BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP OF BRICK VS. LAMONT REPOLLET (NEW JERSEY COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION) ( 2021 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1568-19
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE TOWNSHIP OF BRICK
(OCEAN COUNTY), BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF JACKSON
(OCEAN COUNTY), BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE
MANALAPAN-ENGLISHTOWN
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
(MONMOUTH COUNTY),
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE TOMS RIVER REGIONAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT (OCEAN
COUNTY), BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF LACEY
(OCEAN COUNTY), BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE FREEHOLD
REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL
DISTRICT (MONMOUTH
COUNTY), BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF WEYMOUTH (ATLANTIC
COUNTY), BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF OCEAN (MONMOUTH
COUNTY), TOWNSHIP OF BRICK
(OCEAN COUNTY), TOWNSHIP
OF TOMS RIVER (OCEAN
COUNTY), BOROUGH OF SOUTH
TOMS RIVER (OCEAN COUNTY),
BOROUGH OF BEACHWOOD
(OCEAN COUNTY), BOROUGH
OF PINE BEACH (OCEAN
COUNTY), and STEPHANIE
WOHLRAB, an individual taxpayer
of Brick Township,
Petitioners-Appellants,
v.
LAMONT REPOLLET,
Commissioner, New Jersey
Department of Education, and
ELIZABETH MAHER MUOIO,
New Jersey State Treasurer,
Respondents-Respondents.
______________________________
Submitted March 8, 2021 – Decided September 1, 2021
Before Judges Currier and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from the New Jersey Commissioner of
Education, Docket No. 19-1/19.
Weiner Law Group, LLP, attorneys for appellants
(Mark A. Tabakin and Stephen J. Edelstein, on the
briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for the
respondents (Sookie Bae, Assistant Attorney General,
of counsel; Christopher Weber and Amna T. Toor,
Deputy Attorneys General, on the brief).
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PER CURIAM
Petitioners, six boards of education, five municipalities, and one taxpayer ,
appeal from the October 31, 2019 final agency decision of respondent
Commissioner (Commissioner), Department of Education (DOE), dismissing
their challenge to the statutory allocation of State aid for education for fiscal
year (FY) 2019 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We
affirm.
I.
In January 2008, the Legislature enacted the School Funding Reform Act
of 2008 (SFRA), N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-43 to -70. Enactment of SFRA followed
decades of litigation over school funding. Abbott v. Burke, 199 N.J. 140 (2009)
(Abbott XX). The statute is intended to fulfill the State Constitution's mandate
that the Legislature provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools for children between the ages of five and
eighteen years. Id. at 144, 147-48; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44; see also N.J. Const. art.
VIII, § 4, ¶ 1 (Thorough and Efficient Clause). The SFRA created a "clear,
unitary, enforceable statutory formula to govern appropriations for education
. . . ." N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-44(g).
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SFRA established a structure for public school funding through which
school districts fund their budgets using a combination of local property taxes
and State aid.1 Ibid. The core of the formula is the "adequacy budget," which
is designed to support the majority of educational resources needed by children
in each district. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51. The adequacy budget is an estimate of
what it costs each district to provide the "comprehensive curriculum standards"
(CCCS) to each student according to the district's enrollment and student
characteristics. The adequacy budget is calculated on a per-pupil base cost that
reflects the costs of educating an elementary school student with no special
needs, with weighted adjustments to reflect the additional costs of educating
middle school students, high school students, at-risk and limited English
proficiency students, and students requiring special education. Abbott XX, 199
N.J. at 153. The DOE uses the adequacy budget in its formula for determining
the amount of each district's State aid. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-51 and -53.
A primary distinction between the SFRA and older school funding
formulae is that "virtually all aid under the new formula is wealth-equalized."
1
The SFRA provides for several categories of State aid. See, e.g., N.J.S.A.
18A:7F-52, -54 to -58 (providing equalization, preschool, special education,
security, transportation, and adjustment aid). "State aid" is a term that
encompasses each of these categories.
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Abbott v Burke, 196 N.J. 544, 556 (2008) (Abbott XIX). This means that while
the SFRA allocates State aid to school districts, the statute "requir[es] certain
levels of funding at the local level." Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 152. As a result,
"[e]ach district contributes to its adequacy budget an amount that is based on its
ability to raise local revenue." Abbott XIX, 196 N.J. at 556-57.
This local portion, commonly known as the "local fair share" or "LFS," is
calculated by "indexing the district's property wealth and aggregate income
using statewide multipliers." Id. at 557; see also N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-52(a). Each
district "must provide the lesser of either its LFS, as calculated using SFRA's
formula, or the local share it raised in the previous year[,]" often referred to as
the "required local share." Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 155; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(b).
This is the district's minimum contribution to its annual budget.
Once the adequacy budget and LFS are calculated, DOE computes the
allocation of "equalization aid" for each district. Equalization aid is a category
of State aid to each district for general fund expenses to support the district in
meeting the cost of CCCS. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-53. Equalization aid is calculated
by subtracting the district's LFS from its adequacy budget, provided that
equalization aid shall not be less than zero. Ibid. The SFRA also contained a
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State aid growth limit, which capped the total percentage increase in State aid
that a district could receive from year to year.
The SFRA's formula reflects the legislative intention that relatively
wealthier municipalities will contribute proportionally more on a local level to
their districts' budgets than poorer municipalities, thus enabling the State to
allocate school aid more equitably to needier districts. See N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-
44(d). The Supreme Court found the SFRA to be constitutional shortly after its
enactment. Abbott XX, 199 N.J. at 175.
In 2011, the Court revisited the SFRA due to funding shortages. Abbott
v. Burke, 206 N.J. 332, 370 (2011). Although the Court disapproved of the
Legislature's failure to fully fund the SFRA formula as to Abbott districts, it
otherwise reaffirmed the constitutionality of SFRA as to all other districts, even
though the State aid for those districts due under the SFRA formula was not
fully funded. Id. at 369-70.
In 2017, the Legislature took steps to address growing imbalances created
by districts that were levying local property taxes well below their respective
LFS. On July 24, 2018, the Legislature amended the SFRA with the passage of
L. 2018, c. 67 (Chapter 67), which amended the formula to calculate the required
local share. Pursuant to Chapter 67, in school years 2019-2020 through 2024-
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2025, certain districts that receive decreased State aid because of changes in the
required local share are required to increase their tax levy by two percent over
the prior year. L. 2018, c. 67, § 2; N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5(d). As a result, certain
districts are required to contribute more to fund schools through their local
levies. To make up for the anticipated reduction in State aid, Chapter 67
provided districts with new tools to raise revenue.
All State aid must be approved through legislative appropriation. The
New Jersey Constitution requires an annual balanced budget. N.J. Const. art.
VIII, § 2, ¶ 2. The State operates on an FY that begins on July 1 and ends on
June 30. Each year in February or March, the Governor presents a budget
message to the Legislature in which he or she presents the balances of State
funds on hand, the administration's revenue projections for the upcoming FY,
and proposed spending for the upcoming FY. N.J.S.A. 52:27B-20. Proposed
spending on School aid is included in the Governor's budget message. Although
the Governor has the statutory authority to propose a budget, the power to
appropriate State funds is vested exclusively in the Legislature through
enactment of an Appropriation Act. See N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 2, ¶ 2.
Within two days of the Governor's budget message, the Commissioner
must notify each school district of the amount of State aid proposed by the
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Governor for the district for the upcoming FY. N.J.S.A. 18A:7F-5. This is
known as an "aid notice." However, because all appropriations are subject to
legislative approval, no allocation of State aid is certain until the annual
Appropriations Act is enacted.
Chapter 67 was enacted shortly after the start of FY 2019 and the
enactment of the Appropriations Act and a supplemental Appropriations Act for
that FY. To address funding inequities in the short term and to transition to
Chapter 67 funding, the Legislature included provisions in the FY 2019
Appropriations Act that modified the Governor's budget message for FY 2019
with respect to State aid. See L. 2018, c. 53 (Appropriations Act) (Chapter 53);
L. 2018, c. 54 (Supplementary Appropriations Act) (Chapter 54). In short, these
acts provide that if a district's prior year State aid was less than its uncapped aid,
that district received an increase in State aid for FY 2019; and, if a district's
prior year State aid was more than its uncapped aid, that district saw a decrease
in State aid for FY 2019. Chapter 67 follows a similar formula by defining a
"[S]tate aid differential," which is a measure of the extent to which a district is
overfunded and underfunded. The State aid differential is used to calculate gains
and losses in State aid for the district.
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Chapter 53 and 54 also require that "[a]ny reduction in State aid pursuant
to this provision shall first be deducted from the amount of adjustment aid in the
school district's March 2018 aid notice . . . ." L. 2018, c. 53 and c. 54.
Essentially, more than a decade after SFRA's enactment, the Legislature began
phasing out the "transitional assistance" that it had provided in the form of
adjustment aid. For FY 2019, the Commissioner distributed State aid in
accordance with the mandates in Chapters 53, 54 and 67.
On January 22, 2019, petitioners Brick Township Board of Education,
Jackson Township Board of Education, Manalapan-Englishtown Regional
Board of Education, Toms River Regional Board of Education, Lacey Township
Board of Education, Freehold Regional High School District Board of
Education, Brick Township, Toms River Township, South Toms River
Township, Beachwood Borough, Pine Beach Borough, and Stephanie A.
Wohlrab, who is a Brick Township taxpayer, parent of a student in the Brick
Township Public Schools, and President of the Brick Township Board of
Education (collectively Petitioners), filed a petition of appeal with the DOE. 2
2
Weymouth Township Board of Education and Township of Ocean Board of
Education joined the petition, but withdrew as petitioners prior to issuance of
the Commissioner's final decision. The petitioners also named State Treasurer
Elizabeth Maher Muoio as a respondent.
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The district petitioners are not Abbott districts. Petitioners alleged that SFRA,
as amended by Chapter 67, is not equitable, predictable, or constitutional, both
facially and as applied, and that their respective school districts are underfunded
for FY 2019 and beyond, depriving them of due process and equal protection.
Petitioners also alleged they are treated unfairly in the SFRA and Chapter
67 because municipalities that have awarded tax abatements, in particular
payments-in-lieu-of-taxes (PILOT) agreements, have artificially deflated local
fair shares under the statutory formula. This is so, according to petitioners,
because PILOT agreements do not generate income for school districts and
properties subject to those agreements are not included in the calculation of a
municipality's ratable property base. They alleged that the exclusion of
properties subject to PILOT agreements in other municipalities in the funding
formula has an impact on petitioners because their local fair shares are
determined not only on their aggregate income and equalized property value,
but also their wealth relative to the wealth of other districts in the State.
In addition, relying on the differences between the amount of State aid for
their districts proposed in the Governor's FY 2019 budget message and the
amount of State aid their districts received after enactment of Chapters 53, 54,
and 67, petitioners argued that State aid was not allocated in accordance with
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the SFRA, as it was approved by the Supreme Court. They alleged they are
underfunded, which caused them to raise local property taxes and pay more than
one hundred percent of their "proper" LFS. Petitioners also alleged that the
underfunding has and will continue to cause them, in an effort to not unduly
burden taxpayers, to cut programs, institute budgetary restrictions, and/or spend
down their fund balances.
Petitioners sought declaratory determinations that: (1) the "methodology"
to determine State aid used by the Commissioner must be modified for the 2019-
2020 school year and beyond to comply with the State Constitution and existing
law; (2) the State Treasurer must provide the Commissioner with sufficient
funds to allocate State aid to petitioners to comply with the State Constitution
and existing law; and (3) the taxpayers in the petitioners' districts are paying
more than their fair or lawful share of property taxes for school district use.
Petitioners also sought an order directing: (1) the Commissioner to
reallocate State aid to petitioners at their pre-Chapter 67 levels so that they
receive an equal, equitable, and predictable amount of State aid and are not
underfunded; (2) the State Treasurer to allocate to the Commissioner an amount
adequate and sufficient to comply with such an order; and (3) the Commissioner
to "retain jurisdiction and oversight over this matter to ensure" that the
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declarations and orders sought by petitioners are carried out on an ongoing basis.
Finally, petitioners sought the appointment of a monitor to assist with oversight
of implementation of the orders requested, as well as attorney's fees and costs.
The Commissioner transmitted the petition to the Office of Administrative
Law (OAL) as a contested case. Shortly thereafter, the Commissioner and the
State Treasurer moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted pursuant to N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.5(g) and -1.10.
On August 1, 2019, Administrative Law Judge Ellen S. Bass issued an
initial decision and recommendation granting respondents' motion to dismiss the
petition. ALJ Bass began her analysis by finding that the petition is properly
viewed as one complaining of an alleged unfair local tax burden from
implementation of SFRA and Chapter 67 for FY 2019 and not a petition alleging
the deprivation of a thorough and efficient system of public education in
petitioners' school districts. The ALJ characterized petitioners' claims as an
argument that the Thorough and Efficient Clause requires they receive School
aid at the level provided in the SFRA prior to enactment of Chapter 67.
Relying on our holding in Stubaus v. Whitman, 339 N.J. Super. 38, 48, 56
(App. Div. 2001), ALJ Bass concluded that the municipality petitioners lacked
standing to assert their claims. The ALJ concluded that "[t]he claim that the
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amendments to the SFRA unfairly burden taxpayers in their communities can be
brought only by those taxpayers." In addition, she concluded that "any
allegations that the SFRA amendments deprive the children in their communities
of" a thorough and efficient education "belongs to those taxpayers and their
children, and not to the municipalities in which those children reside." The ALJ
also found that municipalities "lack the legal capacity to challenge State action
based on equal protection grounds."
ALJ Bass also concluded that the school district petitioners lacked
standing to vindicate the rights of taxpayers or to assert equal protection claims.
The ALJ noted that "[b]ecause school districts are creatures of the State, no
school district can be the subject of discriminatory practice by the State." The
ALJ noted that the petitioners are not Abbott districts and do not allege a claim
that their level of State aid for FY 2019 prevents them from meeting their
constitutional obligation to provide a thorough and efficient education to their
students. The programmatic and staffing reductions alleged by petitioners, the
ALJ found, even if taken as true, do not amount to allegations of a constitutional
dimension.
The ALJ also concluded that allegations of inequitable local taxation
among school districts cannot form the basis of a viable constitutional claim
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under the Thorough and Efficient Clause. See Stubaus, 339 N.J. Super. at 52-
57. ALJ Bass noted that the Supreme Court "rejected the argument that the
[Thorough and Efficient Clause] mandates statewide equity of tax burdens and
[has] interpreted [the Clause] to ensure equal educational opportunity, but not
taxpayer equality." Id. at 53 (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 512-13
(1973) (Robinson I)). The ALJ relied on the Court's holding that while the State
is obligated to provide public school children an equal educational opportunity,
it can meet that burden "by financing education either on a statewide basis with
funds provided by the State, or, in whole or in part, by delegating the fiscal
obligations to local taxation." See Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 142 (1975)
(Robinson II).
The ALJ also found that the holding in Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133(1980), precluded the school districts' claims that they are entitled to the amount
of State aid proposed in the Governor's budget message for FY 2019, but not
appropriated by the Legislature.
With respect to Wohlrab, the ALJ found that although she had standing to
allege claims of unfair taxation and the denial of a thorough and efficient
education for her children, she failed to do so. This is so, the ALJ found,
because Supreme Court precedents allow the Legislature to allocate the financial
A-1568-19
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burden for financing public schools to local entities and do require that the
burden must be equal among school districts and because the Brick Township
Board of Education does not allege it is unable to meet its constitutional
obligation to provide a thorough and efficient education to its students.
Finally, the ALJ concluded that Wohlrab did not allege a viable equal
protection claim because, as we noted in Stubaus, the Court has rejected
application of an equal protection analysis to Thorough and Efficient Clause
claims. See Stubaus, 339 N.J. Super. at 57 (citing Robinson I). The ALJ noted
the Court's caution against "the monumental governmental upheaval that would
result if the equal protection doctrine were held applicable to the financing of
education . . . ." Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 390 (1990) (Abbott II).
Petitioners filed exceptions from the ALJ's initial decision and
recommendation with the Commissioner.
On October 31, 2019, the Commissioner issued a final decision adopting
the ALJ's initial decision and recommendation "for the reasons thoroughly
analyzed and discussed" by ALJ Bass. The Commissioner determined that a full
hearing was unnecessary because he concurred with the ALJ's determinations
regarding standing and her conclusion "that the petition does not properly allege
a claim that the SFRA as amended denied students in the petitioning districts
A-1568-19
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access to" a thorough and efficient public education, and that petitioners did not
raise "a viable claim that their State aid was underfunded" for FY 2019. Finally,
the Commissioner agreed with the ALJ's equal protection analysis and her
conclusion that Wohlrab failed to allege any viable claims.
This appeal follows. Petitioners raise the following arguments.
POINT I
THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION'S FINAL
DECISION IS ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE
UPON APPELLATE REVIEW AND MUST BE
OVERTURNED.
POINT II
THE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO MEET THEIR
HEAVY BURDEN ON A MOTION TO DISMISS
AND, THUS, THE COMMISSIONER OF
EDUCATION'S FINAL DECISION MUST BE
OVERTURNED.
POINT III
THE APPELLATE DIVISION SHOULD APPLY
UNDISPUTED FACTS AND RESULTING
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO THE SUBSTANCE
OF THE PETITION OF APPEAL AND FASHION
APPROPRIATE RELIEF, OR, ALTERNATIVELY,
REMAND THE MATTER TO THE OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FOR FURTHER
DISCOVERY AND, ULTIMATELY, A PLENARY
HEARING ON THE MERITS OF APPELLANT[S']
PETITION.
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II.
A "strong presumption of reasonableness attaches to the actions of the
administrative agencies." In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.
2001) (quoting In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993)). The
scope of our review of a final decision of an administrative agency is limited
and we will not reverse such a decision unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, or . . . not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record
as a whole." In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (citing Henry v. Rahway
State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). When making that determination, we
consider:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or
implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency
follow the law; (2) whether the record contains
substantial evidence to support the findings on which
the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying
the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably
have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Ibid. (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83
(2007)).]
We are, however, "in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a
statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue . . . ." Carter, 191 N.J. at 483(quoting Mayflower Sec. Co. v. Bureau of Sec., 64 N.J. 85, 93 (1973)). We will,
A-1568-19
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however, generally "afford substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of
a statute that the agency is charged with enforcing." Patel v. N.J. Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, 200 N.J. 413, 420 (2009) (quoting Richardson v. Bd. of Trs., 192 N.J.
189, 196 (2007)).
The standards governing the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim in the administrative context are identical to those
governing a similar motion in the Superior Court. Compare N.J.A.C. 6A:3-1.10
with Rule 4:6-2(e); see also Sloan ex rel. Sloan v. Klagholtz, 342 N.J. Super.
385, 393-94 (App. Div. 2001). When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 4:6-2(e), the inquiry is "limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the
facts alleged on the face of the complaint." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp
Elec. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989). A reviewing court must "search[] the
complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a
cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim . . . ."
Ibid. (internal quotation omitted). A complaint will not be dismissed if a cause
of action is suggested by the facts alleged. Ibid.Although this standard is a "generous one" for a plaintiff, a pleading will
be dismissed if it states no basis for relief and discovery would not provide one.
Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451 (2013); Rezem Family Assocs., L.P.
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v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 113 (App. Div. 2011). A party
cannot satisfy its obligations to identify a cognizable claim with con clusory or
vague allegations. Delbridge v. Office of the Public Defender, 238 N.J. Super.
288, 314 (Law Div. 1989). While a complaint is entitled to a liberal reading, it
must allege facts that give rise to a legal cause of action; mere conclusion cannot
suffice. Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 4:5-2
(2020) (citing Glass v. Suburban Restoration Co., 317 N.J. Super. 574, 582
(App. Div. 1998)). "We review a grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a cause of action de novo, applying the same standard under Rule
4:6-2(e) that governed the motion court." Wreden v. Twp. of Lafayette, 436
N.J. Super. 117, 124 (App. Div. 2014).
We begin with the Commissioner's decision with respect to the "threshold
justiciability determination of whether" petitioners have standing, i.e., a
sufficient interest in the matter so as to allow them "to initiate and maintain an
action." Spinnaker Condo. Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Sea Isle City, 357 N.J. Super.
105, 110 (App. Div. 2003). Standing requires a plaintiff to have: (1) "a sufficient
stake in the outcome of the litigation[;]" (2) "a real adverseness with respect to
the subject matter[;]" and (3) "a substantial likelihood . . . [of] suffer[ing] harm
in the event of an unfavorable decision." In re Camden Cty., 170 N.J. 439, 449
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(2002). We generally apply a "generous view" of standing. In re State Contract
A71188, 422 N.J. Super. 275, 289 (App. Div. 2011).
We agree with the Commissioner's determination that our holding in
Stubaus precludes the municipality petitioners from alleging claims based on an
alleged unfair tax burden and any alleged educational deficiency caused by a
lack of State aid. In Stubaus, a number of taxpayers and school districts
challenged the public school funding system in place at that time. We affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, relying on the holding
in Robinson I that the Thorough and Efficient Clause is not intended to ensure
statewide equity among taxpayers. 339 N.J. Super. at 53-56. It is the
Legislature's prerogative to allocate among its political subdivisions the
financial responsibility for funding public education. See Robinson II, 69 N.J.
at 142. In addition, claims of educational deficiencies or inadequacies belong
to school districts, parents, or students, not municipalities. 3
3
For the same reasons, we agree with the Commissioner's determination that
petitioners cannot allege a valid claim that they are entitled to the level of
funding proposed in the Governor's budget message for FY 2019, absent an
appropriation enacted by the Legislature. It is well established that the
Legislature has the sole power and responsibility to raise revenue and
appropriate funds for the operation of our State government. N.J. Const. art.
VIII, §2, ¶2; see Byrne, 82 N.J. at 149 (1980) ("There can be no redress in the
courts to overcome either the Legislature's action or refusal to take action
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We are not convinced by the municipality petitioners' attempts to
distinguish their claims from those raised in Stubaus. Although petitioners
allege that the level of State aid they received for FY 2019 has caused, or
threatens to cause, them to reduce staff and programming, the basis of their
claims is that these cuts are, in part, the product of petitioners' decision not to
overly burden their taxpayers by raising additional local revenue to support
schools.
In addition, we agree with the Commissioner that it is well established
that the municipality petitioners and the school district petitioners lack standing
to raise equal protection claims against the State. Stubaus, 339 N.J. Super. at
48 (citing City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192, 196 (1921); McKenney
v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 304, 315 n.4 (1980)).
We agree with the Commissioner's conclusion that the district petitioners
have standing to raise claims of educational inadequacy and inequality and that
Wohlrab has standing to allege that her children are being denied a thorough and
efficient education. However, as the Commissioner concluded, an indulgent
pursuant to its constitutional power over state appropriations"). The prohibition
on the expenditure of State funds without legislative authorization is "the center
beam of the State's fiscal structure." Id. at 146.
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review of the petition does not reveal allegations of such claims upon which
relief can be granted.
While a thorough and efficient education is a "continually changing
concept," it is student-focused, and establishing a constitutional deprivation
requires a demonstration that a district's students' educational opportunities are
so deficient as to jeopardize their futures. Abbott II, 119 N.J. at 303. To plead
a valid deprivation of a thorough and efficient education, a petitioner must allege
facts that students in the district are not being "equip[ped] for [their] role[s] as
citizen[s] and competitor[s] in the labor market . . . ." Id. at 313 (citing Robinson
I, 62 N.J. at 515).
Having reviewed the petition, we agree with the conclusion of the ALJ,
adopted by the Commissioner, that "the petitioning Boards do not aver with any
specificity that they will be unable to raise the local taxes needed to deliver" a
thorough and efficient education to their students. While petitioners allege that
in some instances districts would be unable to raise local property taxes because
of the State-imposed cap on property tax increases, they do not allege how the
cap would directly impact the named parties or affect the delivery of essential
educational programming. Petitioners allege programming and staff cuts made,
or contemplated for future years, as a result of decreased State aid and
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petitioners' decision not to overburden taxpayers by raising additional local
revenue for education. Petitioners do not allege deprivations in their educational
programs of a constitutional dimension. 4
At base, petitioners assert their disagreement with the amount of State aid
appropriated to them by the Legislature for FY 2019 and the amounts of State
aid they expect to receive in future years to the extent that the Legislature
continues to appropriate State aid in accordance with the SFRA, as amended by
Chapter 67. Because they have not alleged a viable constitutional claim under
the Thorough and Efficient Clause, petitioners' disagreement with the
Legislature's appropriations must be addressed to the elected branches of
government, which have the sole authority to determine how to appropriate State
funds, in the absence of a constitutional mandate.
4
We agree with the Commissioner's conclusion that while Wohlrab has standing
to allege claims of unfair taxation and equal protection violations, those claims
are precluded by well-established precedents. See Robinson II, 69 N.J. at 142(1975) (holding that the Legislature may delegate the fiscal obligations to fund
schools to local governments); Stubaus, 339 N.J. Super. at 53 (holding that
Constitution does not guarantee taxpayers in various districts bear the burden of
financing education equally); Abbott II, 119 N.J. at 390 (holding that an equal
protection analysis is inapplicable to funding claims under the Thorough and
Efficient Clause).
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To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of petitioners'
remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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