L.W. VS. HUDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2230-19
L.W.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
HUDSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY
SERVICES,
Respondent-Respondent.
___________________________
Submitted April 19, 2021 – Decided June 9, 2021
Before Judges Rothstadt and Mayer.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human
Services.
L.W., appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Mark D. McNally, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner L.W. appeals from the Department of Human Services, Division
of Family Development, Bureau of Administrative Review's (the Division) final
agency decision affirming the Hudson County Department of Family Services'
(HCDFS) recoupment, under N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.18(a)(2)(i), from his first
supplemental social security insurance (SSI) retroactive payment of public
assistance benefits paid to L.W. during the pendency of his SSI application. On
appeal, L.W. argues that his written authorization supporting the recoupment,
which was a condition precedent to his receipt of public assistance, is immaterial
and the HCDFS's recoupment constituted impermissible "Double Dipping,"
"[e]xtortion," a discriminatory action, and a violation of his equal protection and
due process rights. We affirm, as we conclude L.W.'s claims lack merit, are
based substantially on a flawed reading of the regulations he is challenging, and
he has not demonstrated that the Division's decision was arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable.
The facts are not disputed. L.W. applied for SSI benefits in April 2017.
However, because SSI benefits are not immediately approved, he also applied
to the HCDFS, which was his local County Welfare Agency (CWA), for Work
First New Jersey General Assistance (WFNJ/GA) public assistance benefits
while his SSI application was pending. In order to apply for those benefits, L.W.
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was required by N.J.A.C. 10:90-14.5(c) and N.J.A.C. 10:90-1.2(f)(8)(i) to sign
various forms, including those designated as WFNJ-10D, WFNJ/GA-30, and
WFNJ/GA-30A. Together, these forms concern an applicant's obligation to
repay any benefits a CWA provides to the applicant while awaiting a
determination of the applicant's SSI entitlement and authorize the Social
Security Administration (SSA) to reimburse the CWA directly from the
applicant's SSI award. See N.J.A.C. 10:90-14.5(c).
From May 2017 to May 2019, while L.W.'s SSI benefit application was
pending, he received $28,612 in public assistance benefits through the HCDFS,
including cash in the amount of $5,223, emergency assistance benefits in the
amount of $22,708, and temporary rental assistance benefits in the amount of
$681.
In May 2019, L.W. was approved for SSI benefits retroactive to the date
of his application in April 2017. Thereafter, the SSA sent L.W.'s first lump-sum
SSI payment in the amount of $19,516.25 to the HCDFS. That amount
represented the total SSI benefits L.W. would have been eligible to receive
during the pendency of his application had he been approved when he applied
in April 2017.
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L.W. submitted a request for a review of the HCDFS's recoupment to the
Division. On December 26, 2019, the Division issued a final decision affirming
the HCDFS's recoupment. The written decision explained that before a CWA
may provide public assistance benefits during the pendency of an SSI
application, under N.J.A.C. 10:90-14.5(c) and N.J.A.C. 10:90-1.2(f)(8)(i), the
CWA must have an applicant sign forms WFNJ/GA-30 and WFNJ/GA-30A. It
also noted that, under N.J.A.C. 10:90-3.18(a)(2)(i), "retroactive SSI benefits
payments are subject to recoupment so that the assistance provided during the
pendency of the SSI benefits matter can be repaid."
The decision also explained that, under a contractual arrangement between
the State of New Jersey and the SSA, where a state welfare agency is entitled to
recoup the costs of interim benefits provided to an applicant, the applicant's SSI
retroactive benefits are paid directly to the appropriate agency for
reimbursement of the interim benefits provided. N.J.A.C. 10:90-14.5(a), (c). It
continued to note that L.W. had expressly authorized the payment to the HCDFS
when he signed, on February 26, 2019, an "Authorization for Reimbursement of
Initial Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Payment or Initial SSI Post-
eligibility Payment" form (WFNJ/GA-30), an "Agreement to Repay" form
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(WFNJ-10D), and an "Agreement to Repay Assistance from Initial SSI
Payment" form (WFNJ/GA-30A).
Finally, the Division noted that L.W. had received a total of $28,612 in
public assistance benefits from the HCDFS during the pendency of his SSI
application and that the total amount of SSI benefits he would have received had
his application for SSI benefits been granted in April 2017 would have been
$19,516.25. The Division therefore upheld the HCDFS's recoupment of
$19,516.25 from L.W.'s SSI benefits payment "based on applicable regulatory
authority," as L.W. had received interim benefits during the pendency of his SSI
matter and had signed the proper authorizations permitting the HCDFS to recoup
any interim benefits provided. This appeal followed.
Our scope of review of an agency decision is limited. In re Stallworth,
208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011); Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J. Super. 186,
190 (App. Div. 2010). We presume the validity of an "administrative agency's
exercise of its statutorily delegated responsibilities." Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J.
163, 171 (2014). "We defer to an agency decision and do not reverse unless it
is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable[,] or not supported by substantial
credible evidence in the record." Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super.
243, 259 (App. Div. 2010). The burden is on the appellant to establish that an
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agency's decisions were "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable[,] or not
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record." Ibid.; D.C. v. Div. of
Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 464 N.J. Super. 343, 353 (App. Div. 2020).
In our review, we defer to the "agency's interpretation of statutes and
regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility." D.C., 464
N.J. Super. at 353 (quoting A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs.,
407 N.J. Super. 330, 339 (App. Div. 2009)). "This deference comes from the
understanding that a state agency brings experience and specialized knowledge
to its task of administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field
of expertise." In re Election Law Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op. No. 01-2008, 201
N.J. 254, 262 (2010).
Applying our deferential standard of review, we conclude that L.W.'s
contentions on appeal are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. 1 R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). We affirm substantially for the reasons
stated by the Division in its December 26, 2019 written decision. Suffice it to
1
We only note that, contrary to L.W.'s interpretation, N.J.A.C. 10:90-14.5(a)'s
reference to a "contractual agreement" between the SSA and the State is not
evidence that benefit recoupment is fully funded by the federal government.
Rather, the language is a preamble to the rest of the regulation, which provi des
the process whereby CWAs, such as the HCDFS, through the Division, may be
reimbursed directly through the recipient's SSI award and requires the signing
of forms providing authorization to do so. See N.J.A.C. 10:90-14.5(c).
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say that the challenged recoupment was required by State regulations and
authorized by L.W.'s execution of the required forms when he applied for public
assistance. The Division's decision was legally correct and unassailable.
Affirmed.
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