U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ETC. VS. AJAY KAJLA (F-034025-07, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3481-18
U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE
FOR CREDIT SUISSE FIRST
BOSTON MBS ARMT 2005-8,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
AJAY KAJLA and PAMELA
KAJLA,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
Defendant.
___________________________
Argued February 3, 2021 – Decided April 28, 2021
Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Monmouth County, Docket No.
F-034025-07.
Joshua L. Thomas argued the cause for appellant.
Henry F. Reichner argued the cause for respondent
(Reed Smith, LLP, attorneys; Henry F. Reichner, of
counsel; Lauren S. Zabel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this foreclosure action, defendant Ajay Kajla appeals from a March 11,
2019 order denying his motion to stay eviction and a March 29, 2019 order
denying his motion to vacate a final judgment of foreclosure. We conclude
defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant extensive
discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), and affirm. We add the
following comments.
On April 29, 2005, defendant obtained a loan from Metrocities Mortgage
L.L.C. (Metrocities) in the amount of $1,400,000. As security for the loan,
defendant encumbered real property in Colts Neck, New Jersey. Defendant
defaulted on the loan in September 2007. In 2008, Metrocities assigned the loan
to plaintiff U.S. Bank National Association. Defendant has failed to make any
payments since defaulting.
On March 25, 2005, defendant executed a mortgage with Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) for $500,000 on the same property. This mortgage
A-3481-18
2
was recorded on April 27, 2005, but Wells Fargo subsequently agreed to
subordinate its mortgage to Metrocities'.
In December 2007, plaintiff filed a foreclosure complaint against
defendant, his wife Pamela Kajla, and Wells Fargo. In July 2008, plaintiff filed
an amended complaint. In October 2008, a second amended complaint was filed.
Despite being served with all three complaints, defendant failed to file an answer
to any of them and default was entered three times. A final judgment was
entered, and an initial sheriff's sale was scheduled for March 2009.
The sale was stayed on numerous occasions; first, because defendant filed
for bankruptcy, and thereafter to explore mediation and loss mitigation options.
After defendant was discharged from bankruptcy, an amended final judgment
was entered in July 2011. A second-amended final judgment was ultimately
entered in March 2015.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion to vacate the judgment, which was
denied in April 2015. Defendant then filed a motion to stay the sheriff's sale ,
which was denied in June 2015. Defendant subsequently filed an emergent
motion to stay the sheriff's sale, which was denied.
Defendant appealed the April 2015 order denying his motion to vacate,
and we affirmed. U.S. Bank N.A. v. Kajla, No. A-3875-14 (App. Div. Sept. 22,
A-3481-18
3
2016) (slip op. at 2). There, defendant argued that plaintiff lacked standing
because it was not the owner of the note and mortgage. Ibid. Defendant also
asserted numerous claims of fraud. Id. at 2-3. We held that defendant's standing
claim was barred because he waited "approximately seven years to assert [it]
and did so after default judgment had been entered." Id. at 4-5. We nonetheless
concluded that defendant's standing argument was "meritless" and determined
his allegations of fraud were wholly without merit under Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Id. at 5-7.
Our Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. U.S.
Bank N.A. v. Kajla, 228 N.J. 494 (2017). The United States Supreme Court
denied defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Kajla v. U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 120 (2017). The United States Supreme Court
also denied his petition for a writ of mandamus. In re Kajla, ___ U.S. ___, 138
S. Ct. 656 (2018),
Undeterred, on October 23, 2017, defendant filed a complaint, predicated
almost exclusively on plaintiff's standing to foreclose and allegations of fraud.
He also sought a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) in the District
Court of New Jersey to prevent the sheriff's sale of the property scheduled for
October 30, 2017. The federal judge denied defendant's TRO application and
A-3481-18
4
dismissed his complaint. Kajla v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 17-8953, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33404, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2018). The Third Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of defendant's complaint and the denial of his motion to amend.
Kajla v. U.S. Bank N.A., 806 F. App'x 101, 102 (3d Cir. 2020).
In the interim, the property was sold at a sheriff's sale on October 30,
2017. After the deed was recorded, an eviction was scheduled for March 11,
2019. A month before the scheduled eviction, and after filing for Chapter Seven
bankruptcy, defendant filed a motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction in
the District Court of New Jersey. That request was denied on the basis that it
was "an inappropriate attempt to have [that] Court review the merits" of his
previously dismissed claims. Kajla v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 18-16813,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39576, at *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2019).
Defendant then filed a motion to stay the eviction in the Chancery
Division. The judge noted that after the initial default in 2007 defendant had
remained in the home for approximately twelve years, during which time
plaintiff paid approximately $277,000 in carrying costs. On March 11, 2019,
the judge denied defendant's motion to stay the eviction but granted him a
seven-day hardship stay and permitted eviction any time thereafter. The eviction
A-3481-18
5
ultimately took place in March 2019. 1 Defendant then filed this motion to vacate
the foreclosure and set aside the sheriff's sale, which was denied on March 29,
2019.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments for our
consideration:
POINT I
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING A
RULING ON THE MOTIONS WITHOUT
ACTUALLY MAKING A NEW RECORD OF
REASONS AND INSTEAD RELYING ON A PRIOR
HEARING[.]
POINT II
WHETHER THE COURT'S OPINION THAT THE
DATE DECEMBER 7, 2007 (FILED FORECLOSURE
COMPLAINT DATE) COMES AFTER JANUARY 31,
2008 ("A FRAUDULENT ASSIGNMENT" DATE) (A
REQUIREMENT ESTABLISHING "RIGHT OF THE
MORTGAGEE TO RESORT TO THE MORTGAGED
PREMISES") ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE SHERIFF['S] SALE
AND EVENTUAL EVICTION IN LIGHT OF THE
SUBSTANTIAL NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED[.]
1
We note that defendant's motion to stay the eviction is moot. "We consider an
issue moot when 'our decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no
practical effect on the existing controversy.'" Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v.
Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Greenfield v. N.J.
Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006)). Defendant has
already been evicted and, therefore, any decision by this court would have no
practical effect.
A-3481-18
6
POINT III
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY IGNORING
ALL FRAUD PERPETRATED BY THE APPELLEE
AND ITS AGENTS IN NOT GRANTING
DISCOVERY IN LIGHT OF THE SUBSTANTIAL
NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED[.]
POINT IV
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED AGAINST ITS
OWN PUBLISHED GUIDELINES WHILE
SUPPORTING THE ACTIONS OF THE APPELLEE
IN A FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED
FORECLOSURE[.]
We need not address defendant's meritless arguments in a written opinion
because they have been addressed and rejected ad nauseam by numerous state
and federal courts. Simply put, defendant rehashes his baseless allegations of
fraud and lack of standing, both of which have been thoroughly and repeatedly
addressed and rejected. It is difficult to envision a clearer case of collateral
estoppel. See Ziegelheim v. Apollo, 128 N.J. 250, 265 (1992) (quoting State v.
Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 186 (1977)). Indeed, the unending re-litigation of this
simple foreclosure action has eviscerated "[t]he primary purpose of collateral
estoppel [which] is 'to promote efficient justice by avoiding the re-litigation of
matters which have been fully and fairly litigated and fully and fairly disposed
A-3481-18
7
of.'" Lopez v. Patel, 407 N.J. Super. 79, 93 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting
Kortenhaus v. Eli Lilly & Co., 228 N.J. Super. 162, 166 (App. Div. 1988)).
Affirmed.
A-3481-18
8