IN THE MATTER OF WEST ORANGE BOARD OF EDUCATION VS. WEST ORANGE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS COMMISSION) ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4315-16T2
    IN THE MATTER OF
    WEST ORANGE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
    Petitioner-Respondent,
    v.
    WEST ORANGE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    __________________________________
    Submitted January 8, 2018 - Decided July 25, 2018
    Before Judges Accurso, O'Connor and Vernoia.
    On appeal from the Public Employment
    Relations Commission, Docket No. SN-2017-
    013.
    Zazzali, Fagella, Nowak, Kleinbaum &
    Friedman, attorneys for appellant (Genevieve
    Murphy-Bradacs, on the briefs).
    Cleary Giacobbe Alfieri & Jacobs, LLC,
    attorneys for respondent (Matthew J.
    Giacobbe and Gregory J. Franklin, on the
    brief).
    Christine Lucarelli-Carneiro, Acting General
    Counsel, attorney for respondent New Jersey
    Public Employment Relations Commission
    (David N. Gambert, Deputy General Counsel,
    on the statement in lieu of brief.)
    PER CURIAM
    Following expiration of its collective negotiations
    agreement with the West Orange Education Association, the West
    Orange Board of Education filed a scope petition with the Public
    Employment Relations Commission asserting certain provisions of
    the expired agreement were not mandatorily negotiable and should
    be stricken from any successor agreement.   Among those
    provisions was Article XV, Section B (entitled "Supplementary
    Sick Leave"), which provided:
    Full-time employees shall be credited with
    five (5) days supplementary sick leave
    allowance for each year of service, with
    unused days to be accumulated. Full-time
    employees who have exhausted their regular
    sick leave may utilize the accumulated
    supplementary sick leave to the extent
    necessary to provide total compensation of
    up to three (3) days beyond this period in
    any month wherein less than three (3) days'
    compensation has been earned.
    The Board argued the provision was an extended sick leave
    benefits clause preempted by N.J.S.A. 18A:30-6.1   The Association
    1
    N.J.S.A. 18A:30-6 provides:
    When absence, under the circumstances
    described in section 18A:30-1 of this
    article, exceeds the annual sick leave and
    the accumulated sick leave, the board of
    education may pay any such person each day’s
    salary less the pay of a substitute, if a
    substitute is employed or the estimated cost
    (continued)
    2                         A-4315-16T2
    countered that notwithstanding the wording of the provision and
    its reference to "sick days," "the sole purpose of Article XV,
    Section B was to codify the parties' longstanding past practice
    of providing employees with 'insurance days' based on years of
    service that could be used to continue their health benefits
    during unpaid leaves of absence."2   The Association contended
    there was no dispute that provision of health benefits coverage
    during unpaid leaves of absence was a mandatorily negotiable
    (continued)
    of the employment of a substitute if none is
    employed, for such length of time as may be
    determined by the board of education in each
    individual case. A day’s salary is defined
    as 1/200 of the annual salary.
    [Emphasis supplied.]
    2
    In a certification submitted to PERC, the president of the
    Association explained that over the last many years, all full-
    time employees have been allowed to accumulate five so-called
    "insurance days" for each year of service annually. Use of
    three of those days entitled an employee to the Board's portion
    of the health premium for one calendar month. Thus, an employee
    with six years' service was entitled to thirty "insurance days,"
    which could be used to continue the Board's contribution to the
    employee's health premium for ten months while on unpaid leave.
    Based on PERC's 1992 decision, which notes the supplementary
    sick leave provision became part of the parties' CNA beginning
    in the 1960-61 school year, counsel for PERC speculates the
    clause mutated "into the alleged past practice of providing
    solely for the 'insurance days'" after the blanket award of
    supplementary sick days was preempted by the enactment of
    N.J.S.A. 18A:30-6 in 1967.
    3                        A-4315-16T2
    subject, relying on a 1992 PERC decision against the Board in
    the Association's favor so holding.
    PERC ruled for the Board, finding that although health
    benefits during periods of unpaid leave is a negotiable topic,
    the Association "cannot achieve such a contractual benefit in
    the guise of supplementary sick leave that allows for extra paid
    sick leave days to be earned and utilized via blanket rule
    rather than per the Board's discretion within the constraints of
    N.J.S.A. 18A:30-6."   It distinguished its prior decision, which
    arose in the context of a grievance arbitration, because there,
    "application of the relevant contract clause was confined to the
    known circumstances of the issues sought to be arbitrated."
    Although acknowledging that the supplementary sick leave
    provision in that case was "nearly identical" to Article XV,
    Section B, PERC found the issue in the prior case "was whether
    the Board violated the contract 'when it discontinued health
    insurance benefits for employees on unpaid leaves of absence.'"
    The Association moved for reconsideration arguing that
    after PERC's decision of June 30, 2016, "the Board has advised
    that it will no longer honor the parties' longstanding
    contractual agreement to allow employees to use their
    accumulated 'supplementary sick leave' to continue their health
    benefits while on unpaid leaves of absence."   The Association
    4                          A-4315-16T2
    complained the Board acted notwithstanding "that such an
    agreement involves a mandatorily negotiable term and condition
    of employment" and that "there is not now, nor has there ever
    been, any other permissible use for supplementary sick leave
    days provided by the parties' agreement other than for the
    continuation of health benefits during an unpaid leave of
    absence."3
    PERC, although noting "employers may not unilaterally
    change prevailing terms and conditions of employment," whether
    established by agreement or past practice, as doing so "would
    circumvent the statutory duty to bargain," see Galloway Tp. Bd.
    of Ed. v. Galloway Tp. Ed. Ass'n, 
    78 N.J. 25
    , 48 (1978), agreed
    with the Board the Association had not established a basis for
    reconsideration.
    The Association did not appeal those rulings.   Two weeks
    later, however, it filed a grievance on behalf of a member
    denied the use of supplementary sick days to secure continuation
    of her health benefits during an extended unpaid leave.     The
    Board denied the grievance relying on PERC's decision striking
    3
    The Board disputes that, contending the CNA further obligated
    it to a $5000 "opt-out waiver payment" for employees foregoing
    such coverage. As our disposition does not rest on these
    grounds, we have no need to resolve the parties' dispute on the
    point.
    5                           A-4315-16T2
    Article XV, Section B and PERC's rejection of the Association's
    past practice argument on reconsideration.
    When the Association demanded the issue be placed before a
    panel of arbitrators, the Board filed a scope petition with PERC
    seeking to restrain arbitration.    The Association argued PERC's
    decision striking Article XV, Section B was not controlling as
    that matter turned on a negotiability analysis, not the
    arbitrability analysis required here.    PERC rejected the
    argument that whatever distinction might exist between
    arbitrability and negotiability could result in the past
    practice of awarding health insurance days remaining arbitrable
    despite the striking of the parties' supplementary sick leave
    clause.   Finding it undisputed, based on its prior decisions and
    the Association president's certification, that "the past
    practice regarding 'insurance days' was solely rooted" in
    Article XV, Section B, PERC determined its removal left the past
    practice "without any foundation and . . . effectively
    eliminated."
    On appeal, the Association reprises the arguments it made
    to PERC that the continuation of health insurance benefits for
    employees on unpaid leaves of absence is a mandatorily
    negotiable term and condition of employment, and adds that PERC
    exceeded its jurisdiction when it failed to limit its inquiry to
    6                            A-4315-16T2
    whether the subject matter of the grievance involved a
    mandatorily negotiable term and condition of employment.     We
    disagree.
    The Association's argument is premised on a proposition
    neither the Board nor PERC disputes, that health coverage for
    employees during unpaid leaves of absence is a mandatorily
    negotiable term of employment.    Thus, if one squints at the
    issues so that it is the only one visible, the question might
    appear initially to meet the test for negotiability established
    in In re Local 195, IFPTE, 
    88 N.J. 393
    , 404-05 (1982), that is,
    involve (1) an "item [that] intimately and directly affects the
    work and welfare of public employees"; (2) that "has not been
    fully or partially preempted by statute or regulation"; and (3)
    involves a matter where "a negotiated agreement would not
    significantly interfere with the determination of governmental
    policy."    But so myopic a focus blurs, not sharpens, the dispute
    the parties presented to PERC.
    PERC struck Article XV, Section B because it is plainly
    preempted by N.J.S.A. 18A:30-6, rejecting the Association's
    position that the clause, although worded as a supplementary
    sick leave provision, was actually only a mechanism for the
    provision of health benefits during a period of unpaid leave, a
    well-settled negotiable term of employment.    PERC acknowledged
    7                         A-4315-16T2
    the parties were free to negotiate for the provision of health
    coverage during leave, but ruled the Association could not
    "achieve such a contractual benefit in the guise of [a]
    supplementary sick leave" term preempted by statute — a
    proposition the Association effectively conceded by failing to
    appeal PERC's decision striking the clause from the parties'
    Agreement.
    Permitting the Association to arbitrate the Board's denial
    of a member's request to use her supplemental sick days to
    secure paid health benefits based on the past practice
    established under Article XV, Section B would effectively
    nullify PERC's ruling striking the provision from the parties'
    contract.    The clause, although stricken from the Agreement,
    would continue to live on, enforceable as past practice
    notwithstanding that the clause, and thus the practice, has been
    preempted by legislation, a result clearly contrary to law.      See
    State v. State Supervisory Emps. Ass'n, 
    78 N.J. 54
    , 81-82 (1978)
    (holding "where a statute or regulation sets a maximum level of
    rights or benefits for employees on a particular term and
    condition of employment, no proposal to affect that maximum is
    negotiable nor would any contractual provision purporting to do
    so be enforceable").
    8                        A-4315-16T2
    We accordingly can find no error, much less reversible
    error, in PERC's determination that excising the supplementary
    sick leave provision from the Agreement prevented the union from
    relying on the past practice of permitting District employees to
    compel the District to provide paid health benefits on the basis
    of supplementary sick days awarded on other than the case-by-
    case basis permitted by N.J.S.A. 18A:30-6.    See City of Jersey
    City v. Jersey City Police Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 
    154 N.J. 555
    , 568 (1998) (directing that a decision by PERC concerning
    the scope of negotiations will stand unless clearly demonstrated
    to be arbitrary or capricious).
    Moreover, as observed by PERC's counsel on appeal, and not
    disputed by the Association, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-16, the statute on
    which the Association relies to establish the negotiability of
    health benefits during periods of leave, conditions such
    coverage on an express contractual provision negotiated by the
    parties.4   PERC having struck Article XV, Section B from the
    4
    N.J.S.A. 18A:16-16 provides:
    The coverage of any employee, and of
    his dependents, if any, shall cease upon the
    discontinuance of his employment or upon
    cessation of active full-time employment in
    the classes eligible for coverage subject to
    such provision as may be made in any
    contract made by the local board of
    (continued)
    9                       A-4315-16T2
    parties' Agreement, N.J.S.A. 18A:16-16 preempts the
    Association's reliance on past practice alone to establish an
    employee's entitlement to continued health benefits while on
    unpaid leave.   The parties are free to negotiate for health
    coverage during periods of unpaid leave; PERC's decision, which
    we affirm, only requires they do so within the parameters
    established by the Legislature in N.J.S.A. 18A:30-6 and N.J.S.A.
    18A:16-16.
    Affirmed.
    (continued)
    education for limited continuance of
    coverage during disability, part-time
    employment, leave of absence other than
    leave for military service, and for
    continuance of coverage after retirement.
    [Emphasis supplied.]
    10                       A-4315-16T2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-4315-16T2

Filed Date: 7/25/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019