In the Matter of Neil M. Cohen, an Attorney at Law , 220 N.J. 7 ( 2014 )

SYLLABUS
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)
In the Matter of Neil M. Cohen, an Attorney at Law (D-50-13) (073728)
Argued June 24, 2014 -- Decided October 23, 2014
FAUSTINO FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
In this case, the Court considers the discipline to be imposed on an attorney who pleaded guilty to second-
degree endangering the welfare of a child, following an investigation into sexually explicit pornographic images of
children discovered on a state-issued desktop computer used by respondent and on respondent’s private law office
computer.
The facts of this case are undisputed. In July 2008, printouts of pornographic images, some of which
depicted young female victims, were found in a receptionist’s desk drawer at the district office of New Jersey’s
Twentieth Legislative District. At the time, respondent was an assemblyman representing the Twentieth District.
The discovery led to an investigation by the New Jersey State Police, which revealed that this was not the first time
pornography was encountered at the office; staff had previously discovered sexually explicit images in the office
during morning work hours or following a weekend. As a result, the Office of Legislative Services required
passwords on the computers.
When confronted, respondent admitted to the State Police that he had visited pornographic sites and printed
the sexually explicit pictures. He acknowledged that the sites he viewed and the printed images contained both adult
and child pornography. He explained that he had accessed the receptionist’s state-issued computer with a password
that he instructed another member of his staff to obtain. Interviews also revealed that staff members observed
respondent viewing pornography on the receptionist’s computer on prior occasions. In total, the police recovered
thirty-four images of child pornography that respondent accessed on computers at the district office and at
respondent’s law office. The images retrieved from respondent’s law office depicted nineteen girls under sixteen
years old.
Respondent resigned from his position in the Legislature on July 20, 2008. On July 9, 2009, the State
Grand Jury returned a five-count indictment against respondent. He pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a), on April 12, 2010. Pursuant to his guilty
plea, respondent was sentenced on November 4, 2010 to five years in State prison. He was ordered to comply with
Megan’s Law requirements, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, and he was prohibited from using the Internet. Respondent was
temporarily suspended from the practice of law on January 13, 2011, following his guilty plea. In re Cohen, 204
N.J. 588 (2011). Thereafter, the Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) granted the Office of Attorney Ethics’s (OAE)
motion for final discipline. Finding that respondent’s guilty plea was conclusive evidence of guilt for purposes of
the disciplinary proceeding, Rule 1:20-13(c), the DRB, in a majority decision, voted to prospectively suspend
respondent from the practice of law for two years. Two members of the panel dissented and voted for disbarment.
HELD: Respondent’s guilty plea to second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, based on the discovery of
sexually explicit pornographic images of children on a state-issued desktop computer – used by him while serving as
Assemblyman – and on his private law office computer, warrants an indeterminate period of suspension, pursuant to
Rule 1:20-15A(a)(2). Respondent may not seek reinstatement for five years from January 13, 2011, the date of his
temporary suspension.
1. The Court’s role in this matter is solely to impose an appropriate quantum of discipline on respondent for his
ethical violations. Under Rule 1:20-13(c)(1), a criminal conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary
proceeding. Respondent’s guilty plea to second-degree possession of child pornography constitutes a violation of
RPC 8.4(b), which dictates that professional misconduct occurs when an attorney “commit[s] a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.” The primary purpose of
discipline is not to punish the attorney but to preserve the confidence of the public in the bar, and discipline is
imposed even when an attorney’s offense is not related to the practice of law. In reaching a final sanction for an
attorney’s ethics violation, the Court takes into consideration several factors, including “the nature and severity of
the crime, whether the crime is related to the practice of law and any mitigating factors, such as respondent’s
reputation, his prior trustworthy conduct and general good conduct.” In re Lunetta, 118 N.J. 443, 445-46 (1989).
(pp. 4-5)
2. Crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children have a devastating impact and create serious consequences
for the victims. Child pornography, in particular, revictimizes the children involved with each viewing of the same
image or video. Thus, the moral reprehensibility of this type of behavior warrants serious disciplinary penalties, up
to and including disbarment, albeit mitigating circumstances might call for lesser discipline in particular cases. For
cases involving possession of child pornography, the discipline imposed has ranged from a six-month suspension to
disbarment. Disbarment is the most severe punishment, reserved for circumstances in which “the misconduct of
[the] attorney is so immoral, venal, corrupt or criminal as to destroy totally any vestige of confidence that the
individual could ever again practice in conformity with the standards of the profession.” In re Templeton, 99 N.J.
365, 376 (1985). The Court disbarred an attorney who had been actively viewing child pornography for ten years,
had in his possession the equivalent of 753 images of child pornography, and had traded these images with other
persons. In re Burak, 208 N.J. 484 (2012). Similarly, the Court disbarred an attorney after he pleaded guilty in the
United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire to felony possession of child pornography, a
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). In re Sosnowski, 197 N.J. 23 (2008). More generally, attorneys who
have been convicted of offenses involving the physical sexual assault of children have typically been disbarred by
this Court. (pp. 5-12)
3. Respondent’s behavior is more severe than the cases in which a six-month suspension was issued. In addition to
printing sexually explicit images of children, respondent used a receptionist’s computer and left images at the
receptionist’s desk where others found them, thereby exposing an innocent third party to the risk of criminal
liability. On the other hand, respondent did not actively disseminate the photographs and was not involved in
trading prohibited images with others, as the attorney in Burak, supra, and respondent did not install cameras to
watch children as the attorney did in Sosnowski, supra. Moreover, respondent did not record or produce
inappropriate videos of children, nor did respondent physically touch any children or use violence against them.
Still, the gravity of respondent’s offense against society and the child victims involved in the creation and
dissemination of child pornography compels the Court to expand upon this Court’s past approach to attorney
discipline in these types of circumstances. Today, the Court is more acutely aware of the long-lasting pernicious
effects of sexual crimes against children. While recognizing that different factors can affect the level of discipline
imposed in any disciplinary case, attorneys must be on notice that engaging in this form of unlawful activity may be
considered grounds for losing the privilege of membership in a distinguished and trusted profession. While the
Court does not establish a per se rule of disbarment, convictions in egregious cases may result in disbarment going
forward so as to align with society’s sharper understanding of, and indignation over, the harm caused by the
exploitation of child victims of pornographers. (pp. 12-15)
4. After analyzing and weighing the circumstances of respondent’s criminal offense, as well as respondent’s alleged
mental illness, his own experience being sexually abused as a child, and his cooperation in seeking treatment and his
progress thus far, the Court has determined to impose, for the first time, discipline not formerly used. Respondent
shall serve an indeterminate period of suspension, pursuant to Rule 1:20-15A(a)(2). This form of discipline is a step
short of disbarment and is the most severe suspension that can be imposed on an attorney. Imposition of the
indeterminate suspension in this case places all attorneys on notice of the consequences that may follow sexually-
related offenses. Respondent may not seek reinstatement for five years from the date of his temporary suspension.
In addition, he must establish his fitness to practice law prior to being readmitted to the practice of law in New
Jersey. Proof of fitness will be subject to vigorous review. (pp. 15-16)
So Ordered.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON and SOLOMON;
and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
D-50 September Term 2013
073728
IN THE MATTER OF
NEIL M. COHEN,
An Attorney at Law
Argued June 24, 2014 – Decided October 23, 2014
On an Order to show cause why respondent
should not be disbarred or otherwise
disciplined.
Michael J. Sweeney, First Assistant Ethics
Counsel, argued the cause on behalf of the
Office of Attorney Ethics.
Daniel J. McCarthy argued the cause for
respondent (Rogut McCarthy, attorneys).
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of
the Court.
In this case, respondent, Neil M. Cohen, an attorney
licensed to practice law in New Jersey, pleaded guilty to
second-degree endangering the welfare of a child, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a). The plea followed an investigation
into sexually explicit pornographic images of children
discovered on a state-issued desktop computer used by respondent
and on respondent’s private law office computer. He was
sentenced to five years in prison for his offense.
1
We now sanction respondent to an indeterminate suspension
from the practice of law, pursuant to Rule 1:20-15A(a)(2). We
caution that while we do not establish a bright-line rule
requiring disbarment in all cases involving sexual offenses
against children, in the future, convictions in egregious cases
involving child pornography may result in disbarment of
attorneys who commit these offenses, in light of society’s
increasing recognition of the harm done to the victims of those
offenses.
I.
The facts of this case are undisputed. In July 2008,
printouts of pornographic images, some of which depicted young
female victims, were found in a receptionist’s desk drawer at
the district office of New Jersey’s Twentieth Legislative
District. At the time, respondent was an assemblyman
representing the Twentieth District. The discovery led to an
investigation by the New Jersey State Police, which revealed
that this was not the first time pornography was encountered at
the office; staff had previously discovered sexually explicit
images in the office during morning work hours or following a
weekend. As a result, the Office of Legislative Services
required passwords on the computers.
When confronted, respondent admitted to the State Police
that he had visited pornographic sites and printed the sexually
2
explicit pictures. He acknowledged that the sites he viewed and
the printed images contained both adult and child pornography.
He explained that he had accessed the receptionist’s state-
issued computer with a password that he instructed another
member of his staff to obtain. Interviews also revealed that
staff members observed respondent viewing pornography on the
receptionist’s computer on prior occasions.
In total, the police recovered thirty-four images of child
pornography that respondent accessed on computers at the
district office and at respondent’s law office. The images
retrieved from respondent’s law office depicted nineteen girls
under sixteen years old.
Respondent resigned from his position in the Legislature on
July 20, 2008. On July 9, 2009, the State Grand Jury returned a
five-count indictment against respondent. He pleaded guilty to
one count of second-degree endangering the welfare of a child,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(a), on April 12, 2010.
Pursuant to his guilty plea, respondent was sentenced on
November 4, 2010 to five years in State prison.1 He was ordered
to comply with Megan’s Law requirements, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11,
and he was prohibited from using the Internet.
1 On January 4, 2012, after serving fourteen months of his five-
year sentence, respondent was released from prison on parole.
3
Respondent was temporarily suspended from the practice of
law on January 13, 2011, following his guilty plea. In re
Cohen, 204 N.J. 588 (2011). Thereafter, the Disciplinary Review
Board (DRB) granted the Office of Attorney Ethics’s (OAE) motion
for final discipline. Finding that respondent’s guilty plea was
conclusive evidence of guilt for purposes of the disciplinary
proceeding, Rule 1:20-13(c), the DRB, in a majority decision,
voted to prospectively suspend respondent from the practice of
law for two years. Two members of the panel dissented and voted
for disbarment. Respondent consents to the suspension, but
seeks to have it applied retroactively to the date of his
temporary suspension.
II.
We begin by emphasizing that our role in this matter is
solely to impose an appropriate quantum of discipline on
respondent for his ethical violations. R. 1:20-13(c); R. 1:20-
16; In re Principato, 139 N.J. 456, 460 (1995); In re Magid, 139
N.J. 449, 451-52 (1995). Under Rule 1:20-13(c)(1), a criminal
conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt in a disciplinary
proceeding. Respondent’s guilty plea to second-degree
possession of child pornography constitutes a violation of RPC
8.4(b), which dictates that professional misconduct occurs when
an attorney “commit[s] a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.”
4
As we engage in our analysis, we note that the primary
purpose of discipline is not to punish the attorney but to
preserve the confidence of the public in the bar. In re
Witherspoon, 203 N.J. 343, 358 (2010). Discipline is imposed
even when an attorney’s offense is not related to the practice
of law. In re Kinnear, 105 N.J. 391, 395 (1987). This is
because “[t]he privilege to practice law is dependent on an
attorney's ability to maintain a high moral character.” In re
Hasbrouck, 140 N.J. 162, 166 (1995).
In reaching a final sanction for an attorney’s ethics
violation, we take into consideration several factors, including
“the nature and severity of the crime, whether the crime is
related to the practice of law and any mitigating factors, such
as respondent’s reputation, his prior trustworthy conduct and
general good conduct.” In re Lunetta, 118 N.J. 443, 445-46
(1989).
III.
Our decision in this case is driven by the gravity of the
offense. Crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children
have a devastating impact and create serious consequences for
the victims. Child pornography, in particular, revictimizes the
children involved with each viewing of the same image or video.
Thus, the moral reprehensibility of this type of behavior
warrants serious disciplinary penalties, up to and including
5
disbarment. Mitigating circumstances might call for lesser
discipline in particular cases.
A.
For cases involving possession of child pornography, the
discipline imposed has ranged from a six-month suspension to
disbarment. For example, In re Armour, 192 N.J. 218 (2006),
involved a six-month suspension for an attorney who pleaded
guilty to fourth-degree endangering the welfare of a child,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b).2 In that case, the
attorney, who was general counsel for Newark Housing Authority
at the time, viewed many images of child pornography on a
government-owned computer while at work. He was sentenced to
eighteen months’ probation.
Similarly, In re Haldusiewicz, 185 N.J. 278 (2005),
concerned a six-month suspension imposed on a Deputy Attorney
General who also pleaded guilty to fourth-degree endangering the
welfare of a child, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b), when
he was caught having downloaded 996 images of child pornography
on his office’s desktop computer. He was sentenced to three
years’ probation, ordered to pay fines and costs, and prohibited
2 The facts of these cases are derived from DRB opinions that are
archived and available on the Rutgers School of Law – Newark
website. Decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Disciplinary Review Board, Rutgers School of Law – Newark,
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/drb/ (last visited August
22, 2014).
6
from unsupervised contact with children under the age of
sixteen. Notably, although the attorney was a government
lawyer, discipline was not enhanced because his misconduct had
no bearing on his work. The mitigating factors considered
included the attorney’s difficulty in establishing a new
professional career and the forfeiture of his pension and other
benefits.
We imposed a six-month suspension on an attorney who
admitted to downloading internet images of children engaging in
sexual acts, several hundred of which were found on his home
computer. In re Kennedy, 177 N.J. 517 (2003). He pleaded
guilty to fourth-degree endangering the welfare of a child,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b), and received three years
probation. In that case, two psychologists opined that the
attorney was not a risk to the community and that his collection
of images was partially due to a hoarding disorder.
Likewise, an attorney was suspended from the practice of
law for six months, who was found in possession of twenty-three
pictures of children engaged in various sexual acts, which he
had downloaded from the internet to his home computer. In re
Rosanelli, 176 N.J. 275 (2003). The attorney was admitted into
a pretrial intervention program after pleading guilty to fourth-
degree endangering the welfare of a child, contrary to N.J.S.A.
2C:24-4(b)(5)(b). Psychiatric and psychological reports
7
indicated that the attorney was not likely to engage in similar
misconduct in the future, was not a risk to his clients, to
children, or to the community, and that there was no “serious
sexual psychopathology.”
B.
More serious involvement with child pornography has been
held in several cases to warrant harsher disciplinary actions.
In In re Peck, 177 N.J. 249 (2003), for example, an attorney
pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, a violation
of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4)(B). The attorney possessed at least
three magazines, which were mailed from New York to New Jersey,
with pictures of children engaged in sexually explicit
activities. The attorney was sentenced to a fifteen-month
prison term, followed by a three-year probationary term. We
imposed a one-year suspension retroactive to the respondent’s
temporary suspension, ultimately determining that the nineteen
months he spent in prison was an appropriate suspension and
sufficient discipline.
In a different setting, a two-year suspension, retroactive
to the date of the attorney’s temporary suspension, was imposed
on an attorney who pleaded guilty in federal court to possession
of computer files and images downloaded from the internet, which
depicted minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, a
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252(a)(4). In re McBroom, 158 N.J.
8
258 (1999). There, the attorney was sentenced to a fifteen-
month term of imprisonment, followed by three years’ probation.
On remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, the attorney was resentenced to six months’
imprisonment, followed by two months of home confinement, based
on substantial evidence he suffered from years of sexual abuse
by his father as a child. United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d
533, 534 (3d Cir. 1997). We noted that, even though the
attorney did not have personal contact with the victims, he was
convicted of a crime that carried a maximum five-year prison
sentence and a $250,000 fine. We also ordered that the attorney
“provide proof of his psychiatric fitness to practice law” prior
to his reinstatement as a licensed attorney. In re McBroom,
supra, 158 N.J. at 259.
In another matter, an attorney was suspended from the
practice of law in New Jersey for three years after he was
convicted of fifteen counts of felony possession of pornography
and fifteen counts of unlawful dealing in child pornography. In
re Fink, 181 N.J. 350 (2004). There, investigators found 194
pictures of prepubescent children engaged in prohibited sexual
acts in the attorney’s possession while executing a search
warrant premised on the attorney’s alleged misappropriation of
client funds. However, we conditioned the respondent’s
suspension in Fink on the attorney’s release following his six-
9
year term of incarceration and reinstatement to the Delaware
Bar, from which he consented to be disbarred.3
C.
In some circumstances, we have disbarred attorneys involved
with child pornography, rather than imposing a lengthy
suspension. Disbarment is the most severe punishment, reserved
for circumstances in which “the misconduct of [the] attorney is
so immoral, venal, corrupt or criminal as to destroy totally any
vestige of confidence that the individual could ever again
practice in conformity with the standards of the profession.”
In re Templeton, 99 N.J. 365, 376 (1985).
For example, we concluded that disbarment was an
appropriate discipline for an attorney who had been actively
viewing child pornography for ten years, had in his possession
the equivalent of 753 images of child pornography, and had
traded these images with other persons. In re Burak, 208 N.J.
484 (2012). We found particularly unsettling the fact that
several of the images portrayed children engaged in “sadistic or
masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence,” such as
bondage. The respondent in Burak pleaded guilty to one count of
possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. §
2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), and was subsequently sentenced to
3 Disbarment in Delaware is not permanent. See Del. Lawyers’
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 22(c) (2000).
10
more than eight years in prison. We also took into account that
the attorney had been indicted for criminal sexual contact with
a minor female relative during the time that the FBI was
investigating his child pornography activities.
Similarly, we disbarred an attorney after he pleaded guilty
in the United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire to felony possession of child pornography, a violation
of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). In re Sosnowski, 197 N.J. 23
(2008). The attorney admitted to possessing sixty-seven images
of child pornography and eight sexually explicit video files of
children engaging in sexual acts and exposing their genitals.
In addition, the attorney had placed hidden cameras in a child’s
bathroom and bedroom. He was sentenced to thirty-seven months
in prison, with five years of supervised release, and was
ordered to pay a $100 assessment.
More generally, attorneys who have been convicted of
offenses involving the physical sexual assault of children have
typically been disbarred by this Court. In re Wright, 152 N.J.
35, 35 (1997) (disbarring attorney convicted of aggravated
criminal sexual assault for digitally penetrating his minor
daughter’s vaginal area); In re “X”, 120 N.J. 459, 464-65 (1990)
(disbarring lawyer who sexually assaulted his three daughters
over an eight-year period); cf. In re Herman, 108 N.J. 66, 67
(1987) (suspending attorney for three years for purposely
11
touching the buttocks of a ten-year-old boy, a second-degree
sexual assault).
Most recently, we disbarred an attorney who pleaded guilty
to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child, in violation
of N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). In re Frye, 217 N.J. 438 (2014).
There, the respondent admitted to improperly touching a nine-
year-old child in 1999, with the intent to “impair or debauch
the morals of the child.” Respondent was sentenced to five
years’ non-custodial probation, community supervision for life,
and was prohibited from having contact with the victim. In
September 2003, the respondent was found guilty of violating his
probation by failing to report to his probation officer on six
dates and failing to attend sex therapy. On September 19, 2003,
he was sentenced to continued probation. We based his
disbarment sanction on the crimes themselves and respondent’s
failure to notify the OAE of his conviction for more than
fifteen years, during which he continued to practice law with
impunity.
IV.
Were we limited to past approaches to fixing the proper
quantum of punishment for child-pornography-related cases
involving licensed attorneys, we would judge the behavior of the
respondent in this case to be more severe than the cases in
which a six-month suspension was issued. Respondent’s guilty
12
plea for endangering the welfare of a child was a crime of the
second-degree resulting in a five-year prison sentence. The
crime was certainly more serious than the offenses committed in
Armour, Haldusiewicz, Kennedy, and Rosanelli. In those matters,
the respondents pleaded guilty to a fourth-degree charge and
were either admitted into a pretrial intervention program or
sentenced only to a term of probation. Moreover, like the
respondents in Armour and Haldusiewicz, respondent in this
matter used a state-issued computer to download the images while
at work. Respondent, however, took matters one step further by
using a receptionist’s computer, thereby exposing an innocent
third party to the risk of criminal liability.
On the other hand, although respondent printed sexually
explicit images of children and left them in a receptionist’s
desk where others found them, he did not actively disseminate
the photographs and was not involved in trading prohibited
images with others, as the attorney in Burak. Moreover,
respondent did not install cameras to watch children as the
attorney did in Sosnowski, and he did not record or produce
inappropriate videos of children. Nor did respondent physically
touch any children or use violence against them. Based on the
facts adduced in past disciplinary matters, the setting of this
case is closest to the circumstances of McBroom and Peak because
13
respondent was found in possession of child pornography and was
sentenced to serve time in prison.
Still, the gravity of respondent’s offense against society
and the child victims involved in the creation and dissemination
of child pornography compels us to expand upon this Court’s past
approach to attorney discipline in these types of circumstances.
Today, we are more acutely aware of the long-lasting pernicious
effects of sexual crimes against children. In light of the
seriousness of these crimes, the Legislature acknowledged this
increased awareness when it amended N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4 in 2013.
L. 2013, c. 136. The amendment increased the severity of crimes
involving possession and dissemination of child pornography, and
increased the age of children -- from sixteen to eighteen years
old -- for which individuals can be prosecuted under the child
endangerment statutes. Assemb. Law and Public Safety Comm.,
Statement to S. No. 2493 and Assemb. Nos. 3735 and 3740, 215th
Leg. at 1 (May 6, 2013).
Until now attorneys have not had clear notice of the more
stringent approach we will take in disciplining attorneys for
egregious offenses. Today, attorneys must be on notice that
engaging in this form of unlawful activity may be considered
grounds for losing the privilege of membership in a
distinguished and trusted profession. While we do not establish
a per se rule of disbarment, convictions in egregious cases may
14
result in disbarment going forward so as to align with society’s
sharper understanding of, and indignation over, the harm caused
by the exploitation of child victims of pornographers.
We recognize that different factors can affect the level of
discipline imposed in any disciplinary case, including child
pornography cases. Such factors include whether the case
involved touching, physical violence, or actual dissemination to
others, the number of pictures or videos, or whether the
perpetrator suffered from mental illness or sexual abuse himself
or herself.
In the case at hand, after analyzing and weighing the
circumstances of respondent’s criminal offense, as well as
respondent’s alleged mental illness, his own experience being
sexually abused as a child, and his cooperation in seeking
treatment and his progress thus far, we have determined to
impose, for the first time, discipline not formerly used. We
hold that respondent shall serve an indeterminate period of
suspension, pursuant to Rule 1:20-15A(a)(2). This form of
discipline is a step short of disbarment and is the most severe
suspension that can be imposed on an attorney.
Imposition of the indeterminate suspension in this case
places all attorneys on notice of the consequences that may
follow sexually-related offenses. Respondent may not seek
reinstatement for five years from the date of his temporary
15
suspension. In addition, he must establish his fitness to
practice law prior to being readmitted to the practice of law in
New Jersey. Proof of fitness will be subject to vigorous
review.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON
and SOLOMON; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
16
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
NO. D-50 SEPTEMBER TERM 2013
APPLICATION FOR
Order to Show Cause Why Respondent Should
DISPOSITION
Not be Disbarred or Otherwise Disciplined
IN THE MATTER OF
NEIL M. COHEN,
An Attorney at Law
DECIDED October 23, 2014
OPINION BY Justice Fernandez-Vina
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
INDETERMINATE
CHECKLIST
SUSPENSION
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER X
JUSTICE LaVECCHIA X
JUSTICE ALBIN X
JUSTICE PATTERSON X
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA X
JUSTICE SOLOMON X
JUDGE CUFF (t/a) X
TOTALS 7