RODNEY LEE VS. PHELAN HALLINAN DIAMOND & JONES, PC (L-1766-18, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )


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  •                                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1079-18T2
    RODNEY LEE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    and
    JANET COLLIER,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    PHELAN HALLINAN
    DIAMOND & JONES, PC,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Submitted August 1, 2019 – Decided August 7, 2019
    Before Judges Whipple and Firko.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
    Division, Burlington County, Docket No. L-1766-18.
    Rodney Lee, appellant pro se.
    Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones PC, respondent pro
    se (Brian J. Yoder, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Self-represented plaintiff Rodney Lee appeals a Law Division order
    entered on October 29, 2018 granting defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's
    complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). For the reasons that follow,
    we affirm.
    On August 21, 2018, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Law Division
    requesting judgment for damages against defendant, Phelan Hallinan Diamond
    & Jones, PC, who represented the mortgagee, U.S. Bank National Association
    (U.S. Bank), in the underlying mortgage foreclosure action. Plaintiff alleged he
    still owned the Subject Property located at 83 Pine Grove Terrace in Newark,
    U.S. Bank had no right to collect rent payments from any tenants at the property,
    defendant violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act by making false
    statements about him, and defendant violated the Foreclosure Fairness Act,
    N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 to -71.
    On October 4, 2018, defendant filed the motion to dismiss under review.
    Defendant construed plaintiff's allegations as a "bad faith and futile attempt to
    collaterally attack the underlying foreclosure action and U.S. Bank's ownership
    of the Subject Property" notwithstanding plaintiff's actual knowledge of the
    Sheriff's sale. Defendant presented the following arguments in support of its
    A-1079-18T2
    2
    motion to dismiss: plaintiff's claims are based on the doctrines of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, and the entire controversy doctrine because "the record of
    the Chancery Court under docket F-030486-13 establishes beyond question the
    fact that [U.S. Bank] acquired title[] to the Subject Property at Sheriff's sale on
    May 31, 2016[,]" thereby disavowing plaintiff's claim that he still owns the
    property, and plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
    Plaintiff filed opposition to defendant's motion on October 10, 2018 and
    waived his appearance for oral argument. On October 29, 2018, the scheduled
    date for oral argument, Judge Susan L. Claypoole entered an order and a
    statement of reasons dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Judge
    Claypoole's opinion fully explained her reasons for granting defendant's motion:
    Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is a doctrine that
    declares that once a matter has been fully litigated and
    resolved, it cannot be re-litigated. Nolan v. First
    Colony Life Ins. Co., 
    345 N.J. Super. 142
    , 153 (App.
    Div. 2001) [(citing Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic
    Beverage Control, 
    33 N.J. 428
    , 435 (1960)).] In order
    for res judicata to have effect, there must be (1) a final
    judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2)
    identity of issues, (3) identity of parties, and (4) identity
    of the cause of action. Brookshires Equity, LLC v.
    Montaquiza, 
    346 N.J. Super. 310
    , 318 (App. Div.
    2002).
    Res judicata promotes judicial efficiency, as litigation
    in a matter must eventually end. Watkins v. Resorts
    Int'l[] Hotel & Casino, 
    124 N.J. 398
    , 409 (1991). "In
    A-1079-18T2
    3
    essence, the doctrine of res judicata provides that a
    cause of action between parties that has been finally
    determined on the merits by a tribunal having
    jurisdiction cannot be relitigated by those parties or
    their privies in a new proceeding." Velasquez v. Franz,
    
    123 N.J. 498
    , 505 (1991) (citations omitted). For a
    decision to have the effect of res judicata, there must be
    a valid and final judgment on an issue of fact or law that
    is essential to the judgment. 
    Id. at 506.
    It is then
    binding on the parties, whether in the same or a
    different claim. 
    Ibid. In order for
    collateral estoppel to apply, a party must
    show (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the
    issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was
    actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court
    in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the
    merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential
    to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom
    the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with
    a party to the earlier proceeding. First Union Nat['l]
    Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 
    190 N.J. 342
    , 352
    (2007) [(citing Hennessey v. Winslow Twp., 
    183 N.J. 593
    , 599 (2005)).]
    The Entire Controversy Doctrine is found in [Rule]
    4:30A. Pursuant to [Rule] 4:30A: "Non-joinder of
    claims required to be joined by the entire controversy
    doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted
    claims to the extent required by the entire controversy
    doctrine. . . ." R. 4:30A.
    The purpose of the entire controversy doctrine is to
    avoid fragmentation of litigation and to promote party
    fairness, judicial economy and efficiency. See Thomas
    v. Hargest, 
    363 N.J. Super. 589
    , 596 (App. Div. 2003).
    Thus, a litigant is required to assert in one action all
    claims arising from a single controversy. 
    Id. at 595.
    In
    A-1079-18T2
    4
    order for the doctrine to bar the action being asserted,
    the plaintiff must have had a fair and reasonable
    opportunity to fully litigate its claim in the prior action.
    
    Id. [at 546.]
    The entire controversy doctrine is one of judicial
    fairness and will be invoked in that spirit. Crispin v.
    Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 
    96 N.J. 336
    , 343 (1984). The
    doctrine was judicially created as a "reflection of . . .
    the unification of the state courts" in light of our
    Constitution's recognition of "the value in resolving
    related claims in one adjudication so that all matters in
    controversy between parties may be completely
    determined." Higgins v. Thurber, 
    413 N.J. Super. 1
    ,
    11-12 (App. Div. 2010). The objectives of the doctrine
    are:    (1) to encourage the comprehensive and
    conclusive determination of a legal controversy; (2) to
    achieve party fairness, including both parties before the
    court as well as prospective parties; and (3) to promote
    judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding
    fragmented, multiple and duplicative litigation. 
    Id. at 12.
    ....
    In support of its [m]otion, [d]efendant cites to Malaker
    Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm[ittee] v. First
    New Jersey Nat[tional] Bank, in which the [appellate]
    court held that the entire controversy doctrine [barred]
    the claims because "the bank's claims in the prior suit,
    upon which judgment was recovered, and plaintiffs'
    claims in the present litigation, do derive from the same
    transaction or series of transactions—the underlying
    alleged agreements to extend credit." [
    163 N.J. Super. 463
    , 498 (App. Div. 1978).] Here, [d]efendant argues
    that [p]laintiffs' claims against it are "entirely
    dependent on a challenge to [U.S. Bank's] ownership of
    the Subject Property. However, [U.S. Bank's] right to
    A-1079-18T2
    5
    foreclose the Subject Property was established by the
    court's entry of Final Judgment of Foreclosure on
    November 24, 2015."         Further, ownership was
    established by the Essex County Sheriff's issuance of a
    Sheriff's Deed on August 6, 2016.
    ....
    Plaintiff Lee contends that [d]efendant has violated the
    New Jersey Fair Foreclosure Fairness Act.
    Specifically, [p]laintiff Lee states that, in New Jersey,
    ownership of real property is transferred by deed, and
    the transfer of a property interest is complete upon
    delivery of same. Here, according to [p]laintiff Lee, the
    certification of Brian J. Yoder, Esq. fails to certify that
    the Sheriff's Deed . . . was transferred and completed;
    that [U.S. Bank] is "person who takes titles, as a result
    of a [S]heriff's sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure to a
    residential property["]; and that [d]efendant, as an
    agent of [U.S. Bank], provided the Notice to Tenants in
    accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:50-70. Further, [p]laintiff
    Lee asserts that the certification of Brian J. Yoder, Esq.
    also fails to offer any credible evidence to prove that it
    was the intent that the Sheriff's Deed be effective upon
    its physical delivery to [U.S. Bank] or to transfer the
    Subject Property to same.
    [Plaintiff] also asserts that [d]efendant has failed to
    demonstrate that it did not violate the New Jersey Fair
    Foreclosure Fairness Act and, as such, the allegations
    set forth against [d]efendant remain undisputed. Nor
    has [d]efendant presented any credible evidence that
    [U.S. Bank] had taken title[] to the Subject Premises
    prior to, or after, sending the Notice to Tenants. In
    support of this assertion, [p]laintiff Lee cites to an
    apparently unanswered letter dated August 2, 2018 in
    which he demanded proof that ownership of the Subject
    Property had in fact changed. . . .
    A-1079-18T2
    6
    In reply, [d]efendant argues that, despite any claims to
    the contrary, the evidence attached to the [m]otion to
    [d]ismiss is admissible. Defendant cites to [Rule] 902
    which provides that extrinsic evidence of authenticity
    as condition precedent to admissibility is not required
    with respect to New Jersey public documents and
    certified copies of public records. [N.J.R.E. 902.]
    Here, all of the documents on which [d]efendant relies
    are limited to true and correct copies of New Jersey
    public documents and copies of public records.
    Therefore, all of [d]efendant's exhibits are self-
    authenticating and admissible.
    Further, [d]efendant states that the publically recorded
    Sheriff's Deed demonstrates that title to the Subject
    Property has vested in [U.S. Bank]. While [p]laintiff
    Lee claims that no proof was submitted of any physical
    delivery, [d]efendant contends that such extrinsic
    evidence is not required as "the public recording of the
    Deed automatically creates a presumption at law of
    delivery with the intent to transfer." 
    Ibid. [(Citations omitted).] The
    judge concluded that dismissal was warranted under Rule 4:6-2(e)
    because "the record is replete with evidence showing that [U.S. Bank] gained
    title to the Subject [P]roperty via the Sheriff's [s]ale." Further, the judge aptly
    noted that, on November 25, 2015, a final judgment and writ of execution were
    granted in favor of U.S. Bank. On May 31, 2016, the Essex County Sheriff sold
    the Subject Property to U.S. Bank and issued a Sheriff's deed on August 6, 2016.
    On July 10, 2017, plaintiff's motion to vacate the Sheriff's sale was denied, and
    A-1079-18T2
    7
    on June 26, 2018, a post-sale Notice to Tenant was properly forwarded to the
    tenants in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2A:50-70. The judge concluded there was
    "proof" of ownership vesting in U.S. Bank, the issue of ownership "has been
    clearly decided," and plaintiff's claims are barred under the doctrines of res
    judicata, collateral estoppel, and the entire controversy doctrine. This appeal
    followed.
    "On appeal, we apply a plenary standard of review from a trial court's
    decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e)." Rezem Family
    Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 
    423 N.J. Super. 103
    , 114 (App. Div. 2011).
    "[W]e owe no special deference to a trial judge's legal interpretations in deciding
    any motion." Giannakopoulos v. Mid State Mall, 438 N.J. Super 595, 600 (App.
    Div. 2014).
    "In reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 4:6-2(e) our inquiry is
    limited to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the face of the
    complaint." Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 
    116 N.J. 739
    , 746
    (1989). "The essential test is simply 'whether a cause of action is "suggested" by
    the facts.'" Green v. Morgan Props., 
    215 N.J. 431
    , 451 (2013) (quoting Printing
    
    Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746
    ). Reviewing courts must "search[] the
    complaint in depth and with liberality to ascertain whether the fundament of a
    A-1079-18T2
    8
    cause of action may be gleaned even from an obscure statement of claim,
    opportunity being given to amend if necessary." Printing 
    Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 746
    (quoting Di Cristofaro v. Laurel Grove Mem'l Park, 
    43 N.J. Super. 244
    , 252 (App. Div. 1957)).
    Applying this standard of review, following our review of plaintiff 's
    arguments in light of the record and applicable law, we affirm the Law Division's
    order substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Claypoole's comprehensive
    and well-reasoned statement of reasons.
    Any argument raised by plaintiff not explicitly addressed in this opinion
    lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
    3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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    9