New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. C.W. in the Matter of I.N.W. ( 2014 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0542-12T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
PERMANENCY,
March 27, 2014
Plaintiff-Respondent, APPELLATE DIVISION
v.
C.W.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________
IN THE MATTER OF I.N.W., a minor.
_________________________________
Submitted February 12, 2014 - Decided March 27, 2014
Before Judges Lihotz, Maven and Hoffman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Camden County, Docket No. FN-04-339-12.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Robert H. McGuigan,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Lewis A.
Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Andrea R. Fonseca-Romen, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor I.N.W. (Lisa M.
Black, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LIHOTZ, J.A.D.
We address the requisite procedures Family Part judges must
follow to protect a defendant's due process rights when a
child's testimony is sought in a protective services action. We
hold that in any proceeding filed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.2(c), when a defendant objects to utilizing an alternative to
the child's in-court testimony, the judge must adhere to the
statutory procedures outlined in N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4, prior to
allowing in camera testimony of a child-witness.
In this matter, defendant C.W. appeals from two Family Part
orders entered in this Title Nine action initiated by plaintiff,
the Division of Youth and Family Services (Division).1 The first
order under review was filed on April 20, 2012, following trial,
and included the judge's findings that C.W.'s daughter, I.N.W.,
was an abused or neglected child pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.21(c), and C.W. "failed to provide a minimum degree of care
2
for the child due to her drinking problem." The second order,
1
On June 29, 2012, the Governor signed into law A-3101,
which reorganizes the Department of Children and Families,
including the renaming of the Division as the Division of Child
Protection and Permanency. L. 2012, c. 16, eff. June 29, 2012
(amending N.J.S.A. 9:3A-10(b)).
2
K.R., C.W.'s boyfriend who resided in the household, was
also a named defendant in the litigation. However, because he
(continued)
2 A-0542-12T4
filed on August 15, 2012, placed I.N.W. in the custody of her
adult sibling, awarded custody of her younger sibling to a
paternal relative, and concluded the litigation. On appeal,
C.W. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues the
trial judge erred in grounding her factual findings upon then
seventeen-year-old I.N.W.'s in camera interview. Although the
procedure followed in this matter did not conform to the
requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4, defendant did not object
to the use of the alternate procedure. Further, the evidence of
record, after excluding I.N.W.'s in camera statements, amply
supports the judge's findings of abuse and neglect.
Accordingly, we conclude C.W.'s due process rights were not
impinged and affirm.
At trial, the Division chose to admit documentary evidence,
without objection from defendants or the Law Guardian. This
included six multi-page exhibits containing: prior Division
records beginning in 1996, substantiating incidents of abuse or
neglect by C.W.; Division case notes and reports, redacted by
agreement, recording the Division's investigation of the instant
referral and interviews regarding the alleged assault of I.N.W.
by C.W. and K.R.; and a report prepared by the Gloucester
(continued)
has not participated in this appeal, we omit the order's
provisions addressing his conduct.
3 A-0542-12T4
Township Police Department (GTPD) documenting the investigation
of the alleged assault by C.W. and K.R., along with photographs
depicting I.N.W.'s injuries. The Division offered no witnesses.
Neither C.W. nor K.R. testified. However, K.R. presented
testimony from his brother and a friend who were present in the
home when the subject altercation occurred. At the close of
evidence, the trial judge spoke to I.N.W. in chambers, while
counsel and the parties listened, as the interview was broadcast
into the courtroom. Prior to the interview, the judge had
requested all parties to submit questions to be posed to the
child.
These facts are found in the exhibits admitted into
evidence. The GTPD contacted the Division on the evening of
December 2, 2011, when sixteen-year-old I.N.W. appeared at the
police station with her adult sibling. I.N.W. reported C.W. and
K.R. had physically assaulted her at a time when the two had
been drinking.
Family Services Specialist Demetrius Briggs and another
Division caseworker responded. The Division's case notes
recited the information obtained from the police station
interviews of I.N.W. and her older sibling. At that time,
Briggs also recorded his observations of I.N.W.'s physical
appearance, stating she had "several scratches" on her face,
4 A-0542-12T4
including "a scratch on the left cheek approximately an inch and
a half [sic] long; a linear abrasion approximately three inches
long on the right side of her neck; an abrasion on the back/left
side of her neck; and bruising on the left jaw area." A police
officer photographed I.N.W.'s injuries.
In her interview with Briggs, I.N.W. stated when she
returned home from school, C.W. and K.R. had been drinking. She
stated "everyday" C.W. and K.R. drink "beer and vodka" before
she and her sibling return home from school and "both become
very angry when they drink[]."
C.W. and her youngest child began joking, but the banter
turned into an argument when C.W. "suddenly became irritated and
started yelling," purportedly because I.N.W. began laughing.
I.N.W. intended to go to the library and may have "called her
mother crazy," as she left the residence. C.W. followed I.N.W.
outside and "began hitting her while her back was turned." C.W.
pushed I.N.W. to the ground and "continued to punch and hit her,
knocking her into the chair on the porch." I.N.W. "reported as
she was on the ground, her mother grabbed her by the throat and
was strangling her." I.N.W "grabbed [C.W.]'s wrists," in an
attempt to try to remove her hands from her neck. When C.W.
released I.N.W., she got up and ran to her friend's home and
never returned. I.N.W. also told Briggs of an earlier incident
5 A-0542-12T4
when K.R. struck her. Ultimately, I.N.W.'s older sibling was
called and drove her to the police station.
That night, Briggs and his co-worker went to the home,
accompanied by the GTPD investigating officers. Briggs removed
I.N.W. and her younger sibling from their parents' care and
placed them in a resource home. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 and N.J.S.A.
30:4C-12. Thereafter, the Family Part granted the Division
custody, care and supervision of both children.
Briggs also recorded the following notes after his December
2, 2011 investigation. "From the time workers entered the home
there was a very strong smell of alcohol" emanating from C.W.,
which police also confirmed. Although coherent, C.W.'s "speech
appeared to be slurred and she smelled of alcohol." However, no
testing was performed to confirm this suspicion. C.W. and K.R.
denied drinking before 10:00 p.m.; C.W. stated at that time she
had consumed three beers. C.W. acknowledged she drinks "maybe
on the weekends, or when a football game is on[,]" but denied
being an alcoholic and asserted her family had no previous
involvement with the Division. Briggs inspected the premises
and found "an empty Genuine Draft six[-]pack box in the kitchen
and half a bottle of beer in the refrigerator." Additionally,
he observed "an empty vodka bottle and three empty beer bottles
in the trash can" of C.W.'s bedroom.
6 A-0542-12T4
Briggs interviewed C.W. in the dining room, while his co-
worker interviewed K.R. on the steps. C.W. explained I.N.W. was
"very disrespectful" earlier in the day. C.W. told her to
complete her chores, but I.N.W. "was not listening and was just
laughing" and mimicking her. After I.N.W. left the house, again
saying something disrespectful, C.W. followed her outside to
tell her such behavior was unacceptable. C.W. told Briggs
I.N.W. "took a swipe," scratching the right side of her jaw
line. The police report identified "redness and some swelling
to [C.W.'s] bottom right jaw." C.W. told Briggs I.N.W.
scratched her, but he noted the scratch was "not very visible";
rather, C.W. "appeared to be attempting to make a scratch and/or
mark appear on her own face" during the interview.
C.W. admitted she placed her hands on I.N.W.'s chest and
pushed her against a wall, as a defensive maneuver. However,
she denied I.N.W. fell or was pushed to the ground. She also
maintained K.R. did not punch I.N.W. and insisted I.N.W. had no
scratches or abrasions when she left the house, subsequently she
"may have scratched herself."
K.R.'s two trial witnesses described their observations of
the day's events. However, both admitted they did not know when
and how the "little tussle" between C.W. and I.N.W. began, as
7 A-0542-12T4
they did not see the entire altercation. Neither witness
observed K.R. strike anyone.
At the close of testimony, the judge interviewed I.N.W. in
chambers. No other party was present. The details of the
events described in this interview vary slightly from those
recorded by Briggs. Despite the minor discrepancies, I.N.W.
consistently reported the significant events the trial judge
relied upon to support her legal conclusions.
The judge issued a written opinion on April 20, 2012.
Crediting I.N.W.'s testimony, she found the Division had proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that I.N.W. was "an abused
and/or neglected child within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21
et seq." The judge memorialized her conclusions in the April
20, 2012 order, and conducted a dispositional hearing
immediately thereafter, to address the children's placements.
I.N.W. remained with her resource family until the school year
concluded, when she moved to her older sibling's home. Her
younger sibling was placed with a paternal relative, where she
remained. On August 15, after a follow-up dispositional
hearing, the judge found it was not safe to return either child
to C.W.'s care, as she was homeless and only recently commenced
substance abuse treatment. The same day, the trial court
entered the final order, provided I.N.W. would remain in the
8 A-0542-12T4
custody of her sibling, her younger sibling would remain with
relatives, and terminated the litigation. This appeal ensued.
Our review of determinations made following a bench trial
is limited. "A reviewing court should uphold the factual
findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are
supported by 'adequate, substantial and credible evidence' on
the record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189
N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269
N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)); Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). We afford particular deference "to
factfindings of the family court because it has the superior
ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify
before it and because it possesses special expertise in matters
related to the family." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
F.M, 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012). This "'feel of the case' . . .
can never be realized by a review of the cold record." N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)
(quoting M.M., supra, 189 N.J. at 293). Consequently, a family
court's factual findings "should not be disturbed unless 'they
are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of
justice[.]'" J.T., supra, 269 N.J. Super. at 188 (quoting Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474,
483-84 (1974)). See also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.
9 A-0542-12T4
F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259 (App. Div. 2005) ("When the
credibility of witnesses is an important factor, the trial
court's conclusions must be given great weight and must be
accepted by the appellate court unless clearly lacking in
reasonable support.").
Reversal is warranted only when a trial judge's findings
are "'so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the
competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to
offend the interests of justice.'" Rova Farms, supra, 65 N.J.
at 484 (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super.
154, 155 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 40 N.J. 221 (1963)).
Further, the trial judge's "interpretation of the law and the
legal consequences that flow from established facts" are not
subject to deference and are reviewed de novo by this court de
novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140
N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
On appeal, C.W. argues the judge erred by conducting an in
camera interview of then seventeen-year-old I.N.W., "rather than
requiring her to testify," a practice which C.W. suggests
contravenes the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4, and
"abrogate[s] [her] due process rights." C.W. also maintains the
judge failed to administer an oath to I.N.W. and merely
discussed with her the importance of telling the truth and
10 A-0542-12T4
obtained her assurance she understood the need to "be honest[.]"
C.W. insists these defects require the trial judge's factual
findings be set aside.
The Division and the Law Guardian argue any error resulting
from the in camera interview was harmless. Alternatively, the
Division and Law Guardian maintain the procedures employed by
the trial judge precisely complied with Rule 5:12-4(b), which
grants the judge discretion to take the child's testimony
"privately in chambers," and were not error.
We agree the statute was not followed in this proceeding.
I.N.W. was over sixteen years-of-age and the record on appeal
does not include judicial findings to support the necessity of
an in camera proceeding in lieu of the child's trial testimony.
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4. Nevertheless, we determine the record
reflects sufficient credible evidence, aside from I.N.W.'s in
camera statements, which fully support the trial judge's
conclusions.
"Our decisional law has . . . recognized the State's
interests in eliciting testimony of child abuse . . . ." N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 120 N.J. 112, 126 (1990).
In that regard, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4 provides the framework for
taking a child's closed circuit testimony in abuse and neglect
proceedings, stating:
11 A-0542-12T4
a. . . . in any action alleging an abused
or neglected child under [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21
to -8.73], the court may, on motion and
after conducting a hearing in camera, order
the taking of the testimony of a witness on
closed circuit television at the trial, out
of the view of . . . defendant, . . . as
provided in subsection b. of this section.
b. An order under this section may be made
only if the court finds that the witness is
16 years of age or younger and that there is
a substantial likelihood that the witness
would suffer severe emotional or mental
distress if required to testify in open
court. The order shall be specific as to
whether the witness will testify outside the
presence of . . . defendant, . . . and shall
be based on specific findings relating to
the impact of the presence of each.
. . . .
d. The defendant's counsel shall be
present at the taking of testimony in
camera.
. . . .
The statute also applies to specified criminal proceedings,
when the testimony of a child-witness is necessary. Ibid.
Certainly, the statutory protections are designed to preserve a
criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses, as granted by
the Sixth Amendment of our federal Constitution through the
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. VI and XIV, and by the
New Jersey Constitution, N.J. Const., Art. I, par. 10. In re
B.F., 230 N.J. Super. 153, 158 (App. Div. 1989) (citing State v.
Washington, 202 N.J. Super. 187, 191 (App. Div. 1985)).
12 A-0542-12T4
The basic elements of confrontation are
physical presence, oath, cross-examination,
and observation of demeanor by the trier of
fact. [Maryland v.] Craig, [] 497 U.S.
[836,] 846, 110 S. Ct. [3157,] 3163, 111 L.
Ed. 2d [666,] 678 [(1990)]. However, "[t]he
central concern of the Confrontation Clause
is to ensure the reliability of the evidence
against a criminal defendant by subjecting
it to rigorous testing in the context of an
adversary proceeding before the trier of
fact." Id. at 845, 110 S. Ct. at 3163, 111
L. Ed. 2d at 678.
[State v. Smith, 158 N.J. 376, 385 (1999).]
The focus in civil matters, such as this one, differs.
"[A]lthough the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is not
applicable in civil proceedings, due process guarantees civil
litigants a measure of confrontation." A.B. v. Y.Z., 184 N.J.
599, 604 (2005) (citation omitted). At the same time, public
policy requires the judiciary to prevent further victimization
or traumatization of young children called to testify in court
proceedings. Our Supreme Court has cautioned a "child's fear
. . . prevent[s] the proper functioning of the truth-finding
process[.]" Smith, supra, 158 N.J. at 387.
Moreover, our court rules contain provisions governing
proceedings initiated by the Division, when a child's testimony
may be necessary. See Rule 5:12-1 to -7. The Division and Law
Guardian rely on Rule 5:12-4(b), which provides:
Hearings and trials shall be conducted in
private. In the child's best interests, the
13 A-0542-12T4
court may order that a child not be present
at a hearing or trial unless the child's
testimony is necessary for the determination
of the matter. The testimony of a child
may, in the court's discretion, be taken
privately in chambers or under such
protective orders as the court may provide.
See also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. S.S., 185 N.J.
Super. 3, 6 (App. Div.) (approving use of "the somewhat novel
procedure utilized by the judge" for interviewing a child-
witness in chambers with the minor's law guardian present and
defendant, who was charged with child abuse, permitted to submit
questions he wished the judge to ask), certif. denied, 91 N.J.
572 (1982).
In considering, the Division and Law Guardian's suggestion
that compliance with Rule 5:12-4(b) is all that is required when
a Family Part judge exercises his or her discretion to conduct
an in camera interview of a child, we have located no decisional
authority regarding the application of N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4 in
Title Nine actions nor have we found any discussion of how the
statute interfaces with the court rules governing proceedings
initiated by the Division. We note both the statute and rule
require the exercise of reasoned discretion, when determining
whether to allow a child to be questioned using an alternative
procedure, instead of being required to take the stand. See
B.F., supra, 230 N.J. Super. at 158 ("[T]he decision as to
14 A-0542-12T4
whether one is to be granted relief under the statute is in the
sound discretion of the court."); see also R. 5:12-4(b). Also,
both the statute and the rule require a judge to make specific
findings warranting use of alternate procedures. This court has
found "[t]rial judges have broad discretion in abuse and neglect
cases . . . to conduct a private examination of a child." N.J.
Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.A., 357 N.J. Super. 155, 168
(App. Div. 2003).
Under Rule 5:12-4(b), the testimony of a child taken in
chambers or under provisions of a protective order allows the
judge to pursue an inquiry in a less intrusive atmosphere for a
child whose "testimony is necessary for the determination of the
matter." To that extent, the provisions of the rule do not
conflict with N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4. However, a child-witness's
testimony that is necessary to determine a matter pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21, is expressly governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-
32.4. Accordingly, we conclude when a Title Nine defendant
objects to utilizing a procedure other than presenting a child's
in-court testimony, the trial judge must follow the requisites
of N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4a to -c, including first making detailed
findings of the necessity of an alternative to the child's in-
court testimony, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-32.4(b). Any alternate
procedures used must assure protection of a defendant's due
15 A-0542-12T4
process rights and the order must also detail the procedures
used to do so.
Also, when a minor child is summoned to testify using an
alternative procedure, the judge must determine whether the
child-witness is competent to testify, N.J.R.E. 601, and
comprehends the need to tell the truth. Morrone v. Morrone, 44
N.J. Super. 305, 313 (App. Div. 1957). The child must be placed
under oath, or instructed of the need to tell the truth and
determined to understand that obligation. See State v. G.C.,
188 N.J. 118, 132-33 (2006) (stating in taking testimony from a
child-witness "the clearly preferred procedure would have
entailed the use of an oath or oath substitute that acknowledged
both the obligation to testify truthfully and that the failure
to do so could result in adverse consequences").
The child-witness also must be available for cross-
examination. Most assuredly, presentation of testimony from a
child-witness requires sensitivity, and most parents would demur
when faced with the prospect of forcing a child to appear in
court. While we do not suggest every child-witness should face
the unbridled interrogation of skilled counsel, we remain
confident our Family Part judges may craft procedures acceptable
to the parties to assure the child is not subjected to badgering
16 A-0542-12T4
or harshness, while nonetheless protecting a defendant's due
process rights.
Turning to the record in this matter, we cannot determine
who initiated the in camera interview procedure. We do know
that neither C.W. nor K.R. requested I.N.W. take the stand and
neither objected to using this alternative procedure. The
record also reflects the parties reached a consensus on the
nature of the documentary evidence once the Division provided
photographs corroborating I.N.W.'s injuries, such that the
exhibits, as redacted, were admitted without objection. Perhaps
this explains why the trial judge did not consider the statute's
plain language — no one thought it necessary and the parties
never questioned the use of an in camera interview of I.N.W.
However, our determination is not concluded by the apparent
acceptance of the process. "Because due process guarantees
civil litigants a measure of confrontation, the burden to prove
the denial of such confrontation harmless . . . rests with
plaintiff[], who benefited from the circumscription of
defendant's right to face his accuser." A.B., supra, 184 N.J.
at 605 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct.
824, 828, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710 (1967)). Accordingly, we must
consider whether C.W. was given a sufficient opportunity to
confront the Division's evidence in light of the interview
17 A-0542-12T4
procedures followed by the judge. The analysis is twofold: was
C.W. prejudiced by the procedure utilized, and did the
Division's other evidence satisfy its burden of proof. We
conclude C.W. was not prejudiced by the in camera interview
procedure because she had the opportunity to confront the
Division's evidence, which standing alone proved by a
preponderance of the evidence I.N.W. was an abused or neglected
child.
By definition, actions under Title Nine seek to impose
protective services when parental conduct jeopardizes a child's
safety and security. Relevant here, a child is deemed "abused
or neglected" if he or she is less than eighteen years-of-age
whose physical, mental, or emotional
condition has been impaired or is in
imminent danger of becoming impaired as the
result of the failure of his parent or
guardian, as herein defined, to exercise a
minimum degree of care . . . in providing
the child with proper supervision or
guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or
allowing to be inflicted harm, or
substantial risk thereof, including the
infliction of excessive corporal punishment;
or by any other acts of a similarly serious
nature requiring the aid of the court[.]
[N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).]
Specific injuries or risks, such as wounds, "[c]uts, bruises,
abrasions, welts," and "[r]isk of harm due to substance abuse by
18 A-0542-12T4
the parent/caregiver of the child" may constitute abuse and
neglect. N.J.A.C. 10:129-2.2(a)6, 9, and 13.
A finding of abuse or neglect under the statute must be
"based on a preponderance of the evidence," and the record must
consist only of "competent, material and relevant evidence
. . . ." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(1) and (2). Such a finding
cannot be based solely on "previous statements made by the child
relating to any allegation of abuse or neglect," without further
corroboration. N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46a(4).
C.W. was provided with all evidence the Division intended
to rely upon to prove its case. She was also given the names of
the investigating police officers and the photographs taken by
police on December 2, 2011. C.W. was afforded the opportunity
to present interview questions to be posed to I.N.W., and, as
noted during the pre-trial conference, could have requested
additional inquiries if prompted by the child's responses. The
judge also advised rebuttal testimony could be offered after
I.N.W.'s interview. C.W. heard I.N.W.'s interview as it was
conducted, and was represented by and readily able to confer
with counsel during the entire proceeding. The totality of
these procedures safeguarded C.W.'s ability to consider the
evidence presented by the Division to support its complaint,
19 A-0542-12T4
allowed her to challenge that evidence, and enabled her to
assist in and present her defense.
If I.N.W.'s interview statements are excluded, we easily
conclude the remaining uncontroverted evidence demonstrates
C.W.'s conduct resulted in I.N.W. being an abused child. See
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.M., 181 N.J. Super. 190,
201 (App. Div. 1981) (when determining whether a child is abused
or neglected, the court must "evaluat[e] the whole picture each
part cannot be separately determined."). The Division proved
C.W. struck, punched, scratched, and attempted to strangle
I.N.W. on December 2, 2011, because she was angry. Although
C.W. suggested I.N.W. initiated the altercation by swinging at
her, that possibility does not excuse the resultant physical
assault on her teenage daughter. Further, C.W.'s alcohol abuse
was documented in the case notes and verified by observation of
the police and the caseworkers, who found empty beer and vodka
bottles in her bedroom. Subsequent substance abuse evaluations,
also substantiated C.W.'s need for treatment. These facts
emphasized the need for court intervention to prevent further
injury to I.N.W. and her younger sibling. Based upon the
totality of the evidence, we conclude the Division proved its
case and any possible error resulting from the trial judge's in
20 A-0542-12T4
camera interview of I.N.W. was not "clearly capable of producing
an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.
The remaining arguments advanced by C.W. on appeal lack
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E). Following our review, we find no basis to set aside
the court's orders. See A.B., supra, 184 N.J. at 606.
Affirmed.
21 A-0542-12T4