STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. ZENG L. CHEN (10-10-1964, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2050-20
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ZENG L. CHEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted January 20, 2022 – Decided February 1, 2022
Before Judges Hoffman and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 10-10-
1964.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Lori Linskey, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Lisa Sarnoff Gochman,
Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Zeng L. Chen appeals from the July 30, 2020 Law Division
order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing.
In 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree felony
murder, and single counts of first-degree murder, first-degree armed robbery,
second-degree burglary, and third-degree possession of a weapon (knife) for an
unlawful purpose. The trial court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with
an eighty-five percent parole bar on the first-degree murder conviction.1 In
2018, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences, State v. Chen, No. A-
4929-14 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. April 12, 2018), and our Supreme Court
denied certification. State v. Chen, 235 N.J. 449 (2018).
Approximately four-and-a-half years elapsed between defendant's arrest
and his trial. Citing this delay, on December 11, 2018, defendant filed the PCR
petition under review, asserting his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
1
In addition, after appropriate mergers, the trial court sentenced defendant to a
concurrent thirty-year term with a thirty-year parole bar on the first-degree
felony murder conviction and a concurrent fifteen-year term with an eighty-five
percent parole bar on the first-degree armed robbery conviction.
A-2050-20
2
by failing to move for dismissal on constitutional speedy trial grounds. 2 The
PCR judge denied relief, ruling that defendant's petition was procedurally barred
because the speedy trial issue could have been raised on direct appeal.
On appeal, defendant challenges the PCR court's finding that his petition
was procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-4. Moreover, defendant
maintains he established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel
based on speedy trial grounds, and that we should therefore remand for an
evidentiary hearing. After reviewing the record in light of applicable legal
standards, we vacate and remand for the PCR court to make specific findings of
fact and law under the Barker3 test for speedy trial violations in the context of
the two-pronged Strickland 4 test for PCR.
It appears that much of the delay in this case was attributable to 1)
defendant's severance motion to be tried separately from his co-defendant; 2)
pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment and suppress defendant's statement;
3) reassignment of the matter to four different trial judges; and 4) the serious
2
This case predates the Criminal Justice Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to –
26, which took effect on January 1, 2017. State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 55
(2017).
3
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972)
4
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
A-2050-20
3
nature of the charges, which required experts in forensic DNA analysis and
biological stain identification. However, the PCR judge did not make specific
findings with respect to the four factors set forth in Barker, but instead relied on
the procedural bar established by Rule 3:22-4. In light of our general policy
against entertaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal,
State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459-60 (1992),5 and our preference for hearing
such claims in post-conviction proceedings, ibid., we find it necessary to vacate
the order under review and remand this matter to the Law Division to undertake
the fact-sensitive analysis required by Barker.
I.
We assume the reader's familiarity with the facts and procedural history
set forth in our decision denying defendant's direct appeal, State v. Chen, (slip
op. at 2-12). We summarize the most significant facts and events to provide
context for defendant's speedy trial claim.
5
"Our courts have expressed a general policy against entertaining ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because such claims involve
allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record." Preciose, 129 N.J. at
460. Consequently, "[i]neffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are particularly
suited for post-conviction review because they often cannot reasonably be raised
in a prior proceeding." Ibid. (citing R. 3:22-4).
A-2050-20
4
On June 16, 2010, defendant and his co-defendant, Dong B. Lin, broke
into the home of a former employer, who lived on South Street in Freehold,
intending to steal money and other valuables. The victims, Yun Chen, and her
brother, Yao Chen, were unexpectedly at home that afternoon. Yao came out of
his first-floor bedroom, heading toward the kitchen, when he encountered the
intruders. Lin had a white-handled knife in his hand and defendant had brass
knuckles. Lin ordered Yao to "be quiet" and to return to his room. Yao
complied.
Lin gave the knife to defendant, who threatened Yao, while Lin went to
locate a telephone cord, which they used to tie Yao's hands and feet to the
bedframe. Wielding a second knife that Lin retrieved from the kitchen,
defendant threatened Yao to keep him quiet while Lin went upstairs with the
white-handled knife to search for valuables. Using the white-handled knife, Lin
attacked Yun through her comforter, as she lay in her bed, stabbing her seventy-
nine times in the neck, chest, torso and abdomen, and through her arms and
wrists.
When Yao heard his sister screaming upstairs, he started screaming and
struggled to get free. Defendant held Yao down and repeatedly punched him in
the head with the brass knuckles. Defendant also stuffed cloth in Yao's mouth
A-2050-20
5
to stifle his screams. Since defendant saw Lin take the white-handled knife
upstairs with him, when he heard Yun screaming, he was "pretty sure" Lin was
killing her.
Defendant called Lin to help him with Yao, who was still screaming and
struggling. Lin came downstairs and stabbed Yao with the white-handled knife;
after that knife broke, Lin grabbed the kitchen knife and stabbed Yao seventy-
four times in the face, neck, shoulder, chest, abdomen, and buttocks.
When Yao stopped making noise, defendant and Lin quickly searched the
house for valuables. They placed computers, a cell phone, camera, watch,
electronics, and a box of cigarettes in a suitcase and left with it. Yao did not die
in the house; despite his extensive wounds, Yao made his way out the front door
of the home, down the porch steps, and onto South Street, where he collapsed.
At that time, off-duty Rahway police officer Richard Long was driving on
South Street, when he observed an Asian male with "multiple wounds to his
head, neck, [and] abdomen . . . stumbling" onto the roadway, with his hands
"bound in front of him by a cord." Long called 9-1-1 and summoned an
ambulance and the police. First responders transported Yao to Jersey Shore
University Medical Center, where he died within the hour.
A-2050-20
6
Based on timely reports and information provided by two neighbors of the
victims, the police were able to locate and arrest defendant and Lin, who were
apparently walking toward the bus station.6 After their arrest, defendant and Lin
were photographed and their clothing and personal effects were collected as
evidence. Defendant had a cut on his left middle knuckle and red staining on
his hands and jeans. After determining that defendant and Lin spoke Chinese
and not English, the police arranged for Officer Robert Wei of the Piscataway
Police Department to provide translation services. Defendant was advised of
his Miranda7 rights, voluntarily waived them, and was interviewed. Defendant
described the break-in and the events that followed. Defendant denied knowing
Lin was going to kill the victims and said that he was "shocked" when Lin did;
instead, he thought they were going to just "threaten" them. Defendant admitted
he punched Yao and used the kitchen knife to threaten him when he was
screaming; however, he insisted that he "did not use the knife to cut anybody."
In October 2010, a Monmouth County Grand jury returned an eight-count
indictment charging defendant and Lin with first-degree knowing/purposeful
6
When the police arrested Lin, they recovered from him a New Jersey Transit
Bus receipt for two one-way adult tickets, issued on June 16, 2010, at 1:46 p.m.
7
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
A-2050-20
7
murder and six related charges. In April 2012, defendant filed a severance
motion, seeking a separate trial from Lin. In June 2012, the trial court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground of insufficient
evidence to support the murder charges. In September 2012, the court granted
defendant's motion to sever.
In December 2013, defendant filed a motion to suppress his electronically
recorded statement. On April 10, 16, and 29, 2014, the trial court conducted a
testimonial hearing, ultimately denying defendant's suppression motion. The
case was reassigned to different judges multiple times. In May 2014, the case
was reassigned to the fourth trial judge.
On January 8, 2014, Lin pled guilty to the knowing/purposeful murders
and felony murders of Yao Chen and Yun Chen. In exchange for Lin's guilty
pleas, the State agreed to recommend a sentence of life imprisonment with the
possibility of parole. A condition of his plea agreement required Lin to testify
truthfully at defendant's trial. Lin's testimony at defendant's trial was largely
consistent with defendant's interview with the police.
After the trial court sentenced defendant, he filed a direct appeal, raising
the following issues:
POINT I
A-2050-20
8
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL
(RAISED BELOW), AND THE TRIAL COURT’S
JURY CHARGES WERE INCORRECT AND
INCOMPLETE (PLAIN ERROR), WARRANTING
VACATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS
FOR MURDER, ARMED BURGLARY AND
ROBBERY, FELONY MURDER, AND POSSESSION
OF A WEAPON FOR AN UNLAWFUL PURPOSE.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
STATEMENTS MADE TO POLICE.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING
DEFENDANT FROM OFFERING EXPERT
TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO
SUPPRESS.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE IS IMPROPER AND
EXCESSIVE.
As noted, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences in April
2018. Eight months later, in December 2018, defendant filed the petition under
review; in September 2019, defendant filed an amended PCR petition asserting
the following grounds for relief:
POINT I
A-2050-20
9
THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION IS NOT
PROCEDURALLY BARRED BECAUSE THE
ISSUES RAISED THEREIN WERE NOT EITHER
PREVIOUSLY RAISED ON APPEAL, OR COULD
NOT HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL.
A. THE PETITION RAISES CLAIMS THAT []
DEFENSE COUNSEL COULD NOT HAVE
REASONABLY RAISED IN PRIOR
PROCEEDINGS. [R. 3:22-4(A)]
B.THE PETITION PRESENTS EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES RESULTING IN A
"FUNDAMENTAL INJUSTICE." [R. 3:22-
4(B)]
C. THE PETITION DEMONSTRATES AN
INFRINGEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. [R. 3:22-4(A)]
POINT TWO
THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A PLENARY
HEARING TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL.
POINT THREE
THE DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BECAUSE HE WAS
DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
POINT FOUR
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE
HE FAILED TO FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS
BASED ON SPEEDY TRIAL VIOLATIONS.
A-2050-20
10
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
HEARING {SIC} BY NOT GIVING THE
DEFENDANT A HEARING WHEN HE WROTE THE
COURT TO HAVE NEW COUNSEL APPOINTED.
POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR BY
NOT ADVISING THE DEFENDANT THAT HE
COULD REPRESENT HIMSELF.
POINT SEVEN
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE
HE DID NOT REQUEST A SUPPLEMENTAL JURY
CHARGE.
POINT EIGHT
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN THE
PREPARATION OF THE CASE, AND IN THE
SELECTION OF AN EXPERT WITNESS.
POINT NINE
RECENT SUPREME COURT LAW MANDATES
THAT A DEFENDANT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENTITLED TO ADEQUATE EXPERT WITNESSES.
POINT TEN
THE DEFENDANT SUBMITS THAT THERE IS
OVERWHELMING NEW JERSEY
JURISPRUDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS LEGAL
GROUNDS THAT HE SHOULD BE RESENTENCED
A-2050-20
11
BECAUSE HE WAS NEVER ADVISED AS {SIC}
AND EARLY PLEA OFFER.
POINT ELEVEN
THE DEFENDANT SUFFERED PREJUDICE
BECAUSE HAD HE BEEN INFORMED OF THE
PLEA OFFER THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE
BEEN DIFFERENT; HE WOULD HAVE RECEIVED
A MUCH SHORTER SENTENCE.
In July 2020, after hearing oral argument, the PCR court denied
defendant's petition, finding that it was procedurally barred, pursuant to Rule
3:22-4.
This appeal followed, with defendant raising the following arguments:
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL
WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR
DISMISSAL OF THE INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY
TRIAL GROUNDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
PROCEDURALLY BARRED.
POINT II
THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE
DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS
FOR FAILING TO MOVE FOR DISMISSAL OF THE
INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS; IN
THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS MATTER MUST BE
REMANDED FOR THE PCR COURT TO ADDRESS
THIS CLAIM.
A-2050-20
12
II.
A.
We first address the trial court's finding that defendant's petition for PCR
is procedurally barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-4.
PCR is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus. State
v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997). It is the vehicle through which a defendant
may, after conviction and sentencing, challenge a judgment of conviction by
raising issues that could not have been raised on direct appeal and, therefore,
ensures that a defendant was not unjustly convicted. State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J.
464, 482 (1997). Generally, a defendant must pursue relief by direct appeal; put
another way, PCR "proceedings are not a substitute for direct appeal." State v.
Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595, 605 (1979).
However, a defendant may use PCR "to challenge . . . [a] final judgment
of conviction which could not have been raised on direct appeal." McQuaid,
147 N.J. at 482-83 (citing Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459).
Any ground for relief not raised in a prior
proceeding . . . is barred from assertion in a proceeding
under this rule unless the court on motion or at the
hearing finds
A-2050-20
13
(1) that the ground for relief not previously
asserted could not reasonably have been raised in
any prior proceeding; or
(2) that enforcement of the bar to preclude
claims, including one for ineffective assistance of
counsel, would result in fundamental injustice; or
(3) that denial of relief would be contrary to a
new rule of constitutional law under either the
Constitution of the United States or the State of
New Jersey.
"[P]etitioners are rarely barred from raising ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims on [PCR]" under New Jersey case law, Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459-60, and
"[o]ur courts have expressed a general policy against entertaining ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because such claims involve
allegations and evidence that lie outside the trial record." Id. at 460.
Here, we find that defendant's petition for PCR is not precluded by the
procedural bar set forth by Rule 3:22-4. Based on the record before us, we
cannot determine whether defendant requires factual evidence outside of the
existing trial record to support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and
therefore we cannot definitively state that defendant could have reasonably
raised this issue on direct appeal. Accordingly, we hold that it was in error to
dismiss defendant's PCR application on procedural grounds.
A-2050-20
14
B.
We next address defendant's contention that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel for his trial attorney's failure to assert a violation of the
right to a speedy trial.
In determining whether a defendant has established ineffective assistance
of counsel, the claim must be evaluated under the two-prong Strickland test,
where "a reviewing court must determine: (1) whether counsel's performance
'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,'. . . and if so, (2) whether
there exists a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. Castagna, 187
N.J. 293, 313-14 (2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694); see
also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland test in New
Jersey).
To establish a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel , the
defendant must prove counsel's deficient representation and "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial." State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387,
392 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). A
defendant may satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test "by a showing that
A-2050-20
15
counsel's acts or omissions fell outside the wide range of professionally
competent assistance considered in light of all the circumstances of the
case." State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 366 (2008) (quoting Castagna, 187 N.J.
at 314). Furthermore, the second prong is met where defendant shows that
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced defendant to the extent he was
deprived of his right to a fair trial. Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.
"The Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to a speedy trial after
arrest or indictment." State v. May, 362 N.J. Super. 572, 595 (App. Div.
2003) (quoting State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 469 (1990)). "The right to a speedy
trial is 'fundamental' and is imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the States." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972).
Announced in Barker and subsequently adopted by our Supreme Court
in State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976), a four-part test is applied to
determine when a violation of a defendant's speedy-trial rights contravenes due
process. The test requires courts to "consider and balance the '[l]ength of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to
the defendant.'" State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div.
2009) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).
A-2050-20
16
"No single factor is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right to a speedy trial." Id. at 10. Moreover, our Supreme
Court has "decline[d] to adopt a rigid bright-line try-or-dismiss rule," instead
continuing its commitment to a "case-by-case analysis" under
the Barker balancing test; it has acknowledged "that facts of an individual case
are the best indicators of whether a right to a speedy trial has been
violated." State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253, 270-71 (2013).
When a delay exceeds one year, it is considered presumptively prejudicial;
such a delay triggers analysis of all of the Barker factors. Cahill, 213 N.J. at
265–66. We have previously cautioned, however, against deciding "how long
is too long . . . 'by sole reference to the lapse of a specified amount of
time.'" State v. Detrick, 192 N.J. Super. 424, 426 (App. Div.
1983) (quoting State v. Smith, 131 N.J. Super. 354, 360 (App. Div. 1974)).
Legitimate delays, "however great," will not violate the defendant's right to a
speedy trial if it does not specifically prejudice defendant's defense. Doggett v.
United States, 505 US. 647, 656 (1992).
Indeed, longer delays may "be tolerated for serious offenses or complex
prosecutions." Cahill, 213 N.J. at 266. Similarly, defense-caused delays do not
support a speedy trial violation and such delays are subtracted from the total
A-2050-20
17
calculus. United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280, 294 (3d Cir.
2014) (citing United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 2009)); see
also State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) (holding that "[a]ny delay that
defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial
violation" (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989))). Of course,
purposeful delay tactics weigh heavily against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. at
531.
"The only remedy" for a violation of a defendant's right to a speedy trial
"is dismissal of the charge." Cahill, 213 N.J. at 276. On appeal, "we reverse
only if the court's determination is clearly erroneous." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J.
Super. at 10 (citing State v. Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. 12, 17 (App. Div. 1977)).
In this instance, the reasons for the four-and-a-half-year period between
arrest and trial are seemingly attributable to both sides. However, we do not
have the benefit of a comprehensive Law Division opinion that divides the
overall delay into discrete periods and then explains and evaluates the reasons
for delay in each of these time periods. Importantly, the PCR judge did not
make specific findings as to the Barker factors.
There are many circumstances to consider, including but not limited to (1)
the seriousness of the crimes; (2) the complexity and logistical challenges of an
A-2050-20
18
investigation that required forensic analysis; (3) the number of judges assigned
to preside over various events; and (4) numerous pretrial motions defendant
filed, including his successful severance motion.
It is impracticable for us to review this record and exercise original
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 2:10-5 to decide the ultimate question whether
defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated. See Tomaino v. Burman, 364
N.J. Super. 224, 234–35 (App. Div. 2003) (opining that appellate courts should
exercise original jurisdiction "only with great frugality"). Moreover, the current
record is not adequate to permit a fulsome review of the Barker factors. The
circumstances explaining certain periods of delay, for example, may be outside
the current record, in which event further factfinding may be necessary.
Exercise of original jurisdiction is discouraged if factfinding is involved. State
v. Micelli, 215 N.J. 284, 293 (2013) (quoting State v. Santos, 210 N.J. 129, 142
(2012)).
We therefore believe review of the Barker factors is best delegated to the
trial court in the present matter. The trial court is better suited than we are to
undertake "the difficult task of balancing all the relevant factors relating to the
respective interests of the State and the defendant[ ]," and to provide "subjective
A-2050-20
19
reactions to the particular circumstances [to] arrive[] at a just
conclusion." Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. at 17.
As such, we remand the matter to the Law Division to (1) catalog and
compartmentalize all of the discrete periods of delay; (2) determine and evaluate
the specific reasons for delay; and (3) as to delay attributed to the State,
determine whether the delay was the product of the case's complexity or other
legitimate justification, or else was the product of purposeful delay tactics or
mere inaction. The Law Division should apply the Barker factors in context of
the two-pronged Strickland test for PCR.
Lastly, Defendant argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A court reviewing PCR petitions
based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should grant an evidentiary
hearing only if a defendant establishes a prima facie showing in support of the
request relief. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462. Here, we leave it to the PCR court's
discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is needed in light of the
standard set forth in Preciose.
Accordingly, because disposition of defendant's petition requires an
articulation of specific findings of fact under the Barker factors and in light of
the Strickland test, we are constrained to vacate the order denying the PCR
A-2050-20
20
petition and remand for the PCR court to state separately findings of fact and
conclusions of law and to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required.
This decision should not be understood to express any opinion on the merits or
the need for an evidentiary hearing. Those matters are for the PCR court to
consider in the first instance, recognizing the importance of PCR proceedings
that the Supreme Court has addressed at length in its recent decisions.
Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-2050-20
21