IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF A.C. (SVP-695-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2018 )


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  •                           RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1118-16T5
    IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL
    COMMITMENT OF A.C. SVP 695-15.
    ______________________________
    Submitted July 9, 2018 – Decided August 1, 2018
    Before Judges Carroll and Rose.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. SVP-
    695-15.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
    for appellant (Thomas G. Hand, Designated
    Counsel, on the brief).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
    for respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Stephen J.
    Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    A.C. appeals from a March 7, 2016 order of the Law Division,
    continuing his commitment to the Special Treatment Unit (STU), the
    secure facility designated for the custody, care and treatment of
    sexually   violent    predators     pursuant    to   the   Sexually    Violent
    Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.                             For the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    We    need    not   recount     in    substantial       detail    A.C.'s     prior
    criminal history, which dates back to the early 1960s.                           In sum,
    A.C. has an extensive criminal history consisting of sexual and
    non-sexual offenses.           In 1964, A.C. was charged in Indiana with
    sexual assault and assault and battery.                        He was convicted of
    assault      and    battery,     but   the       record   is    unclear    as    to    the
    disposition of the sexual assault charge. Defendant was thereafter
    twice convicted of attempted rape in Indiana in 1967 and 1970.
    A.C.'s predicate conviction arose from a November 1979 arrest
    for breaking into the home of a seventy-four-year old woman, who
    he then sexually assaulted.            Following a 1980 jury trial, A.C. was
    convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, first-degree
    aggravated         assault,    first-degree         robbery,     and     second-degree
    burglary, for which he was sentenced to an aggregate forty-five-
    year prison term.
    A.C. escaped from prison in 1981 and was not recaptured until
    1985.       Following a jury trial in 1990, A.C. was convicted of the
    escape,      and    a   consecutive     fifteen-year           prison    sentence      was
    imposed. While incarcerated in state prison, A.C. incurred twenty-
    four    disciplinary          infractions,        including      refusal    to      obey,
    destroying         property,     possession        of     gambling      paraphernalia,
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    disruptive conduct, refusing work assignments, threatening bodily
    harm, and refusing to submit to a search.               The most recent
    institutional infraction occurred in July 2012.
    On November 5, 2014, A.C. was committed to the STU under the
    SVPA after serving his sentence.         The present appeal arises from
    a periodic review of A.C.'s commitment, which was conducted by
    Judge James F. Mulvihill on February 18 and March 1, 2016.          At the
    hearing, the State relied on the expert testimony of psychiatrist
    Roger Harris, M.D., and psychologist Tarmeen Sahni, Psy.D., a
    member of the STU's Treatment Progress Review Committee (TPRC).
    A.C. presented the expert testimony of psychiatrist Michael Kunz,
    M.D., and psychologist Gianni Pirelli, Ph.D.
    After interviewing A.C. and reviewing previous psychiatric
    evaluations, STU treatment records, and related documents, Harris,
    Kunz   and   Pirelli   prepared   reports,   which   were   admitted   into
    evidence.    Dr. Sahni participated in the TPRC's review of A.C.'s
    progress and treatment and authored the TPRC report, which was
    also admitted into evidence, as were various other treatment notes
    and records.
    A.C. was born in 1944, and was seventy-one years old at the
    time of the hearing.        Notwithstanding A.C.'s age, Dr. Harris
    concluded he met the criteria of a sexually violent predator and
    was "highly likely to sexually re-offend if placed in a less
    3                             A-1118-16T5
    restrictive setting" because he has not mitigated his risk.              Dr.
    Harris further opined that if A.C. were to be released from the
    STU with conditions, he was highly unlikely to comply with those
    conditions.
    Based on A.C.'s "long history of disregarding the rights of
    others,"     his   failure   "to   conform   to    social     norms,"    his
    "irritab[ility,]"       "aggressive[ness,]"        "profound       reckless
    disregard for the safety of others[,]" and "lack of remorse and
    being indifferent to the way he has hurt others," Dr. Harris
    diagnosed A.C. with severe antisocial personality disorder.              Dr.
    Harris elaborated that A.C. "maintains the . . . antisocial
    attitudes and behaviors that I believe are the nexus for his sexual
    offending [and are] alive and well today . . . .              I don't think
    [A.C.] is that different today at age [seventy-one] than he was
    throughout the [1970s] when [he was] sexually offending."
    Dr. Sahni testified A.C. had not received "any kind of sex
    offender treatment" that would reduce "his risk to sexually offend
    . . . ."      The TPRC recommended promoting A.C. to Phase 2 of
    treatment,    which    "is   considered   the     beginning    phase[]     of
    treatment[.]"      Dr. Sahni noted A.C. "continues to deny and does
    not take any responsibility for any of the offenses that he's been
    charged with."
    4                               A-1118-16T5
    Like Dr. Harris, Dr. Sahni diagnosed A.C. as suffering from
    a severe antisocial personality disorder.                  Additionally, Dr. Sahni
    made a provisional diagnosis of paraphilic disorder, explaining
    that    A.C.   "most    likely       has   the     disorder,    however,      there's
    insufficient evidence to fully diagnose [him] with such disorder."
    A.C. scored a four on the Static-99R,1 placing him in the "moderate
    high" risk to sexually reoffend.                In accord with Dr. Harris, Dr.
    Sahni opined it was:         (1) "highly likely" that A.C. would sexually
    re-offend in the foreseeable future unless he were confined in a
    secure facility for treatment; and (2) "highly unlikely" that A.C.
    would    comply   if    he    were    to   be    released     from    the   STU   with
    conditions.
    Dr. Kunz initially interviewed A.C. and prepared a report on
    behalf of the State, but was ultimately subpoenaed to testify on
    behalf   of    A.C.    at    the   review       hearing.      Dr.    Kunz   similarly
    determined     that     A.C.       suffered      from   antisocial      personality
    disorder.      In accordance with the State's experts, Dr. Kunz
    1
    "The Static-99R is an actuarial test used to estimate the
    probability of sexually violent recidivism in adult males
    previously convicted of sexually violent offenses.     See Andrew
    Harris et al., Static-99 Coding Rules Revised-2003 5 (2003). [We
    have] explained that actuarial information, including the Static-
    99, is 'simply a factor to consider, weigh, or even reject, when
    engaging in the necessary factfinding under the SVPA.'"     In re
    Commitment of R.F., 
    217 N.J. 152
    , 164 n.9 (2014) (quoting In re
    Commitment of R.S., 
    173 N.J. 134
    , 137 (2002)).
    5                                 A-1118-16T5
    testified    "that   [A.C.]   has   fairly   consistently   denied    having
    committed any sexual offenses, so in that regard he has not
    addressed the offenses."
    A.C. also scored a four on the Static-99R administered by Dr.
    Kunz, "which place[d] him in a moderate high risk for reoffense."
    However, Dr. Kunz noted "the authors of Static-99R advise caution
    when using [it] . . . in the age group of over [seventy] because
    the predictive ability of this instrument is not as good as it is
    in younger age groups."        Rather, the advice of the Static-99R
    authors "is that the offenders over the age of [seventy] should
    be assumed to have low risk."
    In contrast to Dr. Sahni, Dr. Kunz did not diagnose A.C. with
    paraphilia.    Dr. Kunz opined A.C.'s "risk for reoffense is low,"
    but nonetheless "it would be prudent to impose whatever conditions
    could further decrease [A.C.'s] risk for reoffense."             On cross-
    examination, Dr. Kunz conceded he was unable to state within a
    reasonable    degree   of   medical   probability   that,   if   A.C.    were
    conditionally discharged, he would be highly likely to comply with
    the conditions of release.
    A.C.'s expert psychologist, Dr. Pirelli, also concluded A.C.
    suffers from antisocial personality disorder.           Dr. Pirelli was
    unable to find A.C. has a paraphilia "at this time," but noted it
    6                              A-1118-16T5
    was "possible by history given [A.C.'s] offense history that he
    would have likely met [that] criteria in the past."
    According to Dr. Pirelli, A.C.'s age decreased his chances
    of sexually offending, which he described as an "extremely rare
    event" for individuals, such as A.C., over age seventy.   Moreover,
    Dr. Pirelli's evaluation revealed nothing about A.C. that would
    lead him to depart from that statistical analysis.    Similar to Dr.
    Kunz, Dr. Pirelli was unable to find, within a reasonable degree
    of medical certainty, that A.C. was highly likely to comply with
    all conditions of release were that to occur.
    In an oral opinion rendered on March 2, 2016, Judge Mulvihill
    found Dr. Harris to be a "very credible witness."    Likewise, Judge
    Mulvihill found Dr. Kunz credible, but disagreed with Dr. Kunz's
    assessment "that the aging process has mitigated [A.C.'s] risk."
    Rather, the judge found A.C. "has antisocial personality disorder
    that's alive and well, and that he's no different than the man he
    was back when he last offended. And he denies all of his offenses.
    He needs treatment to mitigate his risk."      Similarly, while Dr.
    Pirelli testified credibly, the judge disagreed with Dr. Pirelli's
    testimony that A.C. was not highly likely to reoffend due to his
    age.
    After recounting the testimony of all four experts, and
    detailing A.C.'s criminal and disciplinary history and treatment
    7                          A-1118-16T5
    record at the STU, Judge Mulvihill concluded A.C.'s commitment
    should continue.   The judge found
    by clear and convincing evidence [A.C.] has
    been convicted of sexual violent offenses,
    [and] . . . he continues to suffer mental
    abnormality or personality disorder that does
    not    spontaneously     remit,     antisocial
    personality disorder.   And also I find that
    there is the paraphilia, at least by history,
    and it should be at least a rule out or
    provisional, and clear and convincing evidence
    that presently he is highly likely to sexually
    reoffend if not confined to a secure facility
    for control, care, and treatment, that the
    antisocial personality disorder affects him
    emotionally, cognitively, volitionally, and
    predisposes him to sexual violence, he has
    serious difficulty controlling his sexual
    violent behavior, and I find that he's highly
    likely to sexually reoffend at the present
    time.
    The   judge   entered   a   memorializing   order   continuing    A.C.'s
    commitment, and this appeal followed.
    On appeal, A.C. argues Judge Mulvihill erred in continuing
    his civil commitment, and finding he was highly likely to commit
    acts of sexual violence in the future.      A.C. further contends the
    judge's reliance on the testimony of Dr. Harris and Dr. Sahni was
    not supported by credible evidence, and that in light of A.C.'s
    age, the State's experts failed to prove the required link between
    A.C.'s past crimes and his present danger to sexually reoffend.
    We reject these arguments and affirm.
    8                             A-1118-16T5
    "The scope of appellate review of a commitment determination
    is extremely narrow."      R.F., 217 N.J. at 174 (quoting In re D.C.,
    
    146 N.J. 31
    , 58 (1996)). "The judges who hear SVPA cases generally
    are 'specialists' and 'their expertise in the subject' is entitled
    to 'special deference.'"          
    Ibid.
     (quoting In re Civil Commitment
    of T.J.N., 
    390 N.J. Super. 218
    , 226 (App. Div. 2007)).
    "The    SVPA    authorizes     the       involuntary   commitment    of    an
    individual believed to be a 'sexually violent predator' as defined
    by the Act."    In re Commitment of W.Z., 
    173 N.J. 109
    , 127 (2002)
    (quoting    N.J.S.A.    30:4-27.28).          "The   definition   of   'sexually
    violent predator' requires proof of past sexually violent behavior
    through its precondition of a 'sexually violent offense . . . .'"
    
    Ibid.
       It also requires that the person "suffer[] from a mental
    abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely
    to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure
    facility for control, care and treatment." 
    Ibid.
     (quoting N.J.S.A.
    30:4-27.26).
    "[T]he mental condition must affect an individual's ability
    to control his or her sexually harmful conduct."              
    Ibid.
     "Inherent
    in some diagnoses will be sexual compulsivity (i.e., paraphilia).
    But, the diagnosis of each sexually violent predator susceptible
    to civil commitment need not include a diagnosis of 'sexual
    compulsion.'"       Id. at 129.
    9                              A-1118-16T5
    The   same   standard   that   supports    the    initial   involuntary
    commitment of a sex offender under the Act applies to the annual
    review hearing.       See In re Civil Commitment of E.D., 
    353 N.J. Super. 450
    , 452-53 (App. Div. 2002).          In either case, "the State
    must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual
    has serious difficulty controlling his or her harmful sexual
    behavior such that it is highly likely that the person will not
    control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend."
    W.Z., 
    173 N.J. at 133-34
    .
    As the fact finder, "[a] trial judge is 'not required to
    accept all or any part of [an] expert opinion[].'"             R.F., 217 N.J.
    at 174 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting D.C.,
    
    146 N.J. at 61
    ).        Furthermore, "an appellate court should not
    modify a trial court's determination either to commit or release
    an individual unless 'the record reveals a clear mistake.'"                 
    Id. at 175
     (quoting D.C., 
    146 N.J. at 58
    ).
    We are satisfied from our review of the record that Judge
    Mulvihill's     findings   are    supported      by     substantial   credible
    evidence. Based on credible expert testimony, the judge determined
    that   A.C.'s   disorders,     past   behavior,   and     treatment   progress
    demonstrated that he was highly likely to engage in acts of sexual
    violence unless confined.        The judge was not required to accept
    the testimony of A.C.'s witnesses that his risk of sexually
    10                               A-1118-16T5
    reoffending was low, especially when both experts were unable to
    state with any degree of probability that A.C. would comply with
    conditions imposed by the court if he were released back into the
    community. Given our limited scope of review, the judge's decision
    to   continue   A.C.'s   commitment,   to   which   we   owe   the   "utmost
    deference" and may modify only where there is a clear abuse of
    discretion, In re J.P., 
    339 N.J. Super. 443
    , 459 (App. Div. 2001),
    was proper.
    Affirmed.
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