STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. DWAYNE WILSON (07-04-0720, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0457-15T1
    DONG I. SHIN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    CNA1 and VALLEY FORGE INSURANCE
    COMPANY,
    Defendants-Respondents.
    _______________________________
    Argued January 24, 2017 — Decided March 10, 2017
    Before Judges Reisner and Koblitz.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-
    2342-15.
    John F. Golden argued the cause for appellant
    (Albert Buzzetti & Associates, LLC, attorneys;
    Mr. Golden, on the brief).
    Edward M. Napierkowski argued the cause for
    respondent (CNA Coverage Litigation Group,
    attorneys; Charles G. Carluccio, III, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    1
    Plaintiff incorrectly named "CNA" as a defendant. CNA is a
    service mark and not an insurer of the policy at issue.
    In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiff Dong I. Shin
    appeals from the August 21, 2015 orders granting summary judgment
    to defendant Valley Forge Insurance Company (VFIC) and denying
    plaintiff's   motion   for   summary       judgment.        The    motion     judge
    determined    that   plaintiff       was   not   entitled    to    underinsured
    motorist (UIM) coverage under the business policy issued by VFIC
    for an accident that occurred while he was driving his wife's car
    from church on a Sunday.             Because the policy lists plaintiff
    individually as the named insured, the UIM endorsement covers his
    personal car, and some of the language in the UIM endorsement
    indicates coverage, we agree with plaintiff and reverse both
    orders.
    The facts are not in dispute and the parties agree summary
    judgment is appropriate.     Plaintiff obtained commercial insurance
    from VFIC for his wholesale florist business.                He leases a 2007
    Mitsubishi refrigerator truck that he uses to carry flowers for
    his business.   Plaintiff, rather than his business entity, is the
    only named insured on a business automobile insurance policy issued
    by VFIC for UIM coverage with a $1,000,000 limit.                 The Mitsubishi
    truck is listed on the policy as a "covered 'auto'" and plaintiff's
    personal cars, without description, are listed as covered in the
    UIM endorsement.
    2                                          A-0457-15T1
    On August 5, 2012, plaintiff was driving his three children
    and a friend home from church in a BMW X5 owned by his wife when
    he was rear-ended by another vehicle. Plaintiff sustained injuries
    and filed three insurance claims in connection with the accident.
    He settled with the company that insured the vehicle that hit him,
    for the full policy limit of $25,000.         Plaintiff also asserted a
    claim under his wife's personal insurance policy for the BMW that
    he was driving the day of the accident.           Plaintiff settled for
    $25,000, which was the remaining balance of the $50,000 policy
    after the previous $25,000 settlement was deducted.
    Plaintiff   filed   a   third    claim   under   his   business   auto
    insurance policy with VFIC.        After taking plaintiff's deposition,
    VFIC denied his claim on the basis that at the time of the accident,
    plaintiff was driving his wife's BMW, a car not covered by the
    policy. Plaintiff then filed a declaratory judgment action seeking
    a determination that VFIC was required to provide him with UIM
    coverage for the August 5 motor vehicle accident.
    We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo
    and apply the same standard as the trial court.             Cypress Point
    Condo. Ass'n v. Adria Towers, LLC, 
    226 N.J. 403
    , 414 (2016).
    Summary judgment must be granted if a review of the record shows
    "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged
    and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a
    3                                   A-0457-15T1
    matter of law."   R. 4:46-2(c).   No special deference is afforded
    to the legal determinations of the trial court when no issue of
    fact exists.   Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins.
    Co. of Pittsburg, 
    224 N.J. 189
    , 199 (2016).
    Insurance policies are generally interpreted according to
    their plain and ordinary meaning.      Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v.
    Hurley, 
    166 N.J. 260
    , 273-74 (2001).    However, when the policy is
    ambiguous, "courts should interpret the contract in accordance
    with the 'reasonable expectations' of the insured."    Shotmeyer v.
    N.J. Realty Title Ins. Co., 
    195 N.J. 72
    , 82 (2008).     "Only where
    there is a genuine ambiguity, that is, 'where the phrasing of the
    policy is so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make
    out the boundaries of the coverage,' should the reviewing court
    read the policy in favor of the insured."     Templo Fuente De Vida
    
    Corp., supra
    , 224 N.J. at 200 (quoting Progressive Cas. Ins. 
    Co., supra
    , 166 N.J. at 274); see also Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
    
    168 N.J. 590
    , 601 (2001) (policies will be read according to
    insured's understanding when they contain overly technical text,
    hidden pitfalls, obscure fine print or require strenuous study to
    comprehend).
    After oral argument, the motion court stated in its reasons
    that "the BMW at the time of the accident was not a covered
    vehicle, and was not a substitute for the covered vehicle when it
    4                              A-0457-15T1
    was being used on a Sunday for personal family activities, to wit
    driving from church, and therefore not engaged in the business as
    a florist.    See [Dickson] v. Selective Insurance Company, 363 N.J.
    Super. 344 (App. Div. 2003) in support of this position."                     In
    Dickson, we found no UIM coverage for an individual injured in his
    private vehicle being driven for non-business reasons.            We stated:
    "Because he was neither a specifically named or covered driver,
    nor a person listed as insured or covered in the 'drive other'
    endorsement, he was not entitled to UIM protection under the
    employer's policy for an accident occurring in a vehicle not owned
    and   insured    by   his   employer,   and   having   no   relation   to   his
    business."      
    Dickson, supra
    , 363 N.J. Super. at 353.
    The VFIC policy states:
    Schedule of Coverages and Covered Autos
    This policy provides only those coverages
    where a charge is shown in the premium column
    below.   Each of these coverages will apply
    only to those "autos" shown as covered
    "autos". "Autos" are shown as covered "autos"
    for a particular coverage by the entry of one
    or more of the symbols from the Covered Auto
    Section of the Business Auto Coverage Form
    next to the name of the Coverage.
    [Emphasis added.]
    Unlike in Dickson, here plaintiff was the one named insured
    on the policy and both the leased truck used for flower deliveries
    as well as his privately "Owned 'Autos' Subject to A Compulsory
    5                                    A-0457-15T1
    Uninsured Motorist Law" were specifically listed as covered autos
    on the UIM endorsement.    The UIM endorsement begins with the
    statement, "For a covered 'auto'. . . this endorsement modifies
    insurance . . . ."   The UIM endorsement, however, also contains
    the following language:
    B. Who Is An Insured
    If the Named Insured is designated in the
    Schedule or Declarations as:
    1. An individual,      then     the    following   are
    "insureds":
    a. The Named       Insured    and    any   "family
    members."
    b. Anyone else "occupying" a covered "auto"
    or a temporary substitute for a covered
    "auto." The covered "auto" must be out of
    service because if its breakdown, repair,
    servicing, "loss" or destruction.
    c. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled
    to recover because of "bodily injury"
    sustained by another "insured."
    2. A partnership, limited liability company,
    corporation or any other form of organization,
    then the following are "insureds":
    a. Anyone "occupying" a covered "auto"
    or a temporary substitute for a covered
    "auto." The covered "auto" must be out
    of service because of its breakdown,
    repair,     servicing,    "loss"     or
    destruction.
    b. Anyone for damages he or she is
    entitled to recover because of "bodily
    injury" sustained by another "insured."
    6                                      A-0457-15T1
    c. The Named      Insured    for    "property
    damage" only.
    This language requires that all persons occupy a "covered
    'auto'" to be included in the UIM coverage except for the named
    insured, when an individual, and his or her family members.            VFIC
    argues that because plaintiff's wife's car, which was involved in
    the accident, was not a covered business or personal vehicle under
    the UIM endorsement, UIM coverage is not available.                In the
    endorsement, however, the "Who Is An Insured" language establishes
    coverage for the individually named insured, regardless of the
    vehicle he or she is occupying at the time of the accident.
    "As to insurance contracts specifically, 'the general rule
    of construction [is] that if the controlling language of a policy
    will support two meanings, one favorable to the insurer and the
    other to the insured, the interpretation favoring coverage should
    be applied.'"    Cypress Point Condo. 
    Ass'n, supra
    , 226 N.J. at 416
    (quoting Mazzilli v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 
    35 N.J. 1
    , 7
    (1961)).   Applying the unambiguous language in the portion of the
    UIM endorsement concerning "Who Is An Insured," plaintiff is
    entitled to coverage.
    Reversed.     We remand for the entry of an order denying
    defendant's   summary   judgment   motion    and    granting   plaintiff's
    summary judgment motion.    We do not retain jurisdiction.
    7                                    A-0457-15T1
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-0475-15T2

Filed Date: 8/4/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024