State v. James Grate State v. Fuquan Cromwell (072750) ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                                                      SYLLABUS
    (This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
    convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
    interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
    State of New Jersey v. James Grate; State of New Jersey v. Fuquan Cromwell (A-47/48-13) (072750)
    Argued October 21, 2014 -- Decided January 15, 2015
    SOLOMON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
    In this appeal, the Court considers (1) whether the “knowingly” mens rea requirement of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    5(e)(1) applies to both the possession of the firearm and the defendant’s presence at an educational institution; (2)
    the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i)’s mandatory minimum sentence in light of in Alleyne v. United States,
    ___ U.S. ___, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
     (2013); and (3) the propriety of a defendant’s sentence.
    Defendants Fuquan Cromwell and James Grate were stopped by police officers on the campus of Drew
    University during the attempted robbery of an acquaintance. Defendants were charged with various offenses,
    including second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), and third-degree unlawful
    possession of a weapon at an educational institution, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1). With regard to the latter, the trial
    judge instructed the jury that the State must prove “the defendant possessed the firearm in or upon the buildings or
    grounds of any school, college, university, or other educational institution.” The judge did not ask the jury to decide
    whether defendants were aware that they were on the property of an educational institution. The jury found
    defendants guilty of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and third-degree unlawful possession of a
    weapon at an educational institution, and acquitted them of the remaining charges.
    At the sentencing hearing, Corporal Edwin Santana testified that defendants admitted they were members
    of a local chapter of the Crips street gang and that both defendants had tattoos denoting their membership. The
    judge found that aggravating factors five, a substantial likelihood that defendants were involved in organized
    criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5), three, the risk defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
    1(a)(3), and nine, the need for deterrence, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), applied to both defendants; that aggravating factor
    six, the extent of the defendant’s prior criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), applied solely to Cromwell; and that
    no mitigating factors applied. After merging the possession convictions, the court sentenced Grate and Cromwell to
    eight and nine years in prison, respectively. The court also ordered mandatory five-year parole disqualifiers under
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i), finding it substantially likely that defendants were involved in organized criminal activity.
    On appeal, defendants contended, among other things, that the jury charge for unlawful possession of a
    weapon at an educational institution improperly failed to instruct the jury that the “knowingly” mens rea
    requirement applied to the locational element of the crime. The Appellate Division rejected defendants’ arguments
    and affirmed their convictions and sentences. The Court entered limited grants of certification. State v. Cromwell,
    
    216 N.J. 361
     (2013); State v. Grate, 
    216 N.J. 362
     (2013).
    HELD: (1) In order to prove a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
    both that a defendant knowingly possessed a firearm and that he or she did so while knowingly on the property of an
    educational institution; (2) because the mandatory minimum sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) is based on a
    judicial finding of fact, rather than a finding by the jury, it is unconstitutional under Alleyne; and (3) Grate’s
    sentence was not excessive because the trial court’s analysis of the aggravating and mitigating factors was supported
    by the record.
    1. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) states, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who knowingly has in his possession any
    firearm in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any school, college, university or other educational
    institution without the written authorization of the governing officer of the institution, is guilty of a crime of the
    third degree.” Whether the culpability requirement of “knowingly” applies to the locational element of N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-5(e)(1) is a question of statutory interpretation. As such, the Court attempts to discern and implement the
    Legislature’s intent by first looking at the statute’s plain language and, if that language if ambiguous, by looking to
    1
    extrinsic sources. The Code prescribes rules for the “[c]onstruction of statutes with respect to culpability
    requirements.” N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c). N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1) applies to statutes that provide a culpability requirement
    as to one but not all elements of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1) requires that such statutes be interpreted to apply
    the stated culpability requirement to every material element of the offense if the offense does not distinguish among
    them, and “unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.” Because N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) criminalizes even otherwise
    lawful possession of a weapon if a defendant possesses the weapon at an educational institution, the locational
    element is “material.” In addition, the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) reveals no indication that the
    “possession” element has been distinguished from the “location” element. Both elements are contained within the
    same clause, preceded by the adverb “knowingly.” Finally, no contrary purpose to applying the knowing
    requirement to both material elements is plainly indicated. As a result, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1)’s knowing
    requirement applies to both possession of a firearm and being at an educational institution. (pp. 13-16)
    2. The Court rejects that the Legislature intended a defendant to be strictly liable for the locational element based on
    the “essentially regulatory nature” of our gun control laws. Although the Court has described Chapter 39 sections
    39-3 and 39-5 as containing “essentially regulatory offenses,” in doing so it explained that “they prohibit possession
    of firearms and other weapons without regard to the individual's intent or purpose in possessing them.” State v.
    Harmon, 
    104 N.J. 189
    , 197 (1986). Because N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1), in conjunction with N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1),
    requires only that the State prove defendants knowingly possessed the weapon while knowingly at an educational
    institution, defendants’ intent or purpose in possessing the gun is not at issue here. The regulatory nature of the
    offense does not nullify N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1)’s rule of construction, nor does it alleviate the State of its burden to
    prove defendants acted with the requisite culpability as to each element of the offense. In addition, State v. Smith,
    
    197 N.J. 325
     (2009), does not affect the Court’s interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1). In Smith, the Court
    interpreted a different criminal statute and, based on statutory phrasing materially different than that found in
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1), held that the State did not have to prove that the defendant knew that the firearm he
    possessed had been defaced. 
    Id. at 326-27, 331-32
    . Because the State was required to prove that defendants were
    knowingly at an educational facility in order to obtain a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1), the jury
    instructions with respect to defendants’ convictions under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) warrant reversal, and the Court
    vacates those convictions and remands for resentencing on the unlawful possession charges. (pp. 16-19)
    3. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) requires the sentencing court to impose a period of parole ineligibility “if the court finds” a
    substantial likelihood that the defendant is involved in organized criminal activity. Alleyne held that “any fact that
    increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” to be found beyond a
    reasonable doubt. 
    133 S. Ct. at 2156
    . Alleyne therefore renders the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence
    under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) unconstitutional. The Court acknowledges that, “[i]n appropriate cases, a court has the
    power to engage in judicial surgery or the narrow construction of a statute to free it from constitutional doubt or
    defect.” State v. Fortin, 
    198 N.J. 619
    , 630 (2009) (quoting N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J. Election Law
    Enforcement Comm’n, 
    82 N.J. 57
    , 75 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, this procedure applies
    only “if we fairly can do so.” Id. at 631. Here, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) unambiguously requires the imposition of a
    mandatory minimum sentence based on a judicial finding of fact. Requiring a jury rather than a judge to make such a
    finding would not merely be severing a constitutionally infirm portion of the sentencing statute, it would be rewriting
    its essential requirements. That determination is for the Legislature. The Court vacates defendants’ sentences and
    remands for resentencing for the unlawful possession convictions, without consideration of the mandatory minimum
    sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) and without the empaneling of a sentencing jury. (pp. 19-23)
    4. Grate claims that his sentence was excessive. An appellate court reviews the trial court’s sentencing
    determination under a deferential standard of review and is bound to affirm the sentence as long as the trial court
    properly identifies and balances aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by competent credible
    evidence in the record. The trial court’s findings that aggravating factors three, five, and nine applied, and no
    migrating factors applied, were amply supported by the record. Although a judicial finding of aggravating factor
    five cannot be the basis of a mandatory minimum sentence, the sentencing court may nevertheless consider that
    factor when deciding what sentence to impose within the statutory range. With the exception of the mandatory
    minimum sentence imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i), the Court affirms Grate’s sentence. (pp. 23-26)
    The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and the
    matter is REMANDED for a new trial on the charge of unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational facility
    and for resentencing consistent with the Court’s opinion.
    2
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, and FERNANDEZ-
    VINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    A-47/48 September Term 2013
    072750
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JAMES GRATE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    FUQUAN CROMWELL, (a/k/a
    FUGUAN CROMWELL, FUQUAN A.
    CROMWELL, SAMAAD CROMWELL,
    SAMAD CROMWELL, SAMAAD
    LATHER, SAMADD N. J.L.,
    SAMAAD N. LATHER),
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Argued October 21, 2014 – Decided January 15, 2015
    On certification to the Superior Court,
    Appellate Division.
    Joshua D. Sanders, Assistant Deputy Public
    Defender, argued the cause for appellant
    Fuquan Cromwell (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
    Defender, attorney).
    Al Glimis, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
    argued the cause for appellant James Grate
    (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
    attorney; Mr. Glimis and Kevin G. Byrnes,
    Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
    1
    John K. McNamara, Jr., Assistant
    Prosecutor/Special Deputy Attorney General,
    argued the cause for respondent (Fredric M.
    Knapp, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney;
    Mr. McNamara and Erin Smith Wisloff,
    Assistant Prosecutor/Special Deputy Attorney
    General, on the brief).
    Jeffrey S. Mandel argued the cause for
    amicus curiae Association of Criminal
    Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (Cutolo
    Mandel, attorneys; Mr. Mandel and Andrew
    Stein, on the brief).
    Alexander R. Shalom argued the cause for
    amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union
    of New Jersey (Edward L. Barocas, Legal
    Director, attorney).
    Jennifer   E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney
    General,   argued the cause for amicus curiae
    Attorney   General of New Jersey (John J.
    Hoffman,   Acting Attorney General, attorney).
    JUSTICE SOLOMON delivered the opinion of the Court.
    Following an attempted robbery of an acquaintance,
    defendants Fuquan Cromwell and James Grate were stopped by
    police officers on the campus of Drew University.   The officers
    discovered a gun under the driver’s seat of the acquaintance’s
    car within reach of defendants.   Defendants were arrested and
    charged in a twelve-count indictment with various offenses,
    including second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon and
    third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational
    institution.
    2
    Defendants were tried jointly.    The trial court in its
    charge to the jury did not state that to find defendants guilty
    of unlawful possession of a weapon at an educational facility,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1), it must find defendants knew they were
    at an educational facility.   The jury convicted defendants of
    second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    5(b), and third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon at an
    educational institution, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1).   Cromwell, who
    had a prior felony conviction, was also convicted under N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-7(b)(1), which bars persons convicted of any of the
    offenses enumerated in the statute from possessing a weapon.
    At the sentencing hearing, a witness testified that
    defendants were members of a local chapter of the Crips street
    gang.   The trial court concluded that defendants were involved
    in organized criminal activity, a finding requiring the
    imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    5(i).   Their convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal,
    and we granted certification to resolve three issues.
    The first issue requires us to construe the culpability
    requirement under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1), which criminalizes the
    knowing possession of a weapon at an educational institution.
    We hold that in order to prove a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    5(e)(1), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both
    that a defendant knowingly possessed a weapon and that he or she
    3
    did so while knowingly on the property of an educational
    institution.   The jury instructions here, which did not specify
    that the jury was required to find defendants were knowingly at
    an educational institution, were therefore flawed, and
    defendants’ convictions under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) must be
    vacated.
    Second, we consider the constitutional validity of N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-5(i) in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in
    Alleyne v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    , 
    186 L. Ed. 2d 314
     (2013).   The Alleyne Court held that the imposition
    of a mandatory minimum sentence based upon a fact that was not
    submitted to the jury for determination beyond a reasonable
    doubt violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.     
    Id.
    at __, 
    133 S. Ct. at 2155
    , 
    186 L. Ed. 2d at 321
    .   The mandatory
    minimum sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) is based on a
    judicial finding of fact and cannot survive constitutional
    scrutiny.   We therefore vacate defendants’ sentences and remand
    for resentencing on the unlawful possession of a weapon
    convictions.
    The third issue is the propriety of Grate’s sentence.
    Because we find the court’s findings were supported adequately
    by evidence of record, we reject Grate’s argument that his
    sentence was excessive and affirm as to the trial court’s
    weighing and analysis of factors applicable to Grate’s sentence.
    4
    I.
    A.
    The following facts are derived from the testimony given at
    trial.    In December 2008, Cromwell, Grate, and Cromwell’s
    younger brother, J.L., approached C.A. while he was refueling
    his car at a gas station.    Cromwell asked C.A. to give them a
    ride, and because C.A. knew Cromwell, he agreed.    Soon after
    driving away, Cromwell asked C.A. to give them money.    C.A.,
    believing Cromwell was joking, ignored the requests.    Cromwell
    then pulled out a gun, pointed it at C.A.’s head, and told him
    to “[g]et the money up.”    Because C.A. had no money with him and
    feared for his life, he offered to drive to Drew University to
    retrieve a credit card from his girlfriend, who lived on campus.
    C.A. drove to the university, passed through a security
    checkpoint, and parked outside of his girlfriend’s residence
    hall.    Although C.A.’s girlfriend was not home at the time, her
    roommate allowed C.A. and Cromwell into the room.    While
    searching for his girlfriend’s credit card, C.A. surreptitiously
    phoned William Humphries, a New Jersey State Police Detective
    with whom C.A. was familiar from a prior arrest.    Detective
    Humphries did not answer, but called C.A. back soon thereafter.
    C.A., claiming he was speaking to his uncle, was able to tell
    Detective Humphries that he was being threatened by people who
    5
    were demanding money from him.    Eventually, C.A.’s girlfriend
    arrived and gave C.A. her credit card.
    C.A. and Cromwell returned to C.A.’s car, but before they
    could depart, Sergeant Joseph Cirella of the Madison Police
    Department arrived and ordered everyone out of the car.     Before
    complying, defendants and J.L. told C.A. that, “if anything
    [goes] down, this is your gun.    It’s our word against yours.”
    They got out of the car, and Sergeant Cirella had them lie face
    down on the ground.   After backup officers arrived and placed
    C.A. in the backseat of the police cruiser, he reported that
    there was a gun inside his car.
    During a brief search of C.A.’s car, the officers found a
    loaded nine-millimeter handgun under the driver’s seat.     All
    four men were handcuffed and taken to the police station, and
    C.A.’s car was impounded.   Shortly thereafter, Detective
    Humphries arrived and drove C.A. home.
    Defendants were each indicted on charges of first-degree
    kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(2), (11); first-degree
    carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1), (2), (4); first-degree
    robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2); third-degree terroristic
    threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a); fourth-degree aggravated assault,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4); second-degree unlawful possession of a
    weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and third-degree unlawful
    possession of a weapon at an educational institution, N.J.S.A.
    6
    2C:39-5(e)(1).    Cromwell was charged separately with second-
    degree certain persons not to possess weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    7(b).
    At trial, it was revealed that no latent fingerprints were
    found on the gun because the textured surface of the handle made
    fingerprints difficult to detect.     Sergeant Cirella confirmed
    that the gun was found under the driver’s seat and was
    accessible to anyone riding in the backseat, but was difficult
    to reach from the driver’s seat.
    Testifying in his own defense, Grate denied that anyone had
    pulled a gun on C.A. or demanded money from him.    He claimed
    that Cromwell had asked C.A. to give J.L. a ride home, and that
    C.A. agreed to do so after he visited his cousin at college.
    Grate stated that he believed C.A. was traveling to his cousin’s
    home, and that he did not realize C.A. was traveling to a
    college campus.    He denied ever seeing the gun before appearing
    in court for trial.
    At the charge conference, the trial judge, noting that
    there is no model jury charge for unlawful possession of a
    weapon at an educational institution, settled on an instruction
    that “has been drafted right out of the statute.”    Without
    objection, the judge instructed the jury that the State must
    prove “the defendant possessed the firearm in or upon the
    buildings or grounds of any school, college, university, or
    7
    other educational institution.   In this case, the grounds of
    Drew University.”    The judge did not ask the jury to decide
    whether defendants were aware that they were on the property of
    an educational institution.
    The jury found defendants guilty of second-degree unlawful
    possession of a weapon and third-degree unlawful possession of a
    weapon at an educational institution, but acquitted them of the
    remaining charges.   Cromwell later pled guilty to the separate
    second-degree certain persons charge.
    B.
    At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge heard testimony
    by Corporal Edwin Santana that defendants admitted they were
    members of a local chapter of the Crips street gang known as “5
    Deuce Hoova Crip” and that both defendants had a large “C”
    tattooed on their chests, which denotes membership in that gang.
    Corporal Santana then opined that, based upon his experience,
    the Crips street gang is involved in organized criminal
    activity.   Relying on Corporal Santana’s testimony, the judge
    found aggravating factor five, a substantial likelihood that
    defendants were involved in organized criminal activity,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5), applied to both defendants.
    The court also found aggravating factors three, the risk
    defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3),
    and nine, the need for deterrence, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9),
    8
    applied to both defendants.   Next, the court found aggravating
    factor six, the extent of the defendant’s prior criminal record,
    N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6), applied solely to Cromwell based upon
    his three prior indictable convictions.   The court found no
    mitigating factors applied to either defendant.
    After merging their convictions for possession while at an
    educational institution with their convictions for unlawful
    possession of a weapon, the court sentenced Grate and Cromwell
    to eight and nine years in prison, respectively.    Having found
    that it was substantially likely defendants were involved in
    organized criminal activity, the court made both sentences
    subject to the mandatory five-year parole disqualifier under
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i).   In accordance with his plea agreement, the
    court also sentenced Cromwell to a consecutive eighteen-month
    prison sentence with no parole eligibility on the certain-
    persons conviction.
    C.
    On appeal, defendants contended, among other things, that
    the jury charge with respect to the unlawful possession of a
    weapon at an educational institution was erroneous because it
    failed to instruct the jury that in order to convict defendants
    of that offense the State was required to prove that defendants
    knew they were at an educational institution.     After
    consolidating their appeals, the Appellate Division rejected
    9
    defendants’ arguments and affirmed their convictions and
    sentences in an unpublished opinion.
    Cromwell filed a petition for certification with this
    Court, raising the mens rea argument.   In response to the United
    States Supreme Court decision in Alleyne, which was released
    five days after he filed his initial petition, Cromwell filed a
    supplemental petition arguing that the mandatory minimum
    sentence imposed under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) was unconstitutional.
    We granted Cromwell’s petition, limited to the issues of whether
    “the ‘knowingly’ mens rea requirement of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1),
    third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon at an education
    institution, appl[ies] to both the possession of the firearm and
    the [defendant’s] presence at an educational institution”;
    whether the sentencing court erred “in finding and applying the
    aggravating factor of N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5) (substantial
    likelihood that defendant is involved in organized criminal
    activity)”; and whether “the decision in Alleyne[, supra,]
    render[s] the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence invalid
    under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”
    State v. Cromwell, 
    216 N.J. 361
     (2013) (third alteration in
    original).
    Separately, Grate filed a petition for certification
    asserting that his sentence was excessive, and joined in
    Cromwell’s Alleyne argument.   Initially, we granted
    10
    certification “limited to the issue of whether [Grate’s]
    sentence was excessive.”   State v. Grate, 
    216 N.J. 362
     (2013).
    Grate subsequently filed a motion to expand our grant of
    certification to include the mens rea argument.   By order dated
    April 11, 2014, we expanded our limited grant of Grate’s
    petition to include the mens rea argument raised by Cromwell.
    We also granted motions by the Association of Criminal
    Defense Lawyers (ACDL), the American Civil Liberties Union
    (ACLU), and the Attorney General to appear as amici curiae.
    II.
    A.
    With respect to the mens rea requirement of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    5(e)(1), both defendants and the ACDL contend the trial court
    improperly interpreted the statute to require the State to prove
    only that they knowingly possessed a weapon and not that they
    possessed the weapon while knowingly at an educational facility.
    Defendants rely on N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1), which provides that
    “[w]hen the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of
    culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense,
    without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such
    provision shall apply to all the material elements of the
    offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”   Arguing
    that the locational element of this offense is material and that
    the statute fails to distinguish between its material elements,
    11
    defendants maintain the State was required to prove that
    defendants knowingly possessed a weapon and that they did so
    while knowingly at an educational institution.
    Defendants also rely on N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(3), which
    imposes a “knowing” culpability requirement where a statute
    fails to specify a culpability requirement.   Defendants
    therefore contend that the State had to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that they were knowingly present at an
    educational facility, and that the trial court’s failure to
    instruct the jury regarding that burden constitutes plain error.
    The State counters that the plain language of N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-5(e)(1) unambiguously provides a mens rea requirement to
    the element of possession only, and that the locational element
    merely describes the circumstances of the possession.      The State
    analogizes this statute to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d), which states
    that “[a]ny person who knowingly has in his possession any
    firearm which has been defaced . . . is guilty of a crime of the
    fourth degree.”   The State relies upon State v. Smith, 
    197 N.J. 325
    , 332 (2009), a case in which we interpreted N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    3(d) to require proof only that a defendant knowingly possessed
    a firearm, and not that the defendant knew the firearm was
    defaced.   The State argues that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1), like
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d), contains an independent clause that
    includes a mens rea requirement, followed by a subordinate
    12
    clause containing no mens rea requirement.   The State adds that
    the regulatory nature of this State’s gun control laws is
    largely unconcerned with the intent of the individual carrying a
    firearm.
    B.
    Whether the culpability requirement of “knowingly” applies
    to the locational element of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) is a
    question of statutory interpretation.   As such, we review the
    dispute de novo, unconstrained by deference to the decisions of
    the trial court or the appellate panel.   State v. Drury, 
    190 N.J. 197
    , 209 (2007).   In doing so,
    we attempt to discern and implement the
    Legislature’s intent.    Basic techniques of
    statutory interpretation first require us to
    look at a statute’s plain meaning, and, “[i]f
    the meaning of the text is clear and
    unambiguous on its face, [we] enforce that
    meaning.”   If the language is ambiguous or
    “admits   to   more   than    one   reasonable
    interpretation, we may look to sources outside
    the language to ascertain the Legislature’s
    intent.” Such extrinsic sources, in general,
    may include the statute’s purpose, to the
    extent that it is known, and the relevant
    legislative history.
    [Ibid. (internal citations omitted).]
    Furthermore, “[w]hen interpreting a penal statute, such as the
    one we consider here, if plain meaning and extrinsic sources are
    inadequate, we then ‘employ the canon of statutory construction
    that counsels courts to construe ambiguities in penal statutes
    13
    in favor of defendant.’”   
    Id. at 209-10
     (quoting State v.
    Reiner, 
    180 N.J. 307
    , 311 (2004) (footnote omitted)).
    With those principles in mind, we turn to the statutory
    language at issue here.    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) states, in
    relevant part, that “[a]ny person who knowingly has in his
    possession any firearm in or upon any part of the buildings or
    grounds of any school, college, university or other educational
    institution without the written authorization of the governing
    officer of the institution, is guilty of a crime of the third
    degree.”
    The Code prescribes rules for the “[c]onstruction of
    statutes with respect to culpability requirements.”     N.J.S.A.
    2C:2-2(c).   N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(3) addresses “statutes not
    stating [a] culpability requirement.”     Because N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    5(e)(1) plainly sets forth a mens rea requirement for the first
    element of this offense, the Appellate Division correctly
    determined that N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(3) is inapplicable.
    As set forth above, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1) applies to
    statutes that provide a culpability requirement as to one but
    not all elements of the offense.      Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-
    2(c)(1) requires the statute to be interpreted to apply the
    stated culpability requirement as to every material element of
    the offense if the offense does not distinguish among them, and
    “unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”
    14
    The State does not dispute that the N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1)
    locational element is “material.”    The Code defines “[m]aterial
    element” as “an element that does not relate exclusively to the
    statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other
    matter similarly unconnected with (1) the harm or evil[] . . .
    sought to be prevented, or (2) the existence of a justification
    or excuse.”   N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14(i).   Because N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    5(e)(1) criminalizes even otherwise lawful possession of a
    weapon if a defendant possesses the weapon at or on the grounds
    of an educational institution, we agree that the circumstances
    of the possession are material to the offense.     See State v.
    Harmon, 
    104 N.J. 189
    , 202-03 (1986) (finding a defendant’s
    intent to use a weapon for an unlawful purpose “clearly a
    material element” of the offense of possession of a weapon for
    an unlawful purpose).
    The Appellate Division found N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1) “does
    not apply because N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) distinguishes ‘among
    the material elements’ of the offense.”   However, careful review
    of the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) reveals no indication
    that the “possession” element is clearly distinguishable from
    the “location” element.   Both elements are contained within the
    same clause, preceded by the adverb “knowingly.”    We therefore
    reject the Appellate Division’s conclusion that N.J.S.A. 2C:2-
    2(c)(1) does not apply, and find N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) does not
    15
    distinguish between its material elements.   As a result, to
    obtain a conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) the State was
    required to prove defendants knowingly possessed a firearm while
    knowingly at an educational institution unless the statute
    plainly evidences a contrary purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1).
    We find no such contrary purpose is plainly indicated.      The
    State, emphasizing the “essentially regulatory nature” of our
    gun control laws, urges us to consider N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) in
    conjunction with other sections of Chapter 39 to find the
    Legislature intended a defendant to be strictly liable for the
    locational element of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1).   Although we have
    described sections 39-3 and 39-5 as containing “essentially
    regulatory offenses,” in doing so we explained that “they
    prohibit possession of firearms and other weapons without regard
    to the individual's intent or purpose in possessing them.”
    Harmon, supra, 
    104 N.J. at 197
    ; accord State v. Brims, 
    168 N.J. 297
    , 313 (2001).
    The State correctly notes that the offense at issue here is
    distinguishable from the offense of possession of a weapon for
    an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d), in that the State need
    not prove defendants’ intent or purpose in possessing the gun.
    However, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1), in conjunction with N.J.S.A.
    2C:2-2(c)(1), requires only that the State prove defendants
    knowingly possessed the weapon while knowingly at an educational
    16
    institution.   A person acts “knowingly with respect to the
    nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is
    aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such
    circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of
    their existence.”   N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(2).     Accordingly,
    defendants’ intent or purpose in possessing the gun is not at
    issue here -- only that defendants were aware of what they were
    doing and where they were doing it.     The regulatory nature of
    the offense does not nullify N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(c)(1)’s rule of
    construction, nor does it alleviate the State of its burden to
    prove defendants acted with the requisite culpability as to each
    element of the offense.
    The State also argues that our decision in Smith, supra,
    requires a finding that the Legislature did not intend the
    knowing culpability requirement to apply to the locational
    element of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1).    In Smith, we considered and
    rejected a defendant’s claim that N.J.S.A. 2C:39-2(d), which
    prohibits any person from “knowingly ha[ving] in his possession
    any firearm which has been defaced,” required the State to prove
    he knew the firearm had been defaced.     Smith, supra, 
    197 N.J. at 326-27
    .
    In Smith, we began our analysis by first determining what
    the term “knowingly” modified.   
    Id. at 331
    .    We noted “the
    Legislature placed the term ‘knowingly’ immediately before the
    17
    phrase, ‘has in his possession a firearm,’” followed by the
    “subordinate phrase, ‘which has been defaced,’ that describes
    further the nature of the proscribed item.”     
    Id. at 332
    .
    The State argues that here, as in Smith, the statute at
    issue places the term “knowingly” immediately before the phrase
    “has in his possession any firearm,” followed by the subordinate
    clause “in or upon any part of the buildings or grounds of any
    school, college, university or other educational institution.”
    However, the locational element of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) is not
    contained in a subordinate clause.   Rather, as set forth above,
    “in or upon any part” of an educational facility expresses a
    separate material element of the offense.     Indeed, it is the
    locational element of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) that distinguishes
    ordinary possession, which need not be unlawful itself, from the
    wrongdoing sought to be addressed under the statute, namely the
    harm possession of a firearm presents at a setting like an
    educational facility.   Thus, unlike the statute at issue in
    Smith, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) does not criminalize the
    possession of a certain type of weapon, but rather the
    possession of a weapon at a particular place.
    In any event, as discussed above, the Legislature clearly
    expressed an intent to apply the culpability requirement stated
    as to one element to each other material element.     N.J.S.A.
    2C:2-2(c)(1).   “[O]ur goal is to discern and implement the
    18
    intent of the Legislature.”    Smith, 
    supra,
     
    197 N.J. at 332
    .   The
    State was therefore required to prove defendants were knowingly
    at an educational facility in order to obtain a conviction under
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1).   Accordingly, we find the jury
    instructions with respect to defendants’ convictions under
    N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(e)(1) warrant reversal, and we are constrained
    to vacate those convictions and remand for resentencing on the
    unlawful possession charges.
    Having determined that remand for resentencing is
    necessary, we next address defendants’ sentencing arguments.
    III.
    A.
    Defendants, joined by the ACLU, contest the imposition of
    their mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment under N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-5(i).   That statute requires the sentencing court to
    impose a period of parole ineligibility “if the court finds” a
    substantial likelihood that the defendant is involved in
    organized criminal activity.
    Defendants and amici rely principally on Alleyne, supra,
    which provides that “any fact that increases the mandatory
    minimum sentence is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the
    jury” to be found beyond a reasonable doubt.   ___ U.S. at ___,
    
    133 S. Ct. at 2156
    , 
    186 L. Ed. 2d at 321
     (overruling Harris v.
    United States, 
    536 U.S. 545
    , 
    122 S. Ct. 2406
    , 
    153 L. Ed. 2d 524
    19
    (2002)).   Applying Alleyne’s holding to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i),
    defendants contend that the imposition of mandatory minimum
    sentences based upon a judicial finding that they were involved
    in organized crime violated their Sixth Amendment rights.1
    The State, joined by the Attorney General, concedes that
    Alleyne renders N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) unconstitutional as written.
    Nevertheless, the State asks this Court to graft onto N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-5(i) a requirement that a jury find that a defendant was
    involved in organized criminal activity before requiring the
    imposition of a mandatory minimum prison term.
    B.
    We agree with defendants that Alleyne renders the
    imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
    5(i) unconstitutional.   Further, there is no dispute that
    Alleyne, which was decided during the pendency of defendants’
    appeal, applies to defendants’ convictions.   See State v.
    Wessells, 
    209 N.J. 395
    , 412 (2012) (“[I]t is now well-
    established that ‘a new rule for the conduct of criminal
    prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state
    1 To the extent that Cromwell also challenges application of
    aggravating factor five, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5) (substantial
    likelihood that defendant is involved in organized criminal
    activity), we note that a sentencing court may consider this
    factor when deciding what sentence to impose within the
    statutory range. Post at ___ (slip op. at 24) (citing State v.
    Natale, 
    184 N.J. 458
    , 472, 481-82 (2005)).
    20
    or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no
    exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a “clear
    break” with the past.’” (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 
    479 U.S. 314
    , 328, 
    107 S. Ct. 708
    , 716, 
    93 L. Ed. 2d 649
    , 661 (1987))).
    The question thus becomes whether it is within this Court’s
    purview to amend the statute as the State requests.2
    Given the clear statement of legislative intent in N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-5(i), we decline the State’s invitation to perform
    “judicial surgery.”   We acknowledge that, “[i]n appropriate
    cases, a court has the power to engage in judicial surgery or
    the narrow construction of a statute to free it from
    constitutional doubt or defect.”     State v. Fortin, 
    198 N.J. 619
    ,
    630 (2009) (quoting N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. N.J.
    Election Law Enforcement Comm’n, 
    82 N.J. 57
    , 75 (1980))
    (internal quotation marks omitted).    However, this procedure
    applies only “if we fairly can do so.”     Id. at 631.
    In State v. Natale, 
    184 N.J. 458
     (2005), we considered the
    constitutional validity of our sentencing statutes providing for
    the imposition of a sentence beyond the presumptive statutory
    2 Additionally, the State and amici raise numerous preemptory
    arguments with respect to the constitutional validity of the
    discretionary parole disqualifier under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(b) and
    certain applications of the Graves Act not applicable to this
    case. Because defendants were not sentenced under either of
    those provisions, we decline to address those arguments here.
    See State v. Nero, 
    195 N.J. 397
    , 412 n.5 (2008).
    21
    term based on a judicial finding of one or more aggravating
    factors.   We held that our sentencing provisions allowing for
    the imposition of a sentence beyond that which is allowed by the
    jury verdict violated the Sixth Amendment, as expressed in
    Blakely v. Washington, 
    542 U.S. 296
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
    , 
    159 L. Ed. 2d 403
     (2004).   Natale, 
    supra,
     
    184 N.J. at 481-82
    .   In striking
    the pertinent sentencing provisions, we preserved the judge’s
    discretion to balance the aggravating and mitigating factors in
    considering the appropriate sentence within the applicable
    statutory range.   
    Id. at 488
    .
    Here, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i) unambiguously requires the
    imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence based on a judicial
    finding of fact.   Requiring a jury rather than a judge to make
    such a finding would not merely be severing a constitutionally
    infirm portion of the sentencing statute, it would be rewriting
    its essential requirements.   There is no ambiguity in the
    statute from which we can “assum[e] that the Legislature
    intended to act in a constitutional manner.”    Right to Choose v.
    Byrne, 
    91 N.J. 287
    , 311 (1982).    It is unclear “‘whether the
    Legislature would want the statute to survive with appropriate
    modifications rather than succumb to constitutional
    infirmities.’”   State v. Emmons, 
    397 N.J. Super. 112
    , 122 (App.
    Div. 2007) (quoting Byrne, 
    supra,
     
    91 N.J. at 311
    ), certif.
    22
    denied, 
    195 N.J. 421
     (2008).   Thus, that determination is for
    the Legislature.
    Because judicial rehabilitation is not an option, we are
    compelled to vacate defendants’ sentences and remand for
    resentencing for the unlawful possession convictions, without
    consideration of the mandatory minimum sentence under N.J.S.A.
    2C:39-5(i) and without the empaneling of a sentencing jury, as
    the State requests.
    IV.
    In addition to the Alleyne issue discussed above, Grate
    disputes the trial court’s assessment of the aggravating and
    mitigating factors in his conviction for unlawful possession of
    a handgun.   Specifically, Grate contends there was insufficient
    evidence to support the court’s finding of aggravating factors
    three, the risk that he will reoffend, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3);
    five, the substantial likelihood that he is involved in
    organized criminal activity, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(5); and nine,
    the need for deterrence, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9).
    It is well-established that appellate courts review the
    trial court’s “sentencing determination under a deferential
    standard of review.”   State v. Lawless, 
    214 N.J. 594
    , 606 (2013)
    (citing State v. Cassady, 
    198 N.J. 165
    , 180 (2009); State v.
    O’Donnell, 
    117 N.J. 210
    , 215 (1989)).   We are “bound to affirm a
    sentence, even if [we] would have arrived at a different result,
    23
    as long as the trial court properly identifies and balances
    aggravating and mitigating factors that are supported by
    competent credible evidence in the record.”     
    Ibid.
     (internal
    quotation marks and citations omitted).
    Here, there was ample evidence supporting the trial court’s
    findings.     Grate’s presentence report shows that he had been
    charged with numerous indictable offenses on eight prior
    occasions.     Those charges resulted in two downgraded
    convictions, the first for violent behavior and the second for
    simple assault.     In connection with the current offense, the
    court’s finding that defendant was at a high risk to recidivate
    was sound.     Further, as the court noted, “handguns on a college
    campus . . . is a dangerous situation, and absolutely cannot be
    tolerated.”     Accordingly, we find no basis to overturn the
    court’s findings with respect to aggravating factors three and
    nine.
    We reiterate that a judicial finding of aggravating factor
    five cannot be the basis of a mandatory minimum sentence.       The
    sentencing court may nevertheless consider this factor when
    deciding what sentence to impose within the statutory range.
    See Natale, 
    supra,
     
    184 N.J. at 472, 481-82
     (“A judge is
    authorized to impose a sentence within the range allowed by the
    jury verdict[.]”).    There was more than enough evidence
    supporting the judge’s finding with respect to aggravating
    24
    factor five.   Corporal Santana testified that Grate admitted to
    being a member of the “5 Deuce Hoova Crip” street gang, and that
    he had “body brandings” and a tattoo that identified him as a
    member of that street gang.   Based on this testimony, it was not
    an abuse of discretion to find defendant was substantially
    likely to have been involved in organized crime.
    Grate also argues the sentencing court abused its
    discretion in failing to consider evidence in support of
    mitigating factors one, that he did not cause or threaten
    serious harm, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(1), and two, that he did not
    contemplate that his conduct would cause or threaten serious
    harm, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2).   The sentencing court is required
    to consider evidence of a mitigating factor and must apply
    mitigating factors that “are amply based in the record.”     State
    v. Dalziel, 
    182 N.J. 494
    , 504-05 (2005); see also State v. Hess,
    
    207 N.J. 123
    , 155 n.8 (2011) (noting same).     Grate, however,
    presents no evidence in support of his claim.    In light of the
    nature of the offense, we see no abuse of discretion in failing
    to consider these mitigating factors.
    Accordingly, with the exception of the mandatory minimum
    sentence imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(i), we affirm
    Grate’s sentence.
    V.
    25
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Appellate
    Division affirming defendants’ convictions for unlawful
    possession of a weapon at an educational facility is reversed.
    We remand for a new trial on the charge of unlawful possession
    of a weapon at an educational facility, and for resentencing
    consistent with this opinion.
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER; JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
    and FERNANDEZ-VINA; and JUDGE CUFF (temporarily assigned) join
    in JUSTICE SOLOMON’s opinion.
    26
    SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    NO.    A-47/48                               SEPTEMBER TERM 2013
    ON CERTIFICATION TO            Appellate Division, Superior Court
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JAMES GRATE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________________
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    FUQUAN CROMWELL, (a/k/a
    FUGUAN CROMWELL, FUQUAN A.
    CROMWELL, SAMAAD CROMWELL,
    SAMAD CROMWELL, SAMAAD
    LATHER, SAMADD N. J.L.,
    SAMAAD N. LATHER),
    Defendant-Appellant.
    DECIDED               January 15, 2015
    Chief Justice Rabner                      PRESIDING
    OPINION BY                 Justice Solomon
    CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY
    DISSENTING OPINION BY
    AFFIRM IN PART/
    CHECKLIST                              REVERSE IN PART/
    REMAND
    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER                          X
    JUSTICE LaVECCHIA                             X
    JUSTICE ALBIN                                 X
    JUSTICE PATTERSON                             X
    JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA                        X
    JUSTICE SOLOMON                               X
    JUDGE CUFF (t/a)                              X
    TOTALS                                        7