STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. MAHADI M. ROBINSON, JR. (12-05-0545, 12-05-0633, AND 12-07-1924, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4116-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MAHADI M. ROBINSON, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted January 11, 2021 – Decided April 19, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Indictment Nos. 12-05-
0545, 12-05-0633, and 12-07-1924.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Howard W. Bailey, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Nicole Handy, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a February 28, 2019 order denying his petition
for post-conviction relief (PCR). Defendant argues his plea counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing by failing to adequately advocate
for mitigating circumstances and by failing to respond adequately to the
aggravating circumstances proposed by the prosecutor and ultimately found by
the sentencing court. Judge Mark P. Tarantino entered the order denying PCR
and rendered an eighteen-page written opinion. We affirm substantially for the
reasons set forth in Judge Tarantino's thorough and thoughtful opinion.
I.
In 2012, a Burlington County grand jury returned three indictments
against defendant for three separate crimes committed on different dates.
On January 26, 2012, defendant and two codefendants arranged to meet
with an individual to purchase marijuana, though the actual plan was to rob the
victim at knifepoint. Defendant ran the victim down as he attempted to flee,
striking, and stabbing him multiple times.
With respect to the January 26, 2012 criminal episode, Indictment No. 12-
07-1924-I charged defendant with first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
1(a)(3) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); second-degree aggravated assault by
causing serious bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); third-degree aggravated
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assault with a deadly weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2); third-degree aggravated
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7); third-degree possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; and first-
degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and -2.
On January 30, 2012, defendant, along with the same two codefendants as
well as a juvenile acquaintance, arranged for a taxicab pick-up so that they could
rob the driver at knifepoint. When the cab driver requested payment, defendant
slashed and stabbed the victim multiple times in the neck, inflicting life -
threatening wounds. The victim managed to escape from the cab. Defendant
and his cohorts took off with the vehicle but eventually crashed into a tree and
were arrested shortly thereafter.
With respect to the January 30, 2012 criminal episode, Indictment No. 12-
05-0633-I charged defendant with first-degree conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a);
first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(3) and 11-3(a)(1); two counts
of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); first-degree carjacking,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1); third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); and first-degree use of a minor to commit a
criminal offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-9(a).
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On February 17, 2012, defendant repeatedly threatened a Burlington
County corrections officer while he was detained in the Burlington County jail
for the earlier crimes. With respect to the February 17, 2012 criminal episode,
Indictment No. 12-05-0545-I charged defendant with third-degree terroristic
threats, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-3(a).
Defendant's trial counsel negotiated an agreement with the State in which
defendant agreed to plead guilty to the first-degree armed robbery charged in
the first indictment, the first-degree armed robbery and first-degree carjacking
charged in the second indictment, and a downgraded charge of fourth-degree
aggravated harassment for threatening the corrections officers. The State agreed
to dismiss the remaining charges and cap defendant's aggregate sentence at
twenty years in prison subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A
2C:43-7.2.
On April 22, 2013, defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered guilty
pleas in accordance with the negotiated agreement. Defendant provided a
factual basis for the charges to which he pled guilty, including an admission that
he had used a knife on two separate occasions to inflict injury upon the two
robbery victims.
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The court sentenced defendant on June 21, 2013. Defendant's counsel
argued that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the two violent crimes. 1
Counsel also urged the court to find mitigating factor eight, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(b)(8) ("The defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur[.]"). Counsel argued that defendant should be sentenced to a fifteen-year
aggregate prison term, rather than the twenty-year aggregate term contemplated
in the plea agreement, considering these asserted mitigating circumstances, and
also considering defendant's age, his acceptance of responsibility, and his lack
of parental supervision during the time he spent in foster care.
The sentencing court found aggravating factors one, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(1) ("The nature and circumstances of the offense, and the role of the actor
in committing the offense, including whether or not it was committed in an
especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner[.]"), three, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1(a)(3) ("The risk that defendant will commit another offense[.]"), six, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(a)(6) ("The extent of the defendant's prior criminal record and the
1
Defendant claims that the presentence report (PSR) indicated that defendant
was under the influence of both alcohol and marijuana while committing the
predicate offenses. However, the PSR was not included in defendant's appendix.
The transcript of the sentencing hearing shows that defendant's plea counsel
claimed that defendant informed the intake officer of his intoxication at that
time, that the PSR did not in fact include this information, and that defendant
wished to have the PSR amended accordingly.
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seriousness of the offenses of which the defendant has been convicted [.]"), and
nine, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9) ("The need for deterring the defendant and others
from violating the law[.]"). The court found no applicable statutory mitigating
factors and rejected plea counsel's arguments concerning mitigating factor eight.
The sentencing court placed significant weight on aggravating factor one, noting
that defendant's knife attacks,
especially against the cab driver where his neck was
cut, was particularly cruel and heinous in light of the
fact that when it was all said and done, there was
practically no money that was achieved from this sort
of a robbery and the harm that was inflicted. While I
do agree with defense counsel, no one did die, [] I do
think that's just a fortunate happenstance. It was
fortuitous . . . No reason that I can think of that makes
any sort of sense.
The sentencing court found that the aggravating factors substantially
outweighed the mitigating factors. The court concluded that the twenty -year
prison sentence recommended by the State in the plea agreement was fair and in
the interest of justice, and thereupon imposed that sentence.
Defendant filed a direct appeal of the sentence in August 2014, more than
one year after the sentence was imposed and the judgment of conviction was
entered. We dismissed that appeal as untimely filed. In April 2018, defendant
filed a pro se petition for PCR. Defendant was assigned counsel who filed an
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amended PCR petition on defendant's behalf. Judge Tarantino heard oral
argument on February 11, 2019 and on February 28, 2019 entered the order and
rendered the opinion under review, denying defendant's petition and his request
for an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant raises the following contentions for our consideration:
POINT I
THE [PCR] COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING
HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY
ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE FAILED
TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL.
A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY
HEARINGS, AND PETITIONS FOR [PCR].
B. DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN HIS
ATTORNEY FAILED TO ARGUE
EFFECTIVELY AT SENTENCING.
II.
We begin our analysis by acknowledging the legal principles governing
this appeal. PCR is not a substitute for direct appeal. R. 3:22-3. Rather, it
serves the same function as a federal writ of habeas corpus. State v. Preciose,
129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992). When petitioning for PCR, a defendant must
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establish, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that he or she is entitled
to the requested relief. Ibid. The defendant must allege and articulate specific
facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision."
State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).
Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
1, paragraph 10 of the State Constitution guarantee the right to effective
assistance of counsel at all stages of criminal proceedings. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970)); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To establish a
violation of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
meet the two-part test articulated in Strickland. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. "First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient . . . . Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
To meet the first prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, a defendant must show
"that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Ibid. Reviewing
courts must indulge the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. Furthermore,
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in determining whether defense counsel's representation was deficient,
"'[j]udicial scrutiny . . . must be highly deferential,' and must avoid viewing the
performance under the 'distorting effects of hindsight.'" State v. Norman, 151
N.J. 5, 37 (1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
The second Strickland prong is especially demanding. Counsel's errors
must create a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different than if counsel had not made the errors. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694. This "is an exacting standard." State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538,
551 (2021) (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). "Prejudice is
not to be presumed," but must be affirmatively proven by the defendant. Ibid.(citing Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.).
Short of obtaining immediate relief, a defendant may show that an
evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the factual record in connection with
an ineffective assistance claim. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462–63. The PCR court
should grant an evidentiary hearing only where (1) a defendant is able to prove
a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) there are material
issues of disputed fact that must be resolved with evidence outside of the record,
and (3) the hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief. Id. at 462; R.
3:22-10(b). To meet the burden of proving a prima facie case, a defendant must
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show a reasonable likelihood of success under the Strickland test. Preciose, 129
N.J. at 463.
As a general proposition, we defer to a PCR court's factual findings "when
supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." State v. Harris, 181
N.J. 391, 415 (2004) (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of W. Windsor, 173 N.J.
502, 549 (2002)). However, when the PCR court does not hold an evidentiary
hearing, we "may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences drawn
from the documentary record." Id. at 421 (citing Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923
F.2d 284, 291 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991)).
III.
Because we affirm for the reasons explained in Judge Tarantino's thorough
and thoughtful written opinion, we need not re-address defendant's arguments at
length. We add the following comments.
Although defendant couches his argument in terms of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the gravamen of his argument is that he received an
excessive sentence. In State v. Acevedo, the Supreme Court held that a claim
of excessive sentence is "not an appropriate ground for [PCR]." 205 N.J. 40, 47
(2011). In so holding, the Acevedo Court approved of the holding and reasoning
in State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 596–97 (App. Div. 1988), in which we
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"concluded that allegations of improper consideration of aggravating and
mitigating factors and consecutive sentencing guidelines were not cognizable
claims on post-conviction relief." Ibid.We nonetheless address defendant's arguments on the merits, as did Judge
Tarantino. Judge Tarantino concluded that far from rendering ineffective
assistance, defendant's plea counsel performed competently in negotiating a
favorable plea agreement and in arguing, albeit unsuccessfully, for a shorter
prison term than the one that had been negotiated. We agree. Judge Tarantino
appropriately emphasized the "troublesome and violent" nature of defendant's
predicate crimes and especially defendant's brutality in stabbing the cab driver
in the neck, which, Judge Tarantino aptly noted, "by itself justifies a [twenty]-
year [s]tate prison sentence." (emphasis in original). Defendant is hard-pressed
to claim that plea counsel rendered constitutionally deficient assistance by
obtaining dismissal of multiple charges and limiting defendant's prison exposure
to the sentence he received.
With respect to the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test, defendant
contends that he would have received a lesser sentence had plea counsel fully
investigated and raised all relevant sentencing factors. That is nothing more
than rank speculation. Defendant has failed to demonstrate any reasonable
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probability that he would have received a shorter prison sentence had counsel
made additional arguments at allocution. Indeed, it seems clear from our review
of the record that but for counsel's advocacy, defendant would likely have faced
a greater sentencing exposure, including possible consecutive sentences for his
separate knife attacks. In these circumstances, defendant has failed to establish
a prima facie case for an evidentiary hearing, much less a basis for relief in the
form of a reduced sentence.
To the extent we have not addressed them, any remaining arguments
raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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