STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. SHAREEF HOLDER (14-01-0021, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4610-18
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SHAREEF HOLDER, a/k/a
PUMPKIN HOLDER,
SHAREEF T. HOLDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted February 22, 2021 – Decided April 23, 2021
Before Judges Sabatino and Currier.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 14-01-
0021.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, on the
briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Regina M. Oberholzer, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Shareef Holder appeals from the March 15, 2019 order denying
his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
On September 28, 2013, at approximately 9:53 p.m., New Brunswick
police stopped defendant's silver Mercedes Benz SUV after observing it pass by
with substantial front-end damage that appeared to be the result of a recent
accident. Defendant initially got out of his vehicle but then re-entered it and
fled the scene at a high rate of speed, traveling more than 100 miles per hour.
Shortly thereafter, defendant collided with three other vehicles at an
intersection. The collision killed the twenty-two-year-old driver of one of the
cars.
Police officers reported that defendant did not have any significant
injuries; however, he appeared to be "under the influence of either narcotics or
drugs" because his "speech was slurred and his motor skills were very slow."
Officers at the scene also detected the odor of marijuana coming from
defendant's car and observed a glass vial of marijuana in plain view on the front
passenger floor of the car.
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Defendant was taken to a local hospital where an initial blood sample was
drawn without a warrant. Officers later obtained a warrant to take a second
blood sample from defendant and to search his car.
During their search of the car, officers found 948 glassine packets of
heroin, twenty-five bags of marijuana, a digital scale, and two cell phones.
Defendant's blood sample tested positive for marijuana metabolites and reflected
a BAC of .138. A mechanical inspection of defendant's car concluded the crash
was not the result of any mechanical issues.
Defendant was charged in an indictment with: (1) first-degree aggravated
manslaughter in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1); (2) first-degree aggravated
manslaughter in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(2); (3) second-degree eluding
in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b); (4) third-degree possession of heroin in
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); (5) second-degree possession of heroin
with intent to distribute in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5(b)(2); and (6) fourth-degree possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(12).
Defendant subsequently moved to suppress the two blood samples and the
drug evidence taken from his car. Following a hearing, the State advised it did
not intend to rely on the first blood draw evidence. The trial court denied
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defendant's motion to suppress the second blood sample and evidence seized
from the car pursuant to the warrant. The court found there was "probable cause
. . . that . . . defendant was driving while intoxicated" and "probable cause to
authorize the search of [defendant's] trunk[,]" thus the warrant—and the
evidence obtained thereunder—were valid.
Defendant pled guilty to one count of first-degree aggravated
manslaughter and one count of second-degree possession of heroin with intent
to distribute. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remainder of
defendant's charges and recommended a sentence of twenty-one years in state
prison subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for the
aggravated manslaughter charge and a concurrent twelve-year term with a forty-
five-month parole disqualifier for the drug charge.
During the sentencing hearing, defendant declined to speak on his own
behalf although the judge gave him the opportunity to do so. Defense counsel
emphasized for the court defendant's "undiagnosed educational learning
disabilit[ies][,]" the "tragedies in his life[,]" and "the fact that he [had] a child"
in arguing he should receive an eighteen-year prison sentence.
In sentencing defendant, the judge recognized the tragic circumstances of
the case and stated he had "no doubt that one of [defendant's] prime motivations
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in fleeing [was] the fact that [he was] carrying 900 plus decks of heroin in [his ]
car." The judge found aggravating factor three, the risk defendant will commit
another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3), was applicable given his "long history
of indictable offenses for a 29-year-old man." Defendant's criminal history also
supported finding aggravating factor six, the extent of defendant's prior criminal
record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6). In finding aggravating factor nine, the need for
deterring defendant and others, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9), the judge stated the
"grievous manner" in which defendant acted "put[] . . . the entire public at risk
of serious injury and death [and it could] simply not be tolerated."
The judge found no mitigating factors were applicable and concluded the
aggravating factors "preponderate[d]." He sentenced defendant in accordance
with the terms of the plea deal. The judge commented that if the State had
recommended any lesser sentence, he was "not sure [he] would have agreed to
go along with it[,]" as the twenty-one year term of incarceration was "at the low
end of what [was] reasonable."
Thereafter, defendant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing: (1)
the drugs in his trunk should have been suppressed because the search was not
supported by probable cause; and (2) his sentence was excessive because the
court failed to properly consider the mitigating factors. State v. Holder, No. A-
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0497-15 (App. Div. Mar. 1, 2017) (slip op. at 5). We rejected defendant's
arguments and affirmed, holding the search of his trunk was supported by
probable cause and his sentence was "well within the permissible range, . . .
supported by credible evidence in the record, and [did] not shock the judicial
conscience." Id. at 10, 12-13.
Defendant subsequently filed a pro se PCR petition and an amended
petition through counsel. Defendant argued he was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel because: (1) he was "promised that [he] would not receive
a sentence of over [ten] years[;]" and (2) his trial counsel failed to present the
sentencing judge with "mitigating factors, [defendant]'s background and history
of problematic upbringing." Defendant also filed a certification in support of
his PCR petition asserting trial counsel did not tell him that he could have
written a letter to the judge or asked his family members to write letters to the
judge on his behalf.
On March 15, 2019, the PCR judge issued a comprehensive written
opinion denying defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.
The judge found defendant's argument that he was promised a sentence
not to exceed ten years' incarceration "inconsistent with the records, . . . not to
mention . . . at odds with the facts which include the death of the victim caused
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while . . . defendant was eluding police, and he was then found to have over 900
decks of heroin in his car." The judge also rejected defendant's argument that
trial counsel failed to inform him that he or his family members could have
written letters to the judge, concluding: (1) "defendant was provided the
opportunity to speak at [his] sentencing[;]" (2) the "traumatic past that
[defendant]'s witnesses would have discussed at sentencing was discussed in the
[presentence] report and highlighted in [this court's unpublished opi nion] as
well[;]" and (3) defense counsel "did argue for [eighteen] years instead of . . .
[twenty-one] years . . . , referenced the tragedies in [defendant]'s life, and even
some education and potential autism disorders at sentencing."
In rejecting defendant's argument that his sentence would have been
reduced if the court had considered the fact that his child was in the neonatal
intensive care unit (NICU) at the time of his arrest, the judge concluded: "As
found by [the sentencing judge], [defendant] fled from the police and ultimately
caused the death . . . of [the victim] because he had 948 packets of heroin in his
trunk, not because he was under the stress of having a child in the NICU."
(emphasis in original).
Defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration on
appeal:
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I. THE FAILURE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL TO
BRING RELEVANT INFORMATION TO THE
SENTENCING COURT'S ATTENTION IN ORDER
TO DETERMINE THE WEIGHT TO BE AFFORDED
SUCH INFORMATION IS NOT BARRED FROM
PCR REVIEW BY RULE 3:22-5
II. WHEN PCR COUNSEL DOES NOT
ADVANCE A MEANINGFUL ARGUMENT IF
AVAILABLE, THEN THE MATTER SHOULD BE
REMANDED
III. DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED A PRIMA
FACIE INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIM WHERE HE
SHOWED THAT HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY DID NOT
ADDRESS THE STRESS HE WAS UNDER DUE TO
HIS CHILD'S HEALTH AND THE CAUSAL
CONNECTION IT HAD TO THE DEATH
ATTRIBUTABLE TO HIS CONDUCT
IV. THE PCR JUDGE ABUSED HER
DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS UNNECESSARY
The standard for determining whether trial counsel's performance was
ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment was formulated in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) and adopted by our Supreme Court in
State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the two-pronged test establishing
both that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and he or she made errors that
were so egregious that counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by
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the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) the defect in
performance prejudiced defendant's rights to a fair trial such that there exists a
"reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors , the result
of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694.
Defendant contends his trial counsel was deficient in not advising the
sentencing court that he was under stress because of a sick child. He asserts that
stress caused him to drink and drive and ultimately resulted in the accident. He
argues that the sentencing judge would have imposed a lesser sentence if
apprised of that information.
However, the sentencing judge was clear that he would not have agreed to
a lesser sentence and the evidence was sufficient to conclude defendant fled
from police at an excessive rate of speed because of the enormous quantity of
drugs in his car. Therefore, defendant cannot establish his sentence would have
been any different if the court had been advised of his child's medical status;
thus, he cannot show he was prejudiced under the second prong of the
Strickland-Fritz test.
Without addressing any procedural bars raised by the State, we are
satisfied the PCR court's denial of the petition was supported by the credible
evidence in the record. Defendant did not demonstrate his trial counsel was
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ineffective under the Strickland-Fritz test nor has he shown his PCR counsel
was ineffective. Therefore, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Any
remaining arguments not addressed lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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