STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHRISTOPHER M. KRAFSKY (14-11-0769, SOMERSET COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3913-19
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER M. KRAFSKY,
    a/k/a CHRISTOPH KRAFSKY,
    and C-MONEY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ___________________________
    Submitted May 5, 2021 – Decided May 25, 2021
    Before Judges Fuentes and Firko.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 14-11-
    0769.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
    appellant (Brian D. Driscoll, Designated Counsel, on
    the brief).
    Michael H. Robertson, Somerset County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Lauren E. Bland, Assistant
    Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant Christopher M. Krafsky appeals from a December 20, 2019
    order of the Criminal Part denying his post-conviction relief (PCR) petition
    without conducting an evidentiary hearing. We affirm substantially for the
    reasons expressed by Judge Anthony F. Picheca, Jr., in his comprehensive
    written decision that accompanied the order under review.
    I.
    On November 20, 2014, a Somerset County grand jury returned an
    indictment against defendant charging him with strict liability for drug induced
    death, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) and 2C:35-9(a) (count one); and third-degree
    distribution of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1)
    and 2C:35-5(b)(3) (count two). A jury found defendant guilty on count one and
    count two was dismissed.      On January 11, 2016, defendant pled guilty to
    violations of probation for third-degree distribution of CDS. On February 5,
    2016, defendant was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment subject to the No
    Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.         We affirmed defendant's
    conviction and sentence on direct appeal, State v. Christopher Krafsky, No. A-
    2961-51 (App. Div. Mar. 20, 2018), and the Supreme Court denied his petition
    for certification, 
    235 N.J. 353
     (2018).
    2                               A-3913-19
    These are the facts that led the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
    that defendant was strictly liable for the drug induced death of Richard Johnson.
    Johnson died from a heroin overdose in the basement of his mother's home the
    night of December 23, 2013. His parents were divorced and living separately
    and apart. She discovered his body at 5:00 a.m. when she awoke and notified
    the police. The investigating officer, Robert Meszaros, found Johnson had
    communicated by text with an individual named "MAT" the night before, and
    defendant was the service subscriber for MAT's number. Sprint phone records
    identified defendant having a P.O. box address in Irvine, California. Because
    the cellular phone referenced a 908 area code, the officer was able to track
    defendant down through the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Agency and locate him
    in Bridgewater.
    Meszaros testified that he arranged a meeting with defendant in a
    shopping mall. Defendant admitted to the officer that on December 23, 2013,
    he had sold Johnson $50 worth of heroin, which defendant obtained from "Toot."
    After Meszaros tried to take defendant to the patrol car to record a statement, he
    invoked his right to remain silent. At trial, defendant testified that both he and
    Johnson together went to see Toot, who sold heroin to each of them on that date.
    3                                   A-3913-19
    Johnson's father testified that on the night of December 23, at about 11:00
    p.m., he took his son to see another man and a quick exchange occurred between
    the two men on the street. Thereafter, the father took his son back to his mother's
    house. The father was too far away to identify the other man.
    On December 10, 2018, defendant filed this pro se PCR petition alleging
    ineffective assistance of his defense counsel. The court assigned counsel to
    represent defendant in the prosecution of his PCR petition.          PCR counsel
    submitted an amended PCR petition in which he claimed trial counsel was
    ineffective "for not conducting any investigation whatsoever pre-trial through
    trial and sentencing," 1 failing to procure Johnson's phone records, and failing to
    move for a mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant
    sought to vacate his conviction and sentence. Alternatively, defendant requested
    an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised.
    On October 22, 2019, oral argument was heard on defendant's PCR
    petition. Judge Picheca rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of
    trial counsel. In his December 20, 2019 written statement of reasons pursuant
    to Rule 1:6-2(f), the PCR judge held that defendant did not present a prima facie
    1
    PCR counsel's brief is not included in the appendix.
    4                                   A-3913-19
    case of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to obtain additional phone
    records. Judge Picheca elaborated:
    Here, [defendant] was required to assert the facts
    that an investigation would have revealed, supported by
    affidavits or certifications based upon the personal
    knowledge of the affiant or the person making the
    certification. [State v.] Cummings, 
    321 N.J. Super. 154
    [,] 170 [(App. Div. 1999)]. First, [defendant] failed
    to support his claims by either an affidavit or
    certification as required under Cummings.           
    Ibid.
    [Defendant] asserts the victim could have made
    multiple purchases that evening to satisfy his drug
    addiction; however, there is no proof of this and there
    is no guarantee this would be found within his text
    message records. [Defendant] failed to present any
    evidence of what those possible text messages would
    have shown; in essence, he presents only bald
    assertions that additional investigations would have
    revealed exculpatory information. [Ibid.]
    Additionally, this [c]ourt believes trial counsel's
    failure to investigate for more text messages was used
    against the State and is considered to be trial strategy.
    [Defendant] argues the messages without further
    context were devastating, and that counsel should have
    known better to retrieve those messages. Counsel,
    however, referred to the lack of messages in the
    summations and even said, "[w]e don't have any other
    texts." . . . Because this was used against the State, this
    [c]ourt concludes it was a strategic decision.
    Under the second prong of Strickland, there is not
    a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings
    would have been different had other text messages, if
    any at all, been recovered during investigation.
    [Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 688
     (1984).]
    5                                 A-3913-19
    Nothing is offered to suggest they may have directly
    negated [defendant's] guilt. In fact, it is possible
    additional text messages could have been even more
    inculpatory.
    Judge Picheca also addressed and rejected the balance of defendant's
    arguments attacking defense counsel's performance at trial and declining to
    object or seek a mistrial after closing arguments. Defendant's request for an
    evidentiary hearing was denied.
    Against this record, defendant raises the following arguments in this
    appeal:
    POINT I
    THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING TRIAL
    COUNSEL NOT INEFFECTIVE IN HIS FAILURE
    TO INVESTIGATE THE PHONE RECORDS.
    POINT II
    THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
    FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S
    SUMMATION DID NOT PREJUDICE DEFENDANT.
    POINT III
    THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TRIAL
    COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING
    TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS THE TESTIMONY AND
    REPORT   ON    THE   QUESTIONING     OF
    DEFENDANT.
    6                                 A-3913-19
    POINT IV
    THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
    CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE DID NOT
    PREJUDICE DEFENDANT AND WOULD NOT
    HAVE CHANGED THE RESULT OF THE TRIAL.
    II.
    As our Supreme Court has reaffirmed, "[t]o prevail on a claim of
    ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must . . . show both: (1) that
    counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance
    prejudiced the outcome." State v. Pierre-Louis, 
    216 N.J. 577
    , 579 (2014) (citing
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Fritz, 
    105 N.J. 42
    , 58 (1987)).
    We have considered defendant's arguments raised in this appeal in view
    of the record, the applicable legal principles, and our deferential standards of
    review, and conclude his contentions lack sufficient merit to warrant further
    discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We discern no legal basis to
    disturb Judge Picheca's factual findings in his written statement of reasons
    pursuant to Rule 1:6-2(f) attached to his December 20, 2019 order. Based on
    these findings, we reject defendant's arguments and affirm substantially for the
    reasons expressed by Judge Picheca. Under these circumstances, defendant was
    not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. State v. Preciose, 
    129 N.J. 451
    , 461
    (1992); see also R. 3:22-10.
    7                                 A-3913-19
    Affirmed.
    8   A-3913-19
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-3913-19

Filed Date: 5/25/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/25/2021