Christine Minsavage v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund (081507) (Statewide) ( 2019 )


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  •                                        SYLLABUS
    This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
    Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
    Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
    Christine Minsavage v. Board of Trustees, Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund
    (A-48-18) (081507)
    Argued September 9, 2019 -- Decided October 24, 2019
    PER CURIAM
    The issue in this appeal is whether a widow can modify the retirement application
    of her recently deceased husband, who was a member of the Teachers’ Pension and
    Annuity Fund (Pension Fund), even though his application was never approved because
    he selected a retirement option for which he was ultimately ineligible.
    David and Christine Minsavage were married and had four children. David had
    served as a math teacher for more than twenty-four years when he was diagnosed with
    terminal stage IV pancreatic cancer in August 2014. In November 2014, following
    advice allegedly provided by a New Jersey Education Association representative, David
    selected the “early retirement” option on his retirement application. Early retirement
    eligibility requires twenty-five years of teaching service.
    On April 9, 2015, David passed away, having accumulated just over twenty-four
    years and nine months of teaching service over the course of his career. Less than two
    weeks after David’s death, the Division of Pension and Benefits notified Christine that
    David’s retirement application would not be approved because he had not completed
    twenty-five years of teaching service. As a result, Christine was entitled only to
    reimbursement of David’s pension contributions and a group life insurance benefit.
    Because David did not live long enough to qualify for early retirement, his family would
    have been entitled to greater benefits had he selected and qualified for “ordinary
    disability,” rather than “early retirement,” on his retirement application. Christine sought
    to modify David’s retirement application to select ordinary disability.
    The Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund (the Board) denied Christine’s request
    on the ground that the Pension Fund’s “administrative regulations do not allow for
    retroactive disability retirement applications, and become effective only on or after the
    date of filing.” The Appellate Division affirmed, noting that Christine’s proofs “fell short
    of establishing incapacitation” and that “[t]he plain language of N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.3
    indicates it only applies to a retirement application the Board has already approved.”
    1
    HELD: Neither membership nor prior approval of a retirement application is required
    for modification of a retirement selection where good cause, reasonable grounds, and
    reasonable diligence are shown. The Court remands this matter for further proceedings to
    allow petitioner Christine Minsavage the opportunity to argue in favor of modification
    under that standard.
    1. Pension statutes should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons
    intended to be benefited thereby. For nearly seven decades the Court has maintained that
    the power to reopen proceedings may be invoked by administrative agencies to serve the
    ends of essential justice and the policy of the law. That principle applies equally to the
    right to amend a retirement application. That a pensioner is not a member of the Pension
    Fund when attempting to modify a retirement application does not on its own preclude
    such modification, and beneficiaries have been allowed to change the retirement
    application of a deceased member of the public pension systems. Additionally, the
    common law “establishe[s] that the Board may honor a pensioner’s request to reopen her
    retirement selection” upon “a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable
    diligence” even “after it is due and payable.” Steinmann v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
    116 N.J. 564
    , 573 (1989); Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., PERS, 
    76 N.J. 203
    , 207 (1978). Therefore,
    notwithstanding N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.3(a)’s reference to the period before an allowance
    “becomes due and payable,” an application for pension benefits may be amended whether
    or not pension benefits are due and payable upon the proper showing. (pp. 5-8)
    2. Here, the Board acted unreasonably by denying Christine’s request to modify David’s
    retirement application upon its stated grounds. The interests of justice and a liberal
    reading of the applicable pension laws require that Christine be given an opportunity to
    prove at a hearing that she exercised reasonable diligence and seeks to modify David’s
    retirement selection for good cause upon reasonable grounds. (pp. 8-9)
    The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is
    REMANDED to the Board for further proceedings.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
    FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this opinion.
    2
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    A-48 September Term 2018
    081507
    Christine Minsavage for
    David Minsavage (deceased),
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    Board of Trustees, Teachers’
    Pension and Annuity Fund,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    On certification to the Superior Court,
    Appellate Division.
    Argued                       Decided
    September 9, 2019             October 24, 2019
    John C. Kelly argued the cause for appellant (McCarter &
    English, attorneys; John C. Kelly, of counsel and on the
    briefs).
    Amy Chung, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause
    for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General,
    attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General,
    of counsel, and Christopher Meyer, Deputy Attorney
    General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    1
    The issue in this appeal is whether a widow can modify the retirement
    application of her recently deceased husband, who was a member of the
    Teachers’ Pension and Annuity Fund (Pension Fund), even though his
    application was never approved because he selected a retirement option for
    which he was ultimately ineligible. We hold that neither membership nor prior
    approval of a retirement application is required for modification of a
    retirement selection where good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable
    diligence are shown, and we remand this matter for further proceedings to
    allow petitioner Christine Minsavage the opportunity to argue in favor of
    modification under that standard.
    I.
    The appellate record reveals that David and Christine Minsavage were
    married and had four children. David had served as a math teacher at Hanover
    Park High School for more than twenty-four years when he was diagnosed
    with terminal stage IV pancreatic cancer in August 2014. In November 2014 ,
    following advice allegedly provided by a New Jersey Education Association
    representative, David selected the “early retirement” option on his retirement
    application. Early retirement eligibility requires twenty-five years of teaching
    service. N.J.S.A. 18A:66-113.1.
    2
    David’s cancer developed rapidly, and he stopped teaching in mid-
    December 2014. On April 9, 2015, David passed away. Because the school
    listed his last day of teaching service as the day before he died, David
    accumulated just over twenty-four years and nine months of teaching service
    over the course of his career.
    Less than two weeks after David’s death, the Division of Pension and
    Benefits notified Christine that David’s retirement application would not be
    approved because he had not completed twenty-five years of teaching service
    when he died; had he lived to teach until July 1, 2015, David would have been
    eligible for early retirement. Had David qualified for and chosen early
    retirement, his beneficiary -- his widow Christine -- would have received
    $3,423.06 each month. Because David did not qualify for his retirement
    selection, Christine was entitled only to reimbursement of David’s pension
    contributions and a group life insurance benefit.
    Because David did not live long enough to qualify for early retirement,
    his family would have been entitled to greater benefits had he selected and
    qualified for “ordinary disability,” rather than “early retirement,” on his
    3
    retirement application. 1 On June 15, 2015, Christine sought to modify David’s
    retirement application to select ordinary disability rather than early retirement.
    The Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund (the Board) denied
    Christine’s request on the ground that the Pension Fund’s “administrative
    regulations do not allow for retroactive disability retirement applications, and
    become effective only on or after the date of filing.” (citing N.J.A.C. 17:3-
    6.1(f)(5)). The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that it could not “rely on
    [Christine’s] hindsight to permit her to alter or amend [David’s] retirement
    application” because her proofs “fell short of establishing incapacitation” and
    because “[t]he plain language of N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.3 indicates it only applies to
    a retirement application the Board has already approved.”
    The Attorney General asks this Court to affirm the Appellate Division’s
    decision, arguing on behalf of the Board that because David’s Pension Fund
    membership terminated upon his death, he cannot now submit a new or
    modified retirement application. The Attorney General further asserts that
    because David’s application was never approved and thus never became due
    and payable, his application cannot be modified.
    1
    Whether David would have qualified for ordinary disability is a question this
    Court leaves to be resolved on remand. The record does not specify the value
    of entitlements his family would have received if David had selected and
    qualified for ordinary disability on his retirement application.
    4
    We reject the Attorney General’s contention that the right to reopen a
    retirement application for good cause never extends to those for whom benefits
    never became due and payable because they selected a retirement option for
    which they were not yet eligible. Neither membership nor prior approval of a
    retirement application is necessary to modify an application where good cause,
    reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence are shown.
    II.
    We begin by recognizing that “[a] primary objective in establishing
    [pensions] is to induce able persons to enter and remain in public employment,
    and to render faithful and efficient service.” Geller v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
    53 N.J. 591
    , 597 (1969); accord In re Van Orden, 
    383 N.J. Super. 410
    , 421 (App.
    Div. 2006). Thus, pension statutes “should be liberally construed and
    administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby .”
    Steinmann v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
    116 N.J. 564
    , 572 (1989) (quoting 
    Geller, 53 N.J. at 597-98
    ); see also Fiola v. Dep’t of Treasury, 
    193 N.J. Super. 340
    , 347
    (App. Div. 1984) (“It is virtually axiomatic that statutory pension provisions
    are to be liberally construed in favor of public employees . . . .”).
    Accordingly, for nearly seven decades this Court has maintained that
    “[t]he power to reopen proceedings ‘may be invoked by administrative
    agencies to serve the ends of essential justice and the policy of the law. ’” In re
    5
    Van 
    Orden, 383 N.J. Super. at 419
    (quoting Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 
    4 N.J. 99
    , 107 (1950)); accord Duvin v. Bd. of Trs., PERS, 
    76 N.J. 203
    , 207
    (1978). That principle applies equally to the right to amend a retirement
    application.
    Generally, a “member shall have the right to withdraw, cancel, or change
    an application for retirement at any time before the member’s retirement
    allowance becomes due and payable by sending a written request signed by the
    member.” N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.3(a) (emphases added). “A member’s retirement
    allowance shall not become due and payable until 30 days after the date the
    Board approved the application for retirement . . . .” N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.2.
    Although Pension Fund “[m]embership of any person shall cease . . . at
    death,” N.J.S.A. 18A:66-7(e), this Court has long held that membership is not
    a necessary condition of the right to modify a retirement application , see
    
    Duvin, 76 N.J. at 207
    (“While we agree with PERS that respondent’s
    application for accidental disability benefits was filed at a time when
    respondent had ceased to be a member of PERS, this is not fully dispositive of
    the matter.”). Accordingly, that a pensioner is not a member of the Pension
    Fund when attempting to modify a retirement application does not on its own
    preclude such modification. 
    Ibid. By the same
    logic, beneficiaries have been
    allowed to change the retirement application of a deceased member of the
    6
    public pension systems. See Bumbaco v. Bd. of Trs., PERS, 
    325 N.J. Super. 90
    (App. Div. 1999).
    Additionally, our common law “establishe[s] that the Board may honor a
    pensioner’s request to reopen her retirement selection” upon “a showing of
    good cause, reasonable grounds, and reasonable diligence” even “after it is due
    and payable.” 
    Steinmann, 116 N.J. at 573
    ; see 
    Duvin, 76 N.J. at 207
    ; see also
    Harris ex. rel. Harris v. Bd. of Trs., PERS, 
    378 N.J. Super. 459
    , 462-66 (App.
    Div. 2005) (tolling the pension modification period to permit a widower to
    modify his late wife’s pension in light of her incapacity during that period).
    Therefore, notwithstanding N.J.A.C. 17:3-6.3(a)’s reference to the period
    before an allowance “becomes due and payable,” an application for pension
    benefits may be amended whether or not pension benefits are due and payable
    upon the proper showing.
    Furthermore, although past cases invoking good cause to reopen
    retirement applications involved approved applications, we have never held
    that a retirement selection cannot be modified unless the application has been
    approved. See 
    Steinmann, 116 N.J. at 572-73
    ; 
    Duvin, 76 N.J. at 207
    . To the
    contrary, a retirement application, whether approved or not, may be reopened
    and modified upon a showing of good cause, reasonable grounds, and
    reasonable diligence.
    7
    The pensioners in Steinmann and Duvin selected sub-optimal retirement
    options. 
    Steinmann, 116 N.J. at 565
    ; 
    Duvin, 76 N.J. at 205-06
    . This Court
    held that the Steinmann pensioner had shown good cause for amending her
    pension designation and should have been permitted to do 
    so, 116 N.J. at 577
    -
    78, and that the Duvin pensioner should have the opportunity at further
    proceedings to show good cause “for reopening his original pension
    application and allowing him to claim accidental disability retirement in lieu of
    early retirement 
    allowance,” 76 N.J. at 208
    .
    Here, Christine claims that David was mistaken when he selected the
    “early retirement” option for which he was ultimately ineligible and that he
    was incapacitated from amending his selection thereafter. Because of this
    alleged mistake and incapacity, the Board would have the Minsavages receive
    only a nominal benefit from the Pension Fund to which David contributed for
    297 months.
    We conclude the Board acted unreasonably by denying Christine’s
    request to modify David’s retirement application upon its stated grounds. See
    In re Stallworth, 
    208 N.J. 182
    , 194 (2011) (noting that agency decisions are
    subject to reversal if they are “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable”). In the
    case at hand, the interests of justice and a liberal reading of the applicable
    pension laws require that Christine be given an opportunity to present evidence
    8
    and prove at a hearing that she exercised reasonable diligence and seeks to
    modify David’s retirement selection for good cause upon reasonable grounds.
    Such proof must include evidence that David qualified for ordinary disability
    retirement and that, but for his incapacity, he would have changed his
    retirement selection to ordinary disability.
    III.
    The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter remanded
    to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
    PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this
    opinion.
    9