STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. MANUEL MEDINA (6251, UNION COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4400-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MANUEL MEDINA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued January 5, 2022 – Decided January 20, 2022
Before Judges Mayer and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Municipal Appeal No. 6251.
James A. Abate argued the cause for appellant (Law
Offices of James A. Abate, LLC, attorney; James A.
Abate, of counsel and on the brief).
Meredith L. Balo, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union County
Prosecutor, attorney; Meredith L. Balo, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Manuel Medina appeals from a July 10, 2020 order of the
Superior Court, Law Division, finding him guilty of driving while intoxicated
(DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, and refusal to submit to a breath sample, N.J.S.A.
39:4-50.2 and -50.4(a). We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. In accordance with a plea agreement in
municipal court, defendant acknowledged drinking several beers and a shot of
whiskey prior to operating a motor vehicle within Winfield Township on June
27, 2019. He admitted his consumption of these beverages adversely effected
his judgment, coordination, and ability to drive. He also conceded refusing to
submit to a breathalyzer test at the local police department.
On December 10, 2019, the municipal court judge sentenced defendant on
the DWI charge to a three-month suspension of his driving privileges, twelve
hours at the Intoxicated Driver's Resource Center (IDRC), and payment of a
monetary fine and assessments. On the refusal charge, the municipal court judge
imposed a separate monetary fine and additional assessments, another twelve
hours at the IDRC, a minimum seven-month added suspension of defendant's
driving privileges, and installation of an ignition interlock device for a period of
thirteen-months. The sentence on the refusal charge ran concurrent to the
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sentence on the DWI charge. The municipal court judge stayed the sentences
pending defendant's appeal to the Superior Court, Law Division.
On appeal to the Superior Court, Law Division, defendant agued the new
sentencing provisions under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 should be applied retroactively so
he could be sentenced to installation of an ignition interlock device rather than
suspension of his driver's license. Defendant also argued "an offense does not
come into existence until there is a conviction, and a defendant does not become
an offender until they are convicted."
In a July 10, 2020 order and written decision, the Law Division judge
rejected defendant's arguments. He found defendant committed the DWI
offense on June 27, 2019 and the revised penalties under the DWI statute applied
prospectively to offenses occurring after December 1, 2019. Because defendant
committed the offense five months prior to the effective date of the revised DWI
statute, the Law Division judge concluded suspension of defendant's license was
mandated.
The Law Division judge also held defendant's interpretation of the
language in the revised DWI sentencing statute distorted the common definition
and application of the terms "offense" and "offender." He concluded "[u]nder
plain usage, an 'offense' is distinct from an 'offender.' An offense consists of
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the transactions and occurrences comprising the acts violative of the statute. In
contrast, an offender under N.J.S.A, 39:4-50.17 is a person who has been
convicted of the offense."
At the sentencing hearing, the Law Division judge imposed the same
sentences as the municipal court judge for the DWI and refusal charges. He
stated the sentences would run concurrently. He also denied defendant's request
for a stay of the sentences pending appeal to this court. 1
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT I
USE OF THE TERMS "OFFENSE" AND
"OFFENDER" IN THE LEGISLATION ARE NOT
AMBIGUOUS AND SHOULD BE INTERPRETED
SO AS TO PERMIT DEFENDANTS IN CASES OPEN
AND PENDING AT THE TIME OF THE BILL'S
EFFECTIVE DATE TO ELECT WHETHER TO BE
SENTENCED TO PENALTIES AS THEY EXISTED
BEFORE OR AFTER THE DATE OF
ADJUDICATION.
POINT II
PUNISHMENTS REQUIRED BY AMELIORATIVE
STATUTES MAY APPLY TO OFFENSES
COMMITTED BEFORE BUT ADJUDICATED
AFTER A STATUTE’S EFFECTIVE DATE.
1
We denied defendant's application for an emergent stay in an October 5, 2020
order.
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POINT III
INTERPRETING THE TERM "OFFENSE" TO
APPLY ONLY TO INCIDENTS COMMITTED ON
OR AFTER DECEMBER 1, 2019, LEADS TO AN
ABSURD RESULT, GIVEN THE LEGISLATURE’S
FINDING AND DECLARATION THAT ALCOHOL
IGNITION INTERLOCK DEVICES ARE MORE
EFFECTIVE THA[N] DRIVING PRIVILEGE
FORFEITURE.
POINT IV
GIVEN THE EX POST FACTO IMPLICATIONS
WITH THE ENACTMENT OF NEW PENALTIES,
DEFENDANTS CHARGED BEFORE DECEMBER 1,
2019, SHOULD BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO
CHOOSE WHETHER TO BE SENTENCED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PENALTIES IN EFFECT
EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER DECEMBER 1, 2019.
After the Law Division judge issued his decision in this matter, we
published our opinion in State v. Scudieri, A-0352-20 (App. Div. November 1,
2021) disposing of the same arguments raised by defendant in this appeal. To
the extent defendant suggests his arguments are more nuanced than the
arguments we reviewed and rejected in Scudieri, we disagree.
Here, defendant argues the delay between adoption of the revised DWI
statute and its effective date supports application of the ignition interlock device
penalty to offenses occurring prior to December 1, 2019. We addressed this
argument in Scudieri, "observ[ing] the four-month gap between the law's
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passing and the effective date was hardly an arbitrary or random decision.
Rather, the law granted the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission time to 'take
any anticipatory administrative action in advance of that date as shall be
necessary to implement the provisions of this act.'" Id. slip op. at 5.
We also noted the potential for adverse consequences stemming from
acceptance of the defendant's argument seeking "application of the new [DWI]
sentencing laws to defendants . . . who committed offenses prior to the new law's
enactment, but who are sentenced afterward." Id. slip op. at 6. We commented
such a position would likely result in manipulation of sentencing dates, cause
defendants in similar situations to be sentenced dissimilarly, and foster
impermissible "judge shopping" by defendants seeking a purportedly more
sympathetic judge for sentencing. 2 Ibid.
Additionally, defendant argues the revised DWI statute's use of the word
"offense" and "offender" is clear and unambiguous, and the term "offender" is
synonymous with the term "conviction." However, we rejected that argument
in Scudieri. Id. slip op. at 8.
2
Judge-shopping is "an attorney's attempt to have a particular judge try his or
her case . . . ." Goldfarb v. Solimine, 460 N.J. Super. 22, 32 (App. Div. 2019),
aff'd as modified and remanded, 245 N.J. 326 (2021). In Goldfarb, we held
judge-shopping "may undermine public confidence in the impartial
administration of justice." Ibid.6 A-4400-19
Contrary to defendant's argument, "offense" and "conviction" are not
synonymous. The revised DWI statute applies specifically "to any offense
occurring on or after [December 1, 2019]." N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. If the Legislature
intended to apply the revised DWI statute for any conviction occurring after
December 1, 2019, it would, and could, have so stated. See DiProspero v. Penn,
183 N.J. 477, 494 (2005) (quoting N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 175
N.J. 178, 195 n. 6 (2002)) ("[T]he Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial
construction of its enactments.").
We affirm the sentences imposed for defendant's DWI and refusal
convictions based on our decision in Scudieri. The Law Division judge's
application of the DWI statute in effect as of June 27, 2019, the date defendant
refused to take the breathalyzer and admitted to operating his car while
intoxicated, was both proper and prescient.
Affirmed.
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