Bound Brook Board of Education v. Glenn Ciripompa (076905) , 228 N.J. 4 ( 2017 )


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  •                                                        SYLLABUS
    (This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
    convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
    interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
    Bound Brook Board of Education v. Glenn Ciripompa (A-57-15) (076905)
    Argued November 9, 2016 -- Decided February 21, 2017
    Timpone, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
    In this appeal, the Court determines whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority by applying the standard for
    proving a hostile-work-environment, sexual-harassment claim in a law against discrimination (LAD) case to a claim
    of unbecoming conduct in a tenured teacher disciplinary hearing.
    Defendant Glenn Ciripompa is a tenured high school math teacher, in the Bound Brook School District
    (District). Defendant’s behavior came under the scrutiny of the Bound Brook Board of Education (Board) after the
    Board received copies of student Twitter posts alleging “Mr. C” was electronically transmitting nude photographs.
    An investigation uncovered defendant’s pervasive misuse of his District-issued laptop and iPad, as well as evidence
    of inappropriate behavior toward female colleagues, often in the presence of students. The results of the
    investigation spurred the Board to seek defendant’s termination from his tenured position and served as the
    substantive allegations of the two-count tenure complaint against defendant.
    Count I of the complaint centered on defendant’s improper use of the District-issued laptop and iPad. The
    District’s policy prohibits “all employees and students using District computers, iPads and District networks” from
    accessing content for “illegal, inappropriate or obscene purposes, or in support of such activities.”
    Count II set forth allegations concerning defendant’s inappropriate behavior, noting that “[t]eaching Staff
    members in the Bound Brook School District, including Mr. Ciripompa, receive training with respect to appropriate
    conduct towards staff members and workplace harassment on an annual basis,” and that “[i]nterviews of female staff
    members revealed that Mr. Ciripompa has repeatedly engaged in unprofessional, inappropriate and potentially
    harassing behavior towards female staff members.”
    The concluding prayer for relief applied to both counts of the complaint. It stated that “the foregoing
    unbecoming conduct warrants [defendant’s] dismissal from the Bound Brook Borough School District . . . .”
    Pursuant the Tenure Employees Hearing Law (TEHL), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1, the charges were
    brought to the Commissioner of Education and, when the Commissioner agreed that the charges warranted
    termination, to an arbitrator. The arbitrator found that the Board had proven the allegations underlying Count I but
    dismissed Count II with prejudice, reducing the penalty from dismissal to a 120-day suspension without pay.
    The arbitrator began his analysis of Count II by noting that, “[w]hile the charges contained in Count II do
    not specifically state sexual harassment, it is clear from the nature of the allegations and the cited policy that this is
    in fact the case, as [defendant] has likewise recognized.” The arbitrator then announced that, under this Court’s
    decision in Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 
    132 N.J. 587
    , 610 (1993), a successful claim for sexual harassment
    requires a showing that “working conditions were affected by the harassment to the point at which a reasonable
    woman would consider the working environment hostile.” The arbitrator found that defendant’s conduct did not
    meet the Lehmann standard and concluded that misuse of the District-issued electronics did not justify defendant’s
    removal from his tenured teaching position.
    The District sought review in the Superior Court, Chancery Division. The court reversed the arbitrator’s
    decision, remanding it for a review before a new arbitrator. The court held that the arbitrator “erroneously changed
    the nature of Count II and imposed an inappropriate standard.”
    1
    On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the Chancery Division’s decision vacating the arbitral award
    and reinstated the suspension. 
    442 N.J. Super. 515
    , 518 (App. Div. 2015). The panel found no error in the
    arbitrator’s application of the Lehmann standard to the charges proffered against defendant. 
    Id. at 526
    .
    The Court granted the Board’s petition for certification, limited to the issue of whether the arbitrator’s
    reliance on Lehmann in dismissing the Board’s second charge of inappropriate and unprofessional conduct
    supported vacating the arbitrator’s award. 
    224 N.J. 280
     (2016).
    HELD: The arbitrator impermissibly converted the second charge of unbecoming conduct into one of sexual
    harassment. The re-characterization of Count II erroneously tasked the Board with substantiating charges it did not file
    with evidence it did not proffer. The arbitrator’s review was not “consonant with the matter submitted,” Grover v.
    Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 
    80 N.J. 221
    , 231 (1979); rather, he “imperfectly executed his powers” as well as
    exceeded his authority by failing to decide whether Count II stated a successful claim of unbecoming conduct in
    support of termination. N.J.S.A. 2A:41-8(d). The arbitrator’s award is therefore invalid.
    1. Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited. An arbitrator’s award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is
    subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action. (p. 8)
    2. Under New Jersey’s TEHL, “[t]he arbitrator’s determination shall be final and binding,” but “shall be subject to
    judicial review and enforcement as provided pursuant to N.J.S.[A.] 2A:24-7 through N.J.S.[A.] 2A:24-10.” N.J.S.A.
    18A:6-17.1. Pursuant to the cross-referenced statutes, there are four bases upon which a court may vacate an arbitral
    award. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(a) to -(d). The claim of error in this case implicates subsection (d) of N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8,
    which provides for vacatur “[w]here the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual,
    final and definite award upon the subject matter was not made.” (pp. 9-10)
    3. Limits to the arbitrator’s authority are defined by statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8, as well as by the questions framed by
    the parties in a particular dispute. Indeed, an arbitrator’s award “should be consonant with the matter submitted.
    Otherwise, the determination is contrary to the authority vested in him.” Grover, 
    supra,
     
    80 N.J. at 231
    . The Third
    Circuit addressed “allegation[s] that the arbitrators exceeded their authority by resolving an issue the parties did not
    intend to submit” under 
    9 U.S.C.A. § 10
    (a)(4), which is virtually identical to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d), by considering
    “whether the arbitrators manifestly exceeded their authority in interpreting the scope of the parties’ submissions.”
    Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs., 
    409 F.3d 574
    , 579 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 1089
    (2006). The Court agrees that a claim that an arbitrator decided a legal question not placed before him or her by the
    parties is tantamount to a claim that the arbitrator “imperfectly executed [his or her] powers” as well as a claim that
    the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d). (pp. 10-12)
    4. Proving hostile work environment is not necessary to satisfy the burden of showing unbecoming conduct. A
    charge of unbecoming conduct requires only evidence of inappropriate conduct by teaching professionals. It focuses
    on the morale, efficiency, and public perception of an entity, and how those concerns are harmed by allowing
    teachers to behave inappropriately while holding public employment. The Court has made it clear that the failure of
    a school board to prove a different offense does not preclude a finding of unbecoming conduct. Claims of hostile
    work environment, sexual harassment and unbecoming conduct are governed by separate, distinct legal standards
    and in separate, distinct legal contexts. (pp. 12-14)
    5. There are settings in which sexual harassment claims may provide the underpinnings of an unbecoming conduct
    charge. This is not one of them. The arbitrator erred in his reliance on Lehmann because he imposed a different and
    inappropriate standard of proof on the Board to sustain its unbecoming conduct in the presence of students claim.
    The arbitrator “imperfectly executed” his power by misinterpreting the intentions of the Board so significantly as to
    impose a sexual harassment analysis, when such an analysis was wholly ill-suited in this context. The instant matter
    is not an employee-versus-employer dispute that requires application of the Lehmann standard. Indeed, that standard
    distorts the evaluatory method pertinent to this matter, making it inappropriate for consideration here. (pp. 14-18)
    The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. The matter is REMANDED for arbitration with
    a new arbitrator.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
    VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s opinion.
    2
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    A-57 September Term 2015
    076905
    BOUND BROOK BOARD OF
    EDUCATION,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    GLENN CIRIPOMPA,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    Argued November 9, 2016 – Decided February 21, 2017
    On certification to the Superior Court,
    Appellate Division, whose opinion is
    reported at 
    442 N.J. Super. 515
     (App. Div.
    2015)
    Robert J. Merryman argued the cause for
    appellant (Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro &
    Murphy, attorneys).
    Arnold M. Mellk argued the cause for
    respondent (Mellk O'Neill, attorneys; Edward
    A. Cridge, on the brief).
    Robert A. Greitz argued the cause for amicus
    curiae New Jersey School Boards Association
    (Cynthia J. Jahn, General Counsel,
    attorney).
    JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
    In this case we determine whether an arbitrator exceeded
    his authority by applying the standard for proving a hostile-
    work-environment, sexual-harassment claim in a law against
    1
    discrimination (LAD) case to a claim of unbecoming conduct in a
    tenured teacher disciplinary hearing.     We find that he did.
    Defendant Glenn Ciripompa is a tenured high school math
    teacher, in the Bound Brook School District (District).     The
    Bound Brook Board of Education (Board) charged defendant with
    two counts of unbecoming conduct.     Reviewing under the Tenure
    Employees Hearing Law (TEHL), N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 to -18.1, the
    arbitrator determined that the Board failed to prove that the
    conduct charged in the second count met the four-prong hostile
    work environment test set forth in Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc.,
    
    132 N.J. 587
    , 603-04 (1993).
    The arbitrator impermissibly converted the second charge
    into one of sexual harassment.   Accordingly, we reverse the
    judgment of the Appellate Division and remand for arbitration
    with a new arbitrator to determine whether defendant committed
    unbecoming conduct, and any appropriate penalty.
    I.
    We distill the following pertinent facts from the record.
    Defendant’s behavior came under Board scrutiny after the Board
    received copies of student Twitter posts alleging “Mr. C” was
    electronically transmitting nude photographs.     An investigation
    uncovered defendant’s pervasive misuse of his District-issued
    laptop and iPad, as well as evidence of inappropriate behavior
    toward female colleagues, often in the presence of students.
    2
    The results of the investigation spurred the Board to seek
    defendant’s termination from his tenured position and served as
    the substantive allegations of the two-count tenure complaint
    against defendant.
    Count I of the complaint, unambiguously labelled “Conduct
    Unbecoming,” centered on defendant’s improper use of the
    District-issued laptop and iPad.   The District’s policy
    prohibits “all employees and students using District computers,
    iPads and District networks” from accessing content for
    “illegal, inappropriate or obscene purposes, or in support of
    such activities.”    The complaint alleged that defendant had
    “received and signed for a copy of the District’s acceptable use
    policy.”   Evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing
    established that defendant used the devices, sometimes during
    work hours, on the District computer network to send explicit
    pictures of himself and to seek similar pictures in return from
    various women on the internet.   On the District-issued devices,
    defendant saved nude pictures and sexually explicit emails, sent
    and received by defendant, including negotiations for paid
    sexual services.
    Count II, without a specific label, set forth the following
    allegations:
    1. Teaching Staff members in the Bound Brook
    School District, including Mr. Ciripompa,
    receive training with respect to appropriate
    3
    conduct towards staff members and workplace
    harassment on an annual basis.
    2. During the 2013-14 School Year complaints
    were   received   about   Mr.    Ciripompa’s
    inappropriate conduct towards female staff
    members.
    3.    Interviews of female staff members
    revealed that Mr. Ciripompa has repeatedly
    engaged in unprofessional, inappropriate and
    potentially harassing behavior towards female
    staff members.
    4.   On two occasions Mr. Ciripompa asked
    female staff members out on dates in front of
    students, thereby making the staff members
    very uncomfortable.
    5.   Mr. Ciripompa has repeatedly commented
    about the physical appearance and dress of
    female staff members, making them very
    uncomfortable.
    6.   Mr. Ciripompa sent flowers to a female
    staff member, using students to deliver the
    flowers, along with messages that the female
    staff member found to be inappropriate.
    The concluding prayer for relief applied to both counts of
    the complaint.   It stated that “the foregoing unbecoming conduct
    warrants [defendant’s] dismissal from the Bound Brook Borough
    School District in accordance with N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10.”
    In support of the charges, the Board produced physical
    evidence taken from defendant’s Board-issued computer and iPad,
    as well as testimonial evidence that defendant, in the presence
    of students, propositioned staff members to date him and
    commented on the physical appearance of female staff.    Notably,
    4
    defendant’s remark about the tight fit of a female teacher’s
    pants prompted a follow-up question by a student who was present
    when defendant uttered the remark.       Defendant also used a
    student as his personal courier to deliver flowers and
    “inappropriate” messages to a colleague he was pursuing.
    In accordance with the TEHL, the Board determined by a
    majority vote that the evidence supported the charges and
    warranted dismissal.   The Commissioner of Education
    (Commissioner) reviewed the charges and agreed they warranted
    termination.   The charges were then submitted for review by an
    arbitrator, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16.      The arbitrator found
    that the Board had proven the allegations underlying Count I but
    dismissed Count II with prejudice, reducing the penalty from
    dismissal to a 120-day suspension without pay.
    The arbitrator began his analysis of Count II by noting
    that, “[w]hile the charges contained in Count II do not
    specifically state sexual harassment, it is clear from the
    nature of the allegations and the cited policy that this is in
    fact the case, as [defendant] has likewise recognized.”      The
    arbitrator then announced that, under this Court’s decision in
    Lehmann, supra, 
    132 N.J. at 610
    , a successful claim for sexual
    harassment requires a showing that “working conditions were
    affected by the harassment to the point at which a reasonable
    woman would consider the working environment hostile.”       The
    5
    arbitrator emphasized that the subjective feelings of the female
    staff members were insufficient to establish a hostile work
    environment claim.   He found that defendant’s conduct was not
    severe or pervasive enough to “modify the [female staff
    members’] behavior or routine in any material way.”   While
    announcing that defendant’s “conduct cumulatively amounted to a
    shocking abdication of his professional responsibility” and
    “rais[ed] bad judgment to an art form,” the arbitrator found,
    contrary to evidence presented, that defendant “had no prior
    warnings” concerning misuse of the computer system.   The
    arbitrator concluded that misuse of the District-issued
    electronics did not justify defendant’s removal from his tenured
    teaching position.
    Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1(e), the District sought
    review in the Superior Court, Chancery Division.   The court
    reversed the arbitrator’s decision, remanding it for a review
    before a new arbitrator.   The court held that the arbitrator
    “erroneously changed the nature of Count II and imposed an
    inappropriate standard.”
    On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the Chancery
    Division’s decision vacating the arbitral award and reinstated
    the suspension.   Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 
    442 N.J. Super. 515
    , 518 (App. Div. 2015).   The panel found no error in
    6
    the arbitrator’s application of the Lehmann standard to the
    charges proffered against defendant.       
    Id. at 526
    .
    We granted the Board’s petition for certification, limited
    to the issue of whether the arbitrator’s reliance on Lehmann in
    dismissing the Board’s second charge of inappropriate and
    unprofessional conduct supported vacating the arbitrator’s
    award.    Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 
    224 N.J. 280
    (2016).   We granted leave to the New Jersey School Board
    Association (Association) to appear as amicus curiae.
    II.
    The Board urges this Court to reverse the judgment of the
    Appellate Division, contending that the arbitrator’s hostile
    work environment analysis was improper.      The Board argues that
    there is a fundamental difference between charges of “unbecoming
    conduct” and “sexual harassment” and that the arbitrator
    improperly conflated the two to require the Board to prove a
    hostile work environment under Lehmann.
    In support of the Board’s position, the amicus Association
    maintains that the arbitrator lacked the authority to alter or
    rewrite the charges.     The Association contends that the
    arbitrator should have limited his analysis to a determination
    of unbecoming conduct.    The Association underscores the
    practical impossibility of trying to prepare and present
    appropriate evidence if “arbitrators [have] the ability to
    7
    unilaterally change the charges presented.”    Further, the
    Association asserts that requiring the Board to prove hostile
    work environment “would be anathema in a school setting.”     It
    argues that schools would have no recourse against isolated but
    abhorrent incidents that would not rise to the level of a
    hostile work environment, yet would satisfy the standard of
    unbecoming conduct.
    Defendant urges this Court to read the underlying facts of
    the count as predicated on allegations of sexual harassment
    sufficient to trigger a Lehmann analysis.     Defendant highlights
    the Board’s own reliance on Lehmann during questioning of
    witnesses and on its references to the sexual harassment
    policies as indicative of the true nature of Count II -- sexual
    harassment.
    III.
    “Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited.”
    Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass’n ex rel. Mizichko, 
    202 N.J. 268
    , 276 (2010).   “An arbitrator’s award is not to be cast
    aside lightly.   It is subject to being vacated only when it has
    been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action.”
    Kearny PBA Local #21 v. Town of Kearny, 
    81 N.J. 208
    , 221 (1979).
    We therefore begin with a review of the circumstances under
    which a court may vacate an arbitral award and then consider
    whether this case merits such action.
    8
    A.
    New Jersey’s TEHL provides tenured public school teachers
    with certain procedural and substantive protections from
    termination.    N.J.S.A. 18A:6-10 provides that no tenured
    employee of the public school system “shall be dismissed or
    reduced in compensation . . . except for inefficiency,
    incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause.”          If the
    charges are substantiated, they are submitted for review by the
    Commissioner.   N.J.S.A. 18A:6-11.    If the Commissioner
    determines the tenure charges merit termination, the case is
    referred to an arbitrator.    N.J.S.A. 18A:6-16.   “The
    arbitrator’s determination shall be final and binding,” but
    “shall be subject to judicial review and enforcement as provided
    pursuant to N.J.S.[A.] 2A:24-7 through N.J.S.[A.] 2A:24-10.”
    N.J.S.A. 18A:6-17.1.    Pursuant to the cross-referenced statutes,
    there are four bases upon which a court may vacate an arbitral
    award:
    a.    Where   the  award   was  procured         by
    corruption, fraud or undue means;
    b.   Where there was either evident partiality
    or corruption in the arbitrators, or any
    thereof;
    c.   Where the arbitrators were guilty of
    misconduct in refusing to postpone the
    hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown
    therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence,
    pertinent and material to the controversy, or
    9
    of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the
    rights of any party;
    d.   Where the arbitrators exceeded or so
    imperfectly executed their powers that a
    mutual, final and definite award upon the
    subject matter submitted was not made.
    [N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.]
    Here, the issue is whether the arbitrator impermissibly
    transmuted Count II’s allegation of unbecoming conduct into a
    charge of hostile work environment sexual harassment and thus
    measured the Board’s claim against an improper legal standard,
    namely the standard articulated by this Court in Lehmann, supra,
    
    132 N.J. at 603-04
    .   This particular claim of error implicates
    subsection (d) of N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8.
    “[L]imits to the arbitrator’s authority . . . are defined
    by statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8,” as well as “by the questions
    framed by the parties in a particular dispute.”   Local No. 153,
    Office & Prof’l Emps. Int’l Union v. Tr. Co. of N.J., 
    105 N.J. 442
    , 449 (1987).   Indeed, an arbitrator’s award “should be
    consonant with the matter submitted.   Otherwise, the
    determination is contrary to the authority vested in him.”
    Grover v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 
    80 N.J. 221
    , 231
    (1979); cf. Trentina v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., 
    135 N.J. 349
    , 359
    (1994)(“If the arbitrators decide a matter not even submitted to
    them, that matter can be excluded from the award.” (quoting
    10
    Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 
    129 N.J. 479
    ,
    548 (1992))).
    The Third Circuit addressed “allegation[s] that the
    arbitrators exceeded their authority by resolving an issue the
    parties did not intend to submit” under 
    9 U.S.C.A. § 10
    (a)(4),
    which is virtually identical to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d), by
    considering “whether the arbitrators manifestly exceeded their
    authority in interpreting the scope of the parties’
    submissions.”   Metromedia Energy, Inc. v. Enserch Energy Servs.,
    
    409 F.3d 574
    , 579 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    546 U.S. 1089
    ,
    
    126 S. Ct. 1021
    , 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 852
     (2006).
    The Third Circuit described how courts review claims that
    arbitrators have exceeded their authority:
    [A]rbitrators have the authority in the first
    instance to interpret the scope of the
    parties’ submissions in order to identify the
    issues that the parties intended to arbitrate.
    When confronted with an allegation that the
    arbitrators exceeded their authority by
    resolving an issue the parties did not intend
    to submit, we will review the arbitrator’s
    interpretation of the parties’ intentions
    under   a   “highly   deferential”   standard.
    Nonetheless, this deference is not a rubber
    stamp, and our review must focus upon the
    record as a whole in determining whether the
    arbitrators    manifestly    exceeded    their
    authority in interpreting the scope of the
    parties’ submissions.
    [Metromedia Energy, Inc., supra, 
    409 F.3d at 579
     (discussing Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc.,
    
    99 F.3d 108
    , 112-14 (3d Cir. 1996), cert.
    11
    denied, 
    546 U.S. 1089
    , 
    126 S. Ct. 1021
    , 
    163 L. Ed. 2d 852
     (2006)).]
    We agree that a claim that an arbitrator decided a legal
    question not placed before him or her by the parties is
    tantamount to a claim that the arbitrator “imperfectly executed
    [his or her] powers” as well as a claim that the arbitrator
    exceeded his or her authority within the meaning of N.J.S.A.
    2A:24-8(d).
    Having concluded that subsection (d) frames our review of
    this matter, we turn to the substance of the Board’s claim.
    IV.
    We first review the standard applied to a claim of
    unbecoming conduct.
    This Court has defined unbecoming conduct as conduct “which
    adversely affects the morale or efficiency of the [department]”
    or “has a tendency to destroy public respect for [government]
    employees and confidence in the operation of [public] services.”
    In re Young, 
    202 N.J. 50
    , 66 (2010) (alterations in original)
    (quoting Karins v. Atl. City, 
    152 N.J. 532
    , 554 (1998)).   We
    have also held that a finding of unbecoming conduct “need not
    ‘be predicated upon the violation of any particular rule or
    regulation, but may be based merely upon the violation of the
    implicit standard of good behavior which devolves upon one who
    stands in the public eye as an upholder of that which is morally
    12
    and legally correct.’”    Karins, supra, 
    152 N.J. at 555
     (quoting
    Hartmann v. Police Dep’t of Ridgewood, 
    258 N.J. Super. 32
    , 40
    (App. Div. 1992)).
    Even when the unbecoming conduct alleged has elements
    similar to those that might comprise a hostile work environment
    claim, this Court has explained that “[t]he absence of
    [harassment] evidence in this type of case is not critical. . .
    .   [I]t is not necessary ‘for an employer to allow events to
    unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the
    destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking
    action.’”   Karins, supra, 
    152 N.J. at 561-62
     (quoting Connick v.
    Myers, 
    461 U.S. 138
    , 152, 
    103 S. Ct. 1684
    , 1692, 
    75 L. Ed. 2d 708
    , 723 (1983)).
    Stated otherwise, proving hostile work environment is not
    necessary to satisfy the burden of showing unbecoming conduct.
    A charge of unbecoming conduct requires only evidence of
    inappropriate conduct by teaching professionals.    It focuses on
    the morale, efficiency, and public perception of an entity, and
    how those concerns are harmed by allowing teachers to behave
    inappropriately while holding public employment.    The Court has
    made it clear that the failure of a school board to prove a
    different offense does not preclude a finding of unbecoming
    conduct.    In Young, 
    supra,
     for example, this Court permitted
    tenure charges of unbecoming conduct based on a student’s
    13
    allegations of sexual abuse that were deemed unfounded by the
    Department of Children and Families (DCF).    
    202 N.J. at 68-69
    .
    We explained that although the “DCF might conclude that sexual
    contact between a student and his former teacher does not
    constitute abuse or neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c),” that
    determination “is a far cry from suggesting that it is not
    conduct unbecoming a school employee.”     Id. at 69-70.
    Because claims of hostile work environment, sexual
    harassment and unbecoming conduct are governed by separate,
    distinct legal standards and in separate, distinct legal
    contexts, we next turn to the specifics of this case to consider
    whether the arbitrator correctly determined that Count II of the
    Board’s complaint was properly subjected to the Lehmann
    standard.
    V.
    Count II of the Board’s complaint claimed that defendant
    “engaged in unprofessional, inappropriate and potentially
    harassing behavior towards female staff members,” and the coda
    to the complaint characterized the ground for termination,
    developed through both counts of the charges, as defendant’s
    “unbecoming conduct.”    The Board framed the issue before the
    arbitrator as follows:   “Has the Board of Education established
    the Tenure Charges of conduct unbecoming by a preponderance of
    the evidence?”   This language clearly demonstrates that the
    14
    basis for the complaint was a violation of the District’s code
    of conduct by “engag[ing] in inappropriate language or
    expression in the presence of pupils.”     The Board’s proofs in
    Count II focused on defendant’s repeated propositions of his co-
    workers in the presence of students, his inappropriate use of
    students as couriers to deliver flowers and inappropriate
    messages to colleagues he was pursuing, and his lascivious
    comments, made in the presence of students, about a colleague’s
    clothing.
    While there is passing reference to defendant’s
    “potentially harassing behavior” in the charge, even a cursory
    reading of the complaint, and the underlying facts and evidence,
    demonstrate that the basis for discipline was broader misconduct
    of undermining the morale of his co-workers and behaving
    inappropriately when students were present.
    This count was premised on the Board’s assertion that
    defendant’s actions violated Board Policy Number 4281, which
    addresses “Inappropriate Staff Conduct”:
    School staff’s conduct in completing their
    professional   responsibilities   shall   be
    appropriate at all times. School staff shall
    not make inappropriate comments to pupils or
    about pupils and shall not engage in
    inappropriate language or expression in the
    presence of pupils.
    The Commissioner of Education has determined
    inappropriate staff conduct by a school staff
    member     outside     their     professional
    15
    responsibilities may be considered      conduct
    unbecoming a public employee.
    The arbitrator clearly recognized that the Board had proven
    inappropriate conduct when he found defendant’s conduct to be a
    fundamental renunciation of his duties and obligations as a
    teacher that “raise[d] bad judgment to an art form.”
    Despite that conclusion, the arbitrator found that the
    Board failed to prove Count II.   The arbitrator quoted Board
    Policy Number 3362 -- “Sexual Harassment” -- and made only
    fleeting reference to the “Inappropriate Staff Conduct” policy
    in his discussion of Count II.    The arbitrator then applied the
    Lehmann standard and found Count II to be unproven because the
    “complained of actions [did] not meet the generally recognized
    definition of hostile work environment sexual harassment and
    [did] not rise to that level.”
    There are settings in which sexual harassment claims may
    provide the underpinnings of an unbecoming conduct charge.      This
    is not one of them.   Count II of the complaint charges
    “unprofessional, inappropriate and potentially harassing
    behavior.”   The arbitrator disproportionately focused on the
    “potentially harassing” allegation in his analysis, ostensibly
    disregarding the word “potentially” and the remaining charges in
    the sentence.   The coupling of “unprofessional, inappropriate
    and potentially harassing” should have forewarned the arbitrator
    16
    that this was not a harassment charge.   Indeed, the inclusion of
    the word “potentially” reveals that the Board was not claiming
    harassment per se.
    The explanation we espoused in Karins is instructive:       it
    is not necessary “for an employer to allow events to unfold to
    the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction
    of working relationships is manifest before taking action.”
    Karins, 
    supra,
     
    152 N.J. at 561-62
     (quoting Connick, 
    supra,
     
    461 U.S. at 152
    , 
    103 S. Ct. at 1692
    , 
    75 L. Ed. 2d at 723
    ).    Surely,
    a school board must not be required to prove a “severe and
    pervasive” effect for every harassment-based offense that
    buttresses a charge of unbecoming conduct.   As this Court
    explained in Young, a school district will not be hamstrung by
    failing to establish a claim beyond unbecoming conduct.
    Here, the arbitrator erroneously faulted the Board for
    failing to prove a charge that it did not bring.   The arbitrator
    erred in his reliance on Lehmann because he imposed a different
    and inappropriate standard of proof on the Board to sustain its
    unbecoming conduct in the presence of students claim.     The
    arbitrator “imperfectly executed” his power by misinterpreting
    the intentions of the Board so significantly as to impose a
    sexual harassment analysis, when such an analysis was wholly
    ill-suited in this context.   The Lehmann standards for hostile-
    work-environment, sexual-harassment claims arise in an entirely
    17
    different context -- under the New Jersey Law Against
    Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42.
    “The LAD was enacted to protect not only the civil rights
    of individual aggrieved employees but also to protect the
    public’s strong interest in a discrimination-free workplace.”
    Lehmann, 
    supra,
     
    132 N.J. at 600
    .    In Lehmann, we established the
    standard for a cause of action for hostile work environment
    sexual harassment claims under the LAD.    Lehmann, 
    supra,
     
    132 N.J. at 592
    .   This Court promulgated a four-prong test, under
    which the plaintiff must show that “the complained-of conduct:
    (1) would not have occurred but for the employee’s gender; and
    it was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3) reasonable
    woman believe that (4) the conditions of employment are altered
    and the working environment is hostile or abusive.”    
    Id.
     at 603-
    04 (emphasis in original).    That standard, however, is not
    implicated in a termination hearing under the TEHL. None of the
    female employees affected by defendant’s actions are suing the
    District-employer for turning a blind eye to sexual harassment
    in the workplace.     The instant matter is not an employee-versus-
    employer dispute that requires application of the Lehman
    standard.   Indeed, that standard distorts the evaluatory method
    pertinent to this matter, making it inappropriate for
    consideration here.
    18
    The re-characterization of Count II erroneously tasked the
    Board with substantiating charges it did not file with evidence
    it did not proffer.    The arbitrator’s review was not “consonant
    with the matter submitted,” Grover, 
    supra,
     
    80 N.J. at 231
    ;
    rather, he “imperfectly executed his powers” as well as exceeded
    his authority by failing to decide whether Count II stated a
    successful claim of unbecoming conduct in support of
    termination.   We find the arbitrator’s award invalid under
    N.J.S.A. 2A:41-8(d).
    VI.
    The judgment of the Appellate Division reinstating the
    arbitrator’s award is reversed, and the matter is remanded for
    arbitration with a new arbitrator to determine whether defendant
    committed unbecoming conduct, and any appropriate penalty.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
    PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’s
    opinion.
    19