M.G.S. VS. K.F. (FV-12-0457-21, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2021 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0480-20
M.G.S.,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Respondent,
v.
K.F.,
Defendant-Respondent/
Cross-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted April 19, 2021 – Decided August 25, 2021
Before Judges Hoffman, Suter, and Smith.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
Docket No. FV-12-0457-21.
Ruta, Soulios & Stratis, LLP, attorneys for appellant
(Demetrios K. Stratis, on the briefs).
Rotolo Karch Law, attorneys for respondent (Christian
Merlino, Charles C. Rifici, and William E.
Reutelhuber, on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
After a dismissal of a temporary restraining order (TRO), plaintiff M.G.S.
appeals, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to recuse himself and by
excluding certain witness testimony.1 Defendant K.F. cross-appeals the denial
of counsel fees. We reverse and remand for a new trial and affirm the denial of
counsel fees for the reasons set forth below.
I.
The parties' longtime relationship produced a daughter, A.F., born in May
2020. Defendant father resided with plaintiff at her parents' home for a brief
period after the birth of the child.
Shortly after their child's birth, plaintiff ended the relationship, alleging
defendant became disruptive while still living at her parents' home. After he
moved out of the house, defendant texted plaintiff repeatedly. The parties had
difficulty agreeing upon a parenting time schedule, with the challenges and
limitations of the COVID-19 pandemic complicating the negotiations.
On June 24, 2020, defendant went to plaintiff's home and began punching
the door and windows. Defendant initially refused to leave the premises and the
police were dispatched to the property. Defendant left before the police arrived.
1
We use initials to protect the parties' confidentiality, as well as that of their
child. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
A-0480-20
2
Plaintiff did not seek a temporary restraining order at that time. After this
incident, defendant continued to text plaintiff. Several weeks after the door
punching incident, plaintiff sought an evaluation by forensic psychologist Dr.
Philip Kaplan. Dr. Kaplan diagnosed plaintiff with post-traumatic stress
disorder, and he recommended all communications between plaintiff and
defendant be conducted through intermediaries to protect her from further harm.
On August 21, 2020, plaintiff filed a domestic violence complaint alleging
harassment against defendant. The allegations included defendant sending texts
and emails during late night hours, and defendant making at least one derogatory
Facebook post. A municipal judge entered a TRO. After the TRO was entered,
Dr. Kaplan issued a supplemental report articulating his concern about the risk
of violence occurring against plaintiff and their child.
On September 2, 2020, plaintiff filed an amended TRO complaint, citing
additional domestic violence history with defendant. The amended complaint
alleged defendant made threats of violence to plaintiff over the years, including
but not limited to raising his closed fists in plaintiff's face, making choking
gestures towards her with his hands, and recounting acts of violence he allegedly
committed against his former girlfriend. After the amended TRO complaint was
filed, plaintiff retained a second forensic psychologist, Dr. Kelly Champion,
A-0480-20
3
who opined that plaintiff and the infant A.F. remained in need of protection.
Before commencement of the final restraining order hearing, defendant filed a
separate complaint seeking custody and support and challenging the paternity of
A.F. After reviewing defendant's complaint, Dr. Champion issued a
supplemental report in which she opined that plaintiff and A.F. were "at risk of
a lethal assault" from the defendant.
On October 5, 2020, the trial judge heard plaintiff's motion in limine to
admit the testimony of three witnesses, Dr. Kaplan, Dr. Champion, and
defendant's former girlfriend, R.Y.2 The judge barred the testimony of both
experts, finding Dr. Kaplan's report constituted a net opinion, and that Dr.
Champion's report "went to the ultimate issue." The judge also barred R.Y. from
testifying about prior assaults defendant allegedly committed against her, with
minimal explanation. Plaintiff sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal,
which we denied.
The final restraining order (FRO) hearing took place October 15, 2020.
Prior to trial, plaintiff moved for recusal, arguing that she did not believe she
could receive a fair and impartial trial based on the judge's exclusion of her
2
We use initials to protect the identity of R.Y. as an alleged victim of domestic
violence by K.F. in a previous unrelated matter. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
A-0480-20
4
witnesses as well as other publicly available information she raised about the
judge during the recusal motion. After a brief contentious argument, the judge
denied the motion.
During the FRO hearing, plaintiff and defendant testified extensively.
The only other witness was plaintiff's mother.
At the conclusion of testimony, the judge made detailed findings, among
them; that plaintiff's testimony about predicate acts of harassment by defendant
was not credible; and that her testimony about prior acts of domestic violence
by defendant against her was not credible. The judge found plaintiff failed to
prove purpose to harass, a requisite element under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, and
consequently found no predicate act had been shown under the Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35 (PDVA). The judge then
dismissed the TRO and denied defendant's motion for counsel fees. Plaintiff
sought a stay of the judge's order, which he denied. We then granted a stay of
the TRO dismissal pending appeal. Both plaintiff and defendant appealed.
II.
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the judge should have granted her recusal
motion as she reasonably believed that she could not receive a fair and impartial
A-0480-20
5
hearing. To resolve this question, we highlight from the record important
elements of the recusal argument and the trial relevant to our analysis.
Immediately before the start of the FRO trial, plaintiff's counsel argued
that the judge violated the Judicial Code of Conduct by being "disrespectful" to
him when the judge ruled to bar the testimony of plaintiff's two experts and R.Y.
Specifically, plaintiff's counsel argued that the judge: ridiculed and disparaged
him by calling his arguments "nonsensical," thereby undermining his attorney
client relationship with plaintiff; excluded plaintiff's three witnesses; and
predetermined plaintiff's case by previously stating the matter was "about
parenting time." Plaintiff's counsel also argued that the judge's publicly
available record of judicial misconduct involving a female court employee led
to an appearance of general bias against women, which was disqualifying. The
position of plaintiff's counsel was that the accretive effect of the judge's
"disrespectful" tone and the act of judicial misconduct reasonably led plaintiff
to believe that she could not, as a woman, receive a fair and unbiased hearing.
When plaintiff's counsel raised the misconduct argument, the judge
immediately threatened to file an ethics complaint against him for doing so. The
judge stated that he viewed the reference to the judicial misconduct incident as
"a threat," and as " bullying." When the judge accused plaintiff's counsel of
A-0480-20
6
informing plaintiff about the judicial misconduct incident, plaintiff's counsel
explained that plaintiff learned of the incident when "she Googled your name."
By this point, the judge had already denied the recusal motion to the extent
it was grounded in his exclusion of plaintiff's expert testimony and R.Y.'s
N.J.R.E. 404(b) testimony. As noted, the judge's response to the misconduct
argument was to call plaintiff's argument "insulting" on the record in front of
the parties. In what we perceive to be a defensive response, plaintiff's counsel
quickly clarified for the judge who was responsible for initiating the misconduct
argument, his client. Counsel positioned himself as simply the messenger.
The judge then issued his ruling on plaintiff's recusal motion, "I've taken
it under consideration. I’m denying your application for recusal."
After denying plaintiff's application for a brief opening statement, the
judge directed plaintiff's counsel to call his first witness, without taking a recess.
Plaintiff took the stand. The judge questioned plaintiff extensively during her
direct testimony, frequently interrupting her and repeatedly asking her to clarify
her own testimony. The judge so thoroughly monopolized the questioning of
plaintiff that her counsel effectively delegated to the judge the task of eliciting
her direct testimony. Only occasionally did plaintiff's counsel seek leave to
question his own client. Conversely, the judge permitted defendant's counsel to
A-0480-20
7
conduct his client's direct examination unimpeded, interjecting questions
infrequently. This was in stark contrast to the heavily involved approach the
judge took during plaintiff's case.
At the trial's conclusion, the judge made detailed credibility findings. He
flatly stated that he did not believe plaintiff. He found "exaggeration every step
of the way" in her testimony. The judge characterized her demeanor as
"evasive," "argumentative," "angry," and "combative." He found numerous
inconsistencies between plaintiff's direct testimony, elicited primarily through
his own questions from the bench, and her testimony on cross-examination. The
judge characterizing defendant's testimony as "clearly calm," found defendant
credible. He resolved the parties' significant factual disputes in defendant's
favor.3
III.
Motions for recusal "are entrusted to the sound discretion of the judge and
are subject to review for abuse of discretion." State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45
(2010) (citing Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 66 (App. Div. 2001)). The
3
The judge never reached the second prong of the Silver analysis, where
domestic violence history could properly be considered. See, Silver v. Silver,
387 N.J. Super 112 (App. Div. 2006).
A-0480-20
8
grounds for disqualifying a judge are set out in Rule 1:12-1. Primarily, they
focus on the judge having a familial relationship with the parties or the attorneys
or having an interest in the subject of the litigation. R. 1:12-1(a) to (f). The rule
also provides that a judge can be disqualified "when there is any other reason
which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might
reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-1(g). Under Rule
1:12-1(g), "it is not necessary to prove actual prejudice on the part of the
court[;]" rather, "the mere appearance of bias may require disqualification."
State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997). "However, before the [judge] may
be disqualified on the ground of an appearance of bias, the belief that the
proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable." Ibid. "[B]ias is not
established by the fact that a litigant is disappointed in a court's ruling on an
issue." Id. at 186.
"[J]udges must avoid acting in a biased way or in a manner that may be
perceived as partial. To demand any less would invite questions about the
impartiality of the justice system and thereby 'threaten[ ] the integrity of our
judicial process.'" DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 514-15 (2008) (alteration in
original) (citing State v. Tucker, 264 N.J. Super. 549, 554 (App. Div. 1993)).
A-0480-20
9
The DeNike Court distilled the analysis to one question we find apposite
here: "Would a reasonable, fully informed person have doubts about the judge's
impartiality?" Id. at 517. On this record, we believe the answer is yes.
Plaintiff's counsel made a recusal motion on behalf of his client. The judge
reacted viscerally and aggressively to the misconduct argument. He twice
labeled it "insulting" in the presence of the litigants. The judge signaled by his
choice of language that he considered the misconduct issue off-limits. The
warning shot was unmistakable. Inexplicably, he next threatened to file an
ethics complaint against plaintiff's counsel for raising the recusal argument.
When the judge demanded to know how counsel came into possession of the
misconduct charges against him, plaintiff's counsel identified his client as the
source of the information. In his haste to extricate himself from the dust-up with
the judge, plaintiff's counsel pointed the finger squarely at his client for raising
this sensitive yet substantive argument. The judge very clearly made his
displeasure known to the attorneys and both parties.
Plaintiff heard and observed all of this right before the judge began to
question her extensively. Given the confrontation that occurred, and the judge's
knowledge that plaintiff was the genesis of the recusal motion, an objective
observer could reasonably question whether the judge would favor defendant,
A-0480-20
10
either consciously or subconsciously. Id. at 517. The judge took no recess to
allow the trial atmosphere to calm down after discovering plaintiff herself had
researched publicly available judicial misconduct charges against him. The
judge then made credibility findings adverse to plaintiff soon after he denied the
recusal motion. We conclude the judge should have disqualified himself after
the contentious exchange between plaintiff's counsel and the judge over the
recusal motion. Instead, the judge presided over the trial, questioning plaintiff
extensively, frequently interrupting her, and repeatedly asking her to clarify her
own testimony.
"[J]udges must refrain . . . from sitting in any causes where their
objectivity and impartiality may fairly be brought into question." State v.
Deutsch, 34 N.J. 190, 206 (1961). To demand any less would invite questions
about the impartiality of the justice system and thereby "threaten[ ] the integrity
of our judicial process." State v. Tucker, 264 N.J. Super. 549, 554 (App. Div.
1993).
Plaintiff argues for reversal on substantive grounds, contending that the
judge should not have barred plaintiff's witnesses. We do not reach the issue of
admissibility of all or part of the plaintiff's expert's opinions or R.Y's N.J.R.E.
404(b) testimony, as we find the judge should have recused himself.
A-0480-20
11
We reverse the order dismissing the TRO. The TRO currently in place
pending appeal shall remain in effect. The order denying defendant's counsel
fees is affirmed. We remand this matter to the presiding judge of the Family
Part for entry of an order assigning another judge to preside over the new FRO
trial.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-0480-20
12