In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of W.W., SVP-86-00 (083890) (Essex County & Statewide) ( 2021 )

SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of W.W. (A-63-19) (083890)
Argued November 9, 2020 -- Decided March 11, 2021
FERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether the State must present testimony from
a psychiatrist in support of the need for continued involuntary commitment of a convicted
sexually violent offender at an annual review hearing under the New Jersey Sexually
Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.
W.W. was civilly committed after pleading guilty to the sexual assault of a five-
year-old girl. At his annual review hearing for 2019, the State presented expert testimony
from psychiatrist Dr. Marta Scott and psychologist Dr. Jamie Canataro. The State’s two
experts presented conflicting opinions on W.W.’s risk of reoffending and whether he
should remain committed. Dr. Scott recommended conditional discharge, while Dr.
Canataro concluded further commitment was appropriate.
The trial court ordered the continued commitment of W.W. The court concluded
that neither the State nor the court was bound by the testimony of the State’s psychiatrist,
and it credited Dr. Canataro’s testimony over Dr. Scott’s. The Appellate Division
affirmed. The Court granted W.W.’s petition for certification. 241 N.J. 468 (2020).
HELD: The plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) requires the State to produce
psychiatric testimony in support of commitment when the State seeks the initial or
continued commitment of a sexually violent predator. The State therefore did not meet
its burden in this case by producing a psychiatrist who did not support commitment.
1. A person who has been committed under the SVPA is entitled to an annual review
hearing of the need for involuntary commitment. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) requires that
“[a] psychiatrist on the person’s treatment team . . . shall testify at the hearing to the
clinical basis for the need for involuntary commitment.” That provision is identical to its
corollary in the general civil commitment statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.13(b), and is also
substantially similar to the court rule governing civil commitment of adults, R. 4:74-7(e).
The Appellate Division has determined that both N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.13 and Rule 4:74-7(e)
require that a psychiatrist on the patient’s treatment team testify at the hearing, and
provide medical testimony supporting the need for commitment. (pp. 15-17)
1
2. Because the SVPA does not define the phrase “to the clinical basis for the need for
involuntary commitment,” the Court interprets that language according to its generally
accepted meaning. The Court reviews the definitions of “basis” and “need” and notes
that the statute’s express focus on testimony by a psychiatrist, who holds a medical
degree, cannot be interpreted to encompass testimony by a psychologist, who does not.
The Legislature has distinguished between psychiatric and psychological experts in the
Rules of Evidence. And when it intends that the evaluation of either a psychiatrist or
psychologist suffice for a particular purpose, it has said so explicitly. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-
5. The clear language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) indicates that a psychiatrist must testify
to those underlying facts that require involuntary commitment of the individual. It is not
enough that a psychiatrist testifies -- even if that testimony is against involuntary
commitment -- and that someone else testifies to the need for commitment. (pp. 17-19)
3. The Legislature deliberately modeled the SVPA’s commitment procedures after the
general civil commitment statute. Five years before the enactment of the SVPA, the
Appellate Division held that the language “to the clinical basis for the need for
involuntary commitment to treatment” in the civil commitment statute requires the
psychiatrist’s testimony to be in support of commitment. See In re Commitment of
Raymond S., 263 N.J. Super. 428, 432 (App. Div. 1993). The Court presumes that, as it
crafted the SVPA, the Legislature was aware that the courts had interpreted the general
civil commitment statute to require psychiatric testimony in support of commitment. The
Legislature nevertheless used the exact same phrasing in the SVPA, without a corrective
definition, thus reflecting legislative intent to require psychiatric testimony in support of
commitment under the SVPA as well. (pp. 19-21)
4. The SVPA itself maintains an important and consistent burden on the State, requiring
psychiatric testimony in support of commitment at each stage in the proceedings. To
initiate commitment proceedings under the SVPA, the State must present at least one
clinical certificate prepared by a psychiatrist in support of commitment. N.J.S.A. 30:4-
27.2(b), -27.28(c). The SVPA further requires the State to produce psychiatric testimony
at both the initial commitment hearing and at each review hearing. When viewing the
statute as a whole, it would be discordant to demand more from the certifications required
to commence a hearing than from the testimony provided at the hearings. (p. 21)
5. Because of the passage of time between the trial court’s decision and the issuance of
this opinion, the Court affords the State an opportunity to provide a psychiatrist in
support of commitment in a new review hearing. Pending the court’s determination after
that rehearing, W.W. shall remain committed under the SVPA. (p. 22)
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-63 September Term 2019
083890
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment
of W.W., SVP-86-00.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Argued Decided
November 9, 2020 March 11, 2021
Susan Remis Silver, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant W.W. (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Susan Remis Silver, on the
briefs).
Stephen Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Gurbir S.
Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Stephen
Slocum, on the brief).
Tess Borden argued the cause for amicus curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (American
Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation,
attorneys; Tess Borden, Alexander Shalom, and Jeanne
LoCicero, on the brief).
JUSTICE FERNANDEZ-VINA delivered the opinion of the Court.
1
The New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-
27.24 to -27.38, requires an annual review hearing to assess the continuing
need for the involuntary commitment of a convicted sexually violent offender.
The statute directs that a psychiatrist “shall testify at the hearing to the clinical
basis for the need for involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator.”
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b). The issue in this appeal is whether the State must
present such testimony in order to support commitment, or whether the State
can nevertheless meet its burden to show the need for continued commitment
despite producing a psychiatrist who does not support commitment.
Here, the State produced a psychiatrist who recommended conditional
discharge rather than commitment. Based on testimony by the State’s other
expert, a psychologist, the trial court ordered the continued commitment of
W.W. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the trial court was not
required to accept the psychiatrist’s opinion because commitment decisions are
legal ones, not medical ones.
We disagree with the Appellate Division’s findings. We conclude that
the plain language of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) requires the State to produce
psychiatric testimony in support of commitment, and such a reading is
supported by the legislative history and statutory scheme of the SVPA.
2
Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and
remand for a rehearing.
I.
A.
We begin by summarizing the pertinent facts and procedural history.
In 1994, W.W. was arrested and charged with sexual assault and aggravated
sexual assault for events that occurred over a period of four months in 1993.
W.W. admitted to sexually assaulting a five-year-old girl who lived at his
mother’s house, touching her breasts and vaginal area, performing cunnilingus
on her, and masturbating in his pants.
W.W. pled guilty to sexual assault and was sentenced to seven years ’
imprisonment. An evaluation found that W.W. met the requirements of the
New Jersey Sex Offender Act, and that he was eligible for treatment at the
Adult and Diagnostic Treatment Center, where he served five years of his
seven-year sentence.
On May 30, 2000, the State petitioned to civilly commit W.W. under the
SVPA. On October 27, 2000, W.W. was committed to a Special Treatment
Unit (STU), where he has been for approximately twenty years. At the time
W.W. was evaluated by the experts in this case, he was seventy-one years old.
3
While committed, W.W. “disclosed a longstanding history of
exhibitionism, voyeurism, and stalking behavior.” He reported driving around
naked and described a “long-standing sexual fantasy of driving in his car
naked and picking up a small female child to molest.” He also reported a
fantasy in which he would kill his victim to avoid being caught, although his
treatment team reported that he has since downplayed that statement.
W.W. also revealed three other previously unreported victims in
incidents that occurred when W.W. was nineteen, twenty-seven, and forty-
three-years-old, respectively. The first victim was a five-year-old girl W.W.’s
mother was babysitting. W.W. reported bouncing her on his knee, being
aroused, and masturbating that night. The second was his neighbor’s daughter,
who was between five and eight years old. W.W. disclosed that he had her
come to his house and “lay down on the living room floor with her back
toward him,” while he masturbated. W.W. wanted the girl to touch him, but
stopped when her siblings knocked on the door. The third was a five- to eight-
year-old girl who sat on W.W.’s knee at church while he fondled her chest.
W.W. reported that he then masturbated while thinking of her that night.
In June 2011, his treatment team recommended W.W. begin furloughs.
However, shortly after they began, he failed a polygraph examination. W.W.
admitted he had been masturbating to thoughts of a young girl he had seen in a
4
mall. He added that he had been fantasizing about seeing a young girl and
sexualizing her for years. Following those admissions, W.W.’s furloughs were
terminated. He acknowledged to his treatment team that he chose not to use
the relapse prevention techniques he was taught.
B.
W.W.’s review hearing required by the SVPA was conducted on January
10 and 23, 2019. The State proposed to present expert testimony from
psychiatrist Dr. Marta Scott and psychologist Dr. Jamie Canataro. W.W. did
not present any witnesses, nor did he testify.
On the first day of the hearing, the State recognized that its two experts
were going to present conflicting opinions on W.W.’s risk of reoffending and
whether he should remain committed. Dr. Scott recommended conditional
discharge, while Dr. Canataro concluded further commitment was appropriate.
As a result of that conflict and Dr. Scott’s adverse testimony, the State
informed the trial court that Dr. Scott would not be the State’s witness. The
trial court rejected the State’s attempt, telling the State that “[i]t’s your
obligation under the statute to produce psychiatric testimony. . . . If you don’t
do that, you can’t possibly prevail.”
The State then called Dr. Scott, the psychiatrist who recommended that
W.W. be conditionally discharged. Dr. Scott’s testimony centered around her
5
opinion that W.W.’s “tendency to say things that he doesn’t mean when
angry,” cognitive difficulties, and “low average” IQ all led to a number of
confusing reports, including about whether and under what circumstances
W.W. experiences arousal and whether he felt he could refrain from
reoffending.
Dr. Scott testified that W.W. “demonstrates a great deal of confusion” in
describing his arousal or lack thereof. She referred to a roleplay where W.W.
did not experience an erection, yet, after the group purported to observe his
sexual interest, W.W. acknowledged that he was aroused. She also testified
about a period in which W.W. was placed on probation as a result of stating
that he was not able to refrain from reoffending and that he was glad that he
would not be discharged from the STU. Dr. Scott questioned the validity of
those statements.
In her conclusion, Dr. Scott diagnosed W.W. with pedophilic disorder
and borderline intellectual functioning. Regarding his risk to sexually
reoffend, Dr. Scott found that “the likelihood of him committing another
contact offense does not meet the threshold of highly likely,” and
recommended conditional discharge. Dr. Scott testified that the most
important factor in her analysis was W.W.’s age, which resulted in his
“declining sexual drive, increased self-control, and decreased access to
6
victims.” Dr. Scott also testified that W.W. took a combination of Prozac and
Proscar or Finasteride, which reportedly “significantly decreased his sexual
urges.”
On the second day of the hearing, the State presented a psychologist, Dr.
Canataro, who testified in support of commitment. Dr. Canataro’s testimony
centered around W.W.’s strong arousal, inability or unwillingness to use
intervention techniques, and obsessiveness over victims he never made contact
with, all despite twenty years of treatment. Dr. Canataro emphasized W.W.’s
“longstanding arousal pattern” with victims exclusively between the ages of
five and eight. She testified that this arousal remains strong even in W.W.’s
advanced age and after years of treatment. For example, Dr. Canataro testified
to stopping a discussion about a female child because “[W.W.] became so
sexually aroused that it interfered with the interview.” She also detailed a time
during a roleplay in which W.W.’s arousal was so strong that he chose not to
implement the intervention techniques he had learned.
In response to Dr. Scott’s recommendation of conditional discharge, Dr.
Canataro pointed out that the same conditions were available when W.W. was
on furlough in 2008. She emphasized that, even under those conditions, W.W.
reported masturbating on multiple occasions to a young girl he saw for only an
instant at the mall. Dr. Canataro testified that it was important for her to
7
inform the court that W.W.’s only intervention technique is abstinence. She
testified that “[h]e cannot refrain. We’re basically asking him to extinguish,
give up his total sexual identity,” which is not a reasonable long-term solution.
In support of her recommendation, Dr. Canataro testified that if W.W. is
not recommitted to the STU, his risk to sexually reoffend is high. She
diagnosed W.W. with pedophilic disorder, voyeuristic disorder, sexual
masochistic disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning.
The trial court issued its oral decision on January 28, 2019, finding the
need to continue W.W.’s commitment. It concluded that neither the State nor
the court was bound by the testimony of the State’s psychiatrist. Unpersuaded
by Dr. Scott’s reliance on W.W.’s age and conditions to reduce his risk, the
trial court credited Dr. Canataro’s testimony.
The Appellate Division affirmed. Specifically addressing W.W.’s
argument that the State failed to meet its burden because its psychiatrist did
not support commitment, the Appellate Division reasoned that “the trial court
[was] ‘not required to accept all or any part of’ an expert’s opinion.” Because
“[t]he ultimate determination [regarding involuntary civil commitment] is ‘a
legal one, not a medical one, even though guided by medical expert
testimony,’” the Appellate Division concluded the trial court had the ability
and a reasonable basis to credit Dr. Canataro over Dr. Scott.
8
We granted W.W.’s petition for certification. 241 N.J. 468 (2020). We
also granted the motion of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey
(ACLU) to participate as amicus curiae.
II.
A.
Petitioner W.W. argues that the State failed to meet its burden of
production for commitment under the SVPA because Dr. Scott, the State’s
only psychiatrist, testified that W.W. did not meet commitment standards and
recommended conditional discharge. He submits that the trial court and
Appellate Division erred in concluding that the State was not bound by the
psychiatric testimony it was required to produce. Relying on the plain
language of the SVPA, W.W. submits that psychiatric testimony in support of
commitment must be the basis of the State’s petition for commitment and that
additional testimony permitted under the SVPA, such as testimony by a
psychologist, is not sufficient on its own to meet the burden to commit or
recommit. W.W. stresses that the extraordinary liberty interest at stake makes
it imperative that the State satisfy its burden of producing a psychiatrist to
testify in support of commitment.
9
B.
In opposition, the State contends that it “met its burden of production by
producing the psychiatric testimony of Dr. Scott,” and that it was the trial
court’s decision to accept or reject it. Thus, the State claims the court made no
mistake in relying on the credible testimony of Dr. Canataro.
The State also argues N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) “does not dictate the
substance of [the expert] testimony -- it does not, because it cannot, expect the
expert to simply serve as a mouthpiece in favor of recommitment despite
treatment progress or other changes in circumstances.” The State asserts that
if section 27.30(b) were interpreted to require psychiatric testimony in favor of
commitment, “when taken to the extreme, it would preclude the State from
ever agreeing that conditional discharge is appropriate.”
C.
Amicus curiae ACLU aligns itself with W.W.’s position. It stresses that
the plain language of the SVPA and the dictionary definitions of “basis” and
“need,” show that the psychiatric testimony must be in support of commitment.
The ACLU also relies on the legislative history of the SVPA, pointing
out that the SVPA was based on the general civil commitment statute which
uses the same phrase “clinical basis for the need for involuntary commitment.”
The Appellate Division found this phrase in the general civil commitment
10
statute to require testimony in support of commitment. Presuming the
Legislature was aware of that decision and still chose to use the phrase, the
ACLU submits that the Legislature intended for the State to produce
psychiatric testimony in support of commitment when making applications
under the SVPA. The ACLU further emphasizes that psychiatric testimony in
support of commitment is needed to initially commit someone and that it
would be inconsistent with the SVPA’s overall scheme not to require the same
at annual review hearings.
III.
A.
Our Court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. See
Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995). Thus, this Court owes no special deference to the trial court’s
interpretation of the State’s burden under the SVPA. In re Civil Commitment
of D.Y., 218 N.J. 373 (2014) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P., 140 N.J. at 378).
“[I]n the interpretation of a statute our overriding goal has consistently
been to determine the Legislature’s intent.” Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J.
16, 25 (1995) (quoting Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500, 515 (1994)). “‘To
determine the Legislature’s intent, [courts] look to the statute’s language and
give those terms their plain and ordinary meaning,’ because ‘the best indicator
11
of that intent is the plain language chosen by the Legislature.’” State v. J.V.,
242 N.J. 432, 442 (2020) (first quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492
(2005); and then quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386
(2016)).
“If the language is clear, the court’s job is complete.” In re
Expungement Application of D.J.B., 216 N.J. 433, 440 (2014). An appellate
court will refer to extrinsic sources to determine legislative intent “[o]nly if the
words of the enactment are shrouded in ambiguity.” Zabilowicz v. Kelsey,
200 N.J. 507, 513 (2009).
Additionally, a statute must “be read in [its] entirety; each part or section
should be construed in connection with every other part or section to provide a
harmonious whole.” D.J.B., 216 N.J. at 440 (quoting Burnett v. County of
Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009)). And “when a ‘literal interpretation of
individual statutory terms or provisions’ would lead to results ‘inconsistent
with the overall purpose of the statute,’ that interpretation should be rejected.”
Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-93 (2001) (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow,
153 N.J. 218, 242 (1998)); see also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135
N.J. 209, 225 (1994) (supporting “[f]urther inquiry into a statute’s intended
meaning . . . where the plain meaning seems inconsistent with the statutory
scheme”).
12
“[T]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial construction of its
enactments.” DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 494 (quoting N.J. Democratic Party, Inc.
v. Samson, 175 N.J. 178, 195 n.6 (2002)). Thus, “a change of language in a
statute ordinarily implies a purposeful alteration in [the] substance of the law.”
Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Nagy v. Ford Motor Co., 6 N.J. 341, 348
(1951)).
B.
Here, we apply those principles to determine whether the psychiatric
testimony required by the SVPA in a review hearing must be in support of
commitment.
The Attorney General may initiate court proceedings for the involuntary
commitment “of an inmate who is scheduled for release upon expiration of a
maximum term of incarceration by submission to the court of two clinical
certificates for a sexually violent predator, at least one of which is prepared by
a psychiatrist.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28(c). A “clinical certificate” is defined as a
form that is prepared, approved, and completed as prescribed by statute and
that states, in part, “that the person is in need of involuntary commitment to
treatment.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(b). “In need of involuntary commitment” or
“in need of involuntary commitment to treatment” is defined, in turn, to mean
that an adult with mental illness, whose mental illness
causes the person to be dangerous to self or dangerous
13
to others or property and who is unwilling to accept
appropriate treatment voluntarily after it has been
offered, needs outpatient treatment or inpatient care at
a short-term care or psychiatric facility or special
psychiatric hospital because other services are not
appropriate or available to meet the person’s mental
health care needs.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(m).]
After a finding of probable cause, it is the responsibility of the State to
present to the court “the case for the person’s involuntary commitment as a
sexually violent predator” at an initial hearing. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.29(b). The
State must establish three elements:
(1) that the individual has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense; (2) that he suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder; and (3) that as a
result of his psychiatric abnormality or disorder, “it is
highly likely that the individual will not control his or
her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend.
[D.Y., 218 N.J. at 380-81 (quoting In re Civil
Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 173 (2014)).]
“The terms of the statute must be strictly met”; involuntary commitment under
the SVPA is “limited to those who are highly likely to sexually reoffend.”
Ibid. (emphasis omitted).
“The State bears the burden of proving all three elements by clear and
convincing evidence.” R.F., 217 N.J. at 173. “Clear and convincing evidence
is evidence that produces ‘a firm belief or conviction’ that the allegations are
14
true; it is evidence that is ‘so clear, direct and weighty and convincing’ that the
factfinder can ‘come to a clear conviction’ of the truth without hesitancy.”
Ibid. (quoting In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 407 (1987)).
A person who has been committed under the SVPA is entitled to “an
annual court review hearing of the need for involuntary commitment as a
sexually violent predator.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. The hearing is conducted
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30, which requires in part that
[a] psychiatrist on the person’s treatment team who has
conducted a personal examination of the person as close
to the court hearing date as possible, but in no event
more than five calendar days prior to the court hearing,
shall testify at the hearing to the clinical basis for the
need for involuntary commitment as a sexually violent
predator. Other members of the person’s treatment
team and any other witness with relevant information
offered by the person or the Attorney General shall also
be permitted to testify at the hearing.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b).]
“If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
needs continued involuntary commitment as a sexually violent predator, it
shall issue an order authorizing the involuntary commitment . . . .” N.J.S.A.
30:4-27.32(a). “Given the statutory definition of a ‘sexually violent predator,’
expert witnesses in the fields of psychiatry and psychology routinely play
leading roles in SVPA commitment hearings.” D.Y., 218 N.J. at 382.
15
Commitment under the SVPA is closely connected to the general civil
commitment statute, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1, but was enacted by the Legislature in
recognition that “[t]he nature of the mental condition from which a sexually
violent predator may suffer may not always lend itself to characterization
under the existing statutory standard.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(b). The key
provision in this case, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b), is identical to its corollary in the
general civil commitment statute. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.13(b) (“A psychiatrist
on the patient’s treatment team . . . shall testify at the hearing to the clinical
basis for the need for involuntary commitment to treatment.”). The language
of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) is also substantially similar to the language used in
the court rule governing civil commitment of adults. See R. 4:74-7(e) (“The
application for commitment to treatment shall be supported by the oral
testimony of a psychiatrist on the patient’s treatment team . . . .”).
That language and the phrase “clinical basis for the need for involuntary
commitment” have been considered before by the Appellate Division in both
general civil commitment and SVPA commitment cases. See In re
Commitment of Raymond S., 263 N.J. Super. 428, 432 (App. Div. 1993); In re
Civil Commitment of A.H.B., 386 N.J. Super. 16, 24-25 (App. Div. 2006).
The Appellate Division determined that both N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.13 and Rule
4:74-7(e) “require that a psychiatrist on the patient’s treatment team testify at
16
the hearing, and provide medical testimony supporting the need for
commitment.” A.H.B., 386 N.J. Super. at 25 (emphasis added) (quoting
Raymond S., 263 N.J. Super. at 432).
IV.
Applying the principles of statutory construction to the relevant
provision of the SVPA, we conclude that the Legislature intended for N.J.S.A.
30:4-27.30(b) to require a psychiatrist to testify in support of commitment and
that the State therefore did not meet its burden by producing a psychiatrist who
did not support commitment.
A.
Once again, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) provides, in relevant part, that “[a]
psychiatrist on the person’s treatment team . . . shall testify at the hearing to
the clinical basis for the need for involuntary commitment as a sexually violent
predator.” The statute is clear that a psychiatrist must testify at the hearing.
At issue is the meaning of the phrase “to the clinical basis for the need for
involuntary commitment.”
Because the SVPA does not supply its own definition of the phrase, we
interpret that language according to its generally accepted meaning. See In re
Plan for the Abolition of the Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 467
(2013). A “basis” is “[a] fundamental principle; an underlying fact or
17
condition; a foundation or starting point.” Black’s Law Dictionary 185 (11th
ed. 2019). And “need” is “[t]he lack of something important; a requirement.”
Id. at 1243.
The statute’s express focus on testimony by a psychiatrist, who holds a
medical degree, cannot be interpreted to encompass testimony by a
psychologist, who does not. The Legislature has distinguished between
psychiatric and psychological experts in our Rules of Evidence -- N.J.R.E. 505
provides for a psychologist-patient privilege, whereas the privilege between
psychiatrists and their patients is part of the physician-patient privilege set
forth in N.J.R.E. 506. See State v. Kane, 449 N.J. Super. 119, 135 (App. Div.
2017). And when the Legislature intends that the evaluation of either a
psychiatrist or psychologist suffice for a particular purpose, it has said so
explicitly. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-5 (“Whenever there is reason to doubt the
defendant’s fitness to proceed, the court may on motion by the prosecutor, the
defendant or on its own motion, appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or
licensed psychologist to examine and report upon the mental condition of the
defendant.” (emphasis added)).
Thus, the clear language of the statute indicates that a psychiatrist must
testify to those underlying facts that require involuntary commitment of the
individual. It is not enough, under the statute’s plain terms, that a psychiatrist
18
testifies -- even if that testimony is against involuntary commitment -- and that
someone else testifies to the need for commitment. Since the statute’s
language is not ambiguous, we need not look to extrinsic sources for further
guidance. We nevertheless note that the provision’s plain meaning accords
with both the legislative history of the Act and the overarching statutory
scheme.
B.
The SVPA’s legislative history clearly establishes that the Legislature
deliberately modeled the SVPA’s commitment procedures after the general
civil commitment statute that predated it. The Sponsor’s Statement to the bill
that became the SVPA provides that the SVPA’s procedures are similar to
N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.10 and N.J.S.A.30:4-27.12, which set out the commitment
process for general civil commitment. Sponsor’s Statement to S. 895 15-16
(L. 1998, c. 71). The findings in the SVPA itself declare that it was enacted in
part “to modify the involuntary civil commitment process in recognition of the
need for commitment of those sexually violent predators who pose a danger to
others.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25(c). And, finally, the Legislature took the
language at issue, that a psychiatrist “shall testify to the clinical basis for the
need for involuntary commitment,” directly from the general civil commitment
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guidelines for initial commitment and review hearings. See N.J.S.A. 30:4-
27.13.
Because the Legislature clearly intended the SVPA’s procedure to
follow that of the general civil commitment statute, and because the
Legislature was presumptively aware of the judicial construction of such
procedure, we review precedent from the general civil commitment statute to
decipher the Legislature’s intent in regard to the SVPA.
While considering the general civil commitment statute in 1993, the
Appellate Division was presented with the same question that is before this
Court: whether the language “to the clinical basis for the need for involuntary
commitment to treatment” requires the psychiatrist’s testimony to be in
support of commitment. Raymond S., 263 N.J. Super. 428 (App. Div. 1993).
The Appellate Division answered in the affirmative. Id. at 432.
Five years later, the Legislature enacted the SVPA. We presume that, as
it crafted the SVPA, the Legislature was aware that the courts had interpreted
the general civil commitment statute to require psychiatric testimony in
support of commitment. See DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 494. So informed, the
Legislature nevertheless used the exact same phrasing in the SVPA, without a
corrective definition. Using the same language thus reflects legislative intent
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to require psychiatric testimony in support of commitment under the SVPA as
well.
And the SVPA itself maintains an important and consistent burden on
the State, requiring psychiatric testimony in support of commitment at each
stage in the proceedings.
To initiate commitment proceedings under the SVPA, the State must
present two clinical certificates “which state[] that the person is in need of
involuntary commitment to treatment.” N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.2(b). At least one of
those certificates must be prepared by a psychiatrist. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28(c).
Therefore, to begin the commitment process under the SVPA, a psychiatrist
must support commitment.
The SVPA further requires the State to produce psychiatric testimony at
both the initial commitment hearing and again at each review hearing pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b). See N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. When viewing the statute
as a whole, it would be discordant to demand more from the certifications
required to commence a hearing than from the testimony provided at the
hearings. As such, interpreting N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) to require psychiatric
testimony in support of commitment at hearings is harmonious with the
commencement procedure and creates a consistent burden on the State
throughout the commitment process.
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C.
We find that the plain text of N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.30(b) requires a
psychiatrist to testify in support of commitment when the State seeks the initial
or continued commitment of a sexually violent predator.
Because of the passage of time between the trial court’s decision on
January 29, 2019, and the issuance of this opinion, the Court shall afford the
State an opportunity to provide a psychiatrist in support of commitment in a
new review hearing pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. Pending the court’s
determination after that rehearing, W.W. shall remain committed under the
SVPA.
V.
We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
PATTERSON, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE
FERNANDEZ-VINA’s opinion.
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