LATOYA HENDRICKS VS. BOARD OF REVIEW (DEPARTMENT OF LABOR) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3158-19
    LATOYA HENDRICKS,
    Appellant,
    v.
    BOARD OF REVIEW,
    DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
    and PSKW, LLC,
    Respondents.
    ________________________
    Submitted April 19, 2021 – Decided May 13, 2021
    Before Judges Gooden Brown and DeAlmeida.
    On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
    Labor, Docket No. 199,528.
    Latoya Hendricks, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent Board of Review (Jane C. Schuster,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Sean P.
    Havern, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Latoya Hendricks appeals from the February 6, 2020 final agency decision
    of the Board of Review (Board) upholding the Appeal Tribunal's determination
    that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-
    5(a). We affirm.
    We glean these facts from the record. Hendricks worked at PSKW, LLC
    as "a fixer"1 from July 11, 2018 to October 18, 2019, when she resigned. Her
    claim for unemployment benefits filed in November 2019, was denied by the
    Deputy of the Division of Unemployment Insurance under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a),
    on the ground that Hendricks left work voluntarily without good cause
    attributable to the work. Thereafter, Hendricks filed a timely administrative
    appeal.
    At a telephonic hearing before the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) conducted
    on December 17, 2019, Hendricks testified she resigned because the childcare
    program she enrolled her ten-year-old daughter in was discontinued and she
    "was having an ongoing issue with having someone pick up [her] daughter from
    school." Hendricks confirmed that there were no changes to the terms of her
    1
    The position involved assisting pharmacies processing coupons and discount
    cards for various medications.
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    2
    employment, and the employer's representatives verified that had Hendricks not
    resigned, she would still be employed at PSKW, LLC.
    Following the hearing, the Tribunal found that "the sole reason
    [Hendricks] resigned" was "childcare concerns" and that "[c]ontinuing work was
    available" to her.   While "sympathetic to her circumstances," the Tribunal
    determined Hendricks's "reason for leaving was personal and not attributable to
    the work. Therefore, she [was] disqualified for benefits . . . in accordance with
    N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) and N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(2), as she left work voluntarily
    without good cause attributable to such work." The Board, in turn, affirmed the
    Tribunal's decision, and this appeal followed.
    On appeal, Hendricks reiterates that "[r]esigning from [her] job was an
    exceedingly difficult decision" but, without childcare, it was necessary because
    she "could not risk the welfare of [her] child." Like the Tribunal, while we are
    sympathetic, our "capacity to review administrative agency decisions is
    limited." Brady v. Bd. of Rev., 
    152 N.J. 197
    , 210 (1997) (citing Pub. Serv. Elec.
    & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 
    101 N.J. 95
    , 103 (1985)).
    "In reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment
    compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same
    conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether
    A-3158-19
    3
    the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting
    Charatan v. Bd. of Rev., 
    200 N.J. Super. 74
    , 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "If the
    Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are
    obliged to accept them.'" 
    Ibid.
     (quoting Self v. Bd. of Rev., 
    91 N.J. 453
    , 459
    (1982)); accord Messick v. Bd. of Rev., 
    420 N.J. Super. 321
    , 324-25 (App. Div.
    2011). Only if the Board's action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
    should it be disturbed. Brady, 
    152 N.J. at 210
    .
    N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) provides that "[a]n individual shall be disqualified for
    benefits . . . [f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily
    without good cause attributable to such work. . . ." While a worker may be
    eligible for benefits if the "separation from employment[] was caused by work -
    related factors," a "worker who voluntarily quits [a] job" for "personal
    circumstances of the worker, unrelated to an alteration in the terms or conditions
    of employment, . . . cannot show 'good cause' qualifying him [or her] for
    benefits." Utley v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 
    194 N.J. 534
    , 544-45 (2008).
    Significantly, an employee who leaves "for personal reasons, however
    compelling, . . . is disqualified" from benefits under the statute. 
    Id. at 544
    .
    Here, by her own admission, Hendricks established that she resigned
    because of childcare issues. While her reasons were compelling, they were
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    4
    personal to her and unrelated to any change in the terms of her employment. See
    N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(e)(2) ("An individual's separation from employment shall be
    reviewed as a voluntarily leaving work issue where the separation was for" the
    "[c]are of children or other relatives. . . ."). Clearly, there was sufficient credible
    evidence to support the Board's decision to deny Hendricks unemployment
    benefits, and the Board's decision was not "arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable." Brady, 
    152 N.J. at 210
    .
    Affirmed.
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