STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. CHAD BOYD (18-01-0033, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0400-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
CHAD BOYD,
a/k/a CHAD R. BOYD,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted April 19, 2021 – Decided June 14, 2021
Before Judges Rothstadt and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 18-01-0033.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney for
respondent (Lillian Kayed, Assistant Prosecutor, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Chad Boyd appeals from an August 27, 2019 order denying his
petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
In April 2018, defendant pled guilty to possession of a controlled
dangerous substance, cocaine, with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a
school, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(a); and certain persons not to possess a weapon,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). The sentencing judge imposed an aggregate sentence
of ten years with a five-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant did not
file a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence. 1
Defendant filed a PCR petition on September 25, 2018. In the petition,
defendant asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) based on
allegations that his attorneys failed to investigate and raise deficiencies in a
search warrant affidavit and in the execution of the search warrant.
Later, defendant also filed, through PCR counsel, a brief in support of his
petition. In the brief, he argued that his claims were not barred by Rule 3:22,
that plea counsel was ineffective, and that defendant was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. He also directly filed a supplemental brief reiterating he
1
Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea and subsequently withdrew that
motion.
2 A-0400-19
was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In addition to the briefs,
defendant filed his certification, a certification from his brother, and an affidavit
from his co-defendant, Lester Williams.
In his certification, as to his plea counsel, defendant stated that even
though he asked for discovery from plea counsel, he received it two weeks after
he entered his guilty plea. He added that he wanted to take his case to trial, but
his attorney told him there was "no way" he could win at trial and that if he went,
he would be sentenced to "twice" as long as he would be if he took the plea.
Defendant stated that when he discussed his case with his attorney, "he told me
that he could get the weapons charge dismissed but that I would lose on the
possession and distribution charge. He scared me into taking the guilty plea."
He stated that he felt like he had no choice but to take the plea.
Further, defendant certified that his plea counsel failed to obtain a video
without audio of another co-defendant Patricia Wilson arguing with police and
that he asked his plea counsel to obtain a surveillance log from the police, but
"[his] attorney made a joke out of it." He also stated that if he had received the
discovery in a timely manner, he "would have been able to make the decision
that [he] originally wanted to and taken the case to trial."
3 A-0400-19
As to his sentencing counsel, he explained that he tried to withdraw his
guilty plea, but his new counsel told him that if he "took the plea back . . . the
prosecutor could give [him] consecutive sentences." He also alleged that
counsel told him that if he entered the guilty plea, he could not appeal his case.
Defendant additionally certified that counsel did not provide him with a public
defender form "to state whether or not [he] did want to appeal" and that he
"would have said yes."
Defendant's brother Avery Shinholster's certification stated that he was
present in meetings with defendant and defendant's plea counsel before
defendant entered his guilty plea. He explained that plea counsel "said that he
could get the weapons charge dropped, but that it wouldn't make any difference
to the time [defendant] would get." It was "obvious" to Shinholster that "the
attorney was pressuring [defendant] to take the guilty plea and not go to trial
like he had wanted to do." He also certified that counsel told defendant that trial
would "blow up in his face" and the prosecution "wanted [defendant] to go to
trial because they 'had him.'" After defendant entered the guilty plea, defendant
told Shinholster that his attorney did not give him discovery and "never told him
about Graves Act penalties."
4 A-0400-19
In Williams's affidavit, he stated that he was falsely accused of buying a
controlled dangerous substance from defendant. He also stated that he and
defendant had a conversation about their family before Williams left defendant
and "smoked a cigarette in the middle of Martin Luther King Dr. while [his]
wife and grandson's mother talked." He then drove home with his wife, was
pulled over in front of a school, and was placed under arrest.
The PCR judge, John A. Young, Jr., who also presided at defendant's plea
and sentencing hearings, held oral argument on defendant's petition. On August
27, 2019, the judge entered the order now under appeal denying defendant's
petition. In a written decision, the judge explained that at the plea hearing,
defendant confirmed he went through the plea forms with his counsel, that he
did not have any questions regarding the plea forms, and that he was satisfied
with his attorney's advice and representation.
After setting forth the standard for PCR, the judge also explained that
defendant asserted three IAC claims: (1) plea counsel failed to review discovery
with him until after he pled guilty; (2) plea counsel coerced defendant into the
plea; and (3) his newly appointed counsel failed to advise him of his right to
appeal. First, the judge found that defendant "fail[ed] to demonstrate how timely
receipt of the discovery would have changed his decision to plead." Defendant
5 A-0400-19
did not "identify any specific or particular discovery material that, had he
received it prior to his plea, would have persuaded him to take his case to trial."
Therefore, relying on State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.
1999), the judge concluded that defendant's claim amounted to a "bald
assertion."
The judge also found that defendant's discovery-based claims were belied
by the record. He noted that at the plea hearing, defendant stated under oath that
he was "satisfied with plea counsel's performance and representation," and that
although he had filed a motion to withdraw his plea, he ultimately withdrew that
motion. Based on these factors, the judge determined that "the discovery in
[defendant's] case did not affect his decision to plead."
As to defendant's coercion argument, the judge found that the record
"demonstrate[d] that [he] knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered a
guilty plea" to both charges. He noted that defendant stated under oath that he
possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it, that he lived within 1,000 feet
of a school, and that he unlawfully possessed a handgun. At his plea hearing,
defendant also confirmed that the "decision to plead was his," and that no one
had forced him into the plea. The judge concluded that the record demonstrated
defendant was not coerced into taking the plea.
6 A-0400-19
Finally, as to his right to appeal, the judge also found defendant's claim to
be meritless because the record demonstrated defendant and his sentencing
counsel reviewed and filled out a "Notice of Appeal Rights and Time to File a
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief form," which they also signed. Moreover,
at sentencing, Judge Young also informed defendant of his right to appeal. The
judge concluded defendant had not established a prima facie claim of IAC and
therefore an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues the following:
POINT I
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT
HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED [IAC] BY FAILING
TO COMMUNICATE, VISIT, REVIEW DISCOVERY
WITH HIM, OR PURSUE DEFENSES, THEREBY
FORCING HIM INTO A GUILTY PLEA, AND ALSO
BY TELLING HIM HE COULD NOT APPEAL HIS
CASE.
We are not persuaded by these contentions.
Where a PCR judge does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we "conduct
a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR
court." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State
v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004)).
7 A-0400-19
To establish a prima facie claim of IAC, a defendant must satisfy the two-
pronged test enumerated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984),
as adopted by our Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). To meet the
first Strickland/Fritz prong, a defendant must establish that his counsel "made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The
defendant must rebut the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct [fell]
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. Thus,
this court must consider whether counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688.
To satisfy the second Strickland/Fritz prong, a defendant must show "that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable." Id. at 687. A defendant must establish "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. "[I]f counsel's
performance has been so deficient as to create a reasonable probability that these
deficiencies materially contributed to defendant's conviction, the constitutional
right will have been violated." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.
8 A-0400-19
Both the United States Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court
have extended the Strickland/Fritz test to challenges of guilty pleas based on
IAC. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162-63 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S.
134, 140 (2012); State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 456-57 (1994). A defendant
must demonstrate with "reasonable probability" that the result would have been
different had he received proper advice from his attorney. Lafler, 566 U.S. at
163 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). Moreover, a defendant must also
"convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain" and "insist on
going to trial" "would have been rational under the circumstances." State v.
Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)).
A defendant is only entitled to an evidentiary hearing when he "has
presented a prima facie [claim] in support of [PCR]," State v. Marshall, 148 N.J.
89, 158 (1997) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), meaning
that a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable likelihood that his . . . claim
will ultimately succeed on the merits." Ibid. A defendant must "do more than
make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel" to
establish a prima facie claim entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. Cummings,
321 N.J. Super. at 170. A defendant bears the burden of establishing a prima
9 A-0400-19
facie claim. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012). In reviewing a
defendant's contentions, we "view the facts in the light most favorable to a
defendant to determine whether a defendant has established a prima facie claim."
Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463-64.
We conclude from our review of the record that defendant failed to make
a prima facie showing of IAC within the Strickland/Fritz test, substantially for
the reasons stated by Judge Young in his thorough written decision.
Accordingly, the judge also correctly concluded that an evidentiary hearing was
not warranted. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63.
Affirmed.
10 A-0400-19