Imo Registrant N.B. (073613) , 222 N.J. 87 ( 2015 )

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
In the Matter of Registrant N.B. (A-94-13) (073613)
Argued February 3, 2015 -- Decided July 7, 2015
PER CURIAM
In this appeal, the Court considers whether an individual convicted of a sex offense enumerated in N.J.S.A.
2C:7-2(b), based on multiple acts of unlawful sexual contact with a minor to whom he is related, has committed a
“sole sex offense” within the scope of the household/incest exception set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2), and is
therefore within that exception to the internet registry.
On June 8, 2011, N.B., then nineteen years of age, was indicted for one count of first-degree aggravated
sexual assault, two counts of second-degree sexual assault, and one count of third-degree endangering the welfare of
a child. The charges arose from allegations that N.B. sexually assaulted his half-sister, a minor, when they were
living in the same household. Registrant N.B. later pled guilty to one count of sexual assault by sexual contact with
a child under the age of thirteen, admitting to several acts of sexual contact with his half-sister.
In accordance with the requirements of Megan’s Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8, and the Attorney General
Guidelines for Law Enforcement for the Implementation of Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification
Laws 29-30 (rev’d Feb. 2007) (Attorney General Guidelines), the trial court held a hearing to determine whether
N.B. would be assigned to Tier 1 (low risk of re-offense), Tier 2 (moderate risk of re-offense) or Tier 3 (high risk of
re-offense). The trial court determined that N.B. should be designated a Tier 2 offender, presenting a moderate risk
of re-offense.
The trial court also heard arguments as to whether N.B. met the requirements for the household/incest
exception to internet registration under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2), which exempts from public access the registration
record of an individual convicted of a “sole sex offense” that is committed “under circumstances in which the
offender was related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree or was a resource family parent, a
guardian, or stood in loco parentis within the household[.]” The trial court determined that N.B. did not qualify for
the household/incest exception and ordered that he be included in the Megan’s Law internet registry.
An appellate panel affirmed the trial court’s determination that N.B. was not entitled to invoke the
household/incest exception, concluding that N.B.’s multiple offenses against a single victim at different points in
time precluded the application of the household/incest exception.
The Court granted registrant N.B.’s petition for certification. 217 N.J. 623 (2014).
HELD: A 2004 amendment defining the term “sole sex offense” indicates that the household/incest exception applies
to the conviction here: a single conviction for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), “under circumstances in which the
offender [is] related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree,” notwithstanding the offender’s admission to
multiple acts of sexual contact against the victim. Therefore, N.B. is within the household/incest exception of N.J.S.A.
2C:7-13(d)(2). The matter is remanded to the trial court for a determination as to whether N.B.’s registration record
should be made available to the public, notwithstanding the applicability of the household/incest exception.
1. The registration provision of Megan’s Law was enacted to “permit law enforcement officials to identify and alert
the public when necessary for the public safety,” and “provide law enforcement with additional information critical
to preventing and promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and missing persons.” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1.
Registration with law enforcement is required if an individual “has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found
not guilty by reason of insanity for commission of” certain enumerated sex offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1). The
Legislature amended Megan’s Law in 2001 to make information in the State registry about certain sex offenders
1
publicly available on the internet. However, an offender’s individual registration record is ordinarily excluded from
the internet registry if the offender has been adjudged to have a moderate risk of re-offense and his or her “sole sex
offense” is within one of three exceptions set forth in the statute. (pp. 9-11)
2. The provision that is the subject of this appeal, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2), is the second of the three exceptions to
the internet registry. That provision exempts from public access individual registration records of certain offenders
deemed to pose a “moderate” risk of re-offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) applies if three requirements are met: (1)
the offender must present a “moderate” risk of re-offense; (2) the offender’s “sole sex offense” must be a conviction
or acquittal by reason of insanity for a violation of sexual assault or criminal sexual contact; and (3) the offender
must be “related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third degree or [have been] a resource family parent, a
guardian,” or the offender must have “stood in loco parentis within the household[.]” The term “sole sex offense”
was undefined in the original statute, but, in 2004, a series of amendments provided a statutory definition of the term
as it appears in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d): “For purposes of this subsection, “sole sex offense” means a single conviction,
adjudication of guilty or acquittal by reason of insanity, as the case may be, for a sex offense which involved no
more than one victim, no more than one occurrence or, in the case of an offense which meets the criteria of
paragraph (2) of this subsection, members of no more than a single household.” (pp. 12-14)
3. Here, the Court must determine whether the Legislature intended that an offender, whose conviction otherwise
meets the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d), qualifies for the household/incest exception notwithstanding his or
her admission to more than one instance of sexual contact with a victim who is his or her relative. As applied to this
case, the text of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) itself is ambiguous. However, the 2004 amendment defining “sole sex
offense” provides more compelling evidence of the Legislature’s intent, and directly addresses the issue raised by
this appeal. That clause distinguishes between the exceptions prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(1) and (d)(3), and
the household/incest exception at issue here. As applied to subparagraphs (d)(1) and (d)(3), the statute excludes an
offender if his or her offense involves more than one victim or more than one occurrence. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d). In
contrast, an offender in the household/incest category may qualify for the exception in a broader range of cases:
those which involve “no more than one victim, no more than one occurrence or . . . members of no more than a
single household.” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d) (emphasis added). (pp. 14-18)
4. The Court must interpret laws so as to give meaning to all of the Legislature’s statutory text. Here, a construction
of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d) that applies the N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) exception to individuals such as N.B., whose “sole
sex offense” meets the criteria of that exception and involves “members of no more than a single household,” gives
meaning to every word chosen by the Legislature. The legislative history of the 2004 amendment, including the
statements of the Senate and Assembly committees that reported on the bill, is consistent with this construction.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Legislature intended the household/incest exception to apply to a
registrant whose single conviction otherwise meets the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) and involves more
than one instance of sexual contact with a single victim who is within his or her household. (pp. 19-21)
5. The Court notes that even if one of the exceptions of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d) applies to a given offender, that
offender’s registration record may nonetheless be made available to the public through the internet if certain
statutory requirements are met. Accordingly, the Court remands to the trial court for a determination as to whether
N.B.’s registration record should be made available to the public, notwithstanding the applicability of the
household/incest exception of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2). (pp. 22-23)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED to the trial court
for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, and SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in this opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-94 September Term 2013
073613
IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT
N.B. APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF NOTIFICATION AND
TIER CLASSIFICATION
Argued February 3, 2015 – Decided July 7, 2015
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
James H. Maynard argued the cause for
appellant N.B. (Maynard & Sumner,
attorneys).
Colleen F. Hannon, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent State of New
Jersey (Gaetano T. Gregory, Acting Hudson
County Prosecutor, attorney; Anneris V.
Hernandez, Assistant Prosecutor, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
The statutory scheme known as “Megan’s Law,” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
1 to -19, requires that prescribed categories of sex offenders
register with law enforcement agencies through a central
registry maintained by the Superintendent of State Police.
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1), 4(d). The public is given access to the
registration record of an individual who has been convicted of
certain enumerated sex offenses if the individual’s risk of re-
offense is either “high,” or “moderate or low” and the conduct
1
was repetitive and compulsive. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(b). However,
an offender’s individual registration record is ordinarily
excluded from the internet registry if the offender has been
adjudged to have a moderate risk of re-offense and his or her
“sole sex offense,” which subjects him or her to Megan’s Law, is
within one of three exceptions set forth in the statute.
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d).
One of the exceptions is the “household/incest” exception
defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2). That provision exempts from
public access the registration record of an individual convicted
of a “sole sex offense” that is committed “under circumstances
in which the offender was related to the victim by blood or
affinity to the third degree or was a resource family parent, a
guardian, or stood in loco parentis within the household[.]”
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2).
This appeal requires that we determine whether an
individual convicted of a sex offense enumerated in N.J.S.A.
2C:7-2(b), based on multiple acts of unlawful sexual contact
with a minor to whom he is related, has committed a “sole sex
offense” within the scope of the household/incest exception set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2), and is therefore within that
exception to the internet registry. Registrant N.B. pled guilty
to one count of sexual assault by sexual contact with a child
under the age of thirteen, admitting to several acts of sexual
2
contact with his half-sister. The trial court determined that
N.B. did not qualify for the household/incest exception set
forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) and ordered that he be included
in the Megan’s Law internet registry. An appellate panel
affirmed the trial court’s determination that N.B. was not
entitled to invoke the household/incest exception.
We reverse the panel’s judgment. Although we conclude that
the text of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) is ambiguous and no clear
indication of legislative intent can be derived from that
provision’s plain language, a 2004 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13(d) that defined the term “sole sex offense” provides evidence
of legislative intent and clarifies the ambiguity. L. 2004, c.
151 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)). Construed in a manner
that gives meaning to all of the words chosen by the
Legislature, that provision indicates that N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13(d)(2) applies to the conviction here: a single conviction
for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b), “under circumstances in
which the offender [is] related to the victim by blood or
affinity to the third degree,” notwithstanding the offender’s
admission to multiple acts of sexual contact against the victim.
Therefore, N.B. is within the household/incest exception of
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(e), we remand to the trial
court for a determination as to whether N.B.’s registration
3
record should be made available to the public, notwithstanding
the applicability of the household/incest exception of N.J.S.A.
2C:7-13(d)(2).
I.
On June 8, 2011, N.B., then nineteen years of age, was
indicted for one count of first-degree aggravated sexual
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(1); two counts of second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b); and one count of third-
degree endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).
The charges arose from allegations that N.B. sexually assaulted
his half-sister, a minor, when they were living in the same
household.
N.B. entered into a plea agreement with the State. He
agreed to plead guilty to one count of second-degree sexual
assault. The State agreed to move to dismiss the remaining
counts of the indictment and to recommend a sentence consisting
of a three-year suspended sentence, mandatory registration with
local police pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a), notification to the
community according to his tier ranking, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-6, and
Parole Supervision for Life (PSL), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4. The
State and N.B. agreed that his plea would dispose of all charges
in the indictment, as well as any potential charges that arose
from N.B.’s contact with his half-sister before he reached the
age of eighteen.
4
During N.B.’s plea hearing, his counsel advised the trial
court that N.B. was not contesting allegations concerning
incidents that occurred when he was a juvenile, in order that he
would not later face charges arising from those allegations.
N.B. admitted on the record that he had sexual contact with the
victim on certain dates between April 14, 2010, and February 5,
2011, when he was a juvenile. N.B. did not admit to any offense
involving a victim other than his half-sister. The court
accepted N.B.’s plea and subsequently imposed a three-year
suspended sentence, subject to the provisions of Megan’s Law and
PSL.
In accordance with the requirements of Megan’s Law,
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8, and the Attorney General Guidelines for Law
Enforcement for the Implementation of Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notification Laws 29-30 (rev’d Feb. 2007)
(Attorney General Guidelines), the trial court held a hearing to
determine whether N.B. would be assigned to Tier 1 (low risk of
re-offense), Tier 2 (moderate risk of re-offense) or Tier 3
(high risk of re-offense). The trial court agreed with the
State’s assessment of N.B. under a series of criteria rankings
set forth in the Registrant Risk Assessment Scale (RRAS) and
that N.B. should be designated a Tier 2 offender, presenting a
moderate risk of re-offense.
5
The trial court also heard arguments as to whether N.B. met
the requirements for the household/incest exception to internet
registration under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2). The State argued
that N.B. did not satisfy that exception because he had admitted
to multiple offenses over several years. It also opposed
application of the exception to N.B. because, in one reported
incident, N.B. allegedly made a sexual comment to a child who
was a friend of his half-sister. N.B. argued that he committed
a “sole sex offense,” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d),
because a single conviction for multiple incidents constituted
one “offense.” The trial court ruled in favor of the State and
held that N.B. did not meet the criteria for the
household/incest exception under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2). In the
wake of that holding, the trial court did not make a finding as
to whether N.B.’s registration record should be made available
to the public under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(e).
The trial court ordered that specific schools and community
organizations located within one-half mile of N.B.’s residence
be notified, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c) and the Attorney
General Guidelines, and that N.B. be listed on the Megan’s Law
internet registry, as mandated by N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(b). With the
consent of the State, the trial court stayed the Megan’s Law
notification and internet registration provisions of its order,
pending appeal.
6
N.B. appealed, arguing that interviews of his half-sister
and her friend were improperly conducted and that the trial
court had therefore incorrectly assessed one of the RRAS
criteria. The trial court, on remand, reviewed videotapes of
the interviews and a statement by the victim’s mother, and
reaffirmed its decision assigning N.B. a Tier 2 designation.
N.B. then challenged several of the trial court’s RRAS
findings. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding clear and
convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determinations
with respect to the challenged RRAS criteria. It also concurred
with the trial court’s construction of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2),
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it concluded that N.B.’s multiple offenses against a single
victim at different points in time precluded the application of
the household/incest exception.
We granted certification. 217 N.J. 623 (2014).
II.
N.B. urges the Court to construe N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d) to
create two alternative definitions of “sole sex offense”:
first, an offense involving “no more than one occurrence” and
“no more than one victim,” and second, an offense involving
“members of no more than a single household.” He argues that
even if an offender has committed more than one offense, and
therefore does not meet the requirements of the first
7
alternative, he or she can still qualify for the
household/incest exception if his or her offenses involved one
or more members of a single household. N.B. also advances a
public policy argument, arguing that the Attorney General
Guidelines reflect persuasive evidence that sex offenders who
are related to their victims have a low rate of recidivism.
The State counters that N.B.’s plea allocution involved
admissions that preclude application of the N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13(d)(2) exception because he conceded that he committed
multiple sex offenses. In the State’s view, no matter which of
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)’s three exceptions is at issue, an
individual does not qualify for an exception to the internet
registry if he or she has committed more than one sex offense
within the meaning of the statute. The State contends that the
Appellate Division properly affirmed the trial court’s
determination that the household/incest exception does not apply
to N.B.1
III.
A.
1 The State also addresses arguments raised by N.B. before the
trial court and the Appellate Division concerning the propriety
of his Tier 2 designation under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8. N.B. has not
raised those issues before us, and accordingly, we do not
address them.
8
We review de novo the holdings of the Appellate Division
and the trial court construing the household/incest exception of
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2). The question is one of statutory
interpretation, and accordingly, we are “neither bound by, nor
required to defer to, the legal conclusions of a trial or
intermediate appellate court.” State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161,
176 (2010); see also State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 586 (2014)
(citing Toll Bros v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J. 502, 549
(2002)).
The registration provision of Megan’s Law was enacted to
“permit law enforcement officials to identify and alert the
public when necessary for the public safety,” and “provide law
enforcement with additional information critical to preventing
and promptly resolving incidents involving sexual abuse and
missing persons.” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1. Registration with law
enforcement is required if an individual “has been convicted,
adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity
for commission of” certain enumerated sex offenses. N.J.S.A.
2C:7-2(a)(1).2
2 The registration requirement applies if an offender is
“convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason
of insanity for” a “sex offense,” defined as “[a]ggravated
sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual
contact, kidnapping pursuant to [N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(c)(2)] or an
attempt to commit any of these crimes if the court found that
the offender’s conduct was characterized by a pattern of
9
An individual subject to the registration requirement must
notify appropriate law enforcement officials upon a change of
address, job, or school; failure to provide the required
notification is currently a fourth-degree offense. N.J.S.A.
2C:7-2(d). An offender deemed to be repetitive or compulsive
must verify his or her address with law enforcement every ninety
days; other offenders must verify annually. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(e).
Through Megan’s Law, the Legislature also provided for
public notification. The statute authorizes law enforcement
agencies “to release relevant and necessary information
regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the
information is necessary for public protection[.]” N.J.S.A.
2C:7-5(a). Upon release from incarceration, local law
enforcement must provide notification of the inmate’s release to
the community. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-6. The Attorney General
Guidelines, promulgated pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(a), “provide
for three levels of notification depending upon the risk of re-
offense . . . .” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c).3 If the risk of re-offense
repetitive, compulsive behavior, regardless of the date of the
commission of the offense or the date of conviction[.]”
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(a)(1), (b)(1).
3 A given offender’s risk of re-offense is assessed under the
RRAS, developed by mental health and law enforcement experts.
IMO Registrant C.A., 146 N.J. 71, 82 (1996). The RRAS contains
four categories: seriousness of offense, offense history,
characteristics of offender, and community support; within those
10
is low, law enforcement agencies likely to encounter the
registrant are notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(1). If the risk of
re-offense is moderate, organizations in the community are also
notified. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2). If the risk of re-offense is
high, notification is also given to members of the public who
are likely to encounter the registrant. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(3).
Under the authority of a constitutional amendment adopted
in 2000, N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 12, the Legislature amended
Megan’s Law in 2001 to make information in the State registry
about certain sex offenders publicly available on the internet.4
L. 2001, c. 167 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13). The Legislature
found that public access to the registry of sex offenders via
the internet “would make this information readily accessible to
categories are thirteen risk assessment criteria, which include
“the statutory factors as well as other factors deemed relevant
to re-offense.” Ibid. The offender is assessed as low,
moderate, or high risk for each of the thirteen criteria, and
the offender’s risk of re-offense is calculated. Ibid. “[A]
tier classification made on the basis of the [RRAS] should be
afforded deference[.]” Id. at 108.
4 Although the statute authorizes law enforcement to “exclude
from the Internet registry the registration information of
certain sex offenders,” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-12, the information
generally available to the public includes identifying
information about the offender, such as name, address, aliases,
“age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair,” scars or
tattoos, and a photograph, as well as information about the
offense(s), including convictions for certain sex offenses, date
and location of disposition, a description of the offense,
victim’s gender, victim’s age group, and the offender’s “modus
operandi,” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-113(g).
11
parents and private entities, enabling them to undertake
appropriate remedial precautions to prevent or avoid placing
potential victims at risk.” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-12. The Legislature
also provided protections for offenders from threats, harassment
and misuse of the information disclosed. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-14(a);
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-16.
The provision that is the subject of this appeal, N.J.S.A.
2C:7-13(d)(2), exempts from public access individual
registration records, which would otherwise be included on the
internet registry, of certain offenders deemed to pose a
“moderate” risk of re-offense:
d. The individual registration record of an
offender whose risk of re-offense has been
determined to be moderate and for whom the
court has ordered notification in accordance
with [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2)] shall not be made
available to the public on the Internet
registry if the sole sex offense committed by
the offender which renders him subject to the
requirements of [Megan’s Law] is one of the
following:
(1) An adjudication of delinquency for
any sex offense as defined in [N.J.S.A.
2C:7-2(b)(2)];
(2) A conviction or acquittal by reason
of insanity for a violation of [N.J.S.A.]
2C:14-2 or [N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-3 under
circumstances in which the offender was
related to the victim by blood or
affinity to the third degree or was a
resource family parent, a guardian, or
stood in loco parentis within the
household; or
12
(3) A conviction or acquittal by reason
of insanity for a violation of [N.J.S.A.]
2C:14-2 or [N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-3 in any case
in which the victim assented to the
commission of the offense but by reason
of age was not capable of giving lawful
consent.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d).]
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) applies if three requirements are
met. First, the offender must present a “moderate” risk of re-
offense. Ibid. Second, the offender’s “sole sex offense” must
be “[a] conviction or acquittal by reason of insanity for a
violation of [N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2 (sexual assault)] or [N.J.S.A.
2C:14-3 (criminal sexual contact)].” Ibid. Third, the offender
must be “related to the victim by blood or affinity to the third
degree or [have been] a resource family parent, a guardian,” or
the offender must have “stood in loco parentis within the
household[.]” Ibid.
The term “sole sex offense” was undefined in the original
statute. In a 2004 series of amendments to Megan’s Law, the
Legislature provided, for the first time, a statutory definition
of the term “sole sex offense” as it appears in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13(d):
For purposes of this subsection, “sole sex
offense” means a single conviction,
adjudication of guilty or acquittal by reason
of insanity, as the case may be, for a sex
offense which involved no more than one
victim, no more than one occurrence or, in the
case of an offense which meets the criteria of
13
paragraph (2) of this subsection, members of
no more than a single household.
Since the 2004 amendment, the Legislature has not further
clarified its intent with respect to the household/incest
exception at issue in this appeal.
B.
It is undisputed that N.B. meets several of the
requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d). The trial court deemed his
risk of re-offense to be “moderate” and subjected him to the
notification provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8(c)(2). Moreover,
N.B. was convicted of “a violation of [N.J.S.A.] 2C:14-2 . . .
under circumstances in which the offender was related to the
victim by blood or affinity to the third degree,” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13(d)(2), as his plea of guilty to second-degree sexual assault
was premised entirely on sexual contact with his minor half-
sister. He had only a single sexual assault conviction for
conduct within the scope of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2), and only one
victim was involved. N.B., however, admitted in his plea
allocution to sexual contact with his half-sister on multiple
occasions. Accordingly, we must determine whether the
Legislature intended that an offender, whose conviction
otherwise meets the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d),
qualifies for the household/incest exception notwithstanding his
14
or her admission to more than one instance of sexual contact
with a victim who is his or her relative.
In that inquiry, we rely upon settled principles of
statutory construction. “The primary goal of statutory
interpretation ‘is to determine as best [as possible] the intent
of the Legislature, and to give effect to that intent.’” State
v. Lenihan, 219 N.J. 251, 262 (2014) (quoting State v. Hudson,
209 N.J. 513, 529 (2012)); see also State v. Shelley, 205 N.J.
320, 323 (2011). “[T]he best indicator of that intent is the
plain language chosen by the Legislature.” Gandhi, supra, 201
N.J. at 176. The Legislature has instructed that, when
construing “its statutes, ‘words and phrases shall be read and
construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent
with the manifest intent of the Legislature or unless another or
different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their
generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of
the language.’” State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1).
“When the Legislature’s chosen words lead to one clear and
unambiguous result, the interpretative process comes to a close,
without the need to consider extrinsic aids.” Shelley, supra,
205 N.J. at 323. A court “seek[s] out extrinsic evidence, such
as legislative history, for assistance when statutory language
yields ‘more than one plausible interpretation.’” Id. at 323-24
15
(quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 (2005)); see
also Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 200 N.J. 413, 419
(2009) (stating that “if there is ambiguity in the statutory
language that leads to more than one plausible interpretation,
[a court] may turn to extrinsic evidence, including legislative
history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction,
for further assistance in [its] interpretative task” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). A court may also turn to extrinsic
evidence “if a literal reading of the statute would yield an
absurd result, particularly one at odds with the overall
statutory scheme.” Wilson ex rel. Manzano v. City of Jersey
City, 209 N.J. 558, 572 (2012) (citations omitted).
With those principles in mind, we consider the meaning of
the provision at issue. As applied to this case, the text of
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) itself is ambiguous. On the one hand,
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)’s use of the term “sole sex offense”
suggests that the household/incest exception is available only
to offenders who commit a single act of sexual assault, and not
to offenders who have admitted to multiple offenses against a
single victim. On the other hand, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2)
appears to govern when the “sole sex offense” is a single
conviction and the victim is the offender’s relative, even if
there is more than one instance of sexual contact. N.J.S.A.
16
2C:7-13(d)(2). Thus, the language of the original version of
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d) is subject to conflicting interpretations.
The 2004 amendment defining “sole sex offense,” however,
provides more compelling evidence of the Legislature’s intent.
In the first clause of that provision, the Legislature confirmed
that the exceptions presented in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d) are limited
to offenders such as N.B., with a “single conviction,
adjudication of guilty or acquittal by reason of insanity” for
an enumerated sex offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d). Thus, an
offender who has more than one conviction, adjudication or
acquittal by reason of insanity for an enumerated sex offense
may not invoke the exceptions of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d).
The second clause of the 2004 amendment that defined “sole
sex offense” directly addresses the issue raised by this appeal.
That clause distinguishes between the exceptions prescribed by
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(1) and (d)(3), and the household/incest
exception at issue here. See N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d). As applied
to N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(1) and (d)(3), the statute limits “sole
sex offense” to “a single conviction, adjudication of guilty or
acquittal by reason of insanity, as the case may be,” for a sex
offense involving “no more than one victim, no more than one
occurrence . . . .” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d). The statute thus
excludes an offender who otherwise meets the requirements of
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(1) or N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(3) if his or her
17
offense involves more than one victim or more than one
occurrence.5
In contrast, an offender in the household/incest category
governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) may qualify for the exception
in a broader category of cases: those which involve “no more
than one victim, no more than one occurrence or . . . members of
no more than a single household.” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d) (emphasis
added). The statutory text suggests that N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2)
is intended to be less restrictive than the two other exceptions
prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d).
That distinction is significant. If, as the State
contends, the Legislature intended that none of the three
exceptions set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d) are available to a
registrant whose sex offense involves more than one victim or
more than one occurrence, then it would have left out several of
the words that appear in the statute. For all three of the
exceptions set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d), the Legislature
would have limited “sole sex offense” to a single conviction,
adjudication or acquittal by reason of insanity “for a sex
5 N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(1) applies when the offender has been
adjudicated delinquent for a sex offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
2(b)(2), rather than convicted as an adult. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13(d)(3) applies when the offender has been convicted or
acquitted by reason of insanity of violating N.J.S.A 2C:14-2 or
-3 when an underage victim assented to the commission of the
offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(3).
18
offense which involved no more than one victim, no more than one
occurrence.” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d). Instead, the Legislature
separately addressed the household/incest exception in the final
clause of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d): “or, in the case on an offense
which meets the criteria of [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2)], members of
no more than a single household.” If the State is correct, and
none of the statute’s three exceptions are available to an
offender whose offenses involved more than one victim and one
occurrence, then the final clause of the statute is superfluous.
Such an interpretation would contravene the canon of
statutory construction that directs courts to interpret laws so
as to give meaning to all of the Legislature’s statutory text.
In re Civil Commitment of J.M.B., 197 N.J. 563, 573 (2009)
(“Interpretations that render the Legislature’s words mere
surplusage are disfavored.”); see also DKM Residential Props.
Corp. v. Twp. of Montgomery, 182 N.J. 296, 307 (2005) (“When
interpreting a statute or regulation, [the Court] endeavors to
give meaning to all words . . . .” (citations omitted)). The
Court must “seek an interpretation that will ‘make the most
consistent whole of the statute.’” State v. Sutton, 132 N.J.
471, 479 (1993) (quoting State v. A.N.J., 98 N.J. 421, 424
(1985)). Here, a construction of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d) that
applies the N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) exception to individuals such
as N.B., whose “sole sex offense” meets the criteria of that
19
exception and involves “members of no more than a single
household,” gives meaning to every word chosen by the
Legislature.
The legislative history of the 2004 amendment is consistent
with this construction of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d). The Senate and
Assembly committees that reported on the bill issued nearly
identical statements explaining the scope of the N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13(d) exceptions to Megan’s Law registration requirements:
These narrow exceptions apply to sex
offenders deemed to be a moderate risk of re-
offense who have committed no more than a
single “Megan’s Law” sex offense which falls
into one of the three enumerated categories.
In rulings concerning these exceptions, courts
have varied on the meaning of the “sole sex
offense” requirement. For example, some
courts have construed this term to apply to
offenses which involved only a single incident
or occurrence, or no more than one victim.
Other courts have construed this term more
broadly, considering the term to contemplate
the character, rather than the number of
offenses committed by a defendant, and
therefore applying the exception to offenders
who had one conviction which involved multiple
incidents or victims but which were
consolidated into separate counts of a single
indictment.
This bill clarifies the legislative
intent by defining “sole sex offense” as a
single conviction, adjudication of guilty or
acquittal by reason of insanity, as the case
may be, for a sex offense which involved no
more than one victim, no more than one
occurrence or, in the case of the incest
exception, members of no more than a single
household. This clarification will help
ensure that the statutory exemption from
20
inclusion on the Internet registry is not
improperly applied to repeat sex offenders who
offend against more than one victim or who
victimize a single individual more than once.
[S. Comm. Statement to S. 1208 (May 6, 2004);
Assemb. Comm. Statement to S. 1208 (June 3,
2004).]
Thus, the Senate and Assembly committee statements
reiterate the statutory language distinguishing “the incest
exception” of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) from the narrower
exceptions set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(1) and (d)(3). The
final sentence of each committee statement, which summarizes the
amendment, but omits the reference to the household/incest
exception of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2), does not nullify the
statutory language.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature intended the
household/incest exception to apply to a registrant whose single
conviction otherwise meets the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13(d)(2) and involves more than one instance of sexual contact
with a single victim who is within his or her household.
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2).6 N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(2) applies to N.B.,
who has a single conviction for one count of second-degree
6 If we have misconstrued the legislative intent, a clarifying
amendment by the Legislature can remedy any misperception.
21
sexual assault, premised upon his sexual contact with a
relative.7
IV.
Even if one of the exceptions of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)
applies to a given offender, that offender’s registration record
may nonetheless be made available to the public through the
internet if the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(e) are met:
Notwithstanding the provisions of [N.J.S.A.
2C:7-13(d)], the individual registration
record of an offender to whom an exception
enumerated in [N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(d)(1), (2) or
(3)] applies shall be made available to the
public on the Internet registry if the
offender’s conduct was characterized by a
pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior, or
the State establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that, given the particular facts and
circumstances of the offense and the
characteristics and propensities of the
offender, the risk to the general public posed
by the offender is substantially similar to
that posed by offenders whose risk of re-
offense is moderate and who do not qualify
under the enumerated exceptions.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(e).]
Although the State argued before the trial court that
N.B.’s interaction with his half-sister’s friend indicated that
7 N.B.’s conviction was based on a plea allocution admitting to
acts only against a single victim, his half-sister.
Accordingly, we do not address whether an offender with a single
conviction premised upon multiple admitted acts upon multiple
victims, all within the household and to whom the offender was
related “by blood or affinity to the third degree . . . ,” would
fall within the household/incest exception of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-
13(d)(2).
22
he might pose a greater risk to the public than a typical
offender in the household/incest category, the record does not
reveal a finding by the trial court under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(e).
Accordingly, on remand, N.B. should be included on the internet
registry if the trial court determines that his “conduct was
characterized by a pattern of repetitive, compulsive behavior,
or the State establishes by clear and convincing evidence that”
N.B. poses a risk to the general public that is “substantially
similar to that posed by offenders whose risk of re-offense is
moderate and who do not qualify under the enumerated
exceptions.” N.J.S.A. 2C:7-13(e).
V.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the
matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily
assigned) join in this opinion.
23
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. A-94 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
IN THE MATTER OF REGISTRANT
N.B. APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF NOTIFICATION AND
TIER CLASSIFICATION
DECIDED July 7, 2015
Chief Justice Rabner PRESIDING
OPINION BY Per Curiam
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
REVERSE AND
CHECKLIST
REMAND
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X
JUSTICE SOLOMON X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X
TOTALS 7