MICHAEL DOBLIN VS. LINDA DOBLINÂ (FM-02-556-99, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5066-15T3
MICHAEL DOBLIN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LINDA DOBLIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Argued June 1, 2017 - Decided July 7, 2017
Before Judges Lihotz and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
Docket No. FM-02-556-99.
Kenneth Rosellini argued the cause for
appellant.
Frank J. LaRocca argued the cause for
respondent (LaRocca, Hornik, Rosen, Greenberg
& Patti, L.L.C., attorneys; Mr. LaRocca and
Rotem Peretz, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Linda Doblin appeals from a June 10, 2016 order
denying her Rule 4:50-1 application to vacate a December 12, 2006
consent order. We affirm.
These facts are taken from the record. Although the parties
were married for little more than three years, this litigation has
existed for nearly two decades. In 2012, we recounted the history
of this rather litigious matter in Doblin v. Doblin, No. A-6161-
08 (App. Div. June 26, 2012). We recite our prior decision because
it encompasses all the determinations defendant asked the trial
judge to revisit, addressed in the order now under appeal.
We deem it appropriate to provide an expansive
explanation of the facts, as this appeal marks
the fourteenth year of litigation concerning
a marriage that lasted for a period of three
years before the parties separated.
The parties were married in June 1994. A child
was born of the marriage in April 1996, and
the parties separated in 1997, with a
complaint for divorce being filed in August
1998.
Prior to the marriage, the parties executed a
prenuptial agreement that, among its other
terms, contained an alimony waiver provision,
pursuant to which the parties would forgo
alimony if they divorced within six years of
their wedding. The agreement also provided
that alimony would be available in the event
that either party suffered a disability
preventing him or her from engaging in
fulltime employment.
Following the entry of a judgment of divorce
in October 2001, the parties agreed to
arbitrate their remaining disputes. The
arbitration consumed fourteen days of
negotiations, including extensive, conflict-
ing testimony about alleged disabilities
suffered by each party.
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The arbitrator addressed a number of other
issues. Defendant had argued that the
prenuptial agreement was invalid under the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, N.J.S.A.
37:2-31 to -41. In a decision dated December
31, 2003, the arbitrator determined that the
agreement was valid and enforceable in all
respects. However, the arbitrator determined
that the alimony waiver provision of the
prenuptial agreement was unenforceable
because plaintiff had not filed for divorce
during the appropriate time period. The
arbitrator awarded defendant alimony in the
amount of $3,000 per month, to be paid tax-
free to defendant and not to be tax-deductible
by plaintiff. The arbitrator stated that the
alimony was to be "'permanent' in nature,
rather than [of] a specific limited duration
period" but nevertheless found that "a review
of the 'permanent' alimony should be
undertaken" three years after his decision, a
period he "intended to coincide with the
mandatory and statutory review of child
support called for under N.J.S.A. 2A:17-
56.9[a] . . . ." The arbitrator found that
"at the time of such three[-]year review of
all support payments, the burden of proof
w[ould] be on [defendant] to establish her
continuing need for alimony from [plaintiff]
[,] . . . the procedural variance [of changing
the burden of proof] . . . deemed to be
appropriate and warranted under the
exceptional circumstances of this case." The
Family Part judge confirmed the arbitration
award. The arbitrator thereafter issued a
supplemental arbitration decision wherein he
denied both parties' correction or clarifica-
tion claims. The judge issued an order and
judgment confirming the supplemental arbitra-
tion decision.
Over the next two years, the judge addressed
child custody issues, and in 2005 he modified
the alimony award based on plaintiff's changed
circumstances. Plaintiff was awarded custody
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of the child. The judge did not address the
issue of alimony in 2007, when other issues
were litigated, resulting in, among other
things, the award of counsel fees in
plaintiff's favor in the amount of $53,182.
In 2008, defendant unsuccessfully sought a
transfer of custody. She filed a motion to
enforce litigant's rights due to plaintiff's
alleged failure to make alimony and child
support payments to her. The judge denied the
motion and directed defendant to pay child
support arrears through the Bergen County
Probation Department. No appeal was taken
from that order, but in 2009, defendant filed
a motion seeking to enforce litigant's rights
and to set aside the previously entered
October order, due to misapplication and
misconstruction of law and fact pursuant to
Rule 4:50-1. The judge denied the motion.
[Doblin, supra, No. A-6161-08 (slip op. at 1-
5) (alterations in original).]
We affirmed the Family Part's order denying reconsideration of
defendant’s request to reinstate alimony, and specifically held
alimony had been deemed waived, because defendant failed to seek
it in a timely manner. Id. at 10.
This appeal is the latest salvo in defendant's attempts to
revisit orders from which no timely appeal was taken, which are
now barred by application of res judicata, and also revisit our
determination from the prior appeal. Indeed, defendant's appeal
is from denial of a Rule 4:50-1 motion seeking to vacate and/or
declare void orders from December 12, 2006; December 20, 2006;
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February 2, 2007; February 13, 2007; April 25, 2007; and October
24, 2008.
Despite the years of litigation, for the first time, in her
application to the trial court, defendant claimed she never agreed
to the terms of the December 12, 2006 consent order and her
signature on it was forged. She also claimed the consent order
was invalid because it was not signed by the trial judge and
because she was not afforded a real time interpreter, which
prevented her participation in settlement conferences leading to
entry of the consent order. She asserted the December 20, 2006,
typewritten version of the consent order signed by the judge was
also invalid because it did not bear the parties' signatures.
She claimed two orders filed on February 2, 2007 and April
25, 2007, requiring defendant to pay plaintiff child support and
sanctioning her for interference with parenting time were invalid
because they were entered without a motion. She also challenged
a February 13, 2007 order awarding plaintiff counsel fees resulting
from the February 2, 2007 adjudication as improperly decided.
She challenged the validity of the October 24, 2008 order
denying her alimony and awarding plaintiff fees, claiming the
trial judge relied upon the 2006 consent orders, which were
fraudulent. She claimed the orders entered on December 31, 2003;
October 5, 2004; November 16, 2005; and November 28, 2005;
5 A-5066-15T3
including the judgment of divorce, were not provided to the court,
and only part of the arbitration determination relating to alimony
was provided to the court. Therefore, she asserts the judge had
neither the correct precedent nor the complete arbitration record
to render the October 24, 2008 determination.
The trial court considered these arguments and entered an
order on June 10, 2016: denying defendant's request to vacate the
prior court orders; granting plaintiff's request to find
defendant's motion frivolous; enforcing the October 24, 2008 and
July 13, 2012 orders by assessing counsel fees against Defendant's
counsel for frivolous litigation; granting, in part, plaintiff's
request for counsel fees, but denying his request for further
sanctions; denying plaintiff's requests to enjoin defendant from
filing future motions or allowing him to defeat any prospective
motion through letter application to the court; and denying counsel
for defendant's request to stay the imposition of counsel fees.
Defendant seeks review of June 10, 2016 order, asserting the
trial court made inadequate findings and urges we vacate not only
this order, but the aforementioned ones, pursuant to Rule 4:50-1
(d) and (f). She also argues the trial judge erred in deeming her
motion frivolous and awarding plaintiff fees. Specifically,
defendant challenges the trial judge's conclusion her relief was
barred by res judicata. She argues the June 10, 2016 Order denying
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her motion to vacate was "without rational explanation or any
explanation whatsoever." She argues the trial judge did not
consider or make findings as to her claim of fraud upon the court.
In opposition, plaintiff argues a Rule 4:50-1 motion should
only be granted "sparingly, in exceptional situations." He argues
defendant has not provided any new information to grant relief
under Rule 4:50-1. He contends defendant's application is out of
time, because the orders she seeks to vacate are now a decade old.
He argues a Rule 4:50-1 motion under the grounds asserted by
defendant must be filed "within a reasonable time." Relying on
Wausau Insurance Company v. Prudential Property and Casualty
Insurance Company of New Jersey, 312 N.J. Super. 516 (App. Div.
1998), plaintiff argues a Rule 4:50-1 motion is not a substitute
for a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, neither of which
defendant sought. Plaintiff asserts even though defendant’s
claims of fraud upon the court are not time barred, they should
be barred for lack of both proof and merit.
We begin by reciting our scope of review. The Supreme Court
has stated:
[a] motion under [Rule] 4:50-1 is addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which should be guided by equitable principles
in determining whether relief should be
granted or denied. The decision granting or
denying an application to open a judgment will
7 A-5066-15T3
be left undisturbed unless it represents a
clear abuse of discretion.
[Hous. Auth. of the Town of Morristown v.
Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994) (citations
omitted).]
The doctrine of res judicata applies to matters that have
previously been litigated and bars them from being re-litigated.
Nolan v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 345 N.J. Super. 142, 153
(App. Div. 2001). For res judicata to apply:
there must be a valid, final judgment on the
merits in the prior action; the parties in the
second action must be identical to, or in
privity with those in the first action; and
the claim in the later action must arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence as the
claim in the first action.
[Ibid. (citing Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel
and Casino, Inc., 124 N.J. 398, 412 (1991)).]
The trial judge denied defendant's motion because he
correctly found her claims were barred by res judicata. He held
defendant failed to allege any new facts either unknown to her or
not previously before the court. Specifically, he stated,
The [d]efendant has filed a motion under
[Rule] 4:50 for this [c]ourt to vacate a
series of orders dating back from 2006 to 2008
alleging that they were entered under
fraudulent circumstances with this [c]ourt as
well as other courts.
The relevant rule again is 4:50-1, which reads
in pertinent part: "On motion, with briefs,
and upon any such terms as are just, the
[c]ourt may relieve a party or the party's
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legal representative from a final judgment
order for the following reasons."
It would be here the [d]efendant alleges fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic) misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party. For the
purpose of this review I will also consider
the catchall paragraph, F, "or any other
reason justifying relief from the operation
of judgment of the order."
Our Supreme Court has held that a motion for
relief under this rule should be granted
"sparingly in exception situations", Housing
Authority of the Town of Morristown [v.]
Little, 137 N.J. 274, 289 (1994). See also
Millwork Insulation, Inc. [v.] State
Department of Treasury Division of Taxation,
25 N.J. Tax 452, 462 (2010) ("the rule is
intended to provide relief from litigation
errors that a party could not have protected
against during the suit that resulted in the
judgment sought to be vacated.")
Here, the defendant has not brought any new
facts or information not previously known to
the [d]efendant in making her application.
The [c]ourt agrees with the [p]laintiff that
the [d]efendant's application here is merely
an attempt to relitigate matters that have
been previously decided by this [c]ourt as
well as the Appellate . . . Division, as far
back as . . . 2012 with regard to the Appellate
Division decision.
Moreover, the [d]efendant does not cite to any
legal authority to support her request to
vacate an order that has already been appealed
and upheld. Again, this order -- there was
an order from Judge Guida from 2008, which
upheld the 2006 and 2007 orders.
Again, this matter has been litigated ad
nauseum. And again, the [c]ourt finds that
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based on the [c]ourt's prior orders upholding
the validity of these orders, as well as the
appellate Division decision dated June 26,
2012, which upheld the October 24, 2008 order,
the [d]efendant is collaterally estopped from
seeking the same relief again nearly eight
years after the October 2008 order and almost
four years to the date from the Appellate
Division June 26, 2012 order.
And again, I'm not even going to get into the
time limitations of a [Rule] 4:50 motion,
because again, I don't think it is important.
I think again here, this matter has been
previously litigated. Defendant presents no
new facts for this [c]ourt to consider, or any
basis to overturn, even if it could overturn,
the Court's prior orders. I think based on
the Appellate Division's findings from 2012 -
- I think there is serious doubt as to whether
or not the [c]ourt could, even if it was so
inclined to, . . . vacate the 2006, and 2007,
and 2008 orders would it be able to do so in
light of the Appellate Division decision from
2012.
Accordingly, I will not address the [laches]
argument the [p]laintiff makes in defense,
because again, I think that clearly based on
res judicata and collateral estoppel, there
is no basis for this [c]ourt to vacate its
prior orders.
We agree with the trial judge's assessment. The December 12,
2006; December 20, 2006; February 2, 2007; February 13, 2007;
April 25, 2007; and October 24, 2008 orders defendant seeks to
vacate are all final post-judgment orders, the parties are
identical, and defendant's current claim arises out of the same
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occurrences in the orders at issue. Therefore, the trial judge
properly applied res judicata to deny defendant's motion.
Although we are satisfied res judicata bars defendant’s
claims, we address her claims of fraud upon the court to highlight
why the trial judge’s imposition of counsel fees as a sanction for
frivolous litigation was appropriate. Regarding her claim of
fraud upon the court, the law provides:
a party seeking to be relieved from the
judgment must show that the fact of the
falsity of the testimony could not have been
discovered by reasonable diligence in time to
offset it at the trial or that for other good
reason the failure to use diligence is in all
the circumstances not a bar to relief.
[Shammas v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321, 330 (1952).]
Here, defendant had over a decade to bring the alleged fraud
to the court's attention, and in fact litigated numerous issues
before the trial court, and in one instance, an appeal before this
court, but never asserted this argument. Defendant's financial
circumstances and auditory issues did not prevent her from
litigating these matters through counsel over this ten-year
period. She does not assert the alleged fraud was only recently
discovered, and the eleventh hour conjuring of the claim supports
the trial judge’s view the claim was without merit. No objective
evidence was provided to the trial judge demonstrating her
signature on the December 12, 2006 consent order was forged, and
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the filing of a typewritten version of this order by the trial
court does not render the December 20, 2006 order fraudulent.
Similarly, defendant's attack on the February 2, 2007;
February 13, 2007; and April 25, 2007 orders misrepresents the
record because the parties agreed in the December 12, 2006 consent
order the trial court could address the relief awarded therein on
submissions without a formal motion. As we noted above, we
previously adjudicated the validity of the October 24, 2008 order,
which upheld all prior orders, and the record is devoid of any
reason for us, let alone the trial court, to revisit it.
Defendant's other legal arguments demonstrate a fundamental
misconception of the law. For example, she claims the prior
custody orders are void because the court did not make a best
interest determination or require a plenary hearing before
modifying custody, as required by P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super.
193, 215 (App. Div. 1999). Setting aside the fact the parties’
son is now twenty-one, no hearing was necessary at the time the
parties reached their consent order because "[a] judgment, whether
reached by consent or adjudication, embodies a best interests
determination." Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App.
Div. 1993). Also, "a party must clearly demonstrate the existence
of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is
necessary." Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 159 (1980). Here, there
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was no material dispute in fact because the parties entered into
a consent order obviating a plenary hearing. Thus, it was
reasonable for the trial court to conclude plaintiff’s application
was frivolous and designed to claw back child support retroactive
to 2006, for purpose of avoiding the statutory prohibition on the
retroactive modification of support. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a.
With this as the context, we now turn to defendant’s claims
the trial judge made inadequate findings under Rule 1:4-8 and
abused his discretion in concluding her application was frivolous.
Rule 1:4-8(a) states:
The signature of an attorney or pro se party
constitutes a certificate that the signatory
has read the pleading, written motion or other
paper. By signing, filing or advocating a
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an
attorney or pro se party certifies that to the
best of his or her knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances:
(1) the paper is not being presented for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing
law or by a non-frivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the factual allegations have evidentiary
support or, as to specifically identified
allegations, they are either likely to have
evidentiary support or they will be withdrawn
13 A-5066-15T3
or corrected if reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery indicates
insufficient evidentiary support; and
(4) the denials of factual allegations are
warranted on the evidence or, as to
specifically identified denials, they are
reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief or they will be withdrawn or corrected
if a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery indicates
insufficient evidentiary support.
If the pleading, written motion or other paper
is not signed or is signed with intent to
defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be
stricken and the action may proceed as though
the document had not been served. Any adverse
party may also seek sanctions in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (b) of this
rule.
"A court may impose sanctions upon an attorney if the attorney
files a paper that does not conform to the requirements of Rule
1:4-8(a), and fails to withdraw the paper within twenty-eight days
of service of a demand for its withdrawal." United Hearts, L.L.C.
v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 389 (2009). Furthermore, a
motion may be deemed frivolous when "no rational argument can be
advanced in its support, or it is not supported by any credible
evidence, or it is completely untenable." Ibid. (quotations
omitted).
In concluding defendant's application was frivolous, the
trial judge ordered defendant's counsel to pay $5,087 in sanctions,
based on the terms of the October 24, 2008 and July 13, 2012
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orders, and his own assessment of Rule 1:4-8. The judge’s findings
regarding the frivolous litigation were as follows:
As [p]laintiff acknowledged in his cross
motion, on two separate occasions . . . this
court has forewarned the [d]efendant that if
she were to file what the court would consider
to be a frivolous motion . . . not only
possibly could she be subject to attorneys'
fees, but that the [c]ourt would assess
[c]ounsel for the [d]efendant a sanction.
Again, that was in Judge Guida's order dated
October 24, 2008. And the relevant language
from that order is "the [d]efendant shall pay
the [p]laintiff an attorney fee award in the
amount of $3,500 which shall be reduced to
judgment in favor of the [p]laintiff and
against the [d]efendant. The [c]ourt further
notes that any future counsel for the awards
will be assessed against [c]ounsel for the
[d]efendant if the [c]ourt finds any future
application by her frivolous."
I also included this language in an order that
I issued dated July 13, 2012. However, in
that order, the [c]ourt will note for the
record I did not find the [d]efendant's motion
in that matter to be frivolous. So, I did not
assess the sanction. However, I warned the
defendant then that if I did subsequently find
. . . [an] application to be frivolous, I also
would impose sanctions against her [c]ounsel.
Again, the [p]laintiff is correct. This
matter has been previously litigated. . . .
[T]he [d]efendant seeks the same relief she
previously sought back in 2008, which she
appealed, and that appeal was denied in 2012.
I think given the time-lapse as well as the
prior court orders and the Appellate Division
decision, [d]efendant's attempt to relitigate
this matter, this [c]ourt finds to be, in
fact, frivolous.
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Based on that finding, the [p]laintiff has
moved under [Rule] 1:4-8 for this sanction.
And again, I find that based on this [c]ourt's
prior orders which this [c]ourt has the
ability to enforce prior court orders as well
as the relevant [Rule] 1:4-8, the [d]efendant
is subject to a sanction for filing a
frivolous motion.
I'll also note for the record that [c]ounsel
for the [p]laintiff did contact [c]ounsel for
the [d]efendant, forewarned him that he was
going to move for sanctions and asked
[c]ounsel to withdraw the motion. The
[c]ounsel for the [d]efendant refused to do
so. So, clearly, the [c]ounsel for
[d]efendant was put on notice that the
plaintiff would be seeking a frivolous
sanction against him for filing such a motion.
Based on this [c]ourt's prior orders from
. . . October 24, 2008, and July 13, 2012, [I
am] going to grant [p]laintiff's motion that
sanctions be issued against [d]efendant's
[c]ounsel. [I am] also going to grant
[p]laintiff's request that the [c]ourt find
[d]efendant's motion [to] be frivolous in
violation of [Rule] 1:4-8, and [I am] going
to grant [p]laintiff's request for sanctions
in the form of ordering [c]ounsel for the
[d]efendant to pay [p]laintiff's [c]ounsel in
the amount of $5,087.50 within 30 days of the
date of this order.
There is no basis to disturb the trial judge's findings.
Defendant's application was per se frivolous by virtue of the
repeated attempts to challenge old orders through different legal
argumentation, without the necessary facts to support her claims.
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Lastly, defendant asserts the trial judge's findings
regarding the award of counsel fees were lacking. We disagree.
Rule 5:3-5(c) states:
Subject to the provisions of [Rule] 4:42-9(b),
(c), and (d), the court in its discretion may
make an allowance, both pendente lite and on
final determination, to be paid by any party
to the action, including, if deemed to be
just, any party successful in the action, on
any claim for divorce, dissolution of civil
union, termination of domestic partnership,
nullity, support, alimony, custody, parenting
time, equitable distribution, separate
maintenance, enforcement of agreements
between spouses, domestic partners, or civil
union partners and claims relating to family
type matters. A pendente lite allowance may
include a fee based on an evaluation of
prospective services likely to be performed
and the respective financial circumstances of
the parties. The court may also, on good cause
shown, direct the parties to sell, mortgage,
or otherwise encumber or pledge assets to the
extent the court deems necessary to permit
both parties to fund the litigation. In
determining the amount of the fee award, the
court should consider, in addition to the
information required to be submitted pursuant
to [Rule] 4:42-9, the following factors: (1)
the financial circumstances of the parties;
(2) the ability of the parties to pay their
own fees or to contribute to the fees of the
other party; (3) the reasonableness and good
faith of the positions advanced by the parties
both during and prior to trial; (4) the extent
of the fees incurred by both parties; (5) any
fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of
fees previously paid to counsel by each party;
(7) the results obtained; (8) the degree to
which fees were incurred to enforce existing
orders or to compel discovery; and (9) any
17 A-5066-15T3
other factor bearing on the fairness of an
award.
Regarding the fee award, the trial court specifically found
the issues raised by defendant were already adjudicated. The
judge noted defendant's counsel had been cautioned by plaintiff's
counsel and provided with prior orders addressing the subject
matter upon which defendant was about to embark, putting him on
notice sanctions would result if he did not withdraw his motion.
The trial judge stated:
An application of counsel fees must be
supported by an affidavit of services, Rule
4:42-9[(b)]. The affidavit of services must
state that the fee is reasonable and support
that assertion by providing the information
set forth in [RPC] 1.5[(a)].
In determining the amount of the fee award,
the court shall consider in addition to the
information required to be submitted pursuant
to [Rule] 4:42-9, the factors as enumerated
in [Rule] 5:3-5[(c)], which are as following:
[t]he financial circumstances of the parties,
the ability of the parties to pay their own
fees or to contribute to the fees of the other
party, the reasonableness and good faith of
the positions advanced by the parties, the
extent of the fees incurred by both parties,
any fees previously awarded, the amount of
fees previously paid to counsel by each party,
the results obtained, the degree to which fees
were [incurred] to enforce existing orders or
to compel discovery, and any other factor
bearing on the fairness of an award.
In addition, the New Jersey Supreme Court
found in Mani [v.] Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 94, 2005,
that in awarding counsel fees the court must
18 A-5066-15T3
consider whether the party requesting the fees
is in financial need, whether the party
against whom the fees are sought has the
ability to pay, the good or bad faith of either
party in pursuing or defending the action, the
nature and extent of the services rendered,
and the reasonableness of the fees, id. at 94
to 95.
Normally, bad faith in the context of counsel
fee awards has been construed to signify that
a party acted with a malicious motive so as
to be unfair and to use the court system
improperly to force a concession not otherwise
available[.] Kelly [v.] Kelly, 262 N.J.
Super. 303, [308 (Ch. Div. 1992)].
[I have] considered the relevant factors in
5:3-5[(c)] and of particular note I find that
the reasonableness and good faith of the
positions advanced by the parties, the fees
previously awarded, the results obtained, and
the degree to which fees were incurred to
enforce existing orders, strongly sway this
[c]ourt that again, this matter has been
litigated ad nauseam.
The fact that the [p]laintiff had to respond
to [d]efendant's voluminous submissions, [I
have] also reviewed the submission of
[c]ounsel regarding his fees or his law firm's
fees from Rotem Peretz who has a $295 per hour
billable rate. Mr. LaRocca's rate is $450 per
hour. Again, . . . I believe both of those
rates are reasonable given their expertise as
well as involvement in the case. I see the
amount of time that [they have] billed for
these matters, which again is [fifteen-and-a-
half-hours] as well as an anticipated
additional three hours -- for which presumably
would have been today's appearance, again, I
see nothing in this submission that leads the
[c]ourt to believe that this fee being sought
here is unreasonable, again, given
specifically the tremendous amount of the
19 A-5066-15T3
[d]efendant's submission and the time that
[c]ounsel needed to expend to go -- to respond
to this motion.
And although the [c]ourt also understands that
basically [c]ounsel's position was that this
was unnecessary given the [c]ourt's prior
orders, [c]ounsel still was required to go
through all the documents and respond on the
merits as well as on procedural grounds.
So, for that reason, again, I see nothing that
would lead this [c]ourt to believe that a
$5,000 -- I'm rounding off -- it is $5,087.50
-- is an unreasonable fee. So, [I am] going
to grant again counsel fees.
The clearly worded prior orders addressing not only the
substantive claims defendant attempted to re-litigate, but also
stating a sanction would issue for further applications, coupled
with caution from plaintiff's counsel, and the trial judge's
findings regarding frivolous litigation, clearly support the
counsel fee determination. Defendant's dissatisfaction with the
outcome of the previous litigation did not mandate the trial judge
offer a lengthy dissertation on specious claims repeatedly
asserted.
Affirmed.
20 A-5066-15T3