STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. OMAR D. JACKSON (13-11-2053, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4513-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
OMAR D. JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted March 22, 2021 – Decided April 20, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Rothstadt.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 13-11-
2053.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Lisa Sarnoff
Gochman, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Omar D. Jackson appeals from the January 18, 2019 order that
denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary
hearing. In his petition, defendant maintained that his suppression hearing, trial,
and remand attorneys each rendered ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC).
After considering defendant's petition, Judge Dennis R. O'Brien entered the
order under review after concluding that defendant's claims were procedurally
barred and substantively without merit. We agree and affirm.
In 2014, a jury convicted defendant of second-degree unlawful possession
of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), and third-degree possession of a controlled
dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). The sentencing court imposed a
ten-year term subject to a five-year period of parole ineligibility.
Defendant appealed, arguing that his motion to suppress should have been
granted, the trial judge gave improper jury instructions, and the sentencing judge
mistakenly believed the five-year period of parole ineligibility he imposed was
mandatory. State v. Jackson, A-3697-14 (App. Div. Feb. 9, 2017) (slip op. at 2-
5) (Jackson I). In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed his conviction but
remanded for resentencing. Id. at 17.
In affirming his conviction, we rejected defendant's argument that the
motion to suppress should have been denied. We found that under the totality
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of circumstances, a police officer's stop of defendant, which was prompted by a
9-1-1 call, was legal. Id. at 10-11, 16-17. We remanded for resentencing
"[b]ecause the [sentencing] court appeared to be misinformed as to its
sentencing options." Id. at 17.
After our remand, the resentencing judge imposed the same sentence.
Defendant appealed from his sentence and an Excessive Sentence panel of this
court affirmed. State v. Jackson, A-4479-16 (App. Div. Dec. 5, 2017) (Jackson
II). Defendant never filed a petition for certification with the Supreme Court.
Instead, he filed his petition for PCR.
The facts underlying defendant's arrest and conviction are recounted in
our prior opinion. Jackson I, slip op. at 2-4. We summarize the facts that are
pertinent to defendant's PCR petition.
On May 28, 2013, defendant was stopped by a police officer after the
Neptune Police Department received the 9-1-1 call from a caller who identified
herself but was never located. Id. at 2. The caller explained that there was a
black male wearing a purple jacket and black sneakers with red bottoms looking
through the bushes. Id. at 3-4.
The officer was dispatched to look for the individual and came across
defendant in the middle of the street, matching the description provided in the
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9-1-1 call. Id. at 2. The officer knew of defendant's gang affiliations, his
criminal history, and that a shooting occurred in the area the night before. Id. at
3. As the officer moved defendant out of the middle of the street onto the
sidewalk so he could safely speak with defendant, he observed twigs in
defendant's hair and defendant walking as if he was trying to conceal something
and suspected that he had a gun. Id. at 2-3. A subsequent pat down of
defendant's clothing revealed the gun, and a later search incident to arrest led to
the discovery of the cocaine. Id. at 3.
Before trial, defendant filed his unsuccessful suppression motion. Shortly
before the suppression hearing, defendant was arrested on unrelated charges for
attempted murder and weapons offenses. It was undisputed on PCR that about
a week after his suppression hearing, defendant's counsel, an Assistant Public
Defender, sought to withdraw from the case because the Office of the Public
Defender also "represent[ed] the victim [in defendant's] attempted murder case,"
and the attorney had represented the victim "numerous times in the past." The
attorney was allowed to withdraw, and defendant was assigned new counsel with
whom he proceeded to trial.
After his conviction and unsuccessful appeals, in January 2018, defendant
initially filed a motion to reduce his sentence, without setting forth any grounds
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for relief. In an amended submission filed by PCR counsel in August 2018,
defendant alleged that trial counsel "failed to request a mistrial" or a "speedy
trial," and "was ineffective on all aspects of the case." Defendant also contended
that his sentence was excessive.
In a supporting brief, defendant further argued: (1) his claims were not
barred; (2) he was entitled to a hearing to establish his IAC claim as to his trial
counsel and to "determine why the State destroyed key evidence"; (3) he was
denied effective assistance of counsel; (4) his conviction must be overturned
because the probable cause used to justify the Terry1 stop was based on an
anonymous tip; (5) he was entitled to a new trial because his suppression hearing
counsel had a conflict of interest and failed to defend his Fourth Amendment
rights; (6) he received IAC during his remand hearing on sentencing; and finally,
(7) suppression counsel was ineffective in pursuing the motion to suppress.
On January 18, 2019, Judge O'Brien heard oral argument before denying
defendant's petition and placing his reasons on the record that day. In his
decision, the judge relied upon Rule 3:22-5, and explained that any issue about
the validity of the Terry stop was previously litigated and was therefore barred.
In addition, he concluded that "[a]ll of [defendant's] constitutional claims,
1
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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specifically his Sixth Amendment claims, could have been raised [before the
trial court and] on direct appeal" and thus, defendant's claims for IAC were
procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-4(a). Addressing the substance of defendant's
claims, the judge applied the two-prong test under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), as adopted by our Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,
58 (1987), and also determined that each of defendant's claims were without
merit and did not entitle defendant to an evidentiary hearing. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT I
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[DEFENDANT'S] PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS TESTIMONY IS
NEEDED REGARDING SUPPRESSION
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE HER
CONFLICT OF INTEREST PRIOR TO THE START
OF THE HEARING.
POINT II
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
[DEFENDANT'S] PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS TESTIMONY IS
NEEDED FROM PRIOR SUPPRESSION AND
TRIAL COUNSELS TO EXPLAIN WHY THEY
FAILED TO OBTAIN THE 9-1-1 TAPE OR
CONTACT [THE CALLER].
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POINT III
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] AS
TESTIMONY IS NEEDED FROM REMAND
COUNSEL TO EXPLAIN WHY HE FAILED TO
ARGUE VIGOROUSLY AT [DEFENDANT'S]
RESENTENCING.
POINT IV
THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE
PCR COURT FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION
AND DETERMINATION OF ALL THE ISSUES
RAISED IN THE PCR PETITION. (NOT RAISED
BELOW).
We are not persuaded by defendant's contentions. Applying our de novo
standard of review, see State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div.
2016), we affirm the denial of defendant's petition without an evidentiary
hearing substantially for the reasons stated by Judge O'Brien in his
comprehensive oral decision. We add only the following comments.
At the outset, we observe that on appeal defendant does not challenge
Judge O'Brien's holding that his IAC claims were procedurally barred. We
therefore do not address that issue because "[a]n issue not briefed on appeal is
deemed waived." Woodlands Cmty. Ass'n v. Mitchell, 450 N.J. Super. 310, 318-
19 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J. Super. 648, 657
(App. Div. 2011)); see also Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt.
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5 on R. 2:6-2 (2021). Even if he had raised that challenge, we would have
concluded that under these circumstances, where each of defendant's arguments
focused on events that were a matter of record and either occurred before
defendant's trial or were previously addressed by this court on appeal, the PCR
judge's finding was legally correct. See R. 3:22-3; R. 3:22-4; R. 3:22-5; State
v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 351 (2002); State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49-50
(1997).
As to the merits of his barred claims, we conclude they were either belied
by the record or unsupported by any evidence of how the outcome of defendant's
trial or sentencing would have been different had any of his attorneys performed
in accordance with his arguments on PCR. For example, here, as to counsel's
revelation that she had a conflict after the suppression hearing, defendant did
not demonstrate the requisite "great likelihood of prejudice [that] must be
shown . . . to establish [he received] constitutionally defective representation of
counsel" at his suppression hearing. State v. Cottle, 194 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2008)
(emphasis added) (quoting State v. Norman, 151 N.J. 5, 25 (1997)).
Moreover, contrary to defendant's contentions about suppression counsel,
she did endeavor to locate the 9-1-1 caller but was unable to do so. In any event,
defendant failed to demonstrate on PCR how his conviction could have been
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prevented had the caller been located. He never explained how the 9-1-1 caller's
information was unreliable, nor did he support his contentions with "affidavits
or certifications based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person
making the certification." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App.
Div. 1999). Defendant failed to "do more than make bald assertions that he was
denied the effective assistance of counsel." Ibid.Defendant's claims about his resentencing, from which he never appealed,
are, as Judge O'Brien found, clearly "excessive sentencing argument[s] in
disguise," which Rule 3:22-4(a) precludes on PCR. See State v. Acevedo, 205
N.J. 40, 44 (2011); State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 596-97 (App. Div.
1988). Moreover, although defendant argues that counsel failed to file a new
presentence memorandum, call witnesses on defendant's behalf, and argue that
mitigating factors applied, he does not explain what new information would
have affected the outcome of the sentencing hearing, nor does he provide any
affidavits from proposed witnesses. Without such support, defendant has again
merely advanced "bald assertions" that are insufficient to give rise to a prima
facie claim of IAC. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.
Also, his contention about remand counsel failing to note defendant's
mental health issues, personalize defendant to the sentencing court, or to
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"present any positive information" about him, is belied by the record. His
attorney did stress at resentencing that defendant had made strides in prison,
including getting his G.E.D. and that he wanted to move forward. Moreover, as
the PCR judge explained, the resentencing judge was able to review the first pre-
sentencing report and in the two years between sentencings, there was no new
information regarding defendant's mental health.
Because we conclude that Judge O'Brien correctly determined defendant
failed to demonstrate a prima facie claim of IAC, we agree that defendant was
not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his petition. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J.
89, 158 (1997).
Affirmed.
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