Dalia Seidl;
    and Deputy Attorney General and Acting Attorney Supervisor of the State
    Grand Jury Mallory Shanahan collectively aver that (1) no person summoned
    to serve on a virtual grand jury is excluded because of lack of the necessary
    technology; (2) grand jurors in need of technological equipment are provided
    12
    with tablets by the Judiciary for temporary use; (3) all grand jurors are trained
    to fully and effectively participate in the virtual format; (4) virtual sessions are
    closely monitored to ensure that grand jurors comply with the grand jury’s
    secrecy requirements; and (5) Judiciary staff provide assistance if grand jurors
    encounter technical difficulties hearing or participating in a grand jury
    session.7
    According to McLaughlin, the “summoning of a pool of jurors for a
    [virtual] grand jury selection has remained largely unchanged” during the
    pandemic. Prospective grand jurors complete a standard qualification
    questionnaire either online or in hard copy; Assignment Judges or their
    designees address requests for disqualification or rescheduling of service; and
    requests for excusal because of financial hardship or childcare responsibilities
    are handled in the same standardized manner. “No juror has been excluded
    from selection or from serving on a virtual grand jury based on [a] lack of
    technology.”
    Vicinage Jury Management and information technology (IT) staff have
    provided “individualized training to summoned and selected jurors to facilitate
    7
    In their briefs to this Court, the State attached McLaughlin’s and Seidl’s
    certifications and the Attorney General attached Shanahan’s certification.
    13
    their participation in remote proceedings using Zoom.” 8 And all qualified
    jurors are provided the necessary technology to serve on virtual grand juries.
    As of January 29, 2021, the Judiciary had provided over 150 tablets
    (with broadband internet capacity when necessary) to allow potential jurors to
    participate in virtual grand jury selections and jurors to participate in virtual
    grand jury sessions. Also, as of that date, more than 1,000 grand jurors were
    serving on forty-five county-level virtual grand juries statewide, and more than
    3,000 presentations had been made to virtual grand juries. McLaughlin
    reported that no virtual grand jury selection or session had been breached or
    hacked, or had its technical security otherwise compromised.
    Judiciary staff, moreover, ensure that grand jurors comply with the
    secrecy requirements of virtual grand jury sessions. Before each session, a
    staff member checks in with the jurors, has them perform with their electronic
    devices a “360-degree scan of their environment[s]” to confirm the privacy of
    their locations, and reminds them to turn off their cell phones or other devices.
    Deputy Attorney General Shanahan, the Acting Attorney Supervisor of
    the State Grand Jury since the shift to virtual proceedings, attested that the
    procedures identified by McLaughlin in his certification are largely followed
    8
    Zoom is a video-conferencing platform. See Zoom,
    https://explore.zoom.us/meetings (last visited Apr. 20, 2021).
    14
    in State Grand Jury virtual selections and sessions. “No one is excused for
    reasons relating to technological access or capability,” and any grand juror
    without access to a computer or tablet is provided one by the Judiciary. Jurors
    serving on State Grand Juries “are instructed to interrupt or [wave] at their
    screens if they have any technical problems,” and Deputy Attorneys General
    and grand jury staff monitor grand jurors’ screens to assist with any problems.
    As of February 12, 2021, the Division of Criminal Justice had presented
    more than sixty cases to virtual State Grand Juries, cases “ranging from
    straightforward drug and weapons charges, to multi-defendant Human
    Trafficking cases.” Shanahan noted that jury pool statistics for the number of
    potential jurors available for virtual State Grand Juries are “not significantly
    different” than the number for in-person State Grand Juries during pre-
    pandemic times.
    In Mercer County, Jury Manager Seidl certified that “[n]o juror has been
    unable to participate in virtual selection or virtual sessions based on a lack of
    technology” and that twenty-one grand jurors were provided the required
    technology to participate. She described an “isolated instance early on in the
    process” where one grand juror who was having trouble with her audio asked
    her grandson for help “prior to the start of the session. The Assistant
    Prosecutor conducting the session immediately noticed the presence of the
    15
    grandson, and directed that he leave the room, which he did.” As of February
    10, 2021, virtual grand juries in Mercer County had heard 208 presentations.
    II.
    A.
    On August 22, 2019, a City of Trenton police detective arrested and
    charged defendant Omar Vega-Larregui in a complaint-warrant with third-
    degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (cocaine), N.J.S.A.
    2C:35-10(a)(1); second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2); second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to
    distribute within 500 feet of a public park, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1(a); and the
    disorderly persons offenses of resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1), and
    obstructing a lawful investigation, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. Two days later, a
    Superior Court judge placed defendant on pretrial release.
    On February 13, 2020, the Mercer County Criminal Presiding Judge
    selected a twenty-three-person grand jury panel in the Mercer County
    Courthouse. The grand jury convened in person for orientation on February
    20, 2020 and for sessions on February 27, March 5, and March 12, 2020.
    Further sessions were canceled due to the pandemic until this Court’s
    introduction of the virtual grand jury pilot program.
    16
    On June 18, 2020, the grand jury reconvened in a virtual format. Before
    doing so, however, Dalia Seidl, Jury Manager for the Mercer Vicinage,
    inquired of all of the grand jurors, by telephone or email, whether they had the
    capacity to fulfill their service in virtual sessions. Only one grand juror asked
    to be excused, and that was because she had moved to another county. Five
    other grand jurors expressed a “willingness to serve but indicated that they
    lacked reliable personal technology to participate in virtual sessions.” To
    bridge the digital divide, the Judiciary made available to those five grand
    jurors tablets with internet capacity to ensure their continued service.
    Judiciary staff then assisted all grand jurors with a Zoom trial run. On
    May 20, 2020, the Judiciary also conducted an orientation session and required
    each grand juror “to demonstrate the capacity to use the technology, to see and
    hear the proceedings, to communicate with [Judiciary] staff and each other,
    and to indicate if they experienced any difficulties or otherwise required
    assistance.” In addition, the grand jurors were given technical instructions and
    contact information for the Mercer Vicinage jury and IT staff if they
    encountered any technical problems. At the orientation session, the Criminal
    Presiding Judge administered to the panel the supplemental grand jury charge
    and supplemental oath of secrecy.
    17
    The grand jury convened for virtual Zoom sessions on June 18, June 25,
    and July 2, 2020 and heard eight presentations during which it returned
    indictments and partial no-bills.9 On July 9, 2020, the grand jury met for its
    fourth virtual Zoom session, at which the prosecutor presented defendant’s
    case.
    Before each virtual session, the grand jury staff conducted a check-in
    process with each juror. As part of that process, using their computers or
    tablets, grand jurors were required to perform a 360-degree scan of their
    location to assure staff of the privacy of their environment. In addition, at
    each session, the grand jurors were administered the supplemental oath of
    secrecy.
    B.
    During the virtual session in defendant’s case, Jury Manager Seidl and
    three other grand jury staff members were present to ensure that no technical
    issues arose during the proceeding.10 At the beginning of the session, the
    9
    “When a grand jury authorizes an indictment, it returns a ‘true bill.’ When it
    declines to indict, it returns a ‘no bill.’” State v. Shaw, 
    241 N.J. 223
    , 231 n.1
    (2020) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave et al., 3 Criminal Procedure § 8.2(a) (4th
    ed. updated 2019)).
    10
    At this proceeding, only four grand jurors required the use of electronic
    devices provided by the Judiciary.
    18
    prosecutor asked the grand jurors to express “[b]y a show of hands” whether
    any recognized the names of Detective Stephen Szbanz, the State’s sole
    witness, or defendant Omar Vega-Larregui, and whether any were “unable to
    remain fair and impartial.” This exchange followed:
    PROSECUTOR: I do not see any hands raised in the
    affirmative. And, at this point, everybody can hear and
    see me clearly, correct?
    (No audible response)
    PROSECUTOR: Okay. I see you nodding your heads
    indicating yes. Okay. . . . Does any member of the
    grand jury wish to have any portion of that law re-read?
    (No audible response)
    PROSECUTOR: I do not see any hands raised. . . .
    The prosecutor then read the proposed indictment and asked the grand
    jurors whether they had any questions before she brought in the witness.
    When there was no audible response, the prosecutor stated, “No? Okay.”
    Detective Szbanz testified that on August 22, 2019, he was in uniform
    and on patrol in an unmarked vehicle when he observed a pickup truck parked
    on a sidewalk, blocking a number of garages. He approached several men
    standing nearby, and defendant stated that the pickup truck was his. The
    detective requested the vehicle’s documents, and defendant proceeded to
    unlock the truck’s passenger door, open the glove compartment, and shuffle
    19
    through papers. Defendant was visibly nervous, his hands were shaking , and
    he failed to produce any paperwork. When defendant reached underneath the
    passenger seat, the detective told him to stop, fearing he might reach for a
    weapon. Defendant did not obey the command. At that moment, Detective
    Szbanz also observed a sandwich bag on the floorboard containing a suspected
    controlled dangerous substance.
    The detective pulled defendant from the truck and attempted to place
    him under arrest, but defendant resisted. With the assistance of responding
    officers, defendant was subdued and taken into custody. The sandwich bag
    with the suspected drugs was recovered and submitted to the New Jersey State
    Police Laboratory for analysis. The substance inside the bag tested positive
    for 29.982 grams (more than an ounce) of cocaine. Based on the packaging
    and amount of the cocaine, Detective Szbanz offered his opinion that
    defendant possessed the drugs with the intent to distribute. The detective also
    indicated that defendant possessed the cocaine within 500 feet of a public park.
    About halfway through the prosecutor’s questioning of the detective, the
    prosecutor asked if the grand jurors could hear clearly. When there was no
    audible response, the prosecutor said, “Okay. Good,” and proceeded.
    20
    At the conclusion of his testimony, the detective exited from the virtual
    grand jury room. The prosecutor then made the following inquiries of the
    grand jurors:
    PROSECUTOR: Okay. Do any members of the grand
    jury have any questions for the witness?
    (No audible response)
    PROSECUTOR: Any questions on the law?
    (No audible response)
    PROSECUTOR: Okay. So the State is requesting a no
    bill on the charge of resisting arrest.
    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: And if nothing further,
    the foreperson can ask if there was any technical.
    PROSECUTOR: You’re muted, Michelle.              You’re
    saying something. I can’t hear you.
    THE FOREPERSON: All right. Did anyone have any
    technical issues with hearing this case?
    (No audible response)
    THE FOREPERSON: No. Okay.
    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. I’m going to
    share the screen. Can everyone see the indictment?
    GRAND JURORS: No.
    UNIDENTIFIED SPAKER: How about now?
    21
    GRAND JUROR: No.
    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No? Okay? Let me see.
    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: There we go.
    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah, but that’s not it,
    though. Was that it? How’s that, do you see it?
    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yup.
    UNIDENTIFED SPEAKER: Okay. All right . . . . No
    other questions or concerns?
    (No audible response)
    UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No? Okay.
    An “unidentified speaker” reminded the grand jurors that they were not
    to speak with anyone, even friends or family, about the grand jury hearing and
    that any unauthorized disclosure of information was “a crime punishable by up
    to 18 months [of] imprisonment.” The grand jury then proceeded to the virtual
    “deliberation room” and returned a four-count indictment, charging defendant
    with third-degree possession of cocaine, second-degree possession of cocaine
    with intent to distribute, second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to
    22
    distribute within 500 feet of a public park, and fourth-degree obstructing the
    administration of law or other governmental function, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b).11
    The grand jury session ended with the grand jury foreperson asking,
    “Did anyone have any technical issues with that vote?” After there was no
    audible response, the foreperson said, “No,” and an unidentified speaker also
    said, “No.”
    In a certification, Jury Manager Seidl later averred that the foreperson
    conducted a “pre-deliberation technology check” with the grand jurors to
    ensure that they had not “experienced any technical problems that affected
    their ability to hear and/or observe the proceedings” and a “post-vote
    technology check” to ensure that they did not have “any technical problems
    that affected their ability to deliberate and vote.”
    C.
    Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charges in the indictment.
    On November 10, 2020, defendant filed a motion in the Law Division to
    dismiss the indictment on the basis that the virtual grand jury presentation did
    not “adhere to constitutional norms” and that the State failed “to present
    clearly exculpatory information” during the presentation. More particularly,
    11
    The prosecutor was not present in the virtual deliberation room.
    23
    defendant argued that this Court exceeded its constitutional rulemaking
    authority by convening a virtual grand jury.
    Defendant invited the Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New
    Jersey (ACDL) to intervene as amicus curiae, given the statewide
    constitutional implications of the virtual grand jury format. With the consent
    of the State and defendant, the Law Division granted the ACDL leave to
    participate as amicus curiae and to address defendant’s motion challenging
    “the constitutionality of virtual grand juries.” Defendant indicated that he
    would join the arguments presented by the ACDL.
    D.
    On January 13, 2021, in accordance with Rule 2:12-1, this Court
    certified directly for its review only defendant’s constitutional challenge to the
    grand jury presentation in the virtual format. The Court allowed the ACDL to
    retain its amicus status. The Court also granted the Attorney General of New
    Jersey and the New Jersey State Bar Association leave to appear as amici
    curiae.
    III.
    Defendant, the ACDL, and the State Bar Association -- like the State and
    the Attorney General -- have filed separate briefs but advance many of the
    24
    same arguments. To avoid repetition, for the most part, we present their
    respective arguments collectively.
    A.
    Defendant and amici contend that the right to a fair grand jury
    presentation guaranteed by our State Constitution is violated when an
    indictment is returned by a grand jury performing its duties virtually. In the
    virtual format, they claim, the oath of grand jurors alone is not sufficient to
    assure the secrecy of grand jury proceedings because the jurors are
    participating from their homes or other private locations and may -- despite
    instructions not to do so -- conduct their own factual or legal research using
    smart phones, record the proceedings, or allow others to have access to the
    hearing itself.
    Defendant and amici also assert that virtual grand juries will not
    represent a fair cross-section of the community because minority, poor, and
    elderly populations are less likely to have access to internet devices, thereby
    creating an intolerable “digital divide.” They maintain that technological
    problems arising from the virtual format are rife and undermine the integrity of
    the grand jury presentation, as evidenced in this case by “unidentified
    speakers,” the acceptance of “no audible response” as a silent assent to a
    question, and the possibility that individual grand jurors had connectivity
    25
    issues or did not know how to unmute to pose a question or raise an issue. The
    virtual presentation, they profess, denies grand jurors a meaningful opportunity
    to participate in the hearing.
    The ACDL separately asserts that defendant’s equal protection rights
    were violated by the Judiciary “selectively implementing” the virtual grand
    jury program in only two counties initially. The ACDL reasons that defendant
    was singled out for disparate treatment when his case was presented for
    indictment when other cases, including those of detained defendants, were not.
    The ACDL also faults this Court for overstepping its constitutional rulemaking
    authority and breaching the separation of powers by adding to the legislative
    qualifications for grand juror service the capacity to remotely participate in
    proceedings.
    Last, the State Bar Association and the ACDL call on this Court to
    declare a moratorium on grand jury proceedings until they can return to an in-
    person format.
    B.
    In contrast, the State and amicus Attorney General (collectively, State)
    submit that the virtual grand jury -- a response to a life-threatening pandemic
    -- has kept the criminal justice system in operation and honored the dictates of
    our State Constitution and notions of fundamental fairness. The State
    26
    emphasizes that safeguards have ensured the integrity of the virtual grand jury
    process: grand jurors are trained in the technology needed to participate in
    virtual proceedings; they are advised that a violation of their oath of secrecy
    will lead to criminal sanctions; and they are monitored by Judiciary staff so
    that improper access to proceedings and technical glitches do not occur.
    The State rejects defendant’s presumption that grand jurors cannot be
    expected to obey their oath to keep grand jury proceedings secret or to abstain
    from using electronic devices to conduct private research and investigations.
    According to the State, the argument that jurors will defy their oaths is based
    on nothing more than speculation and has no factual support.
    The State also asserts that no evidence in the record suggests that the
    virtual grand jury selection process does not produce a fair-cross section of the
    community or that a constitutionally cognizable group has been excluded from
    participating. The State contends that no juror has been excluded from serving
    based on a lack of technology and that, in the present case, the Judiciary
    provided five members of the grand jury tablets to participate in the virtual
    sessions.
    In addition, the State insists that no technical issues arose during the
    grand jury presentation in this case that would place in question the fairness of
    the proceedings. It also maintains that the grand jury is an arm of the court,
    27
    and therefore this Court exercised its constitutional rulemaking authority in
    implementing the virtual format.
    Last, the State denies that the presentation of defendant’s case to a
    virtual grand jury in a two-county pilot program before the program was
    extended statewide and before the cases of some detained defendants violated
    defendant’s right to equal protection.
    IV.
    A.
    In addressing the facial constitutional challenge to virtual grand juries
    and the specific challenge to the virtual grand jury presentation in this case, we
    begin with Article I, Paragraph 8 of the New Jersey Constitution. That
    provision guarantees that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal
    offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury.” N.J. Const.
    art. I, ¶ 8.
    An accused’s right to a grand jury presentation has deep roots in the
    English common law, long predating the adoption of New Jersey’s first
    Constitution in 1776 and the United States Constitution in 1787. See State v.
    Shaw, 
    241 N.J. 223
    , 235-36 (2020) (detailing the historical development of the
    grand jury). The right to a grand jury presentation was guaranteed by New
    Jersey’s 1776 Constitution, through its general adoption of the English
    28
    common law, and by the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.12
    Id. at 237;
    see also State v. Rockafellow, 
    6 N.J.L. 332
    , 339 (Sup. Ct. 1796)
    (“Without a legal presentment, no man can, under our administration of the
    laws, be tried for any heinous offence . . . .”), overruled in other part, In re
    Pub. Highway, 
    22 N.J.L. 293
    (Sup. Ct. 1849). The right to a grand jury
    presentation in the current New Jersey Constitution first appeared in similar
    language in Article I, Section 9 of the 1844 Constitution. Bd. of Health of
    Weehawken Twp. v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 
    10 N.J. 294
    , 304 (1952).
    To this day, the grand jury “occupie[s] a high place as an instrument of
    justice in our system of criminal law.” State v. Del Fino, 
    100 N.J. 154
    , 165
    (1985). The grand jury fulfills the dual purpose “of determining if there is
    probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and of protecting
    citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.”
    Ibid. (quoting Branzburg v.
    Hayes, 
    408 U.S. 665
    , 686-87 (1972)). “The indictment requirement of Article
    1, Paragraph 8, is a constitutional protection that enhances the integrity of the
    12
    The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for
    a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
    of a Grand Jury.” U.S. Const. amend. V. That provision of the Fifth
    Amendment does not apply to the states, however. See Branzburg v. Hayes,
    
    408 U.S. 665
    , 688 n.25 (1972). Indeed, most states have abandoned the use of
    grand juries and institute charges by way of information. See 
    Shaw, 241 N.J. at 237
    ; see also Wayne R. LaFave et al., 4 Criminal Procedure § 15.1(d) (4th
    ed. updated 2020).
    29
    charging process,” In re Grand Jury Appearance Request by Loigman, 
    183 N.J. 133
    , 139 (2005), and infuses our system of justice “with a democratic ethos”
    because ordinary citizens serve as grand jurors
    , ibid. (quoting State v.
    Fortin,
    
    178 N.J. 540
    , 638 (2004)).
    A grand jury presentation, however, is not a trial. The accused has no
    right to appear before the grand jury or participate in the grand jury process.
    See Robert Ramsey, Criminal Practice and Procedure, 31 N.J. Practice Law
    Series § 21.7 (2021). Unlike at a trial, a defendant has no right to present
    evidence or confront the witnesses against him at a grand jury proceeding. See
    ibid.; see also 
    Loigman, 183 N.J. at 143
    .
    Although the language of Article I, Paragraph 8 does not speak of the
    right to an in-person grand jury presentation, those who drafted that
    constitutional provision and the same provision in the 1844 Constitution
    obviously presumed that grand jurors would meet together in the same room.
    They likely did not conceive of the technology that today allows for virtual
    telemedicine examinations, virtual classrooms, or virtual grand juries. They
    also did not likely foresee the lethal effects of an airborne virus that would kill
    more than a half-million Americans and that would call for a public health
    response requiring, to the extent possible, personal isolation to stop the spread
    of the deadly pandemic.
    30
    This Court’s temporary suspension of in-person grand juries and jury
    trials was a public health imperative -- a step necessitated to protect jurors,
    prosecutors, and court staff from potential serious illness and death. The
    suspension of grand juries, however, delays the criminal justice process with
    serious implications for the accused, whether detained or released pretrial, and
    the State. Suspension of grand juries means that some detained defendants,
    whose charges might be dismissed by the grand jury, will remain incarcerated
    for longer periods than otherwise necessary. See, e.g., Haley v. Bd. of
    Review, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op. at 4) (noting that the defendant
    spent two months in custody until his charges were dismissed by a grand jury).
    The right of the accused to a speedy trial is also deferred -- and no doubt some
    will argue violated -- by not keeping grand juries in session.
    The State, moreover, has an interest in securing testimony while the
    memories of witnesses are fresh and in convening investigative grand juries
    with the power to subpoena witnesses to ferret out criminal activities -- and in
    bringing justice to victims with all due speed.
    When the Court entered its first Order temporarily suspending grand jury
    sessions, it could not know the duration of the pandemic, the death toll it
    would reap, or whether an effective vaccine or treatment would be developed
    within a year or much longer. Confronting the Court was whether the
    31
    Constitution required a shutdown of the criminal justice system for an
    indeterminate period while arrests continued and detentions climbed.
    The question is whether all of the essential attributes of the right to a
    grand jury presentation can be preserved through a virtual format so that the
    grand jury can function and fulfill its historic purpose, in the way intended by
    the drafters of our Constitution, in the midst of an unprecedented public health
    emergency. In answering that question, we must remember that the framers of
    our State Constitution, like the framers of the Federal Constitution, created a
    founding charter “intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be
    adapted to the various crises of human affairs,” see McCulloch v. Maryland,
    17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) -- a charter capable of adapting “to a
    future that [could] only be ‘seen dimly,’ if at all,” see NLRB v. Noel Canning,
    
    573 U.S. 513
    , 534 (2014) (quoting 
    McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415
    ).
    B.
    We begin with an indisputable legal principle: “[t]he grand jury is a
    judicial, investigative body, serving a judicial function” and “is an arm of the
    court.” 
    Loigman, 183 N.J. at 141
    ; State v. Haines, 
    18 N.J. 550
    , 557 (1955)
    (“The grand jury, at common law, is an arm of the court and acts for the court
    under which it is organized, and its proceedings are regarded as proceedings in
    the court.” (quoting O’Regan v. Schermerhorn, 
    25 N.J. Misc. 1
    , 19-20 (Sup.
    32
    Ct. 1946))). Indeed, “[n]ot only is the grand jury an arm of the court in New
    Jersey, but the Judiciary also exercises supervisory authority over grand juries”
    to ensure that grand jury proceedings are fundamentally fair. 
    Shaw, 241 N.J. at 242
    .
    Our supervisory authority over the grand jury derives from the New
    Jersey Constitution, which provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules
    governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law,
    the practice and procedure in all such courts.” N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3.
    The Constitution also designates the Chief Justice as the “administrative head
    of all the courts in the State.”
    Id. § 7, ¶
    1. “Those two provisions give the
    Chief Justice and the Supreme Court sweeping authority to govern their own
    house,” In re P.L. 2001, Chapter 362, 
    186 N.J. 368
    , 379 (2006), a house that
    includes the grand jury.
    Our “Court’s administrative authority is ‘far-reaching’ and ‘encompasses
    the entire judicial structure [as well as] all aspects and incidents related to the
    justice system,’” including “‘all facets of the internal management of our
    courts.’”
    Id. at 381
    (alteration in original) (first quoting Knight v. City of
    Margate, 
    86 N.J. 374
    , 387 (1981); and then quoting Lichter v. County of
    Monmouth, 
    114 N.J. Super. 343
    , 349 (App. Div. 1971)). That authority
    extends to the power to promulgate rules and issue directives governing the
    33
    grand jury. Ibid.; see also 
    Haines, 18 N.J. at 558-59
    (affirming the Court’s
    power to adopt a rule concerning “the continuance of terms of a grand jury”).
    Because of the constitutional power Article VI vests in the Supreme Court, its
    “administrative rulemaking authority cannot be circumscribed by legislation .”
    In re P.L. 
    2001, 186 N.J. at 381
    .
    The New Jersey Rules of Court set forth comprehensive guidelines and
    procedures governing almost every aspect of the grand jury process. R. 3:6-1
    to -11. Those Rules cover details regarding the summoning of the grand jury;
    the making of objections to the array of the grand jury or individual grand
    jurors; the supervision and charging of the grand jury; the appointment of a
    foreperson and deputy foreperson; the duties of the clerk of the grand jury; the
    persons who may be present during grand jury proceedings; how a record and
    transcript are to be made and retained; the secrecy of grand jury proceedings;
    the finding and returning of indictments and no-bills and the finding and
    returning of presentments; the discharging of a grand jury and continuance of a
    grand jury’s term; and the empanelment and supervision of the State Grand
    Jury.
    Ibid. We acknowledge that
    county grand juries and the State Grand Jury are
    also the subject of legislation that, in many instances, overlaps with our court
    rules. See N.J.S.A. 2B:21-1 to -10 (laws pertaining to county grand juries);
    34
    N.J.S.A. 2B:22-1 to -9 (laws pertaining to the State Grand Jury). The
    Legislature, however, has spoken on topics not covered by our Court Rules,
    such as setting forth the qualifications for service on a grand jury, N.J.S.A.
    2B:20-1; the oath to be taken by grand jurors, N.J.S.A. 2B:21-3; and the
    criminal penalty for purposely disclosing information concerning a grand jury
    proceeding, N.J.S.A. 2B:21-10. Some aspects of the overall legislation are
    clearly procedural and some substantive. It is not uncommon for the Judiciary
    and Legislature to share spheres of responsibility in areas of mutual concern,
    as exemplified by the adoption of court rules and legislation regarding
    evidence rules, e.g., State v. Byrd, 
    198 N.J. 319
    , 342 (2009), and the Pretrial
    Intervention Program, e.g., State v. Johnson, 
    238 N.J. 119
    , 128 (2019).
    In exercising our constitutional supervisory authority over the courts, we
    may “permit or accommodate the lawful and reasonable exercise of the powers
    of other branches of government even as that might impinge upon the Court’s
    constitutional concerns in the judicial area.” 
    Knight, 86 N.J. at 391
    . “The
    purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is not to create three ‘watertight’
    governmental compartments, stifling cooperative action among the” three
    branches of government. In re P.L. 
    2001, 186 N.J. at 379
    . Thus, we act with
    restraint when legislation, touching on the judicial sphere, advances “a
    significant governmental purpose” and does “not interfere with the Supreme
    35
    Court’s administration of the court system.”
    Id. at 384
    (quoting 
    Knight, 86 N.J. at 391
    -93, 394-95).
    Here, in authorizing grand juries to operate in a virtual format for a
    temporary period during an unprecedented public health emergency, the Court
    is exercising a quintessential judicial power that is not in any way in conflict
    with legislative enactments concerning the grand jury. We reject the ACDL’s
    argument that this Court’s rulemaking authority has tread on a “field of the
    substantive law” reserved to the Legislature. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 
    5 N.J. 240
    , 248 (1950). We also reject the ACDL’s more particularized claim that
    service on a virtual grand jury requires a juror qualification at odds with
    N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1.
    N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1 sets forth the qualifications for jury service: age,
    citizenship, and residency requirements; the ability to read and understand the
    English language; lack of an indictable criminal conviction; and lack of a
    mental or physical disability that would prevent service as a juror. The ACDL
    raises the illusory issue that the Court has made “reliable internet access,
    technology, and technological know-how” a new “extra-statutory”
    qualification for grand jury service.
    First, where the grand jury convenes -- customarily in a courthouse -- is
    clearly a matter of procedure. See generally R. 1:2-1. Under the emergent
    36
    circumstance prompted by the pandemic, the grand jury temporarily convenes
    in a virtual format. Second, the record plainly reveals that “[n]o juror has been
    excluded from selection or from serving on a virtual grand jury based on lack
    of technology.” The Judiciary provides not only tablets with broadband
    internet capacity to grand jurors who do not have the available technology, but
    also technical assistance in setting up and using the tablet. In this case, the
    Judiciary made available tablets to five grand jurors who indicated a
    willingness to serve but lacked reliable personal technology to participate in a
    virtual proceeding. All grand jurors, moreover, receive training to participate
    in virtual proceedings using Zoom. Providing tablets to grand jurors -- like
    providing interpreters for non-English speakers and listening devices to the
    hearing impaired -- is akin to other accommodations afforded by the Judiciary
    so that all can participate and have equal access to the courthouse.
    Whatever digital divide existed has been bridged by the Judiciary’s
    provision of the necessary technology and technological know-how to grand
    jurors.
    C.
    Defendant and his supporting amici allege that the very nature of a
    virtual grand jury session is incompatible with the secrecy requirements
    mandated by our Court Rules. See R. 3:6-7 (providing that “the requirement
    37
    as to secrecy of proceedings of the grand jury shall remain as heretofo re” and
    that all grand jurors “shall be required to take an oath of secrecy before their
    admission” to a grand jury session); see also N.J.S.A. 2B:21-3 (requiring grand
    jury members to swear or affirm that they “will keep secret the proceedings of
    the grand jury”). To be sure, “the proper functioning of our grand jury system
    depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.” Douglas Oil Co. of Cal.
    v. Petrol Stops Nw., 
    441 U.S. 211
    , 218 (1979).
    “One of the foundations of our jury system is that the jury is presumed
    to follow the trial court’s instructions.” State v. Burns, 
    192 N.J. 312
    , 335
    (2007). The premise of defendant’s and amici’s argument is that virtual grand
    jurors cannot be trusted to obey their oaths or follow instructions, even on
    penalty of severe sanctions. In effect, they urge that we discard the
    presumption that virtual grand jurors will act in accordance with their lawful
    duties. Because defendant and amici have no sound evidence to support their
    premise of virtual grand juror irresponsibility, they have resorted to
    speculation and hypothetical scenarios.
    Defendant and amici hypothesize that grand jurors -- in the privacy of
    their homes -- will do online research with their smartphones, surreptitiously
    record the proceedings, talk to their families or friends about the case, and
    perhaps give unauthorized access to the virtual grand jury room. They give
    38
    little credit to the repeated reminders given to the grand jurors about the
    sanctity of the proceedings and serious penalties they would face for a
    violation of their oath of secrecy. See N.J.S.A. 2B:21-10 (stating that
    unauthorized disclosures may be punishable as a fourth-degree crime). Nor do
    they fully take into account the diligent efforts by Judiciary staff to monitor
    compliance, such as requiring jurors to perform a 360-degree scan of their
    location with their electronic devices.
    In the end, there is no perfect system of verification, and we must rely
    on the good faith of all grand jurors and all trial jurors to follow instructions
    and obey their oaths -- and in those instances when violations occur, hold the
    offending jurors accountable. We cannot guarantee that a petit juror during a
    trial will not go home and do research or speak to a spouse or a friend about a
    case. We cannot guarantee that a juror will not smuggle an audio recording
    device into the grand jury room or go home and reveal the names of the
    witnesses and target of the investigation. We presume that those jurors will
    follow instructions and obey their oaths. Our confidence in our system of
    justice is proportionate to our faith in those jurors.
    Defendant and amici have given this Court no basis -- other than utter
    conjecture -- for concluding that virtual grand jurors are less trustworthy and
    less honorable than other grand jurors and petit jurors.
    
    39 Dall. 1
    .
    Likewise, defendant’s and amici’s argument that a virtual grand jury
    does not represent a cross-section of the community is based wholly on
    supposition. They have provided no evidence to contradict the fact-based
    certifications in the record that virtual grand juries are not only drawn in the
    same manner as in-person grand juries, but also that no person is excluded
    from grand jury service based on lack of technology or internet capacity.
    A grand jury that represents a cross-section of the community provides
    “a democratic safeguard to our judicial system” and is infused with “the
    common wisdom of ordinary citizens to make the important fact-finding
    decisions that must precede the filing of an indictment.” 
    Fortin, 178 N.J. at 638
    . Impartially selecting a grand jury that mirrors a fair-cross section of the
    community “demands that each person have an equal chance of serving.” State
    v. Ramseur, 
    106 N.J. 123
    , 231 (1987).
    To establish a prima facie claim that the grand jury selection process
    violated the fair-cross-section requirement or the right to equal protection, 13 a
    13
    Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution provides that “[a]ll
    persons . . . have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those
    of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
    protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” We
    have construed the “expansive language” of Article I, Paragraph 1 as
    40
    defendant must show, through statistical evidence or through inferences drawn
    from a discriminatory selection procedure, substantial underrepresentation of
    “a constitutionally cognizable group.” State v. Coyle, 
    119 N.J. 194
    , 213
    (1990).
    Defendant and amici have provided no evidence that the grand jury in
    this case did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. First, the
    statewide Manager of Jury Programs averred that the process of summoning
    jurors for grand jury selection “has remained largely unchanged” for virtual
    grand juries. Prospective grand jurors are mailed a juror summons postcard
    that identifies the internet site at which the juror can complete their
    questionnaire. If they do not respond to the questionnaire online, they are
    mailed a hard copy questionnaire. Deputy Attorney General Shanahan,
    moreover, has attested that, statistically, the number of potential jurors
    available for virtual State Grand Juries is “not significantly different” from
    those before the pandemic.
    guaranteeing every person equal protection under the law. See, e.g., Sojourner
    A. v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
    177 N.J. 318
    , 332 (2003); Lewis v. Harris, 
    188 N.J. 415
    , 442 (2006). The equal-protection guarantee is intended “to protect
    against injustice and against the unequal treatment of those who should be
    treated alike.” Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 
    99 N.J. 552
    , 568 (1985).
    41
    Second, the grand jurors in this case were selected in pre-pandemic days
    when in-person grand juries were still in session. When the Court authorized
    virtual grand juries and the present panel transitioned to virtual sessions, the
    Judiciary provided to five grand jurors tablets with, if necessary, internet
    access so that every juror could continue to serve and participate. No one on
    this grand jury panel was excluded from serving based on lack of personal
    technology.
    The certifications of the statewide Manager of Jury Programs, the Jury
    Manager of the Mercer Vicinage, and the Acting Attorney Supervisor of the
    State Grand Jury indicate that no person called to serve on virtual grand juries
    throughout the state has been excluded for lack of technological equipment or
    means. Those in need of the necessary technology are provided with tablets
    and training to effectively participate.
    Had this Court not followed health-safety protocols and kept in place in-
    person grand juries during the pandemic -- presuming a public facility could
    effectively accommodate the required social distancing of masked grand jurors
    -- it is not likely that vulnerable populations, such as the elderly and those with
    underlying conditions, would have appeared for service at the risk of their
    lives. In-person grand juries -- not virtual grand juries -- would have likely
    caused the underrepresentation decried by defendant and amici. On the other
    42
    end of the spectrum, an indeterminate moratorium on all grand jury
    presentations would have caused adverse consequences for those seeking to be
    cleared of charges, for those seeking to be afforded speedy trials, and for
    victims looking to have their perpetrators brought to justice without undue
    delays.
    New Jersey has not been the only State to authorize virtual grand jury
    proceedings during the pandemic. Five of the seventeen other states that “still
    require a grand jury indictment for serious offenses,” 
    Shaw, 241 N.J. at 237
    ;
    see also Wayne R. LaFave et al., 4 Criminal Procedure § 15.1(d) (4th ed.
    updated 2020), have authorized virtual grand jury proceedings in response to
    the COVID-19 pandemic. See, e.g., Alaska, Sup. Ct. of Alaska, Special Order
    of the Chief Justice No. 8204: Update Regarding Authorizing
    Videoconference Grand Jury Proceedings (Nov. 2, 2020); Georgia, Sup. Ct. of
    Ga., Eighth Order Extending Declaration of Statewide Judicial Emergency
    (Nov. 9, 2020); Kentucky, Sup. Ct. of Ky., Order 2020-40 -- In Re: Kentucky
    Court of Justice Response to COVID-19 Emergency: Expansion of Court
    Proceedings (May 19, 2020); South Carolina, Sup. Ct. of S.C., Operation of
    the Trial Courts During the Coronavirus Emergency (Apr. 22. 2020); Texas,
    Sup. Ct. of Tex., Twenty-Ninth Emergency Order Regarding the COVID-19
    State of Disaster (Nov. 11, 2021).
    43
    In the midst of this worldwide and national pandemic, New Jersey has
    not been alone in crafting temporary remedies -- consistent with constitutional
    rights -- to keep the criminal justice system moving as new cases mount and
    old cases stagnate.
    2.
    Defendant and the ACDL contend that by “selectively implementing”
    the Virtual Grand Jury Pilot Program first in Mercer and Bergen Counties and
    not allowing defendant to await an in-person presentation like similarly
    situated criminal defendants, the Judiciary denied him his right to equal
    protection of the law. In light of our conclusion that a virtual grand jury --
    convened under the emergent circumstances of a deadly pandemic -- does not
    run afoul of the constitutional right to a grand jury presentation, defendant can
    hardly complain that having his constitutional right vindicated too soon and
    before others violates his equal protection rights. 14 Virtual grand juries,
    moreover, are now operating in all twenty-one counties, so defendant’s
    disparate-treatment argument -- if it ever had legitimacy -- falls away.
    The purpose of having a pilot program, such as for virtual grand juries or
    drug courts, is to ensure the efficacy of the program before implementing it
    14
    Contrary to defendant’s assertion, no limitation has been placed on the
    types of criminal cases that could be presented to a virtual grand jury.
    44
    statewide. Pilot programs by their very nature may apply to a subset of a much
    larger population. For example, drug courts began in Essex County and
    Camden County and, over time, expanded statewide. See N.J. Courts, Drug
    Courts, https://njcourts.gov/courts/criminal/drug.html?lang=eng (last visited
    Apr. 21, 2021). The use of a pilot program, as here, did not create an
    impermissible or unlawful classification and advanced a legitimate
    constitutional objective, thus satisfying the rational-basis test for such a
    program. See State v. Bianco, 
    103 N.J. 383
    , 398 (1986) (holding that the
    Excessive Sentencing “Pilot Program, by singling out excessive sentence
    appeals for disposition with oral argument but without briefs . . . rationally
    furthered the State’s interest of securing prompt justice for all” and did not
    violate the defendant’s equal protection rights).
    V.
    A.
    Defendant and supporting amici argue that that the inherent limitations
    and shortcomings of technology fatally undermine the integrity of virtual
    grand jury proceedings and render them fundamentally unfair under New
    Jersey law. They reason that, in the setting of a virtual grand jury,
    technological deficiencies, as illustrated in the particular case before us,
    obstruct one of the core functions of the grand jury -- to be “present or
    45
    informed of the evidence at each session in order to vote or to indict,” citing
    Del 
    Fino, 100 N.J. at 164-65
    .
    We find that the concerns raised by defendant and amici, for the most
    part, are overstated and grounded in conjecture, not in the reality of the many
    thousands of virtual judicial proceedings successfully conducted -- despite
    occasional glitches -- over the course of the pandemic. We acknowledge that
    the use of technology, like all human undertakings, will not meet the test of
    perfection. Nevertheless, we conclude that virtual grand jury proceedings
    comply with the essential tenets of the fundamental fairness doctrine.
    “New Jersey’s doctrine of fundamental fairness ‘serves to protect
    citizens generally against unjust and arbitrary governmental action, and
    specifically against governmental procedures that tend to operate arbitrarily.’”
    Doe v. Poritz, 
    142 N.J. 1
    , 108 (1995) (quoting 
    Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 377
    (Handler, J., dissenting)). The doctrine is “an integral part of due process,”
    
    Shaw, 241 N.J. at 239
    (quoting State v. Saavedra, 
    222 N.J. 39
    , 67 (2015)), and
    promotes the values of “fairness and fulfillment of reasonable expectations in
    the light of the constitutional and common law goals,” 
    Saavedra, 222 N.J. at 68
    . The fundamental fairness doctrine, however, is “applied ‘sparingly,’ only
    when ‘the interests involved are especially compelling.’” 
    Shaw, 241 N.J. at 239
    -40 (quoting 
    Poritz, 142 N.J. at 108
    ).
    46
    B.
    Defendant and amici point out the various technological problems that
    can arise during a virtual grand jury proceeding -- or any virtual proceeding for
    that matter: a frozen video screen, imperfect audio, insufficient signal strength
    and connectivity issues, all capable of causing a grand juror to miss key
    testimony. A virtual proceeding, it is claimed, “does not capture all of the
    cues so vital to judging credibility.” Defendant, moreover, presents anecdotal
    examples from a news article about a grand juror who purportedly dropped off
    a video feed and one who could not hear a witness’s testimony.
    However, the hypothetical technological concerns raised by defendant
    and amici, as well as the secondhand account from a news article, are
    addressed in certifications filed by the statewide Manager of Jury Programs,
    the Mercer Vicinage’s Jury Manager, and the Acting Attorney Supervisor of
    the State Grand Jury. Those certifications detail what actually occurs before,
    during, and after a virtual grand jury presentation to ensure that grand jurors
    were present during the proceeding, heard the evidence, and voted. Those
    certifications spell out that grand jurors are extensively trained to participate in
    virtual grand jury sessions and advised to report technical problems to
    Judiciary staff. Those certifications describe how Judiciary staff and
    47
    prosecutors patrol and monitor the virtual grand proceedings to detect and
    correct technological issues.
    No one suggests that technology does not present challenges in the
    virtual setting. In Mercer County, for example, grand jurors are given the
    contact information for grand jury and IT staff and instructions to call if they
    have any technical issues. Experience and common sense also tell us that if a
    grand juror’s screen is frozen or the grand juror falls off the feed, that will be
    noticed -- by the affected grand juror, by other grand jurors, by Judiciary staff,
    and by the prosecutor. If grand jurors have a problem hearing, presumably
    they will follow instructions and advise Judiciary staff. If a grand juror
    attempts to speak and gets no response, that will be a cue for the juror to
    unmute -- or if others see the juror’s lips moving and hear no sound, they will
    tell the juror to unmute.
    Defendant also raises the question of whether grand jurors can assess the
    credibility of a witness in the virtual format. Yet judges do so in remote
    proceedings in many contested matters, such as testimonial hearings,
    municipal court trials, and even civil jury trials. See also Ramsey, § 21.7
    (“The grand jury process is not a mini-trial where issues related to credibility
    are decided.”).
    48
    The technological problems that may arise in the virtual grand jury
    setting are common to all virtual proceedings -- even live-streamed New Jersey
    Supreme Court virtual oral arguments. Those problems have not deterred the
    thousands of virtual proceedings that have permitted the New Jersey Judiciary
    to keep the doors to the virtual courthouse open in the time of a pandemic.
    Because the virtual process may not be perfect does not mean that it is not
    mostly effective or unconstitutional. Certainly, technological glitches or
    defects will require individually tailored solutions. A defendant will not be
    without a remedy if such problems render grand jurors not present or informed
    about the evidence during a virtual grand jury session.
    We reject the notion that virtual grand jury proceedings facially violate
    the fundamental fairness doctrine or the New Jersey Constitution.
    C.
    We now turn to the virtual grand jury proceeding in this case. Our
    review of the grand jury transcript leads us to conclude that, viewed in its
    entirety, the proceeding did not violate the fundamental fairness doctrine or
    defendant’s constitutional right to a fair grand jury presentation. We
    nonetheless recognize that some simple steps can be taken to further safeguard
    and inspire confidence in the integrity of virtual grand jury proceedings.
    49
    At the beginning of the grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor asked , “by
    a show of hands,” whether any grand juror recognized the name of defendant
    or the State’s only witness and affirmed for the record that no hands were
    raised; she then asked whether the jurors “can hear and see me clearly,” and
    indicated she saw no hands raised. As in typical in-person grand jury
    presentations, the prosecutor relied on silence as an answer. For example, the
    prosecutor asked the grand jurors whether they had any questions about the
    proposed indictment, or for Detective Szbanz after he testified, or on the law;
    and the prosecutor relied on the jurors’ silence (“no audible response”) as their
    response that they had none.
    It is true that if the grand jurors did not hear the question, because of a
    technical malfunction, they arguably would not be in a position to respond.
    But the grand jurors were trained to report technical issues to the grand jury
    staff, and presumably if they saw the prosecutor’s lips moving and heard no
    sound, they would know that there was a problem. Judiciary staff monitored
    the proceedings as well. In addition, following protocol, before the jurors
    deliberated in the breakout room, the foreperson asked the jurors whether any
    experienced a problem that affected their ability to observe or hear the
    proceedings. We are mindful that even in an in-person grand jury session, a
    50
    juror may be daydreaming or distracted, but the existence of such human
    frailties does not indicate an institutional failing in our system of justice.
    In the future, to remove any doubt about a virtual grand juror’s response
    to a question, the prosecutor should require a clear indication for the record,
    such as an audible response or a showing of hands.
    Also, during the colloquy about whether the grand jurors could see the
    indictment, the transcript reveals an “unidentified speaker” making such
    comments as, “Can everyone see the Indictment?”; “How about now?”; “All
    right . . . . No other questions or concerns?”; and “No. Okay.” We reject the
    contention of defendant and amici that the exchange, in its totality, suggested
    that the grand jurors did not see the indictment. That contention is further
    refuted by the foreperson’s post-vote technology check.15 Additionally, the
    Mercer Vicinage Jury Manager certified that the grand jurors reported no
    technical difficulties. Last, the grand jurors were not neophytes; they had
    participated in three previous virtual grand jury sessions and knew their roles.
    Nevertheless, going forward all persons speaking on the record should
    identify themselves or be identified. Everyone participating in the virtual
    15
    In all likelihood, the “unidentified speaker” was a member of the grand jury
    IT staff.
    51
    grand jury process should remember that the record must clearly reflect who is
    speaking and the responses to any questions.
    All in all, defendant received a grand jury hearing that comported with
    basic tenets of fundamental fairness and the constitutional right to a fair grand
    jury presentation. We therefore deny his motion to dismiss the indictment on
    the grounds addressed in this opinion and remand to the trial court for further
    proceedings.
    VI.
    A few final words. Virtual grand juries are a temporary measure
    invoked to meet an extraordinary, life-threatening public health crisis. On
    March 9, 2020, New Jersey reported eleven presumed positive cases of
    COVID-19. See Exec. Order No. 103 (Mar. 9, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 549(a) (Apr.
    6, 2020). A little more than a year later, as of April 19, 2021, New Jersey
    reported 22,551 confirmed deaths and an additional 2,592 probable deaths
    related to COVID-19 -- and 858,519 confirmed cases and 120,334 probable
    cases. N.J. Dep’t of Health, New Jersey COVID-19 Dashboard: Cases and
    Trends, https://www.nj.gov/health/cd/topics/covid2019_dashboard.shtml. On
    April 19, 2021, there were 2,109 COVID-19 patients hospitalized, with 435 in
    intensive care and 254 on ventilators in this state. N.J. Dep’t of Health, New
    Jersey COVID-19 Dashboard: Hospital Census, https://www.nj.gov/health
    52
    /cd/topics/covid2019_dashboard.shtml. Up to that date, 563,890 people had
    died from COVID-19 in the United States. Ctrs. for Disease Control &
    Prevention, COVID Data Tracker, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker.
    New Jersey has suffered the highest per capita death rate in the country during
    the course of the pandemic.
    Those staggering statistics give some understanding of the dimension of
    the crisis faced by the Judiciary and all New Jersey residents. Yet as life goes
    on, the criminal and civil justice system cannot stand still. No one could
    predict how long the pandemic would last. The Judiciary -- like educational
    institutions, government operations, and businesses -- transitioned to a virtual
    format during this grim period. Through the cooperative efforts of judges,
    Judiciary staff and IT personnel, along with lawyers and litigants, many
    thousands of remote hearings have been conducted in our criminal and civil
    justice system. Indeed, the Administrative Office of the Courts has reported
    that between March 16, 2020 and April 20, 2021, 175,073 virtual court events
    have been conducted involving over 2 million participants.
    Since the beginning of the pandemic, more than 6,000 cases have been
    presented to virtual grand juries. The Judiciary has endeavored to maintain all
    the essential attributes of the grand jury in the virtual format, so that the grand
    jury retains its high, preferred place in our constitutional framework. As
    53
    millions of New Jersey residents continue to receive vaccinations, we look
    forward in the near future to a return to normalcy and to reopened courthouses
    -- and to grand jurors sitting together in the same room where testimony is
    taken.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA,
    PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join
    in JUSTICE ALBIN’s opinion.
    54