M.M. v. STOCKTON UNIVERSITY (L-0176-18, ATLANTIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2022 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1260-20
M.M.,1
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STOCKTON UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued December 14, 2021 – Decided February 25, 2022
Before Judges Currier and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. L-0176-18.
Steven D. Cahn argued the cause for appellant (Cahn &
Parra, Inc., attorneys; Steven D. Cahn, on the briefs).
John D. North argued the cause for respondent
(Greenbaum, Rowe, Smith & Davis, LLP, attorneys;
John D. North, of counsel and on the brief; Alexander
W. Raap, on the brief).
1
In light of the sensitive issues discussed here, we use initials to protect the
party's privacy. R. 1:38-3.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff alleges that while he was a student at Stockton University, he
suffered from depression that debilitated him to the extent that he could not leave
his apartment, was missing course assignments, and skipping classes. He sought
treatment at the University's Wellness Center.
Plaintiff also spoke with the professors of his three classes, informing
them of his condition and requesting their cooperation in an effort to avoid
failing the courses. Two of the three professors agreed to give him additional
time to successfully complete their courses. A third professor told him that, due
to the nature of the class, plaintiff could not make up the missed work and the
professor suggested plaintiff withdraw from the course. Because the date to
withdraw from a class without penalty had passed, the only option available to
avoid failing the class was to apply for a medical withdrawal. After the
University denied the request for the medical withdrawal, plaintiff received a
failing grade in the third course.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleged the University violated the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, when it failed to
accommodate his disability—depression. Defendant's first motion for summary
judgment was unsuccessful. However, the trial court granted defendant's second
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motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiff required a medical expert to
prove he had a disability and to establish his depression was so severe that he
was disabled.
Because plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to support the finding of a
disability and, therefore, demonstrated a prima facie case of a failure to
accommodate his disability, we reverse.
The 2016-17 school year was plaintiff's fourth year attending Stockton.
Even if plaintiff had successfully completed his coursework that year, he still
needed additional credits to achieve his undergraduate degree. He testified
during his deposition that he began to suffer from depression during the early
winter months of 2017. He stated he felt "an inability to concentrate and an
inability to focus on [his] schoolwork." He began to experience "suicidal
thoughts," could not get out of bed, rarely left his apartment, and was not
participating in his regular activities. He also stopped going to class.
On March 17, 2017, while out with friends, plaintiff experienced what he
described as a breakdown. Ten days later, he sought help from Stockton's
Wellness Center on campus.
Plaintiff was evaluated by Michael Levin, MS, LPC, LCADC, the
Assistant Director of Counseling Services at the Wellness Center, who
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diagnosed plaintiff with major depressive disorder. In a document titled
"Learning Access Program Documentation of Diagnosed Disability," Levin
indicated that plaintiff was "[u]nable to sleep, [had] difficulty attending class,
[and was] not completing assignments." Levin noted plaintiff "presented with
anxiety and depression symptoms throughout the period of treatment.
Depression worsened in the past week." Under the titled entry "Suggested
Accommodations," Levin recommended Stockton accommodate plaintiff with
"extensions on exams and classwork when symptomatic." Plaintiff attended
weekly sessions with Levin until the end of the school year in April 2017.
The deadline to withdraw from a class without an academic penalty for
the spring semester was April 7, 2017. Plaintiff did not request withdrawals
from any of his courses prior to that date.
On April 28, 2017, the last day of the spring semester, plaintiff met with
Patricia McConville, the Coordinator of Services for Students with Disabilities
in the University's Learning Access Program (LAP). McConville gave plaintiff
an Accommodation Request Form that he could use to request accommodations
for his fall 2017 courses.
The first sentence of the printed form stated: "This form certifies that the
following student has presented the necessary documentation to authenticate
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his/her disability." McConville found accommodations were necessary, stating
on the form:
Symptoms associated with medical condition are
unpredictable, episodic in nature, and with varying
degrees of severity. Please consider an occasional
extension of due dates and/or rescheduling of exams.
When symptomatic student will email faculty to justify
need for extension/absence. Symptoms related to
medical condition may impact ability to arrive to class
on time under certain conditions. Please allow student
briefly leave class when necessary.
Plaintiff was enrolled in three courses in the Spring 2017 semester. As
stated, in April 2017, plaintiff contacted his professors seeking help with missed
assignments and classes. In doing so, he disclosed to each professor his
diagnosis of depression and described his difficulty performing everyday
activities, including attending class and completing coursework.
He was able to reach an informal agreement with one of the professors,
who permitted him to turn in his term paper late and take the final exam. The
professor of a second course required plaintiff to sign an agreement, under which
plaintiff had until September 2017 to complete the remaining assignments for
the course. The form stated "[m]edical [i]ssue[s]" as the reason for the
incomplete work. The agreement was signed by plaintiff, the professor, and an
assistant dean. Therefore, this was an accommodation approved by defendant.
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The professor of the third course—Senior Synthesis—told plaintiff he
could not accommodate his request for an extension to complete missed
classwork and fulfill the course requirements. The professor provided several
reasons for his decision, notably that the nature of the course "is developing the
ability to communicate in group discussions, to present ideas clearly, to
carefully consider complex ideas presented by others and respond with
constructive contributions to group discussion, and more generally to
communicate professionally and intelligently in a structured interacti on." The
deadlines were "firm" because "they [were] an integral part of the coursework."
Therefore, it was not possible for plaintiff to make up the class "without actually
taking part in the course itself."
The professor also served as plaintiff's academic advisor. He gave
plaintiff only one option: complete the paperwork for an incomplete grade and
retake the course the next semester. He also advised plaintiff to seek a medical
withdrawal from the class.
Because plaintiff could not complete Senior Synthesis, and the deadline
to withdraw from a class without an academic penalty had already passed,
plaintiff had to request a medical withdrawal. He submitted the request on May
9, 2017.
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Along with his documents from the Wellness Center and LAP, plaintiff
also provided a note from his personal physician, Michael Findura, D.O., dated
April 24, 2017, stating, "Patient has major depressive disorder." In a subsequent
May 5, 2017 letter to the University, Dr. Findura stated that plaintiff was
"recently diagnosed with major depressive disorder and is having difficulty
completing tasks, concentrating and reading. Due to this medical condition, I
recommend a medical withdrawal from his class."
After plaintiff filed the request for a medical withdrawal, the professor
teaching the Senior Synthesis course advised the provost's office he was in favor
of permitting plaintiff to retroactively withdraw from his course.
On June 1, 2017, the Office of the Provost denied plaintiff's request
stating,
We cannot justify granting a medical withdrawal for
one course in the term, as you successfully completed
other courses in the Spring 2017 term under the same
circumstances. If you wish to submit an appeal for a
medical withdrawal from all of your courses in the
Spring 2017 term, we would consider it.
Plaintiff received an F in the Senior Synthesis course.
In plaintiff's complaint, he alleges Stockton violated the LAD in failing to
grant him a reasonable accommodation despite his medical condition or
disability which resulted in him failing the Senior Synthesis course. After the
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close of discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting the
University's refusal to permit plaintiff to withdraw from the Senior Synthesis
course was not discriminatory because he only sought, and was granted, an
accommodation for the Fall 2017 semester, not the Spring 2017 semester.
Defendant contended it complied with its policy which does not permit a
student to withdraw from a course after the class has concluded and grades have
been issued. Defendant also asserted that plaintiff's request for a medical
withdrawal was not an accommodation as defined under the LAD. Because
plaintiff could not demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination, defendant
asserted it was entitled to summary judgment.
In denying the motion, the judge stated: "[T]here is no dispute that
plaintiff has a disability and that he was able to perform the activity having not
had the disability. So, the whole issue is whether or not he was denied the
benefit of the program or discriminated against because of the disability." The
judge further explained that
it's documented that he's suffering from depression,
both his family doctor and then through Stockton's
program. They determined that he is suffering from
depression and he really—he testifies that it paralyzed
him; he couldn't do anything, he wasn't doing anything
and he did go to all three teachers and indicate that he
needed some kind of an accommodation . . . . But when
you look at what the provost's office did . . . it doesn't
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appear that they did any kind of in depth or any real
investigation into all of the medical records or anything
like that . . . . They just determined that it was late, it
was in violation of the policy, or not compliant with the
policy and they denied the request . . . asking for an
accommodation.
The judge denied the motion
because there are many issues of fact in this case.
[W]hether it was discriminatory to deny this medical
withdrawal; given the facts of the case, given that . . .
because of the nature of those [other two] classes he
was able to get an accommodation and complete those
classes and whether it was discriminatory to not allow
him to withdraw from . . . the Senior Synthesis class as
an accommodation . . . . I think a reasonable juror could
reject Stockton's reasons for denying the medical
withdrawal [request] after the semester ended and I
think there's questions of credibility on both sides.
Several months later, defendant renewed its motion for summary
judgment. The University asserted plaintiff had not presented sufficient proofs
of a disability that prevented him from completing the Senior Synthesis class.
Stockton stated plaintiff required testimony of a witness competent to give
testimony regarding his disability and specifically whether the disability
prevented him from completing his coursework.
In opposing the motion, plaintiff contended Stockton had already
conceded he was disabled. He pointed to the accommodation form McConville
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signed in April 2017 in which she verified that plaintiff had "presented the
necessary documentation to authenticate his disability."
The court found McConville's form was not relevant to whether Stockton
had acknowledged plaintiff's disability. Although the judge stated she did not
doubt plaintiff's testimony that he was depressed, she determined that plaintiff
required expert medical testimony to satisfy the first prong of an LAD failure to
accommodate a disability action. Therefore, the court granted defendant
summary judgment on December 18, 2020.
Our review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment is de novo. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021).
We apply the same standard as the motion judge and consider "whether the
competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder
to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). See Rozenblit v. Lyles,
245 N.J. 105, 121 (2021); R. 4:46-2(c).
"To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court
must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving
party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original)
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(quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)). "Summary
judgment should be granted . . . 'after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Friedman, 242 N.J. at 472 (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
To determine the extent of the protection afforded to disabled persons
under the LAD, we must look to the analytical framework of the Rehabilitation
Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to -12213. J.T. v. Dumont Pub. Sch., 438 N.J. Super. 241,
263 (App. Div. 2014).
In a failure to accommodate a disability case under the RA and ADA
standards, plaintiffs are required to show they "(1) had a disability; (2) [were]
otherwise qualified to participate in the activities or program at issue; and (3)
[were] denied the benefits of the program or otherwise discriminated against
because of [their] disability." Id. at 264 (citing Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.
Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009)). If the plaintiff can meet this
burden, the question then becomes whether the accommodation was reasonable.
Lasky v. Moorestown Twp., 425 N.J. Super. 530, 539-44 (App. Div. 2012);
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Ellison v. Creative Learning Ctr., 383 N.J. Super. 581, 595-96 (App. Div. 2006).
The defendant may argue as an affirmative defense that the requested
accommodation created an undue burden on the defendant. Hall v. Saint
Joseph's Hosp., 343 N.J. Super. 88, 108-09 (App. Div. 2001).
The trial court found plaintiff failed to satisfy the first prong as he lacked
expert testimony to support the finding of a disability. We disagree. Plaintiff
testified he was depressed and he described the effect the condition had on him
including an inability to get out of bed, leave his apartment, attend class,
complete coursework, and participate in any of his usual activities. He also
described having suicidal thoughts. He sought help from the University's
Wellness Center where he was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and
attended counseling sessions until the semester ended. He also saw his family
physician who diagnosed him with major depressive disorder.
Moreover, when plaintiff applied for an accommodation in April 2017,
the University's Coordinator of Services for Students with Disabilities certified
on the accommodation form that "[plaintiff] has presented the necessary
documentation to authenticate his/her disability."
According to defendant, the accommodation form was for the 2017 Fall
semester classes. Nevertheless, the program coordinator found in April 2017
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that plaintiff had a disability that required accommodation—meaning he
demonstrated a disability at the time she executed the form.
We are satisfied plaintiff presented sufficient proofs of a disability to
withstand summary judgment on his claims. In its decision on the first summary
judgment motion, the court stated, "[T]here is no dispute that plaintiff has a
disability." After hearing the second motion, the court agreed with defendant's
new argument that there was not sufficient expert testimony regarding the
disability to support the LAD claim.
Two experts—one employed by the University specifically to treat
students who require counseling—have diagnosed plaintiff with major
depressive disorder. Those experts and plaintiff can be cross-examined as to the
extent of plaintiff's disability and whether it prevented him from attending
classes and completing coursework. But, as the trial judge initially found, there
is no evidence refuting the diagnosis. To the contrary, the diagnosis was made
by the University's own Wellness Center personnel. Another University
employee certified plaintiff was suffering from a disability severe enough that
he would require an accommodation for the next semester—an acknowledgment
that plaintiff had shown evidence of a disability that would continue and require
future accommodations. With those proofs, rendered and accepted by its own
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employees, defendant cannot sustain its argument that there was insufficient
evidence of a disability.
In finding plaintiff had not established he suffered from a disability, the
trial court rejected McConville's April 28, 2017 form because she found it was
a ruling from an administrative proceeding and, therefore, inadmissible in a
Superior Court proceeding. This was a misapprehension of the circumstances.
McConville was the University's Coordinator of services for students with
disabilities. She interviewed students who presented with a disability to discuss
their needs for the determination of reasonable accommodations. This was not
an administrative agency proceeding; it was the University implementing its
own policy to afford students with disabilities "equal access for academic
success."
The trial court's reliance on Clowes v. Terminix Int'l., Inc., 109 N.J. 575(1988) was misplaced. In Clowes, the plaintiff alleged he was terminated
because of his alcoholism. Id. at 583-84. In considering whether the plaintiff
had established a prima facie case of discrimination, the Supreme Court found
the plaintiff did not sustain his burden of proving he was handicapped —as an
alcoholic—at the time of his discharge. Id. at 597. The Court noted that
"[c]onspicuously absent from the record is any testimony from a treating or
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examining physician that [the plaintiff] had been diagnosed as an alcoholic."
Ibid.Because the plaintiff's only proof of alcoholism was his own testimony
and a partial medical record in which "alcoholism" was handwritten after the
entry of "Diagnoses," the Court found the evidence was "insufficient to prove
that he suffered from [alcoholism]." Id. at 598. The Court stated that "[g]iven
the complexity of the many diagnostic procedures involved, expert medical
testimony is required to establish the fact of the employee's alcoholism." Id. at
597.
The circumstances here differ from those in Clowes. Plaintiff has two
diagnoses of major depressive disorder—from his personal physician and a
licensed professional counsel or employed by the University in its Wellness
Center. As stated, these witnesses can be cross-examined regarding the degree
of plaintiff's disability and to what extent it affected his ability to complete the
Senior Synthesis course. The trier of fact will determine whether the
University's denial of the requested accommodation was reasonable.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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