JOHN FALAT, JR. VS. THE COUNTY OF HUNTERDON (L-0188-15, SUSSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2479-15T1
JOHN FALAT, JR., MICHAEL RUSSO
and DEBORAH TROUT,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
THE COUNTY OF HUNTERDON, THE OFFICE
OF THE HUNTERDON COUNTY PROSECUTOR;
GEORGE MELICK, individually and
in his representative capacity
as a Hunterdon County Freeholder
and agent of the County of Hunterdon;
WILLIAM MENNEN, individually and
in his representative capacity
as a Hunterdon County Freeholder
and agent of the County of Hunterdon;
RONALD SWOREN, individually and
in his representative capacity
as a Hunterdon County Freeholder
and agent of the County of Hunterdon;
MATTHEW HOLT, individually and
in his representative capacity
as a Hunterdon County Freeholder
and agent of the County of Hunterdon;
ERIK PETERSON, individually and
in his representative capacity
as a Hunterdon County Freeholder
and agent of the County of Hunterdon;
ROBERT WALTON, individually and
in his representative capacity
as a Hunterdon County Freeholder
and agent of the County of Hunterdon;
GAETANO DESAPIO, individually and
in his representative capacity
as a Hunterdon County Counsel
and agent of the County of Hunterdon;
KENNETH ROWE, individually and
in his representative capacity
as agent of the Office of the Hunterdon
County Prosecutor; EDMUND DEFILLIPIS,
individually and in his representative
capacity as agent of the Office of
Hunterdon County Prosecutor; CYNTHIA
YARD, individually and in her
representative capacity as Hunterdon
County Administrator and agent of
the County of Hunterdon,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
J. PATRICK BARNES, individually and
in his representative capacity as the
Hunterdon County Prosecutor;
BENNETT BARLYN, individually and in
his representative capacity as agent
of the Office of the Hunterdon County
Prosecutor; WILLIAM MCGOVERN,
individually and in his representative
capacity as agent of the Office of
the Hunterdon County Prosecutor; and
DONNA SIMON, in her individual and
representative capacities,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________
Argued May 21, 2018 – Decided July 25, 2018
Before Judges Messano, Accurso, and O'Connor.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Sussex County, Docket No.
L-0188-15.
Nina Rossi argued the cause for appellants
(Law Offices of William J. Courtney, LLC,
2 A-2479-15T1
attorneys; William J. Courtney, of counsel;
Nina Rossi, on the briefs).
Thomas B. Hanrahan argued the cause for
respondents County of Hunterdon, George
Melick, William Mennen, Ronald Sworen, Matthew
Holt, Erik Peterson, Robert Walton and Cynthia
Yard (Hanrahan Pack, LLC, attorneys; Thomas
B. Hanrahan, of counsel; Nicholas P. Milewski,
on the brief).
Walter F. Kawalec, III, argued the cause for
respondent Gaetano DeSapio, Esq. (Marshall
Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, attorneys;
Howard B. Mankoff and Walter F. Kawalec, III,
on the brief).
Eric L. Harrison argued the cause for
respondents Kenneth Rowe and Edmund DeFillipis
(Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys; Eric L.
Harrison, of counsel and on the brief;
Jennifer M. Herrmann, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In November 2007, plaintiff Deborah Trout was elected Sheriff
of Hunterdon County (the County), and she served in that office
from January 1, 2008, until December 31, 2010. At the beginning
of her term, Trout appointed plaintiff Michael Russo as
Undersheriff and plaintiff John Falat, Jr., as an investigator in
the Hunterdon County Sheriff's Office (HCSO). The HCSO previously
employed both Trout and Russo, and both had previously filed and
3 A-2479-15T1
settled litigation against the County.1
In 2010, a Hunterdon County grand jury indicted plaintiffs
for official misconduct and other crimes and issued a presentment
regarding operations at the HCSO. By the time the indictments and
presentment were released publicly in May 2010, the Office of the
Attorney General had superseded the Hunterdon County Prosecutor's
Office (HCPO), and a deputy attorney general (DAG) succeeded County
Prosecutor J. Patrick Barnes and was serving as acting prosecutor.
In August, a different DAG who was handling the prosecution of the
indictments moved to dismiss them without prejudice.
In her August 23, 2010 letter to the criminal trial judge,
the DAG stated the State's motion was "based upon legal and factual
deficiencies in the indictments," and "errors in the presentation
of these matters to the grand jury [that] have resulted in
defective indictments." The DAG also stated "incorrect
instructions . . . tainted the entire deliberative process."
Fairly read, the letter questioned both the sufficiency of the
facts adduced before the grand jury and the legal theory supporting
1
Because these appeals are from orders dismissing plaintiffs'
complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2, and denying their motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint, plaintiffs' version of
the facts is treated "as uncontradicted[] accord[ed] . . . all
legitimate inferences" and "accept[ed] . . . as fact" for purposes
of our review. Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161, 166
(2005).
4 A-2479-15T1
the charged crimes. The judge entered an order dismissing the
indictments without prejudice the same day.
On August 2, 2012, plaintiffs filed a complaint naming the
County and a number of public officials as defendants, including
freeholders George Melick, William Mennen, Ronald Sworen, Matthew
Holt, Erik Peterson, Robert Walton and County Administrator
Cynthia Yard (collectively, the County Defendants), County Counsel
Gaetano DeSapio, and Kenneth Rowe and Edmund DeFillipis,
investigators with the HCPO (collectively, the HCPO Defendants).2
The complaint was removed to federal court, where Judge Stanley
R. Chesler granted defendants' motions to dismiss.
In his written opinion, Judge Chesler dismissed with
prejudice several of the complaint's twenty counts. Judge Chesler
dismissed the remaining counts without prejudice, noting the
pleading "largely fail[ed] to connect . . . factual allegations
to the specific counts . . . ." He permitted plaintiffs to file
an amended complaint "that clearly spells out which individual
plaintiffs are making what legal claims against whom and set forth
specific factual allegations to support each of those claims."
Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in federal court, and
defendants again moved to dismiss. Judge Faith S. Hochberg's
2
The complaint included other defendants who were not named in
future iterations of the pleading or were otherwise dismissed.
5 A-2479-15T1
November 21, 2014 order dismissed plaintiffs' "federal claims"
with prejudice and remanded "all remaining state law causes of
action." In her written opinion that accompanied the order, Judge
Hochberg noted that despite Judge Chesler's earlier order,
"[p]laintiffs persist[ed] in reasserting some of the[] already-
dismissed claims." Judge Hochberg refused to "revive these causes
of action," and summarized what remained extant for her
consideration:
[T]he remaining counts include: (a) free
speech claims under the First Amendment; (b)
a conspiracy claim asserted pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3); (c) a malicious prosecution
claim under the Fourth Amendment against the
individual Defendants; and (d) state law
claims under the New Jersey Constitution, a
state law malicious prosecution claim, and a
claim under [the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (NJLAD)], hostile work
environment, retaliation, and constructive
discharge.
Judge Hochberg dismissed plaintiffs' First Amendment claims
as untimely, specifically rejecting their assertion that the
"continuing violation[s]" doctrine equitably tolled the two-year
statute of limitations, and concluded any specific allegations
within the statute of limitations were insufficiently pled or
otherwise insufficient as a matter of law. The judge dismissed
plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy claims, finding there were
no allegations of "class-based, invidiously discriminatory
6 A-2479-15T1
animus," quoting Faylor v. Szupper, 411 F. App'x 525, 530 (3d Cir.
2011), or "an illegal agreement" among defendants. Turning to
plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim, Judge Hochberg determined
the complaint failed to allege "a lack of probable cause sufficient
to overcome the effect of the . . . indictment . . . ," or that
defendants "initiated the criminal proceeding." The judge
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs'
state law claims and remanded them to the Law Division.
Defendants then renewed their motions to dismiss the amended
complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). In addition to filing
opposition, plaintiffs cross-moved seeking leave to file a
proposed 236-page second amended complaint (second amended
complaint). The second amended complaint expanded some factual
allegations, primarily by repeating the same facts in each count
of the complaint, and abandoned counts in the prior complaint
alleging federal claims and Trout's claim for "constructive
discharge." After oral arguments, the entry of interim orders, a
motion for reconsideration and further arguments, the Law Division
judge entered a series of orders on January 7, 2016 that granted
defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint with prejudice and
7 A-2479-15T1
denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and cross-motion to
file the second amended complaint. This appeal followed.3
I.
A.
"Our review of the trial court's dismissal order[s] in this
context is de novo." Flinn v. Amboy Nat'l Bank, 436 N.J. Super.
274, 287 (App. Div. 2014).4 Motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim "are judged by determining 'whether a cause of action
is "suggested" by the facts.'" Nostrame v. Santiago, 213 N.J.
109, 127 (2013) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp
Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). Although we must
review plaintiffs' complaint "in depth and with liberality to
ascertain whether the fundament of a cause of action may be gleaned
even from an obscure statement of claim," ibid. (quoting Printing
Mart, 116 N.J. at 746), "[a] pleading should be dismissed if it
states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one."
Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super.
103, 113 (App. Div. 2011). "[T]he 'inquiry is limited to examining
the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the
3
Plaintiffs' notice of appeal is limited to the January 7, 2016
orders.
4
As a result, plaintiffs' arguments about the motion judge's
obvious confusion regarding the various complaints is irrelevant.
8 A-2479-15T1
complaint.'" Nostrame, 213 N.J. at 127 (quoting Printing Mart,
116 N.J. at 746).
"A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e) ordinarily is
granted without prejudice." Hoffman v. Hampshire Labs, Inc., 405
N.J. Super. 105, 116 (App. Div. 2009). However, when the complaint
fails to set forth "[t]he traditional articulation" of the elements
of a cause of action, no additional facts could be pled, or further
proceedings will amount only to "a mere fishing expedition,"
dismissal with prejudice is entirely appropriate. Nostrame, 213
N.J. at 128.
B.
"[T]he granting of a motion to file an amended complaint
always rests in the court's sound discretion." Notte v. Merchants
Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006) (quoting Kernan v. One
Washington Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 457 (1998)).
"[T]h[e] Court has construed Rule 4:9-1 to 'require[] that motions
for leave to amend be granted liberally,' even if the ultimate
merits of the amendment are uncertain." Prime Accounting Dept.
v. Twp. of Carney's Point, 212 N.J. 493, 511 (2013) (quoting
Kernan, 154 N.J. at 456. "One exception to that rule arises when
the amendment would be 'futile,' because 'the amended claim will
nonetheless fail and, hence, allowing the amendment would be a
useless endeavor.'" Ibid. (quoting Notte, 185 N.J. at 501).
9 A-2479-15T1
II.
Applying these standards to plaintiffs' amended complaint,
we affirm its dismissal with prejudice. We also affirm the order
denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and leave to file
the second amended complaint.
A.
Trout and Russo alleged the County violated the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -49. As we
can best discern from the amended complaint, Trout alleged
discrimination and disparate treatment based upon gender (Count
One), and both plaintiffs alleged the County created a hostile
work environment (Count Two) and retaliated against them for prior
protected activity — the two previously settled lawsuits (Count
Six). In Count Eight, plaintiffs alleged Yard and DeSapio aided
and abetted the County in its discrimination and retaliation, and
in Count Nine, plaintiffs alleged the County was vicariously liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior for actions of the
individual County Defendants.5
5
In Count Seven, Trout alleged constructive discharge. As already
noted, the proposed second amended complaint abandoned this claim,
and Trout has not made any argument addressing the dismissal of
this cause of action in her brief. An argument not briefed is
deemed waived. Jefferson Loan Co. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520,
525 n.4 (App. Div. 2008).
10 A-2479-15T1
Claims brought under the LAD are subject to a two-year statute
of limitations. Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corp., 231 N.J. 234,
249 (2017) (citing Montells v. Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 291-92
(1993)). "Discriminatory termination and other similar abrupt,
singular adverse employment actions that are attributable to
invidious discrimination . . . generally are immediately known
injuries, whose two year statute of limitations period commences
on the day they occur." Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ., 204 N.J.
219, 228 (2010).
"Whether a cause of action is barred by a statute of
limitations is a question of law . . . reviewed de novo." Catena
v. Raytheon Co., 447 N.J. Super. 43, 52 (App. Div. 2016) (citing
Estate of Hainthaler v. Zurich Commercial Ins., 387 N.J. Super.
318, 325 (App. Div. 2006)). Plaintiffs filed their initial
complaint on August 2, 2012. Therefore, any discrete
discriminatory acts allegedly committed by defendants prior to
August 2, 2010, were time-barred, and plaintiffs do not contend
otherwise.
Plaintiffs seek the safe harbor of the continuing violation
doctrine, "a judicially created . . . equitable exception" to the
LAD statute of limitations. Bolinger v. Bell Atl., 330 N.J. Super.
300, 306 (App. Div. 2000). The continuing violation doctrine does
not allow the aggregation of individually actionable acts in order
11 A-2479-15T1
to avoid the statute of limitations. Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555,
567 (2010).
If, however, a plaintiff alleges "a pattern or series of
acts, any one of which may not be actionable as a discrete act,
but when viewed cumulatively constitute a hostile work
environment," the cause of action accrues "on the date on which
the last act occurred." Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr.,
174 N.J. 1, 21 (2002) (citation omitted). As the Court explained:
[T]he continuing violation theory was
developed to allow for the aggregation of
acts, each of which, in itself, might not have
alerted the employee of the existence of a
claim, but which together show a pattern of
discrimination. In those circumstances, the
last act is said to sweep in otherwise
untimely prior non-discrete acts.
What the doctrine does not permit is the
aggregation of discrete discriminatory acts
for the purpose of reviving an untimely act
of discrimination that the victim knew or
should have known was actionable. Each such
discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock
for filing charges alleging that act.
[Roa, 200 N.J. at 569 (citation omitted).]
In the amended complaint, plaintiffs' specific post-August
2, 2010 factual allegations are: Melick sent a letter to then
Governor Chris Christie and other public officials questioning why
the Attorney General had taken over the prosecution of the
indictment; Mennen stated at a regular meeting of the freeholder
12 A-2479-15T1
board in September 2010 that although the indictment was dismissed,
the board should "administratively review" the allegations;
DeSapio and the County Defendants disclosed unspecified "personal
material relating to insurance programs . . . and [plaintiffs']
personal and family circumstance" without going into executive
session; and on unspecified dates during the "term of Trout," the
County Defendants refused to permit access to the "Sheriff's Trust
Fund," interfered with her hiring decisions, would not permit
other county departments to perform work at HCSO offices without
Yard's approval and "scrutinized, questioned and delayed"
contracts with the HCSO. Plaintiffs alleged this amounted to
disparate treatment in violation of the LAD.
Added to this list in the second amended complaint was an
allegation that in September 2010 the freeholders sought access
to the criminal investigative file as part of their decision to
administratively review the now dismissed criminal charges, and
that they discussed plaintiffs' unemployment benefits at a July
2011 public meeting later reported in a local newspaper.
However, there were no factual allegations connecting these
otherwise gender-neutral actions to Trout's LAD claims. Indeed,
the only direct allegation in either complaint regarding Trout's
gender was that upon her election in 2007, Melick referred to her
as a "b****." Not only were the allegations insufficient to
13 A-2479-15T1
overcome the two-year statute of limitations via the continuous
violation theory, they were insufficient to plead a cause of action
under the LAD in the first instance. See Aguas v. State, 220 N.J.
494, 509 (2015) (emphasis added) (holding in a gender-based LAD
hostile work environment case, a female plaintiff must demonstrate
that the complained-of conduct "(1) would not have occurred but
for [her] gender; and it was (2) severe or pervasive enough to
make a (3) reasonable woman believe that (4) the conditions of
employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or
abusive"). Russo did not attempt to allege an independent gender-
based LAD claim, nor could he. Ibid. We affirm the dismissal
with prejudice of Trout's and Russo's LAD claims in Counts One and
Two of the amended complaint.6
6
It is unnecessary to address in detail an alternative argument
advanced by the County Defendants that supported dismissal of
Trout's LAD claim, specifically that Trout was not an employee of
the County, and, therefore, she could not assert a viable LAD
claim against the County. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a) (prohibiting
discriminatory practices by an "employer"); Thomas v. County of
Camden, 386 N.J. Super. 582, 594 (App. Div. 2006) (citation
omitted) ("Clearly, the LAD was intended to prohibit
discrimination in the context of an employer/employee
relationship.").
In Communications Workers of America v. Treffinger, 291 N.J.
Super. 336, 350-51 (Law Div. 1996), the court described the
statutory powers provided by the Legislature to the Sheriff, a
constitutional officer, regarding personnel decisions, and
concluded, "the Sheriff, not the County, is the exclusive employer
(footnote continued next page)
14 A-2479-15T1
Read in the most indulgent light, the allegations in Count
Six of the amended complaint were that Trout's prior lawsuit,
making claims under the LAD and the Conscientious Employee
Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -14, and Russo's prior
CEPA suit brought resulted in retaliatory conduct by the County
Defendants' against both. See N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d); N.J.S.A.
34:19-3.
The LAD recognizes a cause of action for retaliation.
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(d). "When the claim arises from alleged
retaliation, the elements of the cause of action are that the
employee 'engaged in a protected activity known to the [employer,]'
the employee was 'subjected to an adverse employment decision[,]'
and there is a causal link between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action." Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv.,
Inc., 214 N.J. 518, 547 (2013) (quoting Woods-Pirozzi v. Nabisco
Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996)); see also Royster
v. N.J. State Police, 439 N.J. Super. 554, 576 (App. Div. 2015)
(defining CEPA retaliation claim as having the same elements).
(footnote continued)
and/or hiring authority for his office." Id. at 351. Moreover,
the traditional analyses utilized to consider whether an employer-
employee relationship exists between the Sheriff and the County
weigh heavily in favor of concluding the County is not the employer
of the Sheriff. See, e.g., Thomas, 386 N.J. Super. at 595-99.
15 A-2479-15T1
The amended complaint and second amended complaint alleged
that after Trout's 2007 election, the County Defendants' and
DeSapio's words and conduct created a hostile work environment
equivalent to adverse employment action for purposes of the LAD's
anti-retaliation provision. The alleged "protected activity" was
a lawsuit Trout filed nearly a decade earlier, in 1998. In Young
v. Hobart West Group, 385 N.J. Super. 448, 467 (App. Div. 2005),
we held that in an LAD retaliatory discharge case where timing
alone was not "unusually suggestive," a plaintiff must set forth
other evidence to establish causality. As to Trout, both the
amended and second amended complaint lack facts alleging any nexus
between the 1998 lawsuit and subsequent conduct, save a single
comment attributed to Melick made in 2007 that the County
Defendants would "not . . . make it easy" for Trout because "[t]he
b**** sued us." More importantly, as already noted, the post-
August 2010 conduct alleged in both the amended and second amended
complaint independently failed to establish incidents of LAD
retaliation and are insufficient to qualify as retaliatory conduct
under the continuing violation doctrine.
Russo's prior lawsuit against the County was filed in 1995,
twelve years before Trout's election and seventeen years before
he filed this lawsuit. He fails to cite any case law supporting
the proposition that the filing of a prior CEPA lawsuit is
16 A-2479-15T1
"protected activity" that can trigger another CEPA violation.7 We
need not address this point because the amended complaint and
second amended complaint are devoid of allegations the County
Defendants took adverse employment action against Russo
personally.
Moreover, CEPA contains a one-year statute of limitations.
N.J.S.A. 34:19-5. Allegations of post-August 2, 2011 retaliatory
conduct taken against Russo personally are non-existent in both
pleadings. As a result, the retaliation claims of both Trout and
Russo in Count Six of the amended complaint were properly dismissed
and are not salvaged by the allegations in the second amended
complaint.
B.
Plaintiffs Trout and Russo argue that although Judge Hochberg
dismissed with prejudice their federal causes of action under the
United States Constitution, § 1983 and § 1985, the Law Division
judge erred by dismissing Count Four (Conspiracy in Violation of
the New Jersey Constitution), and Count Five (Violation of the New
Jersey Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A.
10:6-1 to -2 (the NJCRA)), of the amended complaint. As we can
7
We are aware of no reported case that addresses the issue,
although some of our unpublished decisions have reached differing
results.
17 A-2479-15T1
best discern, plaintiffs contend that "[a]lthough the NJCRA may,
at times, be interpreted as analogous to . . . [§] 1983, that is
certainly not always the case." Plaintiffs argue the amended
complaint and second amended complaint alleged violations of New
Jersey's Constitution and statutes, claims specifically preserved
and remanded by Judge Hochberg.
"[O]ur State Civil Rights Act is modeled off of the analogous
Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is intended to
provide what Section 1983 does not: a remedy for the violation of
substantive rights found in our State Constitution and laws." Harz
v. Borough of Spring Lake, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op. at
17) (quoting Tumpson v. Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 474 (2014)). The
NJCRA "is a means of vindicating substantive rights and is not a
source of rights itself." Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 98
(2014). "The statute of limitations for claims under the NJCRA
is two years[,]" Lapolla v. Cty. of Union, 449 N.J. Super. 288,
298 (App. Div. 2017) (citing N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2(a)), the same statute
of limitations that applied to plaintiffs' federal civil rights
claims. Freeman v. State, 347 N.J. Super. 11, 21-22 (App. Div.
2002).
Plaintiffs seemingly argue without any legal support that the
continuing violation theory salvages their NJCRA claims. Notably,
Judge Hochberg rejected the argument as it pertained to plaintiffs'
18 A-2479-15T1
federal civil rights claims. In Freeman, we rejected claims of
equitable tolling and application of the discovery rule to salvage
the plaintiffs' claims of federal civil rights violations under
admittedly different factual circumstances. Id. at 28-32.
In any event, in the absence of controlling precedent to the
contrary, Trout's and Russo's NJCRA claims are limited to
allegations that post-date August 2, 2010. We have already
synopsized above what those allegations are. They are inadequate
to state a cause of action under any of the provisions of the New
Jersey Constitution, cited only parenthetically in Count Four of
the amended complaint, or the NJCRA, cited in Count Five of the
amended complaint.
Count Three of the second amended complaint is 119 pages long
and lists the specific state statutory and constitutional
provisions that defendants allegedly violated. It too is time-
barred, except for conduct that occurred after August 2, 2010.
The allegations in the second amended complaint of post-August
2010 conduct are inadequate to state a cause of action under the
NJCRA.
Falat asserted no claim whatsoever for relief in Counts Four
and Five of the amended complaint, yet he is included in Count
Three of the second amended complaint. Having never been asserted
19 A-2479-15T1
before July 2015, Falat's claims under the NJCRA are certainly
time-barred.
C.
The one exception to this limitations analysis is plaintiffs'
claim for malicious prosecution, asserted under the common law
(Count Eleven of the amended complaint and Count Seven in the
second amended complaint), or, as to Trout and Russo, under the
NJCRA (Counts Four and Five of the amended complaint and Count
Three of the second amended complaint). This is so because the
State dismissed the indictments against plaintiffs on August 23,
2010, i.e., within two years of the filing of plaintiffs' initial
complaint.
In Camiolo v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 334 F.3d
345, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted), the Third Circuit
explained the elements of malicious prosecution for purposes of §
1983:
[A] plaintiff must show that: (1) the
defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)
the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff's
favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated
without probable cause; (4) the defendants
acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the
plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty
consistent with the concept of seizure as a
consequence of a legal proceeding.
20 A-2479-15T1
"[F]iling criminal charges without probable cause . . . is a
constitutional violation actionable under section 1983." Kirk v.
Newark, 109 N.J. 173, 185 (1988).
Plaintiffs concede, however, that "[m]alicious prosecution
under New Jersey law has developed through case law, [and] it is
not a constitutional claim as it is under federal law." As a
result, Trout's and Russo's NJCRA claims in the amended complaint
were properly dismissed and could not be legally salvaged by the
second amended complaint.
Plaintiffs alleged all defendants committed the common law
tort of malicious prosecution (Count Eleven of the amended
complaint; Count Seven of the second amended complaint). Our
Supreme Court has explained:
In order to establish a claim for malicious
prosecution, plaintiff must prove (1) that the
criminal action was instituted by the
defendant against the plaintiff, (2) that it
was actuated by malice, (3) that there was an
absence of probable cause for the proceeding,
and (4) that it was terminated favorably to
the plaintiff.
[Helmy v. City of Jersey City, 178 N.J. 183,
190 (2003) (citing Lind v. Schmid, 67 N.J.
255, 262 (1975); JEM Marketing, LLC v.
Cellular Telecomm. Indus. Ass'n, 308 N.J.
Super. 160, 172 (App. Div. 1998)).]
"Since a suit for malicious prosecution must await a favorable
termination of the criminal proceeding, the statute of limitations
21 A-2479-15T1
does not begin until such termination." Muller Fuel Oil Co. v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 95 N.J. Super. 564, 577 (App. Div. 1967). The
dismissal of plaintiffs' indictments were favorable outcomes that
did not occur until August 23, 2010, i.e., within two years of the
filing of the amended complaint. The malicious prosecution count
was therefore timely. We turn our attention to the other elements
of the tort, the absence of any of which would be fatal to
plaintiffs' claim. LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 90 (2009)
(citations omitted).
Plaintiffs contend the amended complaint fairly sets forth a
pattern of words and deeds by which the County, County Defendants
and DeSapio initiated the criminal investigation resulting in the
indictments. They allege that as to the HCPO defendants, Rowe was
intimately involved in both the investigation and grand jury
presentation, and DeFillipis assisted in arresting Falat prior to
the return of the indictment.
The County and County Defendants argue the pleadings fail to
allege facts sufficient to demonstrate as a matter of law that
they initiated the criminal proceedings, and also contend the
HCPO's independent investigation and presentation to the grand
jury were "intervening and independent acts of law enforcement
authorities" that "insulate" them. Seidel v. Greenberg, 108 N.J.
Super. 248, 264 (Ch. Div. 1969). DeSapio contends that the
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complaint only alleged he provided information as requested to the
HCPO and that even if true, those allegations are insufficient as
a matter of law to prove he initiated the criminal proceedings.
The HCPO defendants argue plaintiffs failed to plead
sufficient facts demonstrating they initiated the criminal
proceedings and acted with malice and without probable cause. They
also contend plaintiffs failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act
(TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, by providing timely notice of
their claim.
In her written decision, Judge Hochberg reviewed the factual
allegations in plaintiffs' amended complaint supporting their
claim that the County Defendants or DeSapio "initiated" criminal
proceedings that led to the indictments and concluded they were
insufficient as a matter of law. We agree with her analysis.
Plaintiffs need not allege one of the County Defendants or
DeSapio actually signed a criminal complaint against them, but the
first element of the tort fails "when [a] defendant merely approves
or silently acquiesces in the acts of another." Epperson v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 373 N.J. Super. 522, 531 (App. Div. 2004).
However, a plaintiff may successfully establish the first element
"by proof that defendant took 'some active part in instigating or
encouraging the prosecution' or 'advis[ing] or assist[ing] another
person to begin the proceeding, [or by] ratif[ying] it when it is
23 A-2479-15T1
begun in defendant's behalf, or [by] tak[ing] any active part in
directing or aiding the conduct of the case.'" Ibid. (quoting
Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts § 119 at 872 (5th ed., 1984));
see also Seidel, 108 N.J. Super. at 257 (the tort requires
"affirmative action by way of advice, encouragement, pressure,
etc., in the institution, or causing the institution, of the
prosecution or in affirmatively encouraging its continuance after
it has been instituted"). The defendant in the malicious
prosecution case must be "the proximate and efficient cause of
maliciously putting the law in motion." Seidel, 108 N.J. Super.
at 258 (quoting 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution § 14 at 966); see
also Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 399
(2009) (noting prosecutor's "separate, independent determination
of whether to submit the case to the grand jury and, if so, what
witnesses would be called before it" was independent of alleged
tortfeasors' conduct).
Plaintiffs do not allege the information provided by DeSapio
and the County Defendants to the HCPO was false. Beyond general
claims of interference with Trout's and Russo's operation of the
HCSO, the amended complaint specifically alleged only that DeSapio
and the County Defendants corresponded with the HCPO regarding
their complaints, provided an "illegally taken" email from Russo's
computer and leaked information to the local newspaper. The second
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amended complaint added little else regarding how DeSapio and the
County Defendants initiated the criminal charges, a required
element of the tort of malicious prosecution.
More importantly, whatever information was supplied,
plaintiffs do not dispute — in fact they highlight — the actions
of the prosecutor and the HCPO defendants that led to their
ultimate arrest or prosecution. In Myrick v. Resorts International
Casino & Hotel, 319 N.J. Super. 556, 559-60 (App. Div. 1999), the
plaintiff alleged the defendant casino, her employer, initiated a
malicious prosecution by reporting her innocent mistaken cashing
of another employee's paycheck to the Division of Gaming
Enforcement (DGE), which in turn caused the plaintiff's arrest on
criminal charges. Ultimately, those charges were administratively
dismissed. Id. at 562.
In affirming the motion judge's grant of summary judgment,
we concluded the casino "did not institute the prosecution of the
defendant." Id. at 563. We cited MacLaughlin v. Lehigh Valley
R.R. Co., 93 N.J.L. 263 (Sup. Ct. 1919), which "held that a company
reporting suspected criminal activity to the authorities cannot
be liable for malicious prosecution when the authorities decide
to prosecute the suspected criminals." Id. at 263-64. Although
the casino called the DGE to investigate the bank's inquiry
regarding the check, we concluded it "did not 'put the [criminal]
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proceedings in motion.'" Id. at 564-65 (quoting Lind, 67 N.J. at
263).
We applied a similar analysis to the plaintiff's claims
against the bank that notified the casino. Id. at 566-67. We
reasoned, "the casino defendants cannot be considered to have put
the law in motion. Certainly, then, the bank defendants, who are
one step removed from the casino defendants, could not be
considered to have done so either." Id. at 567. Here, the
allegations in the amended complaint and the second amended
complaint fail to state a cause of action against the County
Defendants and DeSapio for common law malicious prosecution.
In her written decision dismissing plaintiffs' federal § 1983
cause of action premised on malicious prosecution, Judge Hochberg
concluded the indictments "were prima facie evidence of probable
cause to prosecute," and the "presumption of [grand jury
regularity] will only be overcome by evidence that the presentment
was procured by fraud perjury or other corrupt means." (Citations
omitted). She concluded the amended complaint, which never
asserted the evidence provided to the grand jury was false, and
only stated in conclusory terms there was a lack of probable cause
supporting the indictments, was insufficient under federal
pleading standards.
26 A-2479-15T1
Our Court has said, "[a]lthough a grand jury indictment is
prima facie evidence of probable cause to prosecute, when the
facts underlying it are disputed, the issue must be resolved by
the jury." Helmy, 178 N.J. at 191 (citing Zalewski v. Gallagher,
150 N.J. Super. 360, 367-68 (App. Div. 1977). However,
[t]he fact of a favorable termination sheds
no light on the existence of probable cause
at the time of the initial complaint; the
burden remains on the plaintiff to demonstrate
by independent proof that the criminal
complaint was filed without probable cause.
[Campione v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc., 302
N.J. Super. 99, 120-21, (App. Div. 1997)
(citation omitted), aff'd as mod., 155 N.J.
245 (1998).]
"Particularly, '[t]he plaintiff must establish a negative, namely,
that probable cause did not exist.'" Brunson, 199 N.J. at 394(quoting Lind, 67 N.J. at 263). Additionally, a plaintiff must
demonstrate the defendant's actions were actuated by malice, i.e.,
the "intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse." Id. at 395 (citations omitted).
Here, the malicious prosecution count in the amended
complaint asserted few facts regarding the specific activities of
the HCPO Defendants that demonstrated a lack of probable cause or
that their actions were actuated by malice. Most of the
allegations were regarding the County Defendants and DeSapio.
27 A-2479-15T1
As noted, the amended complaint and the second amended
complaint stated in conclusory language that there was no probable
cause supporting the indictments. The DAG's August 23, 2010 letter
that led to the dismissal never used the phrase "lack of probable
cause," and most of the letter addressed the faulty legal theories
underpinning the indictment. The second amended complaint alleged
several additional facts regarding the HCPO Defendants' specific
conduct, but it never asserted that Rowe or DeFillipis acted
without just cause or excuse.
As a result, we conclude that the common law malicious
prosecution counts in the amended and second amended complaints
were properly dismissed.
Affirmed.
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