B.M.K., ETC. VS. W.A. (L-10916-15, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2658-19
B.M.K., as
Natural Guardian & Biological
Parent of S.K., a Minor,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
W.A. and S.B.A.M.,
Defendants,
and
W.L.A. and V.A.,
Defendants-Respondents.
___________________________
Argued April 13, 2021 – Decided May 24, 2021
Before Judges Gilson, Moynihan and Gummer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-10916-15.
Louis M. DiLuzio argued the cause for appellant (The
Choi Law Group, LLC, attorneys; Louis M. DiLuzio,
on the briefs).
Kelly A. Weber argued the cause for respondent
(Chasan Lamparello Mallon & Cappuzzo, PC,
attorneys; John V. Mallon, of counsel and on the brief;
Kelly A. Weber, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff B.M.K., as natural guardian and biological father of S.K.,
brought a multi-count complaint against, among others, 1 defendants W.L.A. and
V.A. alleging defendants' son, forty-eight-year-old W.A., Jr., (Junior), a
convicted sex offender, sexually assaulted S.K. in a vehicle outside a house
defendants owned after he offered to give her a ride home. Junior lived in that
house. Then-sixteen-year-old S.K. was visiting as a guest of Junior's
stepdaughter.2
Plaintiff appeals from the trial judge's order dismissing his initial
complaint without prejudice and a subsequent order dismissing his amended
complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff argues the judge erred because both
complaints sufficiently pleaded causes of action for negligence.
1
The complaint included causes of action against defendants' son and his wife.
The orders under review do not pertain to those defendants.
2
We use initials to protect the privacy of plaintiff's daughter. See R. 1:38-
3(c)(12). We use familiar appellations for defendants to avoid confusion
because they have the same surname. We intend no familiarity by our practice.
A-2658-19
2
We review dismissal orders entered pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) de novo,
"apply[ing] the same standard that bound the trial judge and, therefore, 'search[]
the complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of
a cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim,
[giving] opportunity . . . to amend if necessary.'" Wild v. Carriage Funeral
Holdings, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 416, 423 (App. Div. 2019) (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs., 116
N.J. 739, 746 (1989)), aff'd 241 N.J. 285 (2020). We "are unconcerned with the
plaintiff's ability to prove what is alleged, and instead consider only whether –
after giving [the] plaintiff the benefit of 'every reasonable inference of fact' – a
sustainable claim has been pleaded. This examination is 'painstaking and
undertaken with a generous and hospitable approach.'" Ibid. (quoting Printing
Mart, 116 N.J. at 746). "[A]t the pleading stage of [a] case, in which the facts
have yet to be developed[, a] plaintiff is entitled to every reasonable inference
of fact, [when a court determines whether] plaintiff has stated a claim sufficient
to survive [a] motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2." Wild, 241 N.J. at 287. The
standard is the same for both complaints and amended complaints. See Smith
v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super. 82, 88, 105 (App. Div. 2017). "We thus examine the
judge's dismissal of the [negligence] claims by assuming the truth of the
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3
[complaint's] factual allegations and by drawing reasonable inferences that
suggest a cause of action." Wild, 458 N.J. Super. at 424.
Although plaintiff did not know the specific extent of Junior's prior record,
he averred3 defendants knew or should have known their son had "a long history
of committing sex-based crimes against minor females" and had been released
from prison approximately three months before he assaulted S.K. 4 After his
release, defendants allowed Junior to reside in a house they owned in another
municipality. Plaintiff asserted causes of action for: (1) "negligently failing to
maintain[] and/or permitting [the dangerous condition caused by Junior's
occupancy] to remain in an unsafe condition, and taking any steps whatsoever
to protect and safeguard invitees about said dangerous and unsafe condition";
(2) negligently breaching their duty to invitees, "particularly female minors like
S.K., to disclose, notify or otherwise warn them and/or their . . . parents" about
Junior's "history of sexual assaults against minor females" and "to take
reasonable measures and precautions to prevent their . . . son . . . from having
unsupervised contact with a minor child" to prevent the "foreseeable risk" he
3
We recite the allegations set forth in plaintiff's amended complaint.
4
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges Junior pleaded guilty to second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), and third-degree endangering the welfare
of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a).
A-2658-19
4
would commit sexual assault; and (3) negligently breaching their "duty to
protect and safeguard S.K. against any dangerous or harmful acts, including but
not limited to sexual abuse, assault and battery, while on their property."
The judge dismissed the complaints concluding defendants, who lived in
a separate residence in another municipality, owed no duty to plaintiff.
Specifically, the judge determined
[t]he existing law as I read it, although there's not a
specific case in New Jersey dealing with the exact set
of facts in this particular case is that there is no parental
duty to supervise when they're living apart, adult
children. And whether you want to call this particular
case a lack of supervision, negligent supervision, you
want to call it a different theory of negligent
entrustment of a house or whether the plaintiff is in a
protected class, I think it's pretty eviden[t] that as a
minor plaintiff, minor female plaintiff, there'[re]
criminal statutes that protect this type of activity that
the offender did and for what [h]e's presently in jail. It's
[an] unfortunate incident. But no new facts are alleged,
and it's a notice requirement state. The pleadings when
I compared visually when I read the amended complaint
to the facts alleged in the original complaint, which I
dismissed against the adult parents who lived in a
different town, I really didn't see much in the way of
material differences.
And so respectfully I'm the first one, my heart bleeds
for this young lady, but from a legal duty perspective I
still do not see there's a legal duty on the . . . non-minor
adult son who is the offender, his parents, living in a
different town. I do not see there being a legal duty.
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5
We reverse and remand because discovery should have been completed
before that determination was made.
Duty "is not a rigid formalism that remains static through time, but rather
is a malleable concept that must of necessity adjust to the changing social
relations and exigencies and man's relation to his fellows." J.S. v. R.T.H., 155
N.J. 330, 339 (1998) (quoting Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 462 (1957))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Determining the existence of a duty and its
scope are questions of law. Robinson v. Vivirito, 217 N.J. 199, 208 (2014). The
New Jersey Supreme Court has long instructed that "fairness" be the touchstone
when analyzing legal duty, Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578,
583 (1962); see also Est. of Desir ex rel. Estiverne v. Vertus, 214 N.J. 303, 322
(2013), because the imposition of legal duty must "generate intelligible and
sensible rules to govern future conduct," Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132
N.J. 426, 439 (1993); see also Vertus, 214 N.J. at 323.
The trial judge properly assumed, for the purposes of analyzing the motion
to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e), defendants knew of Junior's history of sex crimes
and perceived there was a foreseeability of harm. The judge also recognized an
analysis of defendants' duty is guided by the four Hopkins factors. See Hopkins,
132 N.J. at 439 (holding a judge must also determine "whether the imposition
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of such . . . duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the
circumstances in light of considerations of public policy"). Judges are required
to identify, weigh, and balance: (1) "the relationship of the parties"; (2) "the
nature of the attendant risk"; (3) "the opportunity and ability to exercise care";
and (4) "the public interest in the proposed solution." Ibid.All of those factors are best analyzed on a full and complete record of
facts pertinent to each. For example, in considering the third Hopkins factor in
connection with the initial complaint, the trial judge reasoned that factor
weighed against imposing a duty on defendants because
the elderly parents of an adult child would have no
opportunity/ability to exercise care regarding their
adult son's one[-]time interaction with the minor
plaintiff in a different town.[5] It is unclear as to what
the "care" would, or could, consist of, even if it were to
take place.
5
Plaintiff argues the judge went beyond the complaint's four corners in finding
defendants parents were elderly. "In reviewing a complaint dismissed under
Rule 4:6-2(e)[, our] inquiry is limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the
facts alleged on the face of the complaint." Flinn v. Amboy Nat'l Bank, 436 N.J.
Super. 274, 286 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Printing Mart, 116 N.J. at 746).
Under Rule 4:6-2(e), a motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for "summary
judgment and disposed of as provided by R[ule] 4:46" if matters outside the
pleading are presented. Judges, however, may properly consider documents
referred to in a complaint and provided by way of a motion to dismiss the
complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e), without converting the motion into a motion for
summary judgment. N.J. Citizen Action, Inc. v. Cnty. of Bergen, 391 N.J.
Super. 596, 605 (App. Div. 2007).
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Would it be a sign giving notice of the fact that the adult
son was a sex offender? With constant monitoring to
make sure it was not taken down?
Where would it be hung?
Would it be constant surveillance of the son's activities,
both in the house and in his car?
Would it be forcing the eviction of the adult son's
family from the parents' owned residence in question?
Would the family, including the adult son, simply move
to another town?
Analyzing the third Hopkins factor ordinarily requires a thorough factual
assessment for a court to determine whether it could "articulate[] workable
guidelines . . . [to] minimize the risk of harm." Davis v. Devereux Found., 209
N.J. 269, 297 (2012); see also Shields v. Ramslee Motors, 240 N.J. 479, 494
(2020) (declining to impose duty on landlord where the harm is beyond
landlord's control and where a commercial tenant had the ability and opportunity
to avoid the harm); Hopkins, 132 N.J. at 444-45 (in imposing a duty on realtors
to inspect premises before potential buyers enter, our Supreme Court provided
a description of what that inspection should entail). Likewise, an analysis of
"the public interest in the proposed solution," the fourth factor, see Hopkins, 132
N.J. at 439, is best made after full disclosure of the circumstances that may
establish an interest for which the solution is proposed.
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We thus reverse the orders of dismissal and remand to allow the trial judge
to better perform the fact-sensitive analysis of the Hopkins factors after the facts
are fully developed. In remanding, we take no position on whether plaintiff has
developed or ultimately will develop facts that establish a duty owed by parent
defendants. We remand to give plaintiff an opportunity to conduct focused
discovery to see if facts can be discovered. Moreover, our remand does not
preclude the parents from moving for summary judgment after discovery has
been conducted if they believe that the material facts do not establish that they
had a duty to plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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