STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. WILLIAM B. WOODS (18-05-0604, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1141-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM B. WOODS,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted May 10, 2021 – Decided May 26, 2021
Before Judges Fasciale and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 18-05-
0604.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Steven A. Yomtov, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant William B. Woods appeals from an October 25, 2019 judgment
of conviction after pleading guilty to unlawful possession of a weapon, focusing
his argument on the November 1, 2018 order denying his motion to suppress
evidence. We affirm.
The facts are based on the testimony adduced during the October 30, 2018
suppression hearing. The judge considered the testimony of Patrolmen Joshua
J. Treusch and Michael Hampton of the Mount Laurel Police Department. In
addition, the judge viewed the DVD footage from the officers' body-worn
cameras (BWCs).
On February 17, 2018, Patrolman Treusch was dispatched to the Red Roof
Inn after several hotel guests reported a domestic violence incident in Room
233. One of the guests told a hotel employee about a fight between a man and
a woman, reporting the man "was like walking in the room and wouldn't let her
out and hurting her like." Another guest reported "that a female was being held
against her will and that the male had threatened her life." The hotel manager
told the patrolman that "the lady in 233 call[ed her and said] that's me and my
baby's daddy out there but we're not really fighting."
Treusch called for backup and waited outside the hotel for other officers
to arrive. Due to the report of a domestic violence incident, Treusch was
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required to investigate to ensure "the safety and well-being of all individuals
inside of the room."
Patrolmen Hampton and Levy arrived about five minutes later. The
officers proceeded to Room 233, and Treusch knocked on the door several times,
announcing "Mount Laurel Police." When no one answered the door, the
officers obtained a master key from the hotel staff in order to enter the room and
confirm the female occupant was "okay."
After opening the door and entering the room, the officers saw a dog lying
on the bed next to a silver, snub-nose .38 revolver with a wooden handle. The
officers removed the gun and checked the room, searching for occupants who
might be injured or endangered. Except for the dog, the room was empty. While
checking the room, the officers detected a strong odor of marijuana and saw a
safe on the floor with the door ajar.1
Shortly after the police entered Room 233, the female occupant arrived.
Treusch asked her about the male occupant. The woman said that was her
boyfriend, and he left the hotel to return home. The female occupant gave the
officers a false name and date of birth for her boyfriend.
1
Inside the safe, the officers found marijuana and money.
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Treusch asked the female occupant if she was okay. She replied, "I'm
perfectly fine." She further told the officer the couple was fighting but "we was
just playing so."
While the female occupant was speaking to the officers, defendant
returned to Room 233 and yelled out, "Babe, babe, come on, tell them we were
playing." Defendant gave Patrolman Treusch a false first name and incorrect
date of birth. The officers detained defendant and explained why he was being
detained. Defendant then yelled, "Yo officer, everything's mine, everything.
Whatever's there is mine. Whatever's in there – she don't got nothing to do with
nothing, officer . . . She don't got nothing to do with it. It's mine, it's mine."
The officers frisked defendant. Defendant asked if their BWCs were
activated, and the officers confirmed the cameras were recording. Defendant
then gave the officers his true name and date of birth. After checking the serial
number on the gun found in Room 233, the officers learned the gun had been
stolen.
After his arrest, defendant was charged with second-degree possession of
a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); second-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); second-degree
possession of a weapon during the course of committing a drug offense, N.J.S.A.
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2C:39-4.1(a); third-degree receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a); third-
degree hindering apprehension, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(4); third-degree
distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(11); fourth-degree possession of marijuana, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10(a)(3); and second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). Defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the physical evidence seized
from Room 233 the night of the incident. The judge conducted an evidentiary
hearing and heard the arguments of counsel on October 30, 2018. At the
conclusion of the testimony, and after reviewing the footage from the officers'
BWCs, the judge denied the suppression motion. The judge found the testimony
of Patrolmen Treusch and Hampton credible and they testified "consistently."
He noted "the testimony [wa]s also supported by the body cam footage that was
marked as S-2 and S-3 in evidence and displayed during the course of [the]
proceeding." The judge explained he found the officers' "testimony to be
credible and that it's corroborated by the body worn cameras."
The judge concluded:
I find in this particular case that the police, that the
State have met their burden of showing that [there] was
a basis for the emergency aid and/or community
caretaking doctrine. The court finds that the actions of
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Patrolman Treusch and Patrolman Hampton were
entirely reasonable in light of all of the facts and
circumstances presented to them. They c[a]me to a call
of domestic violence. They are told that there are
several complaints from guests on the second floor that
a female (1) is being held against her wishes and (2)
that there was a threat to kill the female.
Based on that information alone it would be reasonable
for the officers to go to the room to investigate. . . .
Now there is a call from the [female occupant of Room
233] saying we were just playing. The officers as well
as the hotel manager are not required to accept a call
from the victim, alleged victim of domestic violence,
that there is no domestic violence. It is entirely
common, reasonable and understood generally that
victims of domestic violence at times will deny that
they've been abused. . . .
In any event, the officers had no way of verifying that
and so their investigation into the room was entirely
justified.
....
The critical issue for the court is whether or not – and
the parties acknowledge the issue – is whether or not
the entry into the room was permissible. The court
finds it was entirely permissible for the reasons stated.
After the judge's denial of the motion to suppress the physical evidence
seized from Room 233, defendant entered into a negotiated agreement with the
State wherein he pleaded guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon. At the plea hearing on July 15, 2019, the judge accepted the plea as
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negotiated, including defendant's reservation of the right to appeal the denial of
his motion to suppress the weapon. On October 25, 2019, the judge sentenced
defendant in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement to a term of five
years in prison with a forty-two-month period of parole ineligibility under the
Graves Act. The remaining charges were dismissed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following argument:
THE SEARCH OF THE HOTEL ROOM WAS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL WARRANTLESS SEARCH,
AND THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT
THE POLICE ENTRY WAS WARRANTED UNDER
THE EMERGENCY AID OR COMMUNITY
CARETAKING DOCTRINE WAS ERROR.
In our review of the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, we "must
defer" to the motion judge's factual findings "so long as those findings are
supported by sufficient evidence in the record." State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521,
538 (2017) (quoting State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)). We ordinarily
defer to those findings because they "are substantially influenced by [the
judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of the
case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313
(2014) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). We will disregard
those findings only when a trial judge's findings of fact are "so clearly mistaken
that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction." State v.
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Hagans, 233 N.J. 30, 37-38 (2018) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425
(2014)). We review a motion judge's legal conclusions de novo. Dunbar, 229
N.J. at 538.
"Both the United States Constitution and the New Jersey Constitution
guarantee an individual's right to be secure against unreasonable searches or
seizures." State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012). The State has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that warrantless searches and
seizures are "justified by one of the 'well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant
requirement." State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 409 (2012) (quoting State v. Frankel,
179 N.J. 586, 598 (2004)).
The State argued the emergency aid and community caretaker exceptions
to the search warrant requirement applied in this case based on reports of a
domestic violence incident involving a female occupant in Room 233. When
exigent circumstances are present, "[p]olice officers serving in a community -
caretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless entry into a home under
the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Vargas, 213
N.J. 301, 323 (2013). The emergency aid doctrine "is derived from the
commonsense understanding that exigent circumstances may require public
safety officials, such as the police, . . . to enter a dwelling without a warrant for
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the purpose of protecting or preserving life, or preventing serious injury." State
v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 469 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Frankel,
179 N.J. at 598). Under the emergency-aid exception, the State must show "(1)
the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency
require[d] that he [or she] provide immediate assistance to protect or preserve
life, or to prevent serious injury and (2) there was a reasonable nexus between
the emergency and the area or places to be searched.'" Id. at 470 (first alteration
in original) (quoting State v. Edmonds, 211 N.J. 117, 132 (2012)).
"The emergency-aid doctrine . . . must be 'limited to the reasons and
objectives that prompted' the need for immediate action." Edmonds, 211 N.J. at
134 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599). "If, however, contraband is 'observed in
plain view by a public safety official who is lawfully on the premises and is not
exceeding the scope of the search,' that evidence will be admissible." Hathaway,
222 N.J. at 470 (quoting Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599-600).
Here, the officers were dispatched to the hotel based on reports from other
hotel guests of a domestic violence incident in Room 233. Based on those
reports and the failure of anyone to answer the door when the police knocked
and announced their presence, the officers were unable to ascertain whether
there was someone inside Room 233 who required immediate emergency
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assistance. Police officers need not "stand by in the face of imminent danger
and delay potential life-saving measures while critical and precious time is
expended obtaining a warrant." Frankel, 179 N.J. at 599.
The community caretaking function also justified the officers' entry into
Room 233. See State v. Bogan, 200 N.J. 61, 73 (2009) (holding "police officers
perform a wide range of social services, such as aiding those in danger of harm,
preserving property, and 'creat[ing] and maintain[ing] a feeling of security in
the community.)'" In Vargas, our Supreme Court held "[p]olice officers serving
in a community-caretaking role are empowered to make a warrantless entry into
a home under the emergency-aid exception to the warrant requirement." 213
N.J. at 323.
While there are similarities between the emergency aid and community
caretaking exceptions, the two exceptions are doctrinally separate and distinct.
State v. Witczak, 421 N.J. Super. 180, 192 (App. Div. 2011). "The community-
caretaker exception asks whether the police are 'engaged in "functions, [which
are] totally divorced from detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
relating to the violation of a statute."'" Id. at 192 (quoting State v. Navarro, 310
N.J. Super. 104, 109 (App. Div. 1998)). The emergency aid exception focuses
on an objectively reasonable belief an emergency exists and there is a reasonable
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nexus between the emergency and the area to be searched. Hathaway, 222 N.J.
at 470.
Here, the officers were engaged in their function as community caretakers,
investigating whether someone occupying Room 233 was in immediate danger,
requiring emergency aid. In addition, under the emergency aid exception, the
officers' conduct was objectively reasonable based on multiple reports from
other hotel guests that a woman was being threatened and held against her will
in the hotel room. Once the officers entered the room searching for someone
who may have required immediate assistance, the officers conducted a limited
search of the room. Based on their limited search, the officers found an open
safe on the hotel room's floor, containing marijuana and cash, and a gun lying
on the bed. Having reviewed the record, we are satisfied the judge did not abuse
his discretion in determining the community caretaking doctrine and emergency
aid exception applied under these circumstances, justifying the warrantless
search of the hotel room. Thus, the judge properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress.
Affirmed.
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