SEIDMAN & PINCUS, LLC VS. RICHARD J. ABRAHAMSEN VS. NICHOLAS G. SEKAS (L-2961-14, PASSAIC COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1740-16T3
SEIDMAN & PINCUS, LLC, and
MITCHELL B. SEIDMAN,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
RICHARD J. ABRAHAMSEN, and
ABRAHAMSEN LAW FIRM, LLC,
Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
NICHOLAS G. SEKAS,
Defendant/Third-Party
Defendant,
and
SEKAS LAW GROUP, LLC, and
SEKAS & ABRAHAMSEN, LLC,
Defendants/Third-Party
Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________________
Argued September 13, 2018 - Decided October 4, 2018
Before Judges Ostrer and Mayer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-2961-14.
Richard J. Abrahamsen argued the cause for pro se
appellants.
Mitchell B. Seidman argued the cause for pro se
respondents Seidman & Pincus, LLC, and Mitchell B.
Seidman (Mitchell B. Seidman and Andrew Pincus, on
the brief).
Nicholas G. Sekas argued the cause for pro se
respondents Sekas Law Group, LLC, and Sekas &
Abrahamsen, LLC.
PER CURIAM
Defendants/third-party plaintiffs Richard J. Abrahamsen and Abrahamsen
Law Firm, LLC (Abrahamsen defendants) appeal from thirteen separate Law
Division orders issued in connection with this litigation.1 We affirm all of the
orders appealed by the Abrahamsen defendants.
1
The orders that are the subject of this appeal are as follows: a May 4, 2015
order denying appointment of a custodian and compelling arbitration; a May 12,
2015 order denying disqualification of counsel and indemnification; a
November 6, 2015 order denying a motion to strike co-defendants' answer for
failure to provide discovery; a November 6, 2015 protective order; a January 8,
2016 order quashing subpoenas and granting attorney's fees; a February 5, 2016
order quashing subpoenas and granting attorney's fees; a February 5, 2016 order
A-1740-16T3
2
In August 2014, plaintiffs Seidman & Pincus, LLC (S&P) and Mitchell
Seidman filed a complaint in Passaic County against Sekas Law Group, LLC
and Sekas & Abrahamsen, LLC (Sekas defendants) and the Abrahamsen
defendants, alleging defamation and tortious interference (defamation action).
The law firm of Sekas & Abrahamsen, LLC (S&A), consisting of Nicholas G.
Sekas and Richard J. Abrahamsen, dissolved in December 2013, prior to the
filing of the defamation action. Litigation related to the dissolution of S&A was
filed in Monmouth County (dissolution action) two weeks after plaintiffs filed
their defamation action.2
The underlying facts are not complex. However, the procedural history is
convoluted based on the sheer number of motions filed by the Abrahamsen
denying a motion to compel discovery; a February 17, 2016 order compelling
payment of counsel fees; a February 26, 2016 order vacating the February 17,
2016 order and awarding counsel fees; a February 26, 2016 order awarding
counsel fees; a December 5, 2016 order denying reconsideration; a December 5,
2016 order compelling reimbursement; and a December 5, 2016 order denying
sanctions.
2
In the dissolution action, Sekas sought to enforce the terms of S&A's
partnership operating agreement and recover assets taken by Abrahamsen when
he left S&A in December 2013. Sekas claimed Abrahamsen was responsible for
his percentage share of debts and obligations of S&A, and for fees and costs on
S&A cases that Abrahamsen took to his new law firm. Abrahamsen claimed the
partnership's operating agreement required S&A to indemnify him against
plaintiffs' defamation action.
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3
defendants. The procedural background related to the defamation action is
further muddled due to the Abrahamsen defendants' repeated conflating of the
issues in the defamation action and the dissolution action. Consequently, a more
detailed recitation of the procedural background is required to provide context
for this appeal.
Plaintiffs filed the defamation action against the Abrahamsen defendants
and Sekas defendants on August 6, 2014, alleging all defendants caused S&P to
lose a long-time client. One month later, the Abrahamsen defendants sent a
notice to plaintiffs demanding withdrawal of the defamation action as frivolous.
In response, plaintiffs requested a copy of a memorandum authored by
Abrahamsen to assess the merits of their claim and determine whether the
memorandum caused the loss of a long-term client. Instead of replying to
plaintiffs' request for a copy of the memorandum, the Abrahamsen defendants
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs then filed a cross-motion to
amend the complaint.
Leave to amend the complaint was granted and, in January 2015, plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint, adding Sekas Law Group, LLC as a defendant and
asserting a new claim based on fraudulent transfer. The Abrahamsen defendants
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4
filed an answer, cross-claim for indemnification against the Sekas defendants,
and third-party complaint against the Sekas defendants and Nicholas G. Sekas.
In March 2015, the Abrahamsen defendants moved to consolidate the
defamation action with the dissolution action. The judge denied consolidation.
In May 2015, the judge dismissed the third-party claims against the Sekas
defendants. The judge also issued an order on May 4, 2015 denying a motion
by the Abrahamsen defendants to appoint a custodian and compel arbitration of
the dispute between the Abrahamsen defendants and the Sekas defendants. A
motion to compel the Sekas defendants to indemnify the Abrahamsen defendants
in the defamation action was denied on May 12, 2015.
Failing to succeed in their earlier motions, the Abrahamsen defendants
requested discovery from the Sekas defendants. In the fall of 2015, the
Abrahamsen defendants moved to strike the Sekas defendants' answer for failure
to provide discovery. In response, the Sekas defendants sought a protective
order related to the discovery requests. The judge denied the motion to strike
and granted the motion for a protective order. These orders, dated November 6,
2015, granted attorney's fees to the Sekas defendants. The judge expressly
warned the Abrahamsen defendants that additional sanctions would be imposed
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5
for their "continued contempt and violation of the intent and spirit of the prior
[o]rders issued by the [c]ourt."
Notwithstanding the unequivocal warning issued by the judge in the
defamation action, the Abrahamsen defendants served multiple subpoenas on
individuals and companies associated with the Sekas defendants. The Sekas
defendants demanded the Abrahamsen defendants withdraw the subpoenas, but
the Abrahamsen defendants refused. The Sekas defendants then filed a motion
to quash the subpoenas, a motion for a protective order, and sought to hold the
Abrahamsen defendants in contempt of the court's prior orders in the defamation
action.
On January 8, 2016, the judge quashed certain subpoenas and granted the
request for a protective order in favor of the Sekas defendants. The order also
denied discovery sought by the Abrahamsen defendants; ordered the
Abrahamsen defendants to stop demanding discovery from the Sekas
defendants; barred the Abrahamsen defendants from requesting discovery
without leave of the court; ordered Abrahamsen, individually, to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt; found the Abrahamsen defendants to be
in contempt; and ordered the Abrahamsen defendants to pay attorneys' fees to
the Sekas defendants. One month later, the judge quashed additional subpoenas
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served by the Abrahamsen defendants and reiterated his prior warning regarding
the imposition of sanctions for continued service of improper discovery
demands. On February 17, 2016, the judge awarded counsel fees to the Sekas
defendants in the amount of $6,310. On February 26, 2016, the judge vacated
the February 17, 2016 award of counsel fees and, instead, awarded counsel fees
to the Sekas defendants in the amount of $5,740. The judge also awarded
additional counsel fees to the Sekas defendants in the amount of $11,410.
The Abrahamsen defendants sought reconsideration of the judge's orders
issued in January and February 2016. Because the Abrahamsen defendants
claimed the judge who issued the January and February 2016 orders had a
conflict based on his law clerk's employment with Sekas as of April 2016, a
different judge heard argument on the motions for reconsideration,
indemnification, and sanctions. These motions were denied by order dated
December 5, 2016.
The factual history preceding the filing of the defamation action is
relevant to understanding the issues on appeal. In 2003, Mariner's Bank retained
plaintiffs to handle various legal matters, including litigation actions,
bankruptcy matters, and foreclosure proceedings.
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7
Around July 2009, Mariner's Bank retained plaintiffs to pursue an action
against Carver Federal Savings Bank (Carver) for default of a loan.3 Around the
same time, Mariner's Bank decided to sell thirteen defaulted loans to Purchase
Partners, LLC (Purchase Partners). Carver asserted counterclaims in the Carver
action against Mariner's Bank before its loan was sold to Purchase Partners.
Because the interests of Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners were aligned,
plaintiffs discussed whether they could represent both parties in the Carver
action. Plaintiffs asked Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners to sign a conflict
waiver letter before plaintiffs would undertake dual representation of the parties
in the Carver action. Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners signed the conflict
waiver letters, and agreed to equally share payment of plaintiffs' legal fees in
the Carver action.
Purchase Partners fell behind on its payments to plaintiffs for legal
services. Plaintiffs requested payment in return for continued representation of
Purchase Partners in the Carver action. Purchase Partners was unable to pay
plaintiffs' legal fees. Purchase Partners then sought a more economical
arrangement with another law firm to represent it in the Carver action.
3
The action, entitled Mariner's Bank v. Carver Federal Savings Bank, was filed
in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Carver
action).
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8
Thereafter, Purchase Partners retained S&A to represent its interest in the
Carver action. Plaintiffs filed a motion in the Carver action to impose a charging
lien against Purchase Partners for outstanding legal fees and for any recovery
obtained by Purchase Partners in the Carver action. The federal judge handling
the Carver action granted plaintiffs' motion.
Plaintiffs then filed a motion in federal court to establish the amount of
the charging lien against Purchase Partners. S&A advised Purchase Partners to
oppose the motion, and dispute plaintiffs' outstanding fees based on an alleged
conflict of interest arising from plaintiffs' dual representation of Mariner's Bank
and Purchase Partners. Plaintiffs' motion to establish the amount of the charging
lien was not decided by the federal judge handling the Carver action until early
2014.4
In August 2013, the parties settled the Carver action. At that time,
Abrahamsen authored a confidential memorandum to Purchase Partners
regarding the Carver action. The memorandum, entitled "Memo on
Mariner[']s Bank and Purchase Partners and the Dual Representation of Seidman
& Pincus," discussed the events that transpired after S&P undertook
4
On February 5, 2014, the federal judge in the Carver action determined
plaintiffs had no conflict of interest and awarded the fees owed by Purchase
Partners to plaintiffs for legal work related to the Carver action.
A-1740-16T3
9
representation of both Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners in the Carver
action. The memorandum opined that "S&P turned on his client [Purchase
Partners] and was [Mariner's Bank] against [Purchase Partners] on this point
while still counsel of record for both parties."
Mariner's Bank received a copy of the Abrahamsen memorandum and
stopped paying plaintiffs for legal services in the Carver action and other
matters. After receipt of the Abrahamsen memorandum, Mariner's Bank did not
hire plaintiffs to represent it in any new matters. In early 2014, plaintiffs
requested overdue payment for legal services from Mariner's Bank. A
representative of Mariner's Bank told plaintiffs the bank was discontinuing
S&P's legal services based on the Abrahamsen memorandum and Abrahamsen's
advice that plaintiffs had a conflict of interest due to S&P's dual representation
of Mariner's Bank and Purchase Partners in the Carver action.
Believing the bank's decision to discontinue plaintiffs' legal services was
due to the Abrahamsen memorandum, plaintiffs filed the defamation action
seeking damages against defendants. Soon after commencing the defamation
action, plaintiffs sought a copy of the Abrahamsen memorandum. Rather than
provide a copy of the memorandum or explain why the memorandum could not
be produced, the Abrahamsen defendants filed a series of motions for discovery
A-1740-16T3
10
and other relief unrelated to plaintiffs' defamation action as described earlier in
this opinion. The defamation action then proceeded for nearly two years.
On March 28, 2016, plaintiffs served a subpoena on Mariner's Bank,
seeking the Abrahamsen memorandum. Mariner's Bank provided the document
to plaintiffs on April 1, 2016. The Abrahamsen memorandum opined S&P had
a conflict of interest based on the law firm's dual representation of Mariner's
Bank and Purchase Partners in the Carver action.
Three months after receipt of the Abrahamsen memorandum, plaintiffs
deposed several individuals affiliated with Mariner's Bank. Based on the
deposition testimony, plaintiffs determined they would be unable to prove the
Abrahamsen memorandum caused Mariner's Bank to terminate S&P's legal
services. Therefore, on July 28, 2016, plaintiffs elected to discontinue the
defamation action. Plaintiffs and the Sekas defendants promptly signed a
stipulation dismissing the complaint. However, the Abrahamsen defendants did
not sign the stipulation until January 2017.
While the defamation action was pending, in or around April 2016, the
judge's law clerk accepted employment with Sekas and his new law firm. The
judge handling the defamation action had not issued any orders in the
defamation action subsequent to February 2016. The Abrahamsen defendants
A-1740-16T3
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did not file a motion for reconsideration and other relief until around March
2016. Due to an alleged conflict based on the judge's law clerk's acceptance of
a position with the Sekas firm, the reconsideration motion and other motions
filed by the Abrahamsen defendants were heard by the presiding judge of the
Civil Division. The presiding judge denied those motions on December 5, 2016.
The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal in the defamation action on
January 17, 2017, and the Abrahamsen defendants then appealed from thirteen
separate orders issued in the defamation action. On appeal, the Abrahamsen
defendants argue four points. 5 First, they argue plaintiffs' complaint constituted
frivolous litigation because it was without basis in law or in fact, and the judge
erred in failing to impose sanctions against plaintiffs. Second, they argue
entitlement to indemnification and counsel fees from the Sekas defendants
pursuant to S&A's partnership operating agreement related to plaintiffs' claims
in the defamation action. Third, they contend the judge handling the defamation
action improperly denied discovery, quashed subpoenas, granted protective
orders, and awarded counsel fees. Fourth, they claim all orders issued by the
5
The Notice of Appeal lists the May 4, 2015 order, the February 5, 2016 order
denying a motion to compel discovery; and the December 5, 2017 order denying
reconsideration of prior orders. However, because the issues related to these
orders were not briefed, the issues are deemed waived. Gormley v. Wood-El,
218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014).
A-1740-16T3
12
original judge assigned to the defamation action should be vacated because his
law clerk was subsequently hired by Sekas' new law firm.
We review the issues raised in this appeal for abuse of discretion. An
abuse of discretion arises when a decision is "made without a rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis." Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571
(2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv.,
779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).
Our review of a trial court's imposition of sanctions is similarly reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Masone v. Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div.
2005). We likewise review a judge's decision to impose discovery sanctions and
award attorney's fees as a discovery sanction under an abuse of discretion
standard. Shore Orthopaedic Grp. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S.,
397 N.J. Super. 614, 629-30 (App. Div. 2008); Innes v. Carrascosa, 391 N.J.
Super 453, 496 (App. Div. 2007).
A judge, in his or her discretion, has the inherent authority to sanction a
party for behavior that is vexatious, burdensome, and harassing. See Brundage
v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 610 (2008) (recognizing the inherent power
of courts to sanction parties as means of enforcing ordinary rules of practice);
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Abtrax Pharm. v. Elkins-Sinn, 139 N.J. 499, 513 (1995) (recognizing the
inherent power to punish for discovery violations); Dziubek v. Schumann, 275
N.J. Super. 428, 439-40 (App. Div. 1994) (reasoning a court's inherent power
may include awarding attorney's fees in the form of a sanction). Although the
power to sanction should be invoked sparingly, the circumstances presented in
this case support the award of attorney's fees as the proper sanction for the
Abrahamsen defendants' vexatious and harassing motion practice in the
defamation action.
We conclude there is sufficient, credible evidence in the record to support
the judge's award of attorney's fees as a sanction against the Abrahamsen
defendants. The Abrahamsen defendants repeatedly sought discovery and filed
motions relating to the dissolution action in the defamation action. The judge's
orders clearly and unambiguously instructed that issues and discovery requests
related to the dissolution action had to be pursued in the dissolution action. The
judge expressly warned that if the Abrahamsen defendants continued to file such
applications in the defamation action, rather than in the dissolution action, he
would impose sanctions. The Abrahamsen defendants failed to heed the judge's
admonition to cease filing repetitive discovery motions and other motions
unrelated to the defamation action.
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Because the Abrahamsen defendants disregarded the judge's orders related
to motion practice and discovery in the defamation action, the judge awarded
attorney's fees as a sanction for the Abrahamsen defendants' improper use of the
defamation action to gain discovery in the dissolution action. The judge found
the Abrahamsen defendants were acting in bad faith, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-
59.1, by attempting to use the defamation action to obtain information relevant
to the dissolution action.
The judge also imposed further sanctions against the Abrahamsen
defendants in accordance with Rule 1:4-8(c). When an attorney signs a
pleading, motion, or other paper, the attorney certifies that the "paper is not
being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." R. 1:4-8(a)(1).
We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to sanction
the Abrahamsen defendants by imposing attorney's fees in favor of the Sekas
defendants. The Sekas defendants were forced to oppose a barrage of motions
filed by the Abrahamsen defendants unrelated to the defamation action. The
record does not reflect favorably on the Abrahamsen defendants' litigation
tactics, which lead the judge to impose sanctions in the form of attorney's fees
to deter continued violations of the court's orders regarding discovery and
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motion practice in the defamation action. The filing of continued requests for
discovery by the Abrahamsen defendants, after the judge's issuance of a warning
not to seek such discovery, was contrary to Rule 1:10-3, and the judge did not
abuse his discretion under the circumstances.
The Abrahamsen defendants also contend the judge should have
sanctioned plaintiffs because the defamation action was frivolous. The frivolous
litigation statute permits a court to award reasonable counsel fees and litigation
costs to a prevailing party in a civil action if the court determines that the
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or defense is frivolous. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-
59.1.
A claim is considered frivolous when: "no rational argument can be
advanced in its support"; "it is not supported by any credible evidence"; "a
reasonable person could not have expected its success"; or "it is completely
untenable." Belfer v. Merling, 322 N.J. Super. 124, 144 (App. Div. 1999).
"[F]alse allegations of fact [will] not justify [an] award . . . unless they are made
in bad faith, 'for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury.'"
McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel & Casino, 132 N.J. 546, 561 (1993)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1(b)(1)). An honest attempt to pursue a perceived,
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though ill-founded, claim is not considered to be frivolous. Id. at 563. The
burden of proving bad faith is on the party who seeks fees and costs. Id. at 559.
Rule 1:4-8 supplements N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1, and governs the conduct of
attorneys. A Rule 1:4-8 sanction is "specifically designed to deter the filing or
pursuit of frivolous litigation." LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 98 (2009).
"For purposes of imposing sanctions under Rule 1:4-8, an assertion is deemed
'frivolous' when 'no rational argument can be advanced in its support, or it is not
supported by any credible evidence, or it is completely untenable.'" United
Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 407 N.J. Super. 379, 389 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting
First Atl. Fed. Credit Union v. Perez, 391 N.J. Super. 419, 432 (App. Div.
2007)). "Where a party has [a] reasonable and good faith belief in the merit of
the cause, attorney's fees will not be awarded." Ibid.The Abrahamsen defendants sought counsel fees, claiming plaintiffs
"persist[ed] in frivolous litigation" pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15-59.1 and Rule
1:4-8. We reject this argument. When plaintiffs filed the complaint, they knew
their long-term relationship with Mariner's Bank was abruptly terminated after
the bank received the Abrahamsen memorandum. However, plaintiffs also knew
as of the date they filed the defamation action that a federal judge determined
S&P did not have a conflict of interest in the Carver action.
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In deciding the Abrahamsen defendants' motion for sanctions against
plaintiffs, the judge stated:
I do think it's a close call. I don't think its mere
speculation. . . . I think there was some indicia that
defamation could have occurred. It didn’t. And I agree.
But – but, you know, [plaintiffs] also ha[d] a problem
with obtaining a memo which . . . is the smoking gun
that, in fact, wasn't smoking. But the only way to obtain
it would have been to file litigation. And, obviously,
through discovery or subpoena power [plaintiffs have]
been able to obtain it through that method. He did. And
then he dropped his complaint.
The judge found plaintiffs never conceded the defamation action was without
merit. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the defamation action after obtaining the
Abrahamsen memorandum (sixteen months after requesting a copy of that
document) and deposing several representatives of Mariner's Bank. Only after
receipt of the Abrahamsen memorandum and completion of depositions in July
2016 did plaintiffs conclude they lacked direct or admissible evidence to prove
their claims in the defamation action.
Plaintiffs' claims were not frivolous. Based on circumstantial evidence,
plaintiffs believed the Abrahamsen memorandum resulted in the loss of
Mariner's Bank as a client, facts sufficient to establish a claim for defamation
and tortious interference against one or more defendants. Based on the refusal
of the Abrahamsen defendants to provide the Abrahamsen memorandum,
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plaintiffs had a good faith basis as to the merits of their claims, and the complaint
was not frivolous under N.J.S.A. 2A:15-29.1 or Rule 1:4-8.
We next review the Abrahamsen defendants' argument related to the
judge's denial of indemnification from the Sekas defendants. The judge
determined the indemnification issue should be resolved in the dissolution
action, not the defamation action. Rule 4:38-2 "vest[s] [a] determination
whether or not to sever claims to the sound exercise of a trial court's discretion."
Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 310 (1995).
The judge denied the Abrahamsen defendants' motion to consolidate the
defamation action with the dissolution action, finding the matters "do not share
'the same transaction or series of transactions' warranting consolidation under
Rule 4:38-1." The judge then dismissed the Abrahamsen defendants' third-party
complaint against the Sekas defendants seeking indemnification. The judge
noted the Abrahamsen defendants could seek indemnification from S&A in the
dissolution action as that court had "appropriate venue" to decide the issue and
was the forum where the "matter properly belongs." The judge instructed that
the indemnification issue be determined in the dissolution action, and denied the
motion without prejudice to allow the filing of the indemnification claim in the
dissolution action. We discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision
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directing the Abrahamsen defendants to pursue their claim for indemnification
in the dissolution action rather than the defamation action.
We turn to the claim by the Abrahamsen defendants that the judge abused
his discretion in denying various discovery requests in the defamation action.
The Abrahamsen defendants did not appeal from the order dismissing the
defamation action. When a party fails to appeal from the dismissal of an action,
that party is barred from appealing any prior adverse discovery orders. Mac
Auto Imports, Inc. v. Jaguar Cars, 244 N.J. Super. 254, 257 (App. Div. 1990).
"Discovery is provided to prepare for trial. In light of plaintiff's dismissal of its
complaint, there will be no trial. Thus, the discovery issues are moot." Ibid.As the claims against the Abrahamsen defendants were extinguished by the
execution of a stipulation of dismissal, the Abrahamsen defendants have no
reason to obtain discovery, and their appeal of any discovery orders is moot. 6
Lastly, we address the argument that the judge's orders should be vacated
based on his law clerk's subsequent employment with Sekas Law Group.
"[A]ppellate courts will decline to consider questions or issues not properly
6
Because we decline to address the Abrahamsen defendants' appeal of
discovery orders as moot, we similarly decline to address the Abrahamsen
defendants' appeal of the judge's orders related to the issuance of protective
orders and the quashing of subpoenas.
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presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is
available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the
trial court or concern matters of great public importance." Nieder v. Royal
Indemnity Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (internal citation omitted). The
Abrahamsen defendants never raised the issue to the trial court despite the
motion for reconsideration being heard several months after the law clerk began
his employment with Sekas. Because the question does not relate to jurisdiction
or constitute a matter of great public importance, we decline to reach this issue
on appeal. Moreover, the judge who issued most of the orders in the defamation
action did not issue any orders after February 2016. Therefore, there is no
evidence in the record the judge was influenced by his law clerk's acceptance of
a job with Sekas in or around April 2016.
Affirmed.
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