THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY, LLC VS. THE COUNTY OF BERGEN THE STOP & SHOP SUPERMARKET COMPANY, LLC VS. THE BERGENCOUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS(L-7943-14 AND L-9333-14, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(CONSOLIDATED) ( 2017 )


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  •                 NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2134-14T1
    A-4630-14T1
    THE STOP & SHOP
    SUPERMARKET COMPANY, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant/
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    Cross-Respondent,
    JUNE 14, 2017
    v.
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    THE COUNTY OF BERGEN; THE BERGEN
    COUNTY PLANNING BOARD; AND THE
    COUNTY OF BERGEN DEPARTMENT OF
    PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
    Defendants-Respondents/
    Cross-Appellants.
    _________________________________________
    THE STOP & SHOP
    SUPERMARKET COMPANY, LLC,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    THE BERGEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN
    FREEHOLDERS, THE BERGEN COUNTY
    PLANNING BOARD, AND INSERRA
    SUPERMARKETS, INC.,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    _________________________________________
    Argued November 9, 2016 - Decided April 6, 2017
    Before Judges Ostrer, Leone, and Vernoia.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Bergen County, Docket Nos. L-
    7943-14 and L-9333-14.
    John R. Edwards, Jr. argued the cause for
    appellant    (Price,   Meese,  Shulman   &
    D'Arminio, P.C., attorneys; Mr. Edwards,
    Gail L. Price, Kathryn J. Razin, and David
    J. Reich, on the briefs).
    Frank P. Kapusinski, Assistant Bergen County
    Counsel, argued the cause for respondents
    the County of Bergen, the Bergen County
    Planning Board, and the County of Bergen
    Department   of    Planning   and   Economic
    Development   (Julien    X.  Neals,   County
    Counsel,   attorney;   Mr.  Kapusinski,   of
    counsel and on the briefs).
    Edward J. Florio argued the cause for
    respondent the Bergen County Board of Chosen
    Freeholders (Florio, Kenny, Raval, L.L.P.,
    attorneys; Mr. Florio, of counsel and on the
    brief; Paul Samouilidis, on the brief).
    John J. Lamb argued the cause for respondent
    Inserra    Supermarkets,     Inc.    (Beattie
    Padovano, LLC, and Wells Jaworski Liebman,
    LLP, attorneys; Mr. Lamb, Ira E. Weiner, and
    James E. Jaworski, of counsel and on the
    brief; Daniel L. Steinhagen, on the brief).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    LEONE, J.A.D.
    Plaintiff the Stop & Shop Supermarket Company, LLC (Stop &
    Shop) opposed the site plan application of defendant Inserra
    Supermarkets, Inc. (Inserra) for the construction of a ShopRite
    supermarket along a county road.   Stop & Shop objected to the
    application before defendant the Bergen County Planning Board
    2                         A-2134-14T1
    (County Planning Board) and then appealed its approval of the
    site    plan    to   defendant     the    Bergen   County       Board     of    Chosen
    Freeholders      (Board     of    Freeholders).          When     the     Board       of
    Freeholders affirmed, Stop & Shop filed a complaint in lieu of
    prerogative writs in the Law Division, which affirmed on May 12,
    2015.    Stop & Shop challenges that decision in appeal A—4630-14.
    Stop & Shop filed an action for declaratory relief against
    the    County    Planning    Board,      defendant      the   County      of    Bergen
    (County),      and   defendant    the    County    of    Bergen     Department        of
    Planning and Economic Development (DPED) (collectively the "OPRA
    defendants").        Stop   &    Shop    alleged   a    violation    of    the     Open
    Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13.                            The Law
    Division dismissed that action on November 26, 2014.                            Stop &
    Shop challenges that decision in appeal A-2134-14.                   We hold that
    OPRA litigation is authorized to allow a party who is denied
    access to records to obtain access to those records, and counsel
    fees are authorized under OPRA if the litigation                        causes the
    production of those records.              Because Stop & Shop had already
    obtained the records before it filed its declaratory judgment
    action, that action was moot and it is not entitled to counsel
    fees.
    We listed the two appeals back-to-back and now consolidate
    them for the purpose of this opinion.              We affirm.
    3                                    A-2134-14T1
    [At   the  direction  of  the   court,  the
    published version of this opinion omits the
    discussion of appeal A-4630-14, including
    Part I (which sets forth the facts relevant
    to that appeal) and Part II (which affirms
    the trial court's ruling in that appeal).
    See R. 1:36-3.]
    III.
    We next consider appeal A-2134-14, concerning the dismissal
    under Rule 4:6-2(e) of Stop & Shop's OPRA litigation.                        "When we
    review a trial court's decision to dismiss a complaint under
    Rule 4:6-2(e)," including for mootness, "our review is de novo."
    Teamsters Local 97 v. State, 
    434 N.J. Super. 393
    , 413, 416 (App.
    Div. 2014).
    We   summarize       the   facts     detailed     in   the    Law    Division's
    November     18,    2014   opinion.        On    July   7,   2011,    Stop    &   Shop
    submitted two OPRA request forms requesting various documents
    relating     to    Inserra's       site   plan    application.        Stop    &   Shop
    received responsive documents on August 8, 2011.
    On   June     26,    2014,    Stop   &     Shop   submitted     another     OPRA
    request form requesting documents provided by Inserra relating
    to its site plan application.                  On July 3, 2014, Stop & Shop
    received additional responsive documents, including: a January
    27,   2011        report   to      the    Township      Board      where    Inserra's
    professional engineer, Jay Troutman, Jr., initially proposed a
    traffic signal be installed at the intersection of Wyckoff and
    4                                 A-2134-14T1
    Greenwood Avenues; a June 30, 2011 e-mail in which a County
    traffic     engineer   recommended     against     signalization       due     to
    "conflicting movements and a railroad crossing" just south of
    the   intersection;    and    June   17,    2011   comments     by   the     same
    engineer stating "[a] corridor improvement with Railroad pre-
    emption and signal coordination are required to be done before
    adding any trips to the corridor" and that "[a] traffic impact
    study of all the impacted intersections is required."
    Stop & Shop wrote the Board of Freeholders advising it
    received those documents and arguing the documents should have
    been produced in response to its 2011 OPRA request.              Stop & Shop
    requested, and the Board agreed, to consider these documents,
    which it admitted at its July 16, 2014 hearing.                      The Board
    expressly stated it considered Stop & Shop's documents when it
    approved Inserra's site plan application on August 20, 2014.
    Two days before, on August 18, 2014, Stop & Shop filed a
    complaint    seeking   a     declaratory    judgment    "that    [the      OPRA]
    Defendants violated Stop & Shop's rights under the Open Public
    Records Act" and the common law right of access.                 Stop & Shop
    also requested counsel fees.         The OPRA defendants filed a motion
    to dismiss pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e).            On November 26, 2014, the
    Law   Division   granted     the   motion   to   dismiss,   finding     Stop    &
    5                                A-2134-14T1
    Shop's action was moot because it received the documents prior
    to initiating its OPRA lawsuit.            We agree.1
    "Mootness     is    a    threshold       justiciability       determination
    rooted in the notion that judicial power is to be exercised only
    when a party is immediately threatened with harm."                   Betancourt
    v. Trinitas Hosp., 
    415 N.J. Super. 301
    , 311 (App. Div. 2010).
    "It is firmly established that controversies which have become
    moot or academic prior to judicial resolution ordinarily will be
    dismissed."     N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. W.F., 
    434 N.J. Super. 288
    , 297 (App. Div.) (quoting Cinque v. N.J. Dep't
    of Corr., 
    261 N.J. Super. 242
    , 243 (App. Div. 1993)), certif.
    denied,   
    218 N.J. 275
       (2014).         "'[F]or    reasons    of   judicial
    economy and restraint, courts will not decide cases in which the
    issue is hypothetical, [or] a judgment cannot grant effective
    relief[.]'"     Cinque, 
    supra,
     
    261 N.J. Super. at 243
     (citation
    omitted).
    Here, Stop & Shop's OPRA litigation was moot before it
    filed its complaint because it already received the documents it
    sought.     Under OPRA's litigation provision, "[a] person who is
    denied access to a government record by the custodian of the
    1
    The Law Division also found dismissal appropriate because the
    complaint was "fatally time-barred" and because declaratory
    judgment is not "a recognized or an authorized form of relief in
    New Jersey" for a violation of OPRA.    We need not reach these
    issues as the action is moot.
    6                                A-2134-14T1
    record,     at    the   option      of   the   requestor,     may:    institute     a
    proceeding to challenge the custodian's decision by filing an
    action in Superior Court."               N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 (emphasis added).
    "If it is determined that access has been improperly denied, the
    court or agency head shall order that access be allowed."                     
    Ibid.
    (emphasis added).          Here, access was allowed even before Stop &
    Shop filed suit.           See, e.g., Walsh v. U.S. Dep't of Veteran
    Affairs,      
    400 F.3d 535
    ,     536   (7th    Cir.    2005)    ("'[O]nce      the
    government produces all the documents a plaintiff requests, her
    claim   for      relief    under     the   FOIA    becomes    moot.'"    (citation
    omitted)).2
    Stop & Shop argues this litigation is not moot because it
    seeks counsel fees.               Under OPRA's litigation provision, "[a]
    requestor who prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a
    reasonable attorney's fee."              N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.         "To be entitled
    to   such     counsel      fees    under   OPRA,    a     plaintiff    must   be    a
    prevailing party in a lawsuit . . . that was brought to enforce
    his or her access rights."               Smith v. Hudson Cty. Register, 
    422 N.J. Super. 387
    , 393 (App. Div. 2011).                  This requires either (1)
    records are disclosed "after the entry of some form of court
    2
    New Jersey courts often consider cases interpreting "OPRA's
    federal counterpart, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 
    5 U.S.C. § 552
    ."    See, e.g., Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J. Dep't of
    Educ., 
    198 N.J. 274
    , 284 (2009).
    7                              A-2134-14T1
    order or enforceable settlement" granting access, or (2) "when a
    government agency voluntarily discloses records after a lawsuit
    is    filed"    and      under    the    catalyst     theory     the      plaintiff       "can
    establish       a    'causal      nexus'     between       the   litigation        and    the
    production          of   requested        records"      and      "'that      the     relief
    ultimately secured by plaintiffs had a basis in law.'"                             Mason v.
    City of Hoboken, 
    196 N.J. 51
    , 57, 76-77, 79 (2008) (citation
    omitted).       Under the common law right of access, litigants must
    make the same showing.             
    Id. at 79
    .
    Our     Supreme      Court       in   Mason     refused       to    presume       OPRA
    litigants are entitled to counsel fees even when records are
    produced       after     suit     is    filed.       
    Id. at 78-79
    .       The        Court
    emphasized      such      an     entitlement       could    "upend     the   cooperative
    balance OPRA strives to attain," give plaintiffs "an incentive
    to file suit" to obtain "an award of attorney's fees," and give
    agencies "reason not to disclose documents voluntarily."                             
    Id. at 78
    .    "OPRA cases designed to obtain swift access to government
    records would end up as battles over attorney's fees."                               
    Id. at 79
    .
    Here, the OPRA defendants voluntarily produced the records
    before Stop & Shop filed suit.                    Such voluntary disclosure would
    be discouraged if Stop & Shop is allowed to file suit to obtain
    counsel fees for records it has already received.                          In any event,
    8                                    A-2134-14T1
    Stop & Shop did not obtain a judgment or enforceable consent
    decree granting it access to the records, and its filing of its
    lawsuit did not cause the production of the already-produced
    records.       The     Law     Division       properly     found      Stop      &    Shop   not
    entitled     to    attorneys'          fees    as    "Stop      &   Shop       is     not   the
    prevailing party and this lawsuit was not the catalyst for its
    receipt of the requested documents."
    Notably, Stop & Shop did not allege the OPRA defendants
    "knowingly     and     willfully        violate[d]"        OPRA     and      "unreasonably
    denied     access      under      the     totality         of   the      circumstances."
    N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11(a).            Nor did Stop & Shop sue for imposition of
    the    civil      penalties      which        OPRA    authorizes         for        such    non-
    disclosure.       
    Ibid.
            Thus, Stop & Shop did not claim entitlement
    to the remedy OPRA provides for such non-disclosure.
    Stop & Shop's OPRA appellate brief also argues its OPRA
    lawsuit is not moot because "[a] declaration in this lawsuit
    that the documents should have been turned over earlier could
    affect" its appeal of the Board of Freeholders' approval of
    Inserra's site plan application, as Stop & Shop plans to argue
    "the   County's      indefensible         delay      in    producing       the       documents
    deprived it of a fair hearing and due process of law."                                However,
    Stop   &   Shop    did    not     raise       that   argument       in    its       subsequent
    appellate      brief      in     the    site        plan   appeal.             Moreover,       a
    9                                      A-2134-14T1
    determination of whether there was an OPRA violation would be
    unnecessary        to     resolve      whether     Stop     &    Shop    received      a    fair
    hearing and due process before the County Planning Board and the
    Board of Freeholders.                  Furthermore, the Board of Freeholders
    considered the documents in its de novo review, and we upheld
    its   approval       of    the    site     plan    application          after   considering
    those documents.           Thus, this appeal is "moot" under OPRA and the
    common law because the "decision sought in [this] matter, when
    rendered,      can        have    no      practical        effect       on   the     existing
    controversy."           Redd v. Bowman, 
    223 N.J. 87
    , 104 (2015).                        Stop &
    Shop argues we should review this moot case because "the issue
    is of substantial importance, likely to reoccur, but capable of
    evading   review."             Bd.   of    Educ.     v.    Kennedy,      
    196 N.J. 1
    ,    18
    (2008).      However, none of those requirements are met here.
    Stop     &        Shop     cannot      avoid        the     proscription         against
    litigating      moot       issues       by   bringing           its   action       under        the
    Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), N.J.S.A. 2A:16-50 to -62.                                       The
    DJA provides courts have the power to determine legal issues "in
    a proceeding for declaratory relief, in which a judgment will
    terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty."                                 N.J.S.A.
    2A:16-52.      However, a "court may refuse to render or enter a
    declaratory judgment, when, if rendered or entered, it would not
    10                                       A-2134-14T1
    terminate     the       uncertainty     or    controversy             giving      rise    to    the
    proceeding."           N.J.S.A. 2A:16-61.
    "[T]he remedy of a declaratory judgment is 'circumscribed
    by   the    salutary         qualification     that           the    jurisdiction         of    the
    courts      may    not       be   invoked     in        the     absence       of    an     actual
    controversy.'"           Finkel v. Twp. Comm., 
    434 N.J. Super. 303
    , 318
    (App. Div. 2013) (quoting N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Parsons, 
    3 N.J. 235
    ,   240    (1949)).            "[W]here    the       issue        is   moot,     declaratory
    judgment     will       not    lie   because       of    the        absence    of    an    actual
    controversy."           Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,
    comment 1.2 on R. 4:42-3 (2017); see Parsons, supra, 3 N.J. at
    240.       Because Stop & Shop received the records, its right to
    receive them "is a moot issue," and it has no "entitlement to
    proceed under the [DJA]."               JUA Funding Corp. v. CNA Ins./Cont'l
    Cas.   Co.,       
    322 N.J. Super. 282
    ,       287    (App.       Div.     1999);      see
    Cornucopia Inst. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 
    560 F.3d 673
    , 675-76
    (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the argument that the "court remained
    free to issue a declaratory judgment that [the agency] violated
    FOIA" after the documents were produced).
    Additionally,          "[t]he   right        to    relief          under    the    DJA    is
    procedural in nature; it does not create substantive rights to
    relief."          In    re    N.J.   Firemen's      Ass'n           Obligation      to    Provide
    Relief Applications Under Open Pub. Records Act, 
    443 N.J. Super. 11
                                              A-2134-14T1
    238, 253 (App. Div. 2015), certif. granted, 
    224 N.J. 528
     (2016).
    "A party that lacks a statutory right of action under OPRA may
    not   obtain   declaratory     relief   regarding   its   rights    or
    obligations under OPRA."     Id. at 257.
    Accordingly, we affirm the Law Division's ruling to the
    extent it held Stop & Shop was not entitled to a declaratory
    judgment in this moot litigation.       We need not decide the OPRA
    defendants' "cross-appeal that Stop & Shop lacks standing" to
    raise the OPRA claim.
    We affirm in appeal A-2134-14 and appeal A-4630-14.
    12                         A-2134-14T1