STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. THOMAS A. WALLACE (15-09-0950, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4545-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v
THOMAS A. WALLACE a/k/a
WALLACE THOMAS and
WALLACE SONNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted January 3, 2022 – Decided January 11, 2022
Before Judges Rose and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 15-09-
0950.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Andrew J. Bruck, Acting Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Valeria Dominguez, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Thomas A. Wallace appeals from a May 15, 2020 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm.
Following multiple sales of crack-cocaine to a confidential informant
(CI), police obtained search warrants for defendant's home and cars, resulting in
the seizure of drugs from one car and money from his bedroom. Around $5,000
was secreted in a Kool Aid can with a false bottom, and $1,480 was seized from
a jacket hanging on the back of a door. The jacket also contained defendant's
driver's license and miscellaneous identification cards. Prior to trial, the court
denied defendant's motion to reveal the identity of the CI, who did not testify at
trial. Noting defendant was gainfully employed at the time of his arrest, defense
counsel argued the drugs did not belong to defendant, but the money seized by
police from his bedroom was lawfully earned. Defendant testified against the
advice of counsel.
A jury convicted defendant of all six drug offenses charged in a Burlington
County indictment. After ordering the appropriate mergers, the trial court
sentenced defendant on the remaining third-degree drug count, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-
5(a)(1), to an extended seven-year prison term, with a parole disqualifier of
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three-and-one-half-years. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f) (mandating an extended term
for repeat drug offenders upon the State's application). We affirmed defendant's
conviction and sentence. State v. Wallace, No. A-1081-17 (App. Div. Apr. 9,
2019).
Defendant filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). With
the assistance of PCR counsel, defendant claimed trial counsel was ineffective
for: (1) acknowledging in his opening statement that the money seized from
defendant's bedroom belonged to defendant; (2) conceding defendant's jacket
and identification were found in his bedroom; and (3) failing to seek information
concerning the CI's favorable treatment by the authorities. Defendant filed a pro
se supplemental brief, asserting various claims, some of which were raised on
direct appeal.
Following oral argument, the PCR judge reserved decision. Shortly
thereafter, the judge issued a cogent written decision, squarely addressing the
issues raised in view of the controlling law. The judge denied all claims for
relief asserted by PCR counsel and defendant pro se. Citing controlling
precedent, the judge essentially concluded "trial counsel's strategy . . . had a
logical basis and consistency, which should not be second guessed." See e.g.,
State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 316 (2006) (declining to find the defendant
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demonstrated a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel where
his trial counsel engaged in the "high-risk strategy of admitting [the defendant]'s
guilt to lesser-included offenses in the hope that it would enhance [the
defendant]'s credibility").
On appeal, defendant reprises the same arguments asserted by counsel
before the PCR court. More particularly, defendant argues:
POINT ONE
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS
TESTIMONY IS NEEDED FROM TRIAL COUNSEL
EXPLAINING WHY HE ADMITTED TO THE JURY
THAT MONEY RECOVERED FROM A BEDROOM
BELONGED TO [DEFENDANT].
POINT TWO
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS
TESTIMONY IS NEEDED FROM TRIAL COUNSEL
EXPLAINING WHY HE FAILED TO ELICIT ON
CROSS-EXAMINATION THAT THE WALLET AND
IDENTIFICATION WAS NOT INITIALLY FOUND
IN A JACKET ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN
HANGING BEHIND A DOOR IN WHAT POLICE
CONCLUDED WAS [DEFENDANT'S] BEDROOM.
POINT THREE
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS
TESTIMONY IS NEEDED FROM TRIAL COUNSEL
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EXPLAINING WHY HE FAILED TO SEEK
INFORMATION THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANT RECEIVED FAVORABLE
TREATMENT FOR HIS OPEN [CONTROLLED
DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES] CASE.
Having considered defendant's contentions in view of the applicable law,
we are satisfied he failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his PCR
claim would ultimately succeed on the merits, and failed to satisfy either prong
of the test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), as
adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). Pursuant
to our discretionary standard of review, State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462
(1992), we discern no reason to disturb the judge's decision. Because there was
no prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel, an evidentiary
hearing was not necessary to resolve defendant's PCR claims. Ibid. We affirm
substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Mark P. Tarantino in his cogent
decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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