C.R. VS. J.R. (FV-20-1234-16, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2017 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4936-15T3
C.R.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.R.,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted October 18, 2017 – Decided November 8, 2017
Before Judges Alvarez and Currier.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Union
County, Docket No. FV-20-1234-16.
Hugo Villalobos, attorney for appellant.
Lowenstein Sandler LLP, attorneys for
respondent (Michael A. Kaplan, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.R.1 appeals from a final restraining order (FRO)
entered against him. After a review of the record and arguments
in light of the applicable legal principles, we affirm.
Plaintiff C.R. applied for and obtained a temporary
restraining order (TRO) on the grounds of harassment and assault
based upon events that occurred on February 29, 2016.
The trial in this matter spanned over the course of several
days. The testimony revealed that the parties were involved in a
long-term dating relationship. Although they had broken off their
relationship several times through the years, they were still a
couple on the date of these events and defendant testified they
had plans on the day of the incident to go to city hall to apply
for a marriage license.
Plaintiff testified that defendant phoned her at least fifty
times and sent her more than fifty text messages on February 29.
When she did not answer, defendant drove to her workplace.
Plaintiff testified that as she walked out to the parking lot,
defendant began yelling at her. She said he grabbed her neck,
pulled her hair, and took her purse and jacket. Defendant then
dragged her towards his car, while he hit her in the head with his
1
We use initials to refer to the individuals in this case for the
purposes of confidentiality and clarity.
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fist. She also stated that he threw her to the ground and kicked
her. Plaintiff's boss saw what was happening and called the
police. Defendant left the scene. Plaintiff testified several
times that she was afraid of defendant.
Defendant recounted a different version of events. He
testified that he went to pick plaintiff up at her workplace
because he wanted to speak with her. He said that plaintiff
refused to speak with him and she punched him. Defendant stated
that plaintiff continued to hit him, kicked the car, and broke off
the side-view mirror, throwing it to the ground. Defendant denied
hitting, pushing, or throwing plaintiff to the ground. Both
parties described prior incidents when there had been physicality
between them.
In an oral decision of June 6, 2016, the trial judge found
that plaintiff had satisfied her proofs as to the predicate act
of harassment, but not as to assault. He noted the great disparity
in the parties' testimony and commented "you both can't cause an
assault when you both engage freely into the fight." The judge
determined that an FRO was necessary since the parties lived across
the street from each other and defendant had continued to harass
plaintiff through social media posts after the entry of the TRO.
On appeal, defendant argues that plaintiff did not prove the
act of harassment or that she needed the protection of an FRO. He
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also contends that the postponement of the trial date to permit
plaintiff to amend her complaint violated his rights. We disagree
and affirm.
Before entering an FRO, a trial judge must find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant engaged in conduct
that would fit the definition of one or more criminal statutes,
including harassment as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. Silver v.
Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-26 (App. Div. 2006). The finding
of a predicate act of domestic violence does not "automatically
mandate[]" the entry of an FRO, id. at 126-27, as the second prong
of the two-step analysis outlined in Silver must also be met,
"whether the court should enter a restraining order that provides
protection for the victim." Id. at 126.
Our scope of review of the trial judge's factual findings is
limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We are
generally bound by the trial judge's findings of fact "when
supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at
411-12. This is especially true when questions of credibility are
involved. Id. at 412.
The trial judge found that both parties were generally
straightforward in their respective testimony, although each
lacked credibility in certain portions of their stories. He found
plaintiff to be "slightly more credible than defendant." In his
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review of the phone calls, he stated: "fifty calls . . . on a
single day sort of screams harassment when someone's at work." He
found there was no purpose to the continuous calls made to
plaintiff's cell phone and workplace other than to harass her. We
are satisfied that the record fully supports the trial judge's
factual findings as to the predicate act of harassment.
We are also satisfied that the judge had a sufficient basis
to conclude that an FRO was appropriate and necessary in this
case. Given the particular expertise of family part judges, it
is not our place to second-guess an exercise of discretion to
enter an FRO when supported by "adequate, substantial, credible
evidence[,]" as was this decision. Id. at 412.
We find the remainder of defendant's arguments lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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