RODNEY LEE VS. RAS CITRON, LLC (DC-003718-19, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4195-18
RODNEY LEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RAS CITRON, LLC and
U.S. BANK, N.A.,
Defendant-Respondent.
________________________
Submitted April 27, 2021 – Decided May 13, 2021
Before Judges Mawla and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-003718-19.
Rodney Lee, appellant pro se.
RAS Citron, LLC, attorneys for respondent
(Christopher Ford, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Rodney Lee appeals from a May 10, 2019 order dismissing his
complaint against defendants RAS Citron, LLC and U.S. Bank, N.A. with
prejudice for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
Plaintiff's property was the subject of a foreclosure in which a final
judgment was entered on November 24, 2015. The property was sold at a
sheriff's sale on May 31, 2016. U.S. Bank was the winning bidder and received
title to the property in a deed dated August 6, 2016, which recited consideration
of $100. Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the sheriff's sale in March 2017. The
Chancery Division judge denied the motion on July 10, 2017.
In February 2019, plaintiff instituted this litigation in the Special Civil
Part, and in his complaint alleged "the purported [r]ecorded [d]eed [g]rantor was
not valid pursuant to N.J.S.A. 25:1-11(a)(1) to pass title of [the] . . . property."
The complaint alleged the grantor did not transfer title "for valuable
consideration as established by N.J.S.A. 46:15-5 or had requested the [deed] . . .
be recorded by RAS Citron, LLC" and therefore U.S. Bank did not have valid
title. Plaintiff alleged because defendants did "not voluntarily expunge[]" the
deed, the court should award him $14,000 in compensatory damages for the
fraudulent transaction.
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One month after filing the complaint, plaintiff filed a motion to "expunge"
the deed, which was denied. Plaintiff's subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied as well. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, which the
motion judge granted in the May 10, 2019 order. Subsequently, the judge
explained his decision in an oral opinion on May 22, 2019 as follows:
Defendants argue the plaintiff's action is barred
by issue preclusion and by [claim] preclusion because
on March 17, 2017[,] [p]laintiff filed a motion to vacate
U.S. Bank's deed on the basis of fraud, mistake
irregularity and the conduct of the [s]heriff's [s]ale.
Defendants argue that the law of the case requires the
[c]ourt to respect the Chancery [c]ourt's decision to
deny [p]laintiff's motion to vacate the sale based on
fraud.
Defendants argue that the plaintiff's complaint
fails to state a legal actionable claim because the
foreclosure action was a valid transfer of title to U.S.
Bank. And they argue that [p]laintiff does not have any
damages because they were foreclosed on the property
pursuant to the terms of the mortgage.
Plaintiff makes really the same arguments [he]
made in the Chancery Division, that there's no evidence
that the [s]heriff's [d]eed was delivered for the purposes
of recording the deed, that there was fraud unspecified
and just general unlawful conduct.
. . . These are all the issues that were dealt with
in the Chancery [c]ourt, fits the identical conduct that
was alleged in the Chancery action. Plaintiff fails to
point to any conduct on the part of the defendant that
did not comply with the proper foreclosure procedures.
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The matter literally went on for years, was fully
litigated and is over.
There's nothing new here. The foreclosure
occurred in accordance with the foreclosure law and
procedures. There's simply no claim upon which relief
can be granted. No illegal conduct by any of the
defendants including [RAS Citron, LLC] who
represented U.S. Bank at the foreclosure. So the motion
is granted.
Plaintiff raises the following point on this appeal:
I. APPELLATE COURT MUST DECIDE WHETHER
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROVIDE
ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION[S] OF LAW SUPPORTING ITS
DECISIONS PURSUANT TO RULE 1:7-4, AND AS
MATTER OF LAW
"A motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e) requires application of 'the test
for determining the adequacy of a pleading: whether a cause of action is
"suggested" by the facts.'" Gonzalez v. State Apportionment Comm'n, 428 N.J.
Super. 333, 349 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "A complaint should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) only if 'the factual allegations
are palpably insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted.'"
Frederick v. Smith, 416 N.J. Super. 594, 597 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Rieder
v. State Dep't of Transp., 221 N.J. Super. 547, 552 (App. Div. 1987)).
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A "with-prejudice" dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint will be reversed if
it is "premature, overbroad[,] . . . [or] based on a mistaken application of the
law." Flinn v. Amboy Nat'l Bank, 436 N.J. Super. 274, 287 (App. Div. 2014).
When we review a trial court's ruling dismissing claims against a party under
Rule 4:6-2(e), we apply a plenary standard of review which owes no deference
to the trial court's conclusions. Bacon v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J.
Super. 24, 33 (App. Div. 2015).
We reject plaintiff's argument because, as we have recounted, the motion
judge clearly made findings of fact and conclusions of law. Moreover, applying
our plenary standard of review, we affirm for the reasons set forth in the motion
judge's opinion. To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised by
plaintiff, it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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