IN RE PETITION FOR EXPUNGEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL RECORD BELONGING TO T.O. (324-18, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3148-18T1
IN RE PETITION FOR
EXPUNGEMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL RECORD
BELONGING TO T.O.
_______________________
Argued December 11, 2019 – Decided December 30, 2019
Before Judges Haas, Mayer and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Hudson County, Expungement No. 324-18.
William J. Palatucci argued the cause for appellant T.O.
(Gibbons PC, attorneys; William J. Palatucci, Jennifer
Ann Hradil, and Brendan J. Kelly, on the briefs).
Erin M. Campbell, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Esther
Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor, attorney; Erin M.
Campbell, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Petitioner T.O. appeals from a February 15, 2019 order denying his
petition to expunge his convictions. We affirm.
On May 2, 1994, petitioner pled guilty to aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-(1)(b). On May 26, 1996, he pled guilty to possession of a controlled
dangerous substance within 1000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35 -7.
Petitioner received a pardon for both convictions from Governor Chris Christie
in January 2018.
On February 15, 2019, the trial court denied petitioner's request to
expunge all records pertaining to his convictions. The motion judge concluded:
the rules for expungement have been relaxed recently,
especially in the wake of criminal reform but it is not
this [c]ourt's job to legislate from the bench; to extend
statutory reforms or to determine expungement
proceedings. This [c]ourt's purpose is to apply the law
to the facts. The facts are that there were two
convictions and that the statute only allows for one
expungement, pardoned or not. Yes, the New Jersey
Constitution is controlling. However, the New Jersey
Constitution grants pardons but does not define the
benefits and advantages of the pardon and again[,]
pardons do not eliminate all the consequences of those
convictions . . . . Therefore the petitioner's request . . .
is barred by statute.
On appeal, petitioner argues:
POINT I
THIS COURT MUST CONSTRUE THE
EXPUNGEMENT STATUTE IN A WAY THAT
GIVES THE GOVERNOR'S PARDON ITS FULL
FORCE AND EFFECT.
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POINT II
THE GUBERNATORIAL PARDON REMOVED THE
STATUTORY BAR TO EXPUNGEMENT OF
[PETITIONER'S] MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS, AND
[PETITIONER] THEREFORE QUALIFIES FOR
EXPUNGEMENT.
A. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) Bars Expungement Based Upon
the Fact of Certain Convictions Rather than the
Commission of the Crime.
B. The Gubernatorial Pardon Removed the Legal
Disabilities Arising from [Petitioner's] Convictions,
Thereby Lifting the Statutory Bar to Expungement.
Petitioner argues the trial court erred in denying his petition for
expungement because such a denial "diminishes the Governor's constitutional
prerogative to issue a pardon." Petitioner insists that because Governor Christie
pardoned him, all disabilities flowing from his convictions have been eliminated
and he is entitled to an expungement.
Our review of a trial court's statutory interpretation is de novo. McGovern
v. Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 108 (2012) (citing Real v. Radir Wheels, Inc., 198 N.J.
511, 524 (2009)). "A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378
(1995).
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When a question of law turns on the interpretation of a statute, we look to
the language and plain meaning of the statute to resolve any ambiguities in the
statute's interpretation. See State v. K.M., 220 N.J. Super. 338, 339-40 (App.
Div. 1987). "When a statute is clear on its face, a court need not look beyond
the statutory terms to determine the legislative intent." State v. Churchdale
Leasing, 115 N.J. 83, 101 (1989).
New Jersey's expungement statute expresses a clear, "primary objective
of providing relief to the one-time offender who has led a life of rectitude and
disassociated himself with unlawful activity." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. "Also, 'a
central purpose of the expungement statute was to broaden the reliable base of
information that will be maintained for law enforcement[,]' thus 'requir[ing]
merely the extraction and isolation, not the destruction, of expunged records.'"
In re Expungement Petition of D.H., 204 N.J. 7, 17 (2010) (quoting State v. XYZ
Corp., 119 N.J. 416, 421 (1990)).
On October 1, 2018, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) was amended to allow
individuals to expunge more than one indictable offense under certain
circumstances. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) now provides, in part:
In all cases, except as herein provided, a person may
present an expungement application to the Superior
Court pursuant to this section if: . . . . the person has
been convicted of multiple crimes or a combination of
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one or more crimes and one or more disorderly persons
or petty disorderly persons offenses under the laws of
this State, all of which are listed in a single judgment
of conviction, and does not otherwise have any prior or
subsequent conviction for another crime or offense in
addition to those convictions included in the
expungement application, whether any such conviction
was within this State or any other jurisdiction; or the
person has been convicted of multiple crimes or a
combination of one or more crimes and one or more
disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses
under the laws of this State, which crimes or
combination of crimes and offenses were
interdependent or closely related in circumstances and
were committed as part of a sequence of events that
took place within a comparatively short period of time,
regardless of the date of conviction or sentencing for
each individual crime or offense, and the person does
not otherwise have any prior or subsequent conviction
for another crime or offense in addition to those
convictions included in the expungement application,
whether any such conviction was within this State or
any other jurisdiction. . . .
The purpose of the 2018 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) was to "revise
procedures for expunging criminal and other records and information, including
the shortening of certain waiting periods before a person may seek an
expungement and increasing the number of convictions which may be
expunged." S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. 3307 1 (L. 2017, c. 244). The
Legislature explained that the addition of the "interdependent or closely related
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in circumstances" and "within a comparatively short period of time" language
was intended to allow expungement of "a so-called 'crime spree.'" Ibid.Petitioner does not suggest that the crimes he committed are set forth in
one judgment of conviction or are interdependent or closely related in
circumstances, so that he would be eligible for expungement under the recently
amended statute. Instead, he relies on his pardon and the provisions of N.J.S.A.
2C:52-6 to contend he is eligible for expungement. He also points to In re L.B.,
369 N.J. Super. 354 (Law Div. 2004), to support his claim that the trial court's
denial of expungement constituted error. We are not persuaded.
Initially, we note the decision in L.B. is not binding upon us. L.B. also is
distinguishable because the petitioner in that case sought an expungement of her
lone indictable conviction after receiving a governor's pardon. In the instant
case, petitioner has two convictions involving distinct offenses from different
dates.
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6 permits expungement when arrests and charges do not
result in a conviction based on a "finding of guilt," or when the "proceedings
against the person were dismissed, [or] the person was acquitted . . . or
discharge[d]." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6(a). Here, petitioner pled guilty to two criminal
offenses, so his reliance on N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6 is misplaced.
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Next, regarding petitioner's assertion that his pardon should have triggered
an expungement of his convictions, we note expungement is not a right
guaranteed by constitutional or common law; it is purely the product of
legislation, and we are limited to the terms of the statute. In re G.P.B., 436 N.J.
Super. 48, 50 (App. Div. 2014), aff'd sub nom In re Expungement Petition of
J.S., 223 N.J. 54 (2015). Expungement is generally available for all criminal
convictions, except for those specifically listed as non-expungable in N.J.S.A.
2C:52-2(b).
An expungement petitioner "has the burden to satisfy the requirements of
the expungement statute[,] by a preponderance of the evidence." In re Criminal
Records of R.Z., 429 N.J. Super. 295, 302-03 (App. Div. 2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting D.H., 204 N.J. at 18). After a petitioner has established that
he or she meets the statutory requirements, the burden shifts to the State "to
'demonstrate[] by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a statutory bar
or that the petition should not be granted.'" D.H., 204 N.J. at 18 (alteration in
original) (quoting In re G.R., 395 N.J. Super. 428, 431 (App. Div. 2007)).
The effect of an expungement is to deem an arrest, conviction and any
other proceedings "not to have an occurred, and a petitioner may answer any
questions relating to their occurrence accordingly." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27.
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Importantly, the expungement statute compels a person, whose record has been
successfully expunged, to still disclose the expunged information under certain
circumstances. Ibid. For example, a petitioner must still reveal the expunged
record if he or she is seeking employment with the judiciary or law enforcement.
N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27(b). Thus, expunging a record does not remove the underlying
criminal acts from existence; instead, it creates a protective barrier to limit
certain entities' access to expunged records. See In re Kollman, 210 N.J. 557,
568 (2012).
On the other hand, a pardon is a matter of executive grace. Storcella v.
State, Dep't of Treasury, Div. of State Lottery, 296 N.J. Super. 238, 243 (App.
Div. 1997) (citation omitted). A gubernatorial pardon forgives the crime. Id. at
244 (citation omitted). However, "a pardon does not obliterate the dishonorable
conduct which resulted in the conviction or 'wash out the moral stain thereof.'"
Ibid. (quoting Hozer v. Treasury Dep't, 95 N.J. Super. 196, 204 (App. Div.
1967)). "A pardoned person is restored to all rights of citizenship, and may vote,
and may serve on a jury, but not all consequences of the conviction are erased
by the pardon." Id. at 243-44 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Just as the effects of a pardon and an expungement are distinguishable, so
too, is the genesis of each act. The Legislature has enacted and modified the
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expungement statute, whereas the executive branch is empowered to grant
gubernatorial pardons under Article 5, Section 2 of the New Jersey Constitution.
A pardon, "exclusively an executive function, is not subject to judicial review."
Brezizecki v. Gregorio, 246 N.J. 634, 644 (1990). By contrast, the grant or
denial of an expungement is subject to judicial review.
Per Article 3, Section 1 of the New Jersey Constitution, "[t]he powers of
the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative,
executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one
branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the
others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution."
Our Supreme Court has adhered to the separation of powers doctrine,
specifically as it relates to expungement. Before the most recent amendment to
the expungement statute, the Court was asked to judicially carve-out an
exception to same. In J.S., 223 N.J. 54, the petitioner was convicted of multiple
crimes within five days of each other. The J.S. Court determined that although
similar in nature, the crimes were not committed as part of a single,
uninterrupted criminal event. Id. at 77. Instead, each offense was a discrete
"crime" within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2, and the second offense was
"subsequent" to the first, which rendered the petitioner ineligible for
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expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2. Ibid. The Court emphasized it
"construe[d] the plain language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) to preclude
expungement" and concluded that, "as it is currently drafted, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-
2(a) does not authorize expungement of the criminal records of individuals who
are in the position of petitioners. If the Legislature determines that expungement
should be available to such individuals, it can amend the statute to clarify its
intent in that regard." Id. at 59.
The J.S. Court acknowledged the expungement statute was broadened in
2010 to expand expungement opportunities for offenders, yet, the expansion did
not include any alteration to the particularly relevant "prior or subsequent crime"
language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). J.S., 223 N.J. at 71-72. As such, the Court
followed the plain language of the statute and affirmed the denial of an
expungement. See State v. A.N.J., 98 N.J. 421, 427 (1985) (holding that the
judiciary's role is to strictly follow the requirements of the expungement statute,
even though "anomalies may occur").
"Certainly, the Legislature is conversant with its own enactments,
particularly when a statute is considered for amendment." Ibid. (quoting Comm.
of Petitioners for Repeal of Ordinance No. 522 (2013) of Borough of W.
Wildwood v. Frederick, 435 N.J. Super. 552, 567 (App. Div. 2014)).
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Nevertheless, even with the expansion of the expungement statute in recent
years, the Legislature has not authorized a rather simple adjustment to the
statute's language to permit a pardon to constitute a separate basis for
expungement. We decline to judicially create such an exception. Accordingly,
we discern no reason to disturb the trial judge's denial of petitioner's request for
an expungement.1
Affirmed.
1
Petitioner's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
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