PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION VS. JAMES MERCADANTE (F-028336-15, OCEAN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5312-16T4
    PNC BANK, NATIONAL
    ASSOCIATION,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    JAMES MERCADANTE
    and NANCY L. MERCADANTE,
    a/k/a NANCY MERCADANTE,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    __________________________
    Submitted September 26, 2018 – Decided October 18, 2018
    Before Judges Accurso and Moynihan.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Ocean County, Docket No. F-
    028336-15.
    James Mercadante and Nancy Mercadante, appellants
    pro se.
    Mattleman, Weinroth & Miller, PC, attorneys for
    respondent (Robert W. Williams, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendants, the obligors on two secured home equity line of credit
    agreements with plaintiff – the original lender – appeal from orders of: June 10,
    2016 granting plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' answer and affirmative
    defenses and enter default 1 against defendants who failed to make any loan
    payments after December 15, 2011, and denying defendants' motion to dismiss
    plaintiff's complaint; September 16, 2016 granting plaintiff's motion to reform,
    correcting a portion of a course in the foreclosed property's metes and bounds
    description; May 26, 2017 denying defendants' motion to fix the amount due;
    and June 14, 2017 entering final judgment. Defendants argue the "trial court
    erred, and abused its discretion by failing to make any findings of fact
    supporting its determination or otherwise sufficiently expressing its reasoning
    to grant [p]laintiff's motion for [s]ummary [j]udgment and denying [d]efendants'
    [c]ross-[m]otion for [d]ismissal." We conclude the trial court made adequate
    findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affirm.
    1
    Both parties refer to this motion as one for summary judgment. The trial court
    recognized plaintiff's motion as one to strike defendants' answer and affirmative
    defenses. It viewed defendants' motion "not only as a motion to dismiss the
    complaint but also as opposition to the motion to strike the answer and summary
    judgment."
    A-5312-16T4
    2
    A lender's right to foreclose is an equitable right inherent in a mortgage,
    triggered by a borrower's failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the
    associated loan. S.D. Walker, Inc. v. Brigantine Beach Hotel Corp., 
    44 N.J. Super. 193
    , 202 (Ch. Div. 1957). Generally, the defenses to foreclosure actions
    are narrow and limited. The material issues to be established in a foreclosure
    proceeding are the validity of the mortgage, the amount of indebtedness, and the
    right of the mortgagee to foreclose on the mortgaged property. See Thorpe v.
    Floremoore Corp., 
    20 N.J. Super. 34
    , 37 (App. Div. 1952) (holding that when
    "the execution, recording, and non-payment of the mortgage are conceded, a
    prima facie right to foreclose [is] made out"); Great Falls Bank v. Pardo, 
    263 N.J. Super. 388
    , 394 (Ch. Div. 1993). If the defendant's answer fails to challenge
    these essential elements, the mortgagee is entitled to strike it as a non-contesting
    answer. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Currie, 
    284 N.J. Super. 571
    , 574 (Ch. Div.
    1995); Somerset Trust Co. v. Sternberg, 
    238 N.J. Super. 279
    , 283 (Ch. Div.
    1989).
    Summary judgment should be granted if the court determines "there is no
    genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is
    entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c). We review the
    motion judge's decision de novo and afford his ruling no special deference.
    A-5312-16T4
    3
    Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 
    224 N.J. 189
    , 199
    (2016). We "consider whether the competent evidential materials presented,
    when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" in
    consideration of the applicable evidentiary standard, "are sufficient to permit a
    rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-
    moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540 (1995).
    When the moving party in a summary judgment motion satisfies its
    burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence that there
    is a genuine issue for trial. Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 
    225 N.J. 469
    , 479-80
    (2016); Brill, 
    142 N.J. at 529
    . The non-moving party may not satisfy its burden
    by merely making allegations or denials in its pleading, but must produce
    sufficient evidence to reasonably support a verdict in its favor. R. 4:46-5(a);
    G.D. v. Kenny, 
    205 N.J. 275
    , 304 (2011). Nor can the non-moving party defeat
    a summary judgment motion by the identification of a disputed fact of an
    insubstantial nature. Brill, 
    142 N.J. 520
     at 529-30.
    Contrary to defendants' contention that the trial court, in contravention of
    Rule 1:7-4,2 failed to make findings of fact or sufficiently express reasons for
    2
    The pertinent part of Rule 1:7-4 provides: "The court shall, by an opinion or
    memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its
    A-5312-16T4
    4
    granting plaintiff's summary judgment motion and denying their cross-motion
    to dismiss, the court, in its oral decision, recognized defendants' "primary
    argument in opposition is that they contend [the] loan [was] paid off[,] referring
    to documents provided by the plaintiff in discovery showing a charge-off of a
    loan." The court ruled the ledger sheets relied on by defendants showed the
    loans were charged-off, but not paid.        The court said it was satisfied a
    certification submitted by plaintiff's loan analyst, together with certified copies
    of the loan documents, including the note and mortgage, established plaintiff's
    "prima facie right to foreclose." The court's oral decision, albeit terse, satisfied
    the requirements of Rule 1:7-4.
    Defendants' like argument concerning the court's ruling on the "reform
    mortgage motion" is meritless. The terms of the order corrected a "scrivener's
    error" in the fifth course of the metes and bounds descriptions set forth in the
    mortgage documents. The court was not required by Rule 1:7-4 to set forth
    findings of fact and conclusions of law because the order was not one appealable
    as of right; it was an interlocutory order. Further, the order, in a handwritten
    notation, provides it was granted "for the reasons set forth in the moving papers,
    conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury, on every motion
    decided by a written order that is appealable as of right. . . ."
    A-5312-16T4
    5
    and because the existing [fifth course] of the plot would result in a plot that does
    not close."
    Defendants briefly mention in their Rule 1:7-4 argument that the trial
    court "had no personal knowledge of [p]laintiff's accounting practices, and
    [p]laintiff did not oppose [d]efendants' motion to fix the amount due. The [t]rial
    [court] denied the motion[,] making assumptions of [p]lanitiff's accounting
    practices." Although not specifically briefed as a ground for appeal, defendants
    claim plaintiff did not possess the underlying notes, as evidenced by ledger
    sheets that show plaintiff charged-off the loans. Defendants claim this evidence
    shows the loans were paid and sold to a third party. They have failed, however,
    to present evidence of a genuine issue for trial. They do not dispute that they
    signed the notes or that plaintiff was the original lender on both loans. Plaintiff's
    loan analyst certified that he personally reviewed the loan documents, and that
    "[p]laintiff is the original lender and remains the current holder of [each] subject
    loan."3 The documentary evidence submitted by defendants refers only to loan
    3
    In their merits brief, defendants mention standing but do not argue plaintiff
    lacked standing. As such we will not consider that issue. 539 Absecon Blvd.,
    L.L.C. v. Shan Enters. Ltd. P'ship, 
    406 N.J. Super. 242
    , 272 n.10 (App. Div.
    2009) (noting claims that have not been briefed are deemed abandoned on
    appeal). In any event, the loan analyst's certification, as the trial court found,
    established plaintiff's right to foreclose.
    A-5312-16T4
    6
    charge-offs; the documents do not establish that the loans were paid, sold or
    otherwise transferred.   Defendants' bald assertion that plaintiff was not in
    possession of the notes is insufficient to overcome the summary judgment
    motion. There is no evidence that plaintiff – the originator of both notes – ever
    transferred them to a third party or that the notes were paid.
    Against defendants' arguments, the record supports the entry of all of the
    contested orders.
    Affirmed.
    A-5312-16T4
    7