LUIS MANSO VS. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) ( 2018 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0348-16T2
    LUIS MANSO,
    Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
    OF CORRECTIONS,
    Respondent.
    ____________________________
    Submitted August 21, 2018 – Decided September 4, 2018
    Before Judges Sumners and Gilson.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
    Corrections.
    Luis Manso, appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
    for respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Kevin
    J. Dronson, Deputy Attorney General, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Luis Manso, an inmate in State prison, appeals from a final
    determination        of   the   New    Jersey    Department     of   Corrections
    (Department), which upheld a finding of guilt and sanctions imposed
    for committing prohibited act .709, failure to comply with a
    written   rule   or   regulation   of       the   correctional   facility,    in
    violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(4)(ix).               Specifically, Manso
    was found to have sent a letter to a teacher at the prison asking
    her for a date.        We reverse because there was no substantial
    credible evidence in the record that Manso actually wrote or sent
    the letter.
    I.
    On September 2, 2016, V.G., a teacher in the education
    department at the State Prison, received a letter.               V.G. had been
    out on leave, returned on September 2, 2016, and was reviewing her
    mail. The typewritten letter was dated "7/7/16" and was not signed
    by hand. The letter began: "My name is Luis Manso, I am a paralegal
    here in the library here at Northern and I have been wanting to
    talk to you."    The letter went on to state, in part: "I find you
    very attractive . . . . I wondering if you be interested in going
    on a date with me when I get home?"                It ended:     "xoxoxoxoxoxo
    Manso."
    The letter arrived in an envelope that had the return address:
    "L. Manso 762786B[,] N.S.P.[,] P.O. Box 2300[,] Newark, N.J.
    07114."   The envelope also had a postmark indicating that it had
    been mailed from Northern State Prison.
    2                              A-0348-16T2
    Upon receipt of the letter, V.G. turned it over to Sergeant
    J.D.    Sergeant J.D., in turn, gave the letter to Sergeant E.J.,
    who    charged   Manso   with    prohibited     acts     .052    (making    sexual
    proposals or threats to another) and .709 (failure to comply with
    a written rule or regulation).
    The   following   day,    on   September     3,   2016,    Sergeant     S.K.
    determined that the disciplinary charges had merit and the charges
    were served on Manso.      Manso denied sending the letter, requested
    a copy of the letter and any video surveillance, and also requested
    that the letter be analyzed for fingerprints.
    A supervising lieutenant also forwarded the letter to a
    Special Investigations Division (SID) investigator.                 The record,
    however, does not contain any report or summary of an investigation
    by SID.      In that regard, the report of the disciplinary hearing
    officer does not list any report from SID as a report submitted
    or considered.
    The disciplinary hearing began on September 7, 2016, and
    concluded on September 8, 2016.             In support of the charges, the
    Department     presented   the    letter,     the   postmarked      envelope,      a
    statement by V.G., a statement by Sergeant J.D., a statement by
    Sergeant E.J., and the disciplinary report.               The hearing officer
    also   received    a   report    authorizing      the    disciplinary      housing
    placement (DHP) of Manso, a report concerning Manso's medical
    3                                  A-0348-16T2
    condition when he was placed in DHP, a report on the seizure of
    the letter, a use of force report, and an excerpt from the inmate
    handbook containing certain facility rules.
    At the hearing, Manso pled not guilty, stating that he had
    "no knowledge" of the letter, and that he had been "set up."        Manso
    also pointed out that in his eighteen years in prison, he had not
    previously been charged with any disciplinary violations.              His
    counsel substitute contended that the information in the letter
    was "not true[,]" and requested leniency because Manso had not
    made any threats.
    The hearing officer found Manso guilty of prohibited act
    .709.   In explaining that finding, the hearing officer stated:
    Pleads not guilty, offers no evidence to
    contradict Part A staff report; letter
    admitted into evidence.    [Inmate] statement
    and [counsel substitute] statement noted,
    provides no evidence to mitigate or exonerate.
    Charge has merit. All relied on.
    Manso   was   sanctioned   to   thirty   days   of   administrative
    segregation, sixty days loss of commutation time, and fifteen days
    loss of recreation privileges.
    The hearing officer did not address the charge of prohibited
    act .052, and it appears that charge was dropped.         In that regard,
    the record contains no finding of guilt on prohibited act .052
    and, thus, we deem that charge to have been dismissed.
    4                            A-0348-16T2
    Manso administratively appealed.   On September 9, 2016, the
    Department, acting through the Assistant Superintendent, upheld
    the disciplinary finding of guilt of prohibited act .709 and the
    sanctions imposed.   In rendering the final agency decision, the
    Department stated:
    The decision of the hearing officer is upheld.
    Consideration has been taken to all relevant
    factors regarding your imposed disciplinary
    sanctions and appeal.     As a result, your
    appeal is denied: it has been determined that
    the sanction is appropriate and within
    acceptable NJDOC limits. No further actions
    are required.
    II.
    On this appeal, Manso makes three arguments.          First, he
    contends that there was no substantial credible evidence that he
    wrote or sent the letter.   Second, he argues that his due process
    rights were violated when he was denied the right to obtain a
    witness statement. Finally, he alleges that his due process rights
    were violated when his request to have the letter analyzed for
    fingerprints was denied.    We need only reach the first argument,
    because the record does not contain substantial credible evidence
    that Manso wrote or sent the letter.
    Our review of agency action is limited.   "An appellate court
    ordinarily will reverse the decision of an administrative agency
    only when the agency's decision is 'arbitrary, capricious or
    5                           A-0348-16T2
    unreasonable   or   []   is   not   supported   by   substantial   credible
    evidence in the record as a whole.'"            Ramirez v. N.J. Dep't of
    Corr., 
    382 N.J. Super. 18
    , 23 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Henry v.
    Rahway State Prison, 
    81 N.J. 571
    , 579-80 (1980)).            Furthermore,
    "[i]t is settled that '[a]n administrative agency's interpretation
    of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing
    responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our deference.'"             Wnuck
    v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 
    337 N.J. Super. 52
    , 56 (App. Div.
    2001) (quoting In re Appeal by Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 
    307 N.J. Super. 93
    , 102 (App. Div. 1997)).         The Department is given broad
    discretion in matters regarding the administration of a prison
    facility, including disciplinary infractions by prisoners.            Russo
    v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    324 N.J. Super. 576
    , 583 (App. Div. 1999).
    The regulations governing inmate disciplinary proceedings
    state:   "[a] finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be
    based upon substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a
    prohibited act."     N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a).         Substantial evidence
    is "such evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
    to support a conclusion."       In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas, 
    35 N.J. 358
    , 376 (1961) (citations omitted).             In other words, it is
    "evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for the agency's action."
    Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 
    414 N.J. Super. 186
    , 192 (App.
    6                             A-0348-16T2
    Div. 2010) (quoting McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    , 562 (App. Div. 2002)).
    Here, there was no substantial credible evidence in the record
    that   Manso   wrote   or       sent   the       letter.      The   hearing   officer
    identified the evidence she considered.                    That evidence included
    the letter, the postmarked envelope, statements by V.G., Sergeant
    J.D., and Sergeant E.J., and the disciplinary report.
    The letter and envelope do not establish that they were
    written by or came from Manso.               The letter was typed and was not
    signed.    While the letter states that it is from Manso, there was
    no evidence that he actually wrote or sent the letter.                        Indeed,
    Manso denied knowing anything about the letter.                      His substitute
    counsel also contended that much of the information in the letter
    was inaccurate.    The initial burden is on the Department to show
    substantial credible evidence that a prohibited act has taken
    place.    See N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a); see also Figueroa, 414 N.J.
    at 188 (recognizing that the Department bears the burden of
    persuasion to sustain a charge of prohibited acts).                     The hearing
    officer   never   made      a    credibility        finding    concerning     Manso's
    denial.    Instead, she improperly shifted the burden to Manso and
    reasoned that he offered no evidence to contradict the staff
    report.
    7                                A-0348-16T2
    The statement by V.G. merely states that she received the
    letter and provides no other basis to link the letter to Manso.
    In that regard, V.G. does not state whether she already knew Manso
    or whether she had any prior interaction with him.
    Similarly, the statements by Sergeant J.D. and Sergeant E.J.
    merely state that they received the letter and the statements do
    not   indicate    that   either    sergeant    conducted     any   independent
    investigation.      The disciplinary report also does not contain any
    substantial credible evidence that Manso wrote or sent the letter.
    The report states that Sergeant S.K. reviewed the "reports" from
    V.G., Sergeant J.D., and Sergeant E.J., but it discloses no other
    investigation.      The report then concludes:          "Charge has merit[.]"
    Critically, however, there is no evidence concerning the factual
    basis for that conclusion.
    As a consequence, when the hearing officer made her finding
    of guilt, she was relying on the existence of the letter and the
    envelope that it came in.         No witness for the Department appeared
    at the hearing.       Thus, the hearing officer made no credibility
    findings.        Instead,   the   hearing     officer    relied    on   written
    statements and documents.         None of those statements or documents
    provide any direct evidence that Manso wrote or sent the letter.
    We note that Manso requested a fingerprint analysis, but no
    analysis was conducted.      We do not suggest that the Department was
    8                                A-0348-16T2
    required to conduct a fingerprint analysis, but without that
    analysis, the Department has no evidence that Manso actually
    touched or handled the letter or envelope.   We also note that the
    letter was sent to SID for investigation, but the record contains
    no results of that investigation.   In short, the Department failed
    to show that there was substantial credible evidence supporting
    the finding of guilt of prohibited act .709.      Accordingly, the
    finding of guilt of prohibited act .709 is vacated and the loss
    of sixty days commutation time is to be restored.
    Reversed and vacated.   We do not retain jurisdiction.
    9                             A-0348-16T2