MATTHEW DOMENICK VS. COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX (L-5044-18, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2099-19
MATTHEW DOMENICK,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX,
Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRIAN MELNICK and BAM
SPORTS a/k/a BAM SOCIAL
SPORTS, PHILADELPHIA
INDEMNITY INSURANCE
Third-Party Defendants-
Respondents,
and
BELL ANDERSON AGENCY,
INC.,
Third-Party Defendants.
___________________________
Argued March 10, 2021 – Decided April 26, 2021
Before Judges Rose and Firko.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-5044-18.
Clark W. Convery argued the cause for appellant
(Convery, Convery & Shihar, PC, attorneys; Clark W.
Convery, on the briefs).
Paul J. Soderman argued the cause for respondents
Brian Melnick and Bam Sports (Sweeney & Sheehan,
P.C., attorneys; Paul J. Soderman, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant/third-party plaintiff County of Middlesex appeals from a
January 15, 2020 Law Division order, denying reconsideration of two November
18, 2019 orders that dismissed its complaint against third-party defendants Brian
Melnick and his company, Bam Sports a/k/a Bam Social Sports (collectively
BAM), on summary judgment. The motion judge concluded the parties'
indemnification agreement failed to specify that BAM would indemnify the
County for the County's own negligence. We agree and affirm.
On June 4, 2017, plaintiff Matthew Domenick 1 tripped and fell while
rounding third base during a softball game played at Johnson Park in Piscataway.
1
Plaintiff's complaint was dismissed on the County's summary judgment
motion. Accordingly, he is not a party to this appeal.
A-2099-19
2
As sponsor of the softball league, Melnick purchased a permit from the County.
Pertinent to this appeal, Melnick signed the County's rules and regulations,
which contained the following provision:
HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT
In consideration of the granting of permission by the
Middlesex County Office of Parks and Recreation to
the applicant for the use of the facilities set forth above,
the applicant hereby shall defend, indemnify and save
harmless the County of Middlesex against all claims
arising from the conduct of activities for which this
application is made.
[(Emphasis added).]
The following year, plaintiff sued only the County, alleging it was
negligent in the preparation and maintenance of the softball field, causing him
to sustain injuries. In turn, the County filed a third-party complaint against
BAM, Bell Anderson Agency, Inc., and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance,2
demanding defense and indemnification of plaintiff's claims.
Just prior to the close of discovery, the County moved for summary
judgment against BAM based on the allegations asserted in its third -party
2
Bell Anderson Agency, Inc. (Bell) and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance (PII)
are not parties to this appeal. During oral argument before this court, the parties
indicated that Bell was dismissed from the litigation prior to the commencement
of discovery, and the County thereafter abandoned its claims against PII.
A-2099-19
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complaint. BAM cross-moved for summary judgment, primarily asserting the
indemnification clause failed to reference "the County's own fault or
negligence."
Following argument, the judge denied the County's motion and granted
BAM's motion. In a statement of reasons accompanying the November 18, 2019
order3 that granted BAM's motion, the judge explained:
This [c]ourt finds that the subject provision does
not provide for suits which allege the County's own
negligence. It is clear that under N[ew] J[ersey] law, in
order to bring a negligent indemnitee within an
indemnification agreement, the agreement must
specifically reference the negligence or fault of the
indemnitee. Azurak v. Corp[.] Prop. Inv[s.], 175[] N.J.
110, 112-[]13 (2003). The provision clearly lacks any
explicit reference to indemnification in the case of a
suit for the County's own negligence. Therefore, . . .
[BAM]'s motion for summary judgment seeking
dismissal of [the County]'s claim is granted.
The judge denied the County's ensuing motion for reconsideration. The
judge memorialized his decision in a statement of reasons accompanying the
January 15, 2020 order. Finding the County failed to satisfy the standard for
reconsideration, the judge reiterated his reliance on Azurak, elaborating:
3
The companion November 18, 2019 order, denying the County's summary
judgment motion cross-referenced the reasons cited in the order, granting
BAM's motion.
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Broad-form indemnification clauses, as is the
case here, are subject to the rule requiring explicit and
plain language for indemnification for an indemnitee as
a result of the indemnitee's own fault or negligence.
See Azurak, . . . 175 N.J. . . . [at] 112-13 . . . . As the
indemnification clause does not explicitly state in plain
language that BAM . . . would indemnify [the] County
for claims arising out of [the] County's own alleged
negligence or fault, there is no basis to sustain [the]
County's indemnification claim.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, the County argues the motion judge erroneously applied the
governing law and "overlooked the parties' true intent" behind the
indemnification clause. The County further contends BAM acted in bad faith.
Having conducted a de novo review of the record, Templo Fuente De Vida Corp.
v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016), in view of
the governing law, Azurak, 175 N.J. at 112-13, we conclude the County's
contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written
opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), beyond the comments that follow.
The interpretation or construction of a contract is a legal question,
reviewed de novo by this court. Driscoll Constr. Co. v. State, Dep't of Transp.,
371 N.J. Super. 304, 313 (App. Div. 2004); see also Celanese Ltd. v. Essex Cnty.
Improvement Auth., 404 N.J. Super. 514, 528 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that
"unless the meaning is both unclear and dependent on conflicting testimony[,]"
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the court interprets the terms of a contract as a matter of law). In our review,
the "trial court's interpretation of the law and legal consequences that flow from"
it are "not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
"The objective in construing a contractual indemnity provision is the same
as in construing any other part of a contract – it is to determine the intent of the
parties." Kieffer v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011). Our task is
interpretative. Ibid. We do not rewrite the parties' contract or provide a better
or different agreement than the one they wrote themselves. Ibid.As a general rule, an indemnity "contract will not be construed to
indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligence
unless such an intention is expressed in unequivocal terms" in the agreement.
Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus., Inc., 103 N.J. 177, 191 (1986). The Supreme
Court has squarely addressed this issue in Mantilla v. NC Mall Associates, 167
N.J. 262 (2001) and Azurak, 175 N.J. 110.
In Mantilla, our Supreme Court examined whether the parties' contractual
indemnification clause obligated the contractor to indemnify the property owner
for legal costs incurred by the owner in defending itself against a negligence
claim. 167 N.J. at 267. The Court concluded that as a matter of public policy,
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"absent explicit contractual language to the contrary, an indemnitee who has
defended against allegations of its own independent fault may not recover the
costs of its defense from an indemnitor." Id. at 275.
The Court's opinion in Azurak, 175 N.J. at 111-12, reinforced the
principles set forth in Mantilla, and eliminated all doubt, holding a "broad form"
indemnification clause, which attempted "to include an indemnitee's negligence
within an indemnification agreement[,] without explicitly referring to th e
indemnitee's 'negligence' or 'fault,' . . . is no longer good law." Citing this court's
opinion, the Court affirmed per curiam, adopting the rationale expressed by
Judge Carchman, which stated:
Significantly, the Court's analysis in Mantilla, by
omission, eschewed the consideration of a "broad" or
"limited" form of indemnification – a critical element
in the analytical framework that had dominated
consideration of these issues in [prior authority]. We
read Mantilla as a reiteration of Ramos and its "bright
line" rule requiring "explicit language" that
indemnification and defense shall include the
indemnitee's own negligence. We note that nowhere in
Mantilla is there any mention of the significance of
broad form or limited form indemnification provisions
....
[Id. at 112 (quoting Azurak v. Corp. Prop. Invs., 347
N.J. Super. 516, 523 (App. Div. 2002).]
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More recently, we considered the indemnity provision in a licensing
agreement between G & G Hotels, Inc. (G & G) and Howard Johnson
International, Inc. (HJI). Sayles v. G & G Hotels, Inc., 429 N.J. Super. 266(App. Div. 2013). Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, G & G was required
to
indemnify, defend and hold [HJI] harmless, to the
fullest extent permitted by law, from and against all
[l]osses and [e]xpenses, incurred by [HJI] in connection
with any . . . claim . . . relating to or arising out of any
transaction, occurrence or service at or in conjunction
with the operation of the [f]acility, any breach or
violation of any contract or any law, regulation or
ruling by, or any act, error or omission (active or
passive) of, [G & G], any party associated or affiliated
with [G & G], or any of their respective owners,
officers, directors, employees, agents or contractors,
including when the active or passive negligence of
[HJI] is alleged or proven.
[Id. at 270 (emphasis added).]
The indemnification provision was triggered when a consolidated
negligence action was filed against G & G and HJI. Id. at 268. HJI moved for
summary judgment against G & G, seeking defense and indemnification
pursuant to their agreement. Ibid. As we noted, the trial court granted the
motion, "finding enforcement of the provision here was consistent with the
principles outlined in Azurak . . . and earlier cases." Ibid. On appeal, we
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rejected G & G's argument that the "the indemnification provision d[id] not, as
a matter of law, unequivocally express the parties' intent that G & G indemnify
HJI for claims based on HJI's negligence." Id. at 269. In doing so, we found
"the indemnification provision sufficiently expresse[d] the parties' intent that
HJI would be entitled to indemnification from G & G for claims arising from
HJI's negligence." Id. at 269-70.
In the present matter, the County cherry-picks our observation in Sayles
that "a court must look for the parties' true intent" when analyzing an indemnity
provision, id. at 274, to support its argument that Azurak "is not the current law
of New Jersey." To the contrary, our decision in Sayles rested precisely on the
parties' inclusion of "the active or passive negligence of [HJI]" in their
indemnity provision.
Here, however, the "broad-form" clause, requiring BAM to "defend,
indemnify and save harmless the County of Middlesex against all claims arising
from the conduct of activities for which this application is made," falls far short
of the explicit language required under Azurak and its progeny. See e.g., Estate
of D'Avila v. Hugo Neu Schnitzer E., 442 N.J. Super. 80, 114 (App. Div. 2015)
(enforcing an indemnification provision containing "plain and unequivocal"
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language requiring "[indemnitor] to indemnify [indemnitee] for damages caused
by [indemnitee's] own negligence").
Simply stated, plaintiff alleged the County negligently maintained and
repaired the softball field, causing his injuries. Because the indemnification
provision lacked any reference whatsoever to the County's own negligence,
BAM was not required to defend or indemnify the County. BAM did not act in
bad faith here.
Affirmed.
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