STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. EDWARD A. CEGLOWSKI II (14-11-0406, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4214-16T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDWARD A. CEGLOWSKI II, a/k/a
EDWARD A. CEGLOWSKI, 2ND,
EDWARD CEGLOWSKI, EDDIE CEGLOWSKI,
EDWARD A. CEGLOWSKI, and
EDWARD CEGLOWSKI JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________________
Submitted September 18, 2018 – Decided October 2, 2018
Before Judges Suter and Firko.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Warren County, Indictment No. 14-11-0406.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Stephen P. Hunter, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Richard T. Burke, Warren County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Kelly Anne Shelton, Assistant
Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from an order denying his motion to suppress a
warrantless traffic stop that led to his conviction after a plea to driving while
suspended for a second or subsequent driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A.
2C:40-26(b), and motor vehicle violations related to DWI. He argues that the
police lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion because they relied upon a
citizen's tip that defendant appeared intoxicated, and acted belligerently, and
that this information was improvidently acted upon. We disagree with
defendant's contention and affirm.
I.
Amanda Bentler ("Bentler") observed defendant, who appeared to be
drunk, acting inappropriately at Bottle King, a liquor store, by yelling, harassing
female customers and asking them if they were married, and running to and from
cash registers. After exiting the store, Bentler got into her vehicle when
defendant knocked on her window and yelled at her "not to text and drive." After
observing him get into the driver's seat of a black Dodge pickup truck, she took
note of his license plate number and called her fiancé, Patrolman Michael
Madonna ("Madonna") of the Mansfield Police Department, expressing her
concerns. In turn, Madonna, who was on duty, relayed her information over the
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police radio and spoke to Officer James Murtha ("Murtha") of the Hackettstown
Police Department about a possible DWI. Murtha was able to stop defendant
after observing him driving over a curb and talking on a hand-held cell phone.
During a conversation, defendant told Murtha that his driving privileges were
suspended.1 Murtha detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from
defendant's breath. Another officer arrived and performed a field sobriety and
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, which resulted in defendant being charged
with DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, refusal to submit to a breath test, N.J.S.A. 39:4-
50.2, careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97, use of a cell phone, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97.3,
obstructed view, N.J.S.A. 39:3-74, and driving while suspended for a second or
subsequent offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).
After the hearing, the judge denied defendant's motion to suppress and
made the following findings:
Ms. Bentler had, as she conveyed to [O]fficer Madonna,
and as she testified to in a credible manner in the
opinion of this court, she had both the opportunity to
make observations. She had the presence of mind to
mentally record, and in the case of the plate number, to
manually record those observations. And in point of
fact, provided Madonna and in turn Murtha with a
reasonable articulable basis to suspect that there may
be a DWI afoot.
1
In fact, a certified driver's abstract confirmed that defendant's license was
suspended and that he had prior DWI convictions.
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Now, therefore, under the totality of the circumstances
officer Madonna had a reasonable and articulable
suspicion to believe that a person was in violation,
operated a motor vehicle in violation of Title 39. He
had a duty consistent with the police community
caretaking function to pass on that information to
dispatch. And based upon that information Murtha in
turn had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the
individual he observed operating a motor vehicle
matching the description right down to six of the seven
[alphanumeric] digits in the license plate, may have
been operating in violation of the motor vehicle code.
After noting that "the reasonable suspicion standard is even lower than the
probable cause standard," the judge assessed the reliability of the source of the
information, the credibility of the testimony given by Bentler, Madonna, and
Murtha, and concluded that the stop was valid. Addressing the applicability of
State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207, 215 (2008), the judge found that Bentler
communicated a commonly understood condition, a drunken person, which
gives an officer a reasonable and articulable basis to stop and investigate. Ibid.The information here, the judge concluded, was conveyed with "an unmistakable
sense that the caller has witnessed an ongoing offense that implicates a risk of
imminent death or serious injury to a particular person such as a vehicle's driver
or to the public at large." State v. Golotta, 178 N.J. 205, 221-22 (2003).
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The judge denied the motion to suppress. Defendant entered an open plea
to DWI and related charges and was sentenced. This appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, defendant raises the following argument:
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE MOTOR
VEHICLE STOP SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED
BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT
SUFFICIENT FACTS ESTABLISHING A
REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION
OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE. U.S.
Const. I, ¶¶ 1, 7.
We defer to the trial court's factual findings on a motion to suppress,
unless they were "'clearly mistaken' or 'so wide of the mark' that the interests of
justice require appellate intervention." State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 245 (2007)
(citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007)).
We exercise plenary review of a trial court's application of the law to the facts
on a motion to suppress. State v. Cryan, 320 N.J. Super. 325, 328 (App. Div.
1999).
The standards governing motor vehicle stops are familiar and well-settled,
and we need not review them at length here. See generally Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979); Golotta, 178 N.J. at 213; State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463(1999). An officer must have at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion of
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a motor vehicle violation or criminal offense in order to effectuate an
investigatory stop. The issue on appeal is whether Murtha had a sufficient basis
to stop defendant on suspicion he was intoxicated. The answer turns on the
reliability of Bentler's report. "[A]n informant's 'veracity,' 'reliability' and 'basis
of knowledge' are 'relevant in determining the value of [the] report.'" State v.
Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 127 (2002) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
328 (1990)). Reliability must be established by "some independent
corroborative effort." Ibid.Unlike the citizen informant in Golotta, who was anonymous, Bentler
disclosed her identity, and was found to be a credible witness. Her tip did not
seek some favor in return. Instead, she expressed concern for public safety by
reporting defendant's intoxication and erratic behavior. The details, including
the make and model of the vehicle, the license plate number, and its general
location and direction, were specified. See Golotta, 178 N.J. at 209-10. Once
Murtha confirmed the identity of defendant's vehicle, he observed him drive
over a curb while using his cell phone.
Courts have upheld the constitutionality of a stop without an officer first
observing the report of erratic driving. See e.g., id. at 210. A higher degree of
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corroboration is involved in such an instance and has been satisfied here. We
have also considered the lack of intrusiveness, since there was no vehicle search.
If the informant is a "concerned citizen or a known person[,]" less scrutiny
attaches to the informant's reliability because a citizen "acts with an intent to aid
the police in law enforcement because of [a] concern for society or for [personal]
safety." Amelio, 197 N.J. at 212-13 (quoting Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey,
162 N.J. 375, 390 (2000)). The judge found that Bentler satisfied these criteria.
An assessment of reasonable and articulable suspicion "must be based
upon the law enforcement officer's assessment of the totality of circumstances
with which he is faced." State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986); see also State
v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002). The State "is not required to prove that the
suspected motor vehicle violation occurred." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 470.
We are satisfied that Murtha had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to
conduct the stop in light of: the reliability of Bentler providing detailed
information to Madonna; the corroboration of her identification of the vehicle,
and the vehicle's location; as well as the danger to public safety posed by
defendant's intoxication and erratic behavior before getting behind the wheel.
The judge aptly found that Madonna fulfilled his community caretaking
function. "That function has its source in the ubiquity of the automobile and the
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dynamic differential situations police officers are confronted with to promote
driver safety." State v. Washington, 296 N.J. Super. 569, 572 (App. Div. 1997)
(citation omitted).
We have considered defendant's other arguments and find that they are
without sufficient merit to warrant comment. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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