MARKEIM-CHALMERS, INC. VS. WILLINGBORO URBAN RENEWAL, LLC(L-3111-12, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5469-14T3
    MARKEIM-CHALMERS, INC.,
    Plaintiff-Respondent/
    Cross-Appellant,
    v.
    WILLINGBORO URBAN RENEWAL, LLC;
    D&D COLLEGE PROPERTIES, LLC;
    CAMPUS PROPERTIES, LLC,
    HANKINS PROPERTIES, LLC; STEVEN
    HANKINS; STRAYER UNIVERSITY, INC.;
    and RENEWAL WILLINGBORO, LLC,
    Defendants-Appellants/
    Cross-Respondents.
    ______________________________________
    Argued April 24, 2017 – Decided August 3, 2017
    Before Judges Sabatino, Currier and Geiger.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-
    3111-12.
    Peter N. Milligan argued the                cause    for
    appellants/cross-respondents.
    Bruce S. Luckman argued the cause for
    respondent/cross-appellant          (Sherman,
    Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky, P.A.,
    attorneys; Mr. Luckman, of counsel and on the
    briefs).
    PER CURIAM
    At issue in this matter is the entitlement to a real estate
    broker's commission for the lease and sublease of a commercial
    building in the Township of Willingboro.            On cross-motions for
    summary judgment, the judge granted plaintiff Markeim-Chalmers,
    Inc. ("MCI") partial summary judgment, awarding MCI a $100,000
    commission    arising   from   the    ninety-nine-year    lease    of   the
    property.    The judge also granted defendants, Renewal Willingboro
    LLC, Inc. ("Renewal Willingboro"), Willingboro Urban Renewal, LLC
    ("Urban Renewal"), D&D College Properties, LLC ("D&D"), Campus
    Properties, LLC ("Campus Properties"), Hankins Properties, LLC
    ("Hankins Properties"), Steven Hankins ("Hankins"), and Strayer
    University, Inc. ("Strayer") partial summary judgment dismissing
    MCI's claim for a commission on the ten-year sublease of the
    property to Strayer.     For the reasons that follow, we affirm in
    part and reverse and remand in part.
    I.
    We   glean   the   following    facts   from   the   motion   record.
    Defendant Renewal Willingboro and its wholly owned subsidiary
    Urban Renewal developed the Willingboro Town Center in Willingboro
    Township. One of their main tenants was Burlington County College,
    which rented the 20,992 square foot commercial property located
    at 300 Campbell Street (the "property") owned by Urban Renewal.
    2                             A-5469-14T3
    In 2011, the college announced its intention not to renew its
    lease, which would leave the office building vacant after September
    2012.   Urban Renewal's lender required it to find a new tenant for
    the building. As a result, Urban Renewal hired several real estate
    brokers, including MCI, to secure a new tenant or buyer for the
    property.   Over the course of the next two years, Urban Renewal
    and MCI entered into several short-term agreements where MCI would
    list the property in the hopes of finding either a purchaser or
    tenant and, if it did, receive a broker's commission.1
    In   one   broker   agreement,       the   "open   listing   agreement,"
    Renewal Willingboro agreed to pay MCI a five percent commission
    if a "sale or exchange" of the property occurred before a specified
    date between Urban Renewal2 and a prospective buyer that had been
    "registered" by MCI with Urban Renewal.             The agreement required
    1
    On September 15, 2010, MCI and Urban Renewal entered into an
    "Exclusive Right to Lease Listing Agreement," which by its terms
    expired on October 15, 2010. The agreement was extended by the
    parties and subsequently terminated by mutual consent before a
    tenant was found. On July 25, 2011, MCI and Urban Renewal signed
    an exclusive "right to sell" agreement, which would expire on
    October 15, 2011.   The agreement expired without a buyer being
    found or any prospective purchasers being registered by MCI.
    2
    Throughout the documentation in this case, Renewal Willingboro
    and Urban Renewal are frequently referred to interchangeably.
    Robert B. Stang and Charles Hack were the managing members of both
    entities.   As one entity wholly owns the other and both are
    controlled by the same people, the distinction does not
    substantively affect our analysis.
    3                               A-5469-14T3
    MCI to inform Urban Renewal of prospective buyers in order to
    receive a five-percent commission "in the event of a sale of
    property."    The agreement also stated: "if owner accepts an offer
    to sell or exchange within 6 months to anyone to whom [MCI] has
    registered in writing with Owner said commission shall be due and
    payable as contained herein."            (Emphasis added).          The agreement
    was not exclusive, and Urban Renewal could have authorized other
    brokers to market the property.
    MCI and Urban Renewal also separately entered into a "lease
    commission agreement," in which Urban Renewal agreed to pay MCI a
    five-percent    commission     if   the        property    was      leased     to     a
    "registered" third party by a specified date.                 The "registered"
    parties identified by MCI under the open listing agreement included
    Steven Hankins and two related companies that he owned, Hankins
    Properties and Campus Properties.
    On December 4, 2011, MCI entered into a "Confidentiality &
    Client Registration Agreement" with Strayer as a potential buyer
    and provided it with confidential information about the property.
    In   emails   later   that   week   to       Strayer's    broker,    Cushman        and
    4                                   A-5469-14T3
    Wakefield of Pennsylvania, Inc. ("C&W"), MCI shared information
    about the property's current tenant and potential sales prices.3
    On February 2, 2012, MCI sent Stang and Urban Renewal a letter
    of intent ("LOI") from Hankins and Campus Properties detailing a
    proposal to buy the college building for $2 million.       The LOI
    noted that MCI (representing Urban Renewal) and C&W (representing
    Hankins) were the brokers on the deal. The LOI expired on February
    7, 2012.
    Over the next few days, MCI facilitated discussions between
    Urban Renewal and the Campus Properties entities, and secured
    permission from Hankins to keep the LOI open "a couple of days"
    past the February 7, 2012 deadline.   That back-and-forth continued
    for a few weeks.
    On February 23, 2012, MCI – responding to an email not in the
    appellate record – emailed Stang and Urban Renewal, writing:
    Glad   to  see   that   things seem  to  be
    progressing. Please try to copy me on all
    correspondence with Steve Hankins on this
    matter as we discussed so I can stay in the
    loop. I know you prefer to negotiate with
    Steve directly, but I am here to assist
    however you would like.
    3
    During oral argument before the trial court, MCI's counsel
    admitted there was no listing agreement at that point in the
    chronology between MCI and Urban Renewal. He also admitted that
    MCI did not register Strayer under the lease commission agreement.
    5                           A-5469-14T3
    For reasons not clear in the appellate record, Stang rejected
    Campus Properties' offer to purchase the property for $2 million.
    Hankins then became involved in Strayer's interest in the property
    on behalf of Urban Renewal.   He certified later, "After a failed
    attempt to purchase the real estate, I began to form a professional
    and business relationship with the owner."    Although Urban Renewal
    admits that MCI introduced Hankins to it, it also independently
    inquired "about hiring Hankins who would earn a developer's fee
    for such work."    Urban Renewal further admits to hiring Campus
    Properties as a developer for the property.
    Hankins wrote that he previously had a long-term relationship
    with Strayer – who already was leasing office space in the property
    from Burlington County College – and Hankins "abandoned my efforts
    to purchase the premises, and started assisting in putting an
    agreement together wherein Strayer University, Inc. would lease
    the premises in question."
    As MCI's listing agreement with Strayer was expiring, C&W
    also signed a broker agreement with Urban Renewal to market the
    property.   On May 10, 2012, Stang sent C&W a commission agreement
    for the property, and C&W registered Strayer with Urban Renewal
    as a potential tenant.   The agreement notes that no other broker
    was involved with this property aside from MCI.       The agreement
    established a sliding scale commission for C&W of six percent of
    6                           A-5469-14T3
    the lease price in year one to three percent of the lease price
    in year three.         The agreement estimated that Strayer would pay
    $2.9    million   in    rent   over   ten   years,    with     C&W   receiving      a
    commission of approximately $137,000.
    Strayer    expressed      interest    in      renting     the    property.
    According to defendants, after the lease commission agreement with
    MCI expired, Strayer indicated it would only sign a lease with
    Urban Renewal if Hankins had an ownership interest in the property.
    Instead of a direct sale or lease, Urban Renewal entered into a
    different transaction in order to facilitate the lease of the
    property to Strayer and to manage Strayer's rental.
    What occurred is that in June 2012, Urban Renewal and Campus
    Properties formed a new entity, D&D, a limited liability company,
    with two members – Renewal Willingboro and Campus Properties, with
    Renewal Willingboro owning ninety percent and Campus Properties
    owning the remaining ten percent.             The D&D operating agreement
    noted    that    Campus   Properties    would     make   $96,173       in   capital
    contributions to D&D.          Renewal Willingboro contributed $867,557,
    which represented the "estimated cost of the Strayer Build Out."
    Additionally,      Renewal     Willingboro    contributed       $2     million     in
    capital, "which the parties agree is the value of the ground lease
    of the property being contributed[.]"
    7                                   A-5469-14T3
    D&D was formed to allow Renewal Willingboro to lease the
    property to D&D, and for "[Steven] Hankins to oversee construction
    of    leasehold    improvements      under   the   Strayer   Lease   and   the
    construction of additional leasehold improvements for the 5,091
    rentable square feet in the property."
    On June 6, 2012, Urban Renewal entered into a ninety-nine-
    year lease of the property with D&D for the nominal rent of $1.00
    per year in consideration.           Stang, as managing member for both
    entities, signed both the landlord and tenant portions of the
    lease.    In turn, on June 12, 2012, D&D entered into a ten-year
    sublease of the property with Strayer, commencing October 1, 2012.
    The sublease specified a sliding scale for rent payments, with
    Strayer paying $13,249.17 a month initially and up to $35,216.58
    a month in year ten.
    The sublease recognized Urban Renewal as the property owner
    and   Renewal     Willingboro   as    redevelopment    manager.      Although
    Strayer previously discussed leasing the entire building, it only
    leased 15,899 square feet in the building.            The ten-year sublease
    with Strayer was entered into after both the open listing and
    lease commission agreements had expired.              MCI never received a
    commission for the sublease.          C&W received a $137,000 commission
    as broker for the Strayer sublease.
    8                             A-5469-14T3
    C&W, which is not a party to this litigation, served as the
    broker for the ten-year sublease from D&D to Strayer, and performed
    the services work as broker on that transaction.             The estimated
    value of the rental payments under the ten-year sublease to Strayer
    was $2.9 million.
    Following the lease, Flushing Bank agreed to modify Urban
    Renewal's mortgage on the property on August 31, 2012.          D&D agreed
    to assume the mortgage, which then had a balance of nearly $3.9
    million.      Stang and Hack personally guaranteed it.
    Plaintiff filed its complaint in July 2012.           The complaint,
    as later amended, asserted breach of contract against Urban Renewal
    (count one); unjust enrichment against all defendants (count two);
    quantum meruit against all defendants (count three); tortious
    interference with contract against all defendants (count four);
    breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
    against all defendants (count five); civil conspiracy against all
    defendants (count six); and aiding and abetting against D&D, Campus
    Properties, Hankins Properties, Strayer, and Renewal Willingboro
    (count seven).
    Defendants did not assert the affirmative defense of statute
    of   frauds    in   their   answer.   See   R.   4:5-4   (prescribing   that
    affirmative defenses such as the statute of frauds are to be set
    forth specifically and separately).
    9                            A-5469-14T3
    In October 2013, while the litigation was pending, Campus
    Properties transferred its membership interest in D&D to Renewal
    Willingboro for $40,000, leaving Renewal Willingboro as the sole
    remaining member and owner of D&D.
    The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.        MCI
    argued that it was entitled to a commission under the open listing
    agreement for the "transfer/exchange" of the property pursuant to
    the ninety-nine-year lease of the property to D&D.          Relying
    principally on Renaissance Plaza Assocs. v. Atlantic City, 18 N.J.
    Tax 342 (Tax 1998), and an unpublished appellate opinion, MCI
    contended that the formation of a joint venture and the signing
    of a ninety-nine-year lease triggered the right to a commission.
    MCI further argued that, by previously registering Strayer with
    Urban Renewal, defendants owed it a commission for the subsequent
    ten-year lease signed by Strayer.    MCI alternatively argued it was
    entitled to damages in quantum meruit under Weichert Co. Realtors
    v. Ryan, 
    128 N.J. 427
    (1992), despite defendant's claim that it
    failed to comply with the statute of frauds.
    Defendants argued that MCI only had a contractual right to a
    commission for the sale of the property, which did not occur, and
    therefore was not entitled to a commission for the sublease to
    Strayer.   Defendants further argued that the relationship between
    D&D and Urban Renewal was not a joint venture, and even if it
    10                           A-5469-14T3
    were, MCI had no agreement for a commission on a joint venture,
    unlike the broker in R.J. Brunelli & 
    Co., supra
    .           Defendants also
    argued that MCI's reliance on Weichert Co. 
    Realtors, supra
    , was
    misplaced   because   the   statute    of   frauds   was   amended   by   the
    Legislature after that Supreme Court case was decided.
    After considering the matter without any evidentiary hearing,
    the trial court granted MCI partial summary judgment, finding that
    MCI was entitled to a commission under the open listing agreement
    for the ninety-nine-year lease to D&D but not for the lease to
    Strayer under the lease commission agreement.              The trial court
    ordered all of the defendants jointly and severally liable to MCI
    for the sum of $100,000 in damages.
    The trial court first found that MCI was not entitled to a
    commission under the lease commission agreement for the ten-year
    sublease to Strayer, stating:
    With respect to this matter, I do not believe
    there is any entitlement to any commission on
    the lease. There -- it was an argument made
    that it should bootstrap back to an agreement
    that was before July 25, 2011, the listing
    agreement, because that spoke about leases. I
    cannot find anything that says that there is
    any entitlement for [MCI], in any respect,
    with -- no matter how broadly I read any of
    the documents within the law, that it would
    entitle them to any type of commission on a
    lease.    Whatever was paid to Cushman &
    Wakefield was paid to Cushman & Wakefield. It
    is of no consequence.    I do not see MCI as
    having a right to a commission on the lease.
    11                                 A-5469-14T3
    The   court     therefore     granted      partial   summary     judgment      to
    defendants, dismissing MCI's claim for damages for the ten-year
    sublease to Strayer.
    The court reached a different result with respect to MCI's
    claim for a commission on the ninety-nine-year lease to D&D. After
    analyzing     the    open   listing   agreement,     MCI's    registration     of
    Strayer and the Hankins entities, and the January 4 letter from
    MCI to Urban Renewal registering Hankins, Hankins Properties and
    Campus Properties under the open listing agreement, the court
    concluded     that   defendants   had   improperly     tried    to   circumvent
    paying a commission to MCI.       The court ruled that the ninety-nine-
    year lease from Urban Renewal to D&D was effectively a sale or
    exchange of the property for value, which triggered the right to
    a commission under the open listing agreement.               The court further
    elaborated:
    It's obvious to the Court that the entities--
    the defendant entities had an obligation to
    [MCI] to pay commission on a sale or exchange,
    and that they proceeded to undertake a
    transaction that would otherwise potentially
    not be considered to trigger a commission to
    be due, and they did not accomplish that in
    the eyes of this Court. The transaction, as
    evidenced by the operating agreement, was a
    method that they attempted to utilize to avoid
    the   document   looking   like  a   sale   or
    hypothecation of rights, or what have you, but
    that's, in fact, what it did. They gave up
    their right to utilize the property, and it
    12                                A-5469-14T3
    was fairly blatant to the [c]ourt what they
    were attempting to do. They were attempting
    to cut out [MCI] from this agreement.   For
    whatever reason, it doesn't matter.
    With regard to the amount of the commission to be awarded,
    the   court     stated:    "I   derived      the   value   from     the   operating
    agreement, from the capitalization in the operating agreement."
    The court calculated the commission to be five percent of the $2
    million estimated value of the leased property, as listed in the
    operating agreement, or $100,000.
    Based on those findings, the court granted partial summary
    judgment to MCI against all defendants for $100,000, with liability
    imposed against them jointly, severally, and in the alternative.
    Defendants now appeal the trial court's order requiring them
    to pay a real estate commission to MCI for the ninety-nine-year
    lease.    On appeal, defendants raise the following arguments: (1)
    there    was    no   exchange    of   the    property      entitling      MCI     to    a
    commission; (2) there was no hypothecation of rights                            to the
    property entitling MCI to a commission; (3) MCI had no right to a
    commission for a lease of the property; and (4) defendants Strayer,
    Campus Properties, Hankins Properties, and Hankins in particular
    cannot   be     liable    for   any   commission     under    the    open   listing
    agreement between MCI and Urban Renewal.
    13                                      A-5469-14T3
    MCI cross-appealed the trial court's order denying its claim
    for compensation for its efforts in connection with the ten-year
    sublease of the property to Strayer.             On appeal, MCI raises the
    following     arguments:     (1)    MCI    is     entitled   to    additional
    compensation in the amount of $137,000 in connection with the
    Strayer   lease      transaction;   (2)    MCI    is   entitled    to   recover
    commissions, notwithstanding the statute of frauds; and (3) there
    is no express contract which bars MCI's quantum meruit claims.
    II.
    We     review    the   trial   court's      rulings   under   well-known
    standards.    Our review of a ruling on summary judgment is de novo.
    "[W]e apply the same standard governing the trial court–we view
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."
    Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 
    210 N.J. 581
    , 584 (2012).                 "If
    a review of the record reveals that 'there is no genuine issue as
    to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is
    entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law,' then a court
    should grant summary judgment."            Nicholas v. Mynster, 
    213 N.J. 463
    , 478 (2013) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).           We thus consider "whether
    the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in a
    light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to
    permit a factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor
    of the non-moving party."       Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
    14                                 A-5469-14T3
    
    142 N.J. 520
    , 540 (1995).              "In applying that standard, a court
    properly grants summary judgement when the evidence is so one-
    sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law."                     Davis v.
    Brickman Landscaping, Ltd., 
    219 N.J. 395
    , 406 (2014) (citation
    omitted). Because the trial court granted partial summary judgment
    to each party, we must consider the facts in a light most favorable
    to the respective non-moving party or parties.
    Further, in construing the meaning of a statute or the common
    law, "our review is de novo."               
    Nicholas, supra
    , 213 N.J. at 478.
    "A   trial    court's       interpretation       of   the    law   and    the     legal
    consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to
    any special deference."           Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995).              Moreover, because the construction of
    contract     terms    is    likewise    a    question   of    law,   see    Boss       v.
    Hackensack Univ. Med. Ctr., 
    345 N.J. Super. 78
    , 92 (App. Div.
    2001), we independently review the trial court's construction on
    a de novo basis.          See Morgan v. Sanford Brown Inst., 
    225 N.J. 289
    ,
    302-03 (2016).       For instance, whether a contract term is clear or
    ambiguous is a question of law.                 Nester v. O'Donnell, 301 N.J.
    Super. 198, 210 (App. Div. 1997).                A term is ambiguous if it is
    "susceptible         to      at    least        two   reasonable         alternative
    interpretations."          
    Ibid. (citation omitted). "If
    contract terms
    are unspecific or vague, extrinsic evidence may be used to shed
    15                                   A-5469-14T3
    light on the mutual understanding of the parties."      Hall v. Bd.
    of Educ. of Jefferson, 
    125 N.J. 299
    , 305 (1991); see also Conway
    v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 
    187 N.J. 259
    , 270 (2006) ("Extrinsic
    evidence may be used to uncover the true meaning of contractual
    terms.").
    III.
    We first address whether MCI is entitled to a commission
    under the open listing agreement for the ninety-nine-year lease
    to D&D.      In order to qualify for a commission under the open
    listing agreement, the lease must constitute a "sale or exchange"
    of the property.
    Ninety-nine-year leases are permitted in New Jersey.           See
    Brunswick v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr., 
    182 N.J. 210
    (2005).          Some
    states still limit leases to ninety-nine years.     See, e.g., Nev.
    Rev. Stat. § 111.200(2) (1963); Code of Ala. § 35-4-6 (1989).       New
    Jersey has no such statutory limit, but it appears that the
    practice of parties entering into ninety-nine-year leases has
    persisted.
    In City of Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Investments, 
    148 N.J. 55
    (1997), the Court addressed the circumstances in which ninety-
    nine-year lessees may be treated as fee simple owners:
    In some circumstances, New Jersey courts have
    held   that    ninety-nine-year    lessees   are
    equivalent to fee simple owners under the common
    16                            A-5469-14T3
    law. Lake End Corp. v. Twp. of Rockaway, 185 N.J.
    Super. 248, 256 (App. Div. 1982) ("[a]s a matter
    of law and fact, ninety-nine-year leaseholds are
    the equivalent of a fee ownership for the
    purposes of real property taxation, valuation
    and assessment.") See Ric-Cic Co. v. Bassinder,
    
    252 N.J. Super. 334
    (App. Div. 1991) (granting
    standing to ninety-nine-year perpetual lessee to
    apply for variances under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 to -
    4).     However, in West Jersey Grove Camp
    Association v. City of Vineland, 
    80 N.J. Super. 361
    (App. Div. 1963), the court declined to
    afford property tax exemptions to holders of
    ninety-nine-year leases that were not renewable.
    Whether a ninety-nine-year lessee should be
    considered a de facto fee simple owner for
    condemnation purposes constitutes an issue of
    first impression. In general, the rights of the
    holder of a ninety-nine-year lease depend on the
    contract and the legislative intent underlying
    the   applicable   statutory   regime.   Although
    ninety-nine-year lessees are deemed to be
    equivalent to fee simple owners for certain
    purposes under the law, we decline to apply the
    doctrine to condemnation.
    [Id. at 72.]
    In Cynwyd Investments, the Court held that the 99-year lessee did
    not have pre-condemnation rights, but may participate in the
    eventual condemnation trial and present noncumulative evidence of
    fair value.    
    Id. at 73.
    As another illustration, in Ocean Grove Camp Meeting v.
    Reeves, 
    79 N.J.L. 334
    (Sup. Ct.), aff'd 
    80 N.J.L. 464
    (E. & A.
    1910), property was leased for ninety-nine years, "renewable" by
    the lessee, "his heirs and assigns for a like term of years
    forever."     
    Id. at 335.
      The court deemed the rent reserved to be
    17                            A-5469-14T3
    "grossly disproportionate to the value of the lands," and the
    lessee owned the buildings and improvements.             
    Id. at 336.
        Under
    these circumstances, the court held that the lessee was liable for
    the assessed real estate taxes.           In reaching that conclusion, the
    court engaged in the following analysis:
    It is quite plain that an instrument demising
    to one and his heirs and assigns a long term
    of years in land, renewable in perpetuity,
    conveys an ownership equivalent to a fee
    simple, although rent may be thereby reserved.
    It is very closely analogous to . . .        a
    conveyance in fee simple, reserving to the
    grantor and his heirs a small ground rent.
    The entire beneficial ownership of the land
    resides as much in the lessee, in a case like
    the present, as in the grantee under such a
    deed reserving ground rent.
    [Id. at 338-39.]
    "As a matter of law and fact, 99-year leaseholds are the
    equivalent    of   a   fee    ownership   for   the   purposes   of   property
    taxation, valuation and assessment."            Lake End 
    Corp., supra
    , 185
    N.J. Super. at 256.          Consequently, individual leaseholds may be
    assessed for tax purposes as individual parcels of real property.
    
    Id. at 257.
       As a result, a tenant under a 99-year lease subject
    to renewal in perpetuity with an option to purchase after twenty
    years is treated as a property owner, since the lease is considered
    tantamount to a transfer in ownership for local property tax
    purposes.    Renaissance Plaza 
    Assocs., supra
    , 18 N.J. Tax at 347.
    18                                A-5469-14T3
    A   tenancy   for   life,   or   for    ninety-nine      years    or     more,
    qualifies the tenant to receive a tax rebate under the Homestead
    Rebate Act, N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.80.        Macmillan v. Taxation Div. Dir.,
    
    180 N.J. Super. 175
    , 179 (App. Div. 1981).               However, leases are
    generally not taxable exchanges under the Internal Revenue Code.
    See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1031.           Moreover, a tenant's interest in a
    leasehold is mortgageable as a matter of general law.                       29 New
    Jersey   Practice,   Law   of    Mortgages    §   5.2,   at   263     (Myron       C.
    Weinstein) (2d ed. 2001).
    Unlike these precedents that arose in the context of taxation,
    zoning, and condemnation matters, there is no legislative regime
    involved in this action, which concerns the enforcement of a
    contractual broker's commission between private parties.               Even so,
    related principles apply.
    The lease between Urban Renewal and D&D expires after ninety-
    nine years.   Unlike in Ocean 
    Grove, supra
    , 79 N.J.L. at 339, and
    Ric-Cic 
    Co., supra
    , 252 N.J. Super. at 341-42, where the ninety-
    nine-year leases extended into perpetuity, no such open-ended
    language appears here.      The lease also does not contain a lessee
    renewal option, as in Lake End 
    Corp., supra
    , 185 N.J. Super. at
    255-56, or an option to purchase, as in Renaissance Plaza 
    Assocs., supra
    , 18 N.J. Tax at 346-47.              Notwithstanding these factual
    aspects, our case law has at times equated a ninety-nine-year
    19                                    A-5469-14T3
    lease with fee simple ownership rights, unless that designation
    would be against the public interest.            See Cynwyd 
    Investments, supra
    , 148 N.J. at 72-73 (condemnation proceedings).               Equating
    this particular leasehold interest with a fee simple estate for
    purposes of considering a broker's right to a commission is not
    manifestly against the public interest.
    Here, the facts militate strongly in favor of considering the
    lease an "exchange" under the open listing agreement.         In addition
    to the extreme duration of the lease, the ground lease constituted
    the majority of Renewal Willingboro's capital contribution to the
    formation of D&D.   D&D would have had no reason to exist, but for
    the lease.    MCI introduced Urban Renewal to Hankins and Campus
    Properties.    Campus    Properties   held   a    ten   percent   ownership
    interest in D&D.    D&D was responsible for paying the real estate
    taxes on the property.    D&D immediately subleased the property to
    Strayer.
    Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the
    nature of the transactions and the relationship of the parties,
    the ninety-nine-year lease effectively should be treated in this
    particular context like a sale or an exchange.            Accordingly, we
    hold that the ninety-nine-year lease between Urban Renewal and D&D
    constituted a "sale or exchange" within the meaning of the open
    listing agreement, thereby entitling MCI to a commission.           To rule
    20                                 A-5469-14T3
    otherwise      would    unjustly    allow    Renewal   Willingboro   to     evade
    responsibility for a commission on the transaction, which appears
    to have largely resulted from MCI's efforts as broker.                We thus
    affirm   the    trial     court's   finding    of   MCI's   entitlement     to    a
    commission on the lease to D&D.
    IV.
    We next address which parties are liable to MCI for the
    commission under the open listing agreement on the ninety-nine-
    year lease to D&D.         The trial court held all defendants jointly
    and severally liable to MCI.            Defendants argue that the trial
    court erred in holding Strayer, Hankins, Hankins Properties, and
    Campus Properties jointly and severally liable for the commission.
    We agree.
    The only parties to the open listing agreement were Urban
    Renewal and MCI.        Strayer, Hankins, Hankins Properties, and Campus
    Properties were not parties to the agreement, did not sign the
    agreement, and did not guarantee its performance.                Accordingly,
    Strayer, Hankins, Hankins Properties, and Campus Properties did
    not violate any contractual obligations and were not contractually
    liable for any commission due under the agreement.               Moreover, in
    its amended complaint, MCI only alleged breach of contract against
    Urban Renewal.         Therefore, the only parties liable to MCI for the
    commission on the ninety-nine-year lease are Urban Renewal and
    21                                 A-5469-14T3
    Willingboro Renewal, its parent company.               Accordingly, summary
    judgment should have been granted to defendants Strayer, Hankins,
    Hankins Properties, and Campus Properties dismissing MCI's claim
    for a commission on the ninety-nine-year lease.
    Defendants further argue that the court erred in awarding a
    commission in the sum of $100,000 to MCI.          The court provided the
    following explanation for the amount of damages it awarded to MCI:
    In terms of damages, I accept the two-million-
    dollar figure in the [D&D] operating agreement
    as sufficient evidence of an approximation of
    value for what was exchanged, and I apply the
    five percent commission figure to that. It's
    that simple, with respect to my findings.
    Defendants   argue     that   this   calculation   is    flawed   and     lacks
    appropriate support in the record.        We agree.
    Article VII, § 7.01 of the operating agreement sets forth the
    respective   capital    contributions     of   Urban    Renewal   and    Campus
    Properties to D&D, stating:
    Capital Contributions. (a) Simultaneously
    with the execution of this Agreement, [Renewal
    Willingboro] and [Campus Properties] shall
    contribute the cash, property and services set
    forth on Schedule A annexed hereto. [Campus
    Properties'] initial capital contribution
    shall be $96,173.00 representing ten percent
    (10%) of the estimated cost of the Strayer
    Build Out.      [Renewal Willingboro] shall
    contribute $2,000,000.00 of capital to the
    Company, which the parties agree is the value
    of the ground lease of the Property being
    contributed by [Renewal Willingboro] to the
    Partnership plus [$]867,557.00 representing
    22                                 A-5469-14T3
    ninety percent (90%) of the estimated cost of
    the Strayer Build Out.
    Accordingly, Renewal Willingboro contributed $2,867,000 to
    D&D, representing the value of the ground lease of the property
    ($2 million), and ninety percent (90%) of the estimated cost of
    the Strayer build-out ($867,000).        Campus Properties contributed
    only $96,173 to D&D, representing the remaining ten percent of the
    estimated cost of the Strayer build-out. Thus, Renewal Willingboro
    contributed 96.75 percent of the total capital contributions to
    D&D, with Campus Properties contributing only the remaining 3.25
    percent.
    The operating agreement for D&D further provided that the
    participation interest of Renewal Willingboro was ninety percent
    and   the   participation   interest   of   Campus   Properties   was   ten
    percent.     Accordingly, if the value of the ground lease was $2
    million, the value of Campus Properties' ownership interest in the
    property would be $200,000, with Renewal Willingboro's interest
    being the remaining $1,800,000.        Defendants argue that if we find
    that MCI is entitled to any commission, its commission should be
    five percent of only $200,000, not five percent of $2 million as
    computed by the trial court.
    Notwithstanding the gross disparity in contribution level,
    the ninety percent participation interest of Renewal Willingboro,
    23                               A-5469-14T3
    and the fact that Willingboro Renewal was still the fee simple
    owner of the property leased to D&D, the trial court awarded a
    five percent commission on the entire $2 million value of the
    property listed in the operating agreement.
    The court reached its decision on damages without conducting
    an evidentiary hearing.    The court's decision did not include any
    analysis or consideration of the following pertinent facts: (1)
    the grossly disparate contributions of Renewal Willingboro and
    Campus Properties; (2) Renewal Willingboro retaining a fee simple
    ownership   of   the   property   leased   to   D&D;   and    (3)   Renewal
    Willingboro holding a ninety percent participation interest in
    D&D, and thus transferred or exchanged only a small percentage of
    the value of the property. These facts should have been considered
    by the court in calculating the appropriate commission.
    We recognize that no party requested an evidentiary hearing,
    and that the issues were presented to the court through cross-
    motions for summary judgment.       Nonetheless, the damages issues
    require further proceedings on remand, with a plenary hearing to
    develop and determine any disputed material facts.           Bruno v. Gale,
    Wentworth & Dillon Realty, 
    371 N.J. Super. 69
    , 76-77 (App. Div.
    2004).
    We therefore vacate the damage award of $100,000 and remand
    for the trial court to conduct further proceedings to determine
    24                                A-5469-14T3
    the appropriate amount of the commission under the open listing
    agreement.
    V.
    Finally, we address whether MCI is entitled to a commission
    under the open lease commission agreement or the doctrine of
    quantum meruit for the lease to Strayer.     The trial court ruled
    that MCI was not entitled to a commission for the Strayer lease
    without specifically commenting on the equitable arguments raised
    by MCI.
    In its cross-appeal, MCI argues that the trial court should
    have awarded it an additional $137,000 commission for the ten-year
    sublease Strayer entered into with D&D for the property.         MCI
    concedes that it was not entitled to commission based on the open
    lease agreement with Urban Renewal.    Rather, it contends that the
    court should have awarded a commission under either the theory of
    unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.    We disagree.
    A real estate broker is generally entitled to receive a
    commission "for the transfer of an interest in real estate, only
    if before or after the transfer the authority of the broker is
    given or recognized in a writing signed by the principal or the
    principal's authorized agent, and the writing states either the
    amount or the rate of commission." N.J.S.A. 25:1-16(b). "Transfer
    or sale" in this section is defined as the "transfer of an interest
    25                           A-5469-14T3
    in real or the purchase or sale of a business."      N.J.S.A. 25:1-
    16(a).    "Interest in real estate" is deemed to include a lease of
    real estate.    N.J.S.A. 25:1-10.
    Further, a broker who works under an oral agreement             is
    entitled to a commission only if:
    1) within five days after making the oral
    agreement and before the transfer or sale, the
    broker serves the principal with a written
    notice which states that its terms are those
    of the prior oral agreement including the rate
    or amount of commission to be paid; and
    (2) before the principal serves the broker
    with a written rejection of the oral
    agreement, the broker either effects the
    transfer or sale, or, in good faith, enters
    negotiations with a prospective party who
    later effects the transfer or sale.
    [N.J.S.A. 25:1-16(d).]
    The Legislature enacted this revised version of the statute
    of frauds in 1995.      Under the prior version, N.J.S.A. 25:1-9
    stated:
    No broker or real estate agent selling or
    exchanging real estate for or on account of
    the owner shall be entitled to any commission
    for such sale or exchange, unless his
    authority therefor is in writing, signed by
    the owner or his authorized agent, or unless
    such authority is recognized in a writing or
    memorandum, signed by the owner or his
    authorized agent, either before or after such
    sale or exchange has been effected, and, in
    either case, the rate of commission on the
    dollar or the amount of the commission shall
    have been stated therein.
    26                          A-5469-14T3
    Any broker or real estate agent selling or
    exchanging real estate pursuant to an oral
    agreement with the owner of such real estate,
    who shall actually effect such sale or
    exchange before such oral agreement shall have
    been repudiated or terminated by the owner in
    writing as hereinafter provided, may recover
    from such owner the amount of commission on
    such sale or exchange, if the broker or agent
    shall, within five days after the making of
    the oral agreement and prior to the actual
    sale or exchange of such real estate, serve
    upon the owner a notice in writing, setting
    forth the terms of the oral agreement and
    stating the rate or amount of commission to
    be paid thereunder, and if the owner shall not
    have repudiated or terminated the oral
    agreement prior to the actual sale or exchange
    of the real estate.
    [N.J.S.A. 25:1-9 (repealed L. 1995, c. 360, §
    9 (eff. Jan. 5, 1996)).]
    "Under both the old and new statutes, the broker can recover
    a commission if within five days after the oral agreement, the
    broker sends the owner a notice stating the terms of the agreement
    including the commission amount or rate, and if the owner does not
    repudiate or terminate the agreement prior to the actual sale of
    the property."   C&J Colonial Realty, Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Sav.
    Bank, F.S.B., 
    355 N.J. Super. 444
    , 472 (App. Div. 2002), certif.
    denied, 
    176 N.J. 73
    (2003).
    "N.J.S.A. 25:1-9, commonly referred to as the real estate
    broker's statute of frauds, '. . . represents a strong statement
    of public policy by the Legislature which cannot be ignored.'"
    27                          A-5469-14T3
    R.A. Intile Realty Co., Inc. v. Raho, 
    259 N.J. Super. 438
    , 454
    (Law Div. 1992) (quoting McCann v. Biss, 
    65 N.J. 301
    , 309 (1974)).
    Strict compliance with the statute of frauds is "essential for a
    broker to recover a commission for the sale of real estate."     C&J
    Colonial 
    Realty, supra
    , 355 N.J. Super. at 473 (citing Tannenbaum
    & Milask, Inc. v. Mazzola, 
    309 N.J. Super. 88
    , 95 (App. Div.
    1997)). Without a written agreement, an oral agreement complying
    with the requirements of N.J.S.A. 25:1-16(d) is the only means of
    satisfying the Statute of Frauds.
    MCI does not claim an oral agreement existed.     Nor did MCI
    send a notice to Urban Renewal pursuant to N.J.S.A. 25:1-16(d).
    Instead, MCI entered into the written lease commission agreement
    with Urban Renewal on September 15, 2010.    The agreement expired
    on February 7, 2011.    D&D and Strayer entered into the ten-year
    lease 486 days after the lease commission agreement expired.     MCI
    entered into a second lease commission agreement with Urban Renewal
    on July 25, 2011, which expired on October 15, 2011.       D&D and
    Strayer entered into the ten-year lease 236 days after the second
    lease commission agreement expired.
    The open listing agreement expired on February 1, 2012, some
    117 days before the lease between D&D and Strayer was entered
    into.   Moreover, the ten-year sublease does not constitute a "sale
    28                          A-5469-14T3
    or exchange" or de facto "conveyance in fee" under the open listing
    agreement.
    "[I]n a leasing, the broker's commission is not earned until
    the critical event, which ordinarily is the date the lease is
    signed."     Feist & Feist Realty Corp. v. Dockside Urban Renewal
    Corp., 
    255 N.J. Super. 100
    , 104 (Law Div. 1992).            Given the
    expiration of both the open listing and lease commission agreements
    before the ten-year sublease between D&D and Strayer was entered
    into, MCI is not contractually entitled to a commission for the
    sublease under either agreement.
    We next address whether MCI is entitled to recover            the
    reasonable value of its services relating to the Strayer sublease
    on an alternative theory of quantum meruit.    Quantum meruit is a
    type of "quasi-contractual recovery for services rendered when a
    party confers a benefit with a reasonable expectation of payment."
    
    Weichert, supra
    , 128 N.J. at 437.    The doctrine allows the party
    to recoup the reasonable value of services rendered.    
    Id. at 438.
    As we recently explained:
    Quantum meruit is a form of quasi-contractual
    recovery and is wholly unlike an express or
    implied-in-fact contract in that it is imposed
    by the law for the purpose of bringing about
    justice without reference to the intention of
    the parties.      The equitable remedy is
    applicable only when one party has conferred
    a benefit on another, and the circumstances
    29                            A-5469-14T3
    are such    that   to   deny   recovery   would   be
    unjust.
    [N.Y.-Conn. Dev. Corp. v. Blinds-To-Go (U.S.)
    Inc., 
    449 N.J. Super. 542
    , 556 (App. Div.
    2017) (citations omitted).]
    Under certain circumstances, a real estate broker can recover
    fees for services rendered even in the absence of an express or
    implied contract.    As we explained in Weichert,
    a broker seeking recovery on a theory of
    quantum meruit must establish that the
    services were performed with an expectation
    that the beneficiary would pay for them, and
    under circumstances that should have put the
    beneficiary    on notice that the plaintiff
    expected to be paid . . . Courts have allowed
    brokers to recover in quantum meruit when a
    principal accepts a broker's services but the
    contract proves unenforceable for lack of
    agreement on essential terms—for instance, the
    amount of the broker's commission . . .
    [t]hus, a broker who makes a sufficient
    showing can recover fees for services rendered
    even absent express or implied agreement
    concerning the amount of the fee.
    [
    Weichert, supra
    , 128 N.J. at 438 (citations
    omitted).]
    However, if an express contract exists, a court cannot grant
    "relief regarding the same subject matter based on quantum meruit."
    Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 
    394 N.J. Super. 278
    , 286 (App.
    Div.), certif. denied, 
    192 N.J. 74
    (2007).     There, the trial court
    awarded a commission for sales made after the termination of the
    contract on a quantum meruit basis.        
    Id. at 288.
         We reversed,
    30                             A-5469-14T3
    holding that awarding a commission after the contract terminated
    was "inconsistent with the terms of [the] express contract" and
    therefore invalid.     
    Ibid. We recently reaffirmed
    this principle by holding a jury cannot
    award damages for quantum meruit if an express contract between
    the parties existed.    
    Blinds-To-Go, supra
    , 449 N.J. Super. at 557.
    It has long been recognized, however, that the
    existence of an express contract excludes the
    awarding of relief regarding the same subject
    matter based on quantum meruit.    An implied
    contract cannot exist when there is an express
    contract about the identical subject.      The
    parties are bound by their agreement, and
    there is no ground for implying a promise.
    [Id. at 556 (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted).]
    Because an express contract existed regarding the identical
    subject matter, MCI cannot obtain relief based on quantum meruit.
    Kas Oriental 
    Rugs, supra
    , 394 N.J. Super. at 286; 
    Blinds-To-Go, supra
    , 449 N.J. Super. at 556.        For example, in Moser v. Milner
    Hotels, Inc., 
    6 N.J. 278
    (1951), the Court held:
    It is well settled that an express contract
    excludes an implied one. An implied contract
    cannot exist when there is an existing express
    contract about the identical subject.      The
    parties are bound by their agreement, and
    there is no ground for implying a promise. It
    is only when the parties do not agree that the
    law interposes and raises a promise. When an
    express contract exists, there must be a
    rescission of it before the parties will be
    remitted to the contract which the law
    31                           A-5469-14T3
    implies, in the absence of the agreement which
    they made for themselves.
    [Id. at 280-81 (quoting Voorhees v. Combs, 
    33 N.J.L. 494
    , 496-97 (E. & A. 1869)).]
    See also Shalita v. Twp. of Washington, 
    270 N.J. Super. 84
    , 90-91
    (App. Div. 1994) ("generally, the parties are bound by their
    agreement and there is no ground for an additional obligation
    where there is a valid unrescinded contract that governs their
    rights").    "The law continues to prohibit the enforcement of an
    implied contract or an implied provision that conflicts or is
    inconsistent with the parties' express contract, as we held in
    Moser."   Kas Oriental 
    Rugs, supra
    , 394 N.J. Super. at 287.
    Here, the ten-year sublease to Strayer was entered into after
    the lease commission agreement expired.      "Since Moser militates
    against the granting of a remedy based on a quantum meruit theory
    that is inconsistent with the terms of an express contract," MCI
    cannot obtain relief based on quantum meruit.     
    Id. at 288.
    We further note that C&W served as the broker for the ten-
    year sublease from D&D to Strayer.       It is undisputed that C&W
    performed    the   services   as    broker   on   that   transaction.
    "'Ordinarily, a broker who has been the effective cause of a
    transaction is entitled to the agreed commission[.]'"        George H.
    Beckman, Inc. v. Charles Reid & Sons, Inc., 
    44 N.J. Super. 159
    ,
    170 (App. Div. 1957) (quoting Restatement of Agency § 448(f)
    32                           A-5469-14T3
    (1933)).   "[W]here a prospective tenant is produced by the broker
    and a negotiated lease results, the broker is deemed to be the
    efficient procuring cause of the lease, entitled to a commission."
    Feist & Feist Realty 
    Corp., supra
    , 255 N.J. Super. at 104.     Here,
    as the trial court correctly perceived, that did not happen with
    respect to MCI.   MCI was not the "effective cause" of the sublease
    to Strayer.   For this additional reason, MCI is not entitled to a
    commission under the open lease commission agreement.
    For these reasons, the trial court properly granted summary
    judgment to defendants dismissing MCI's claim for a commission on
    the ten-year sublease to Strayer based on breach of contract or
    quantum meruit.   This does not end our analysis, however.
    In addition to its claims for breach of contract and quantum
    meruit, MCI's amended complaint also alleged legal theories of
    unjust enrichment, tortious interference with contract, breach of
    the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, aiding and
    abetting, and civil conspiracy.    The court's oral decision did not
    discuss or analyze these additional claims.    It did not set forth
    factual findings and correlate them to legal conclusions as to
    these additional claims. The court did not issue a written opinion
    stating findings of facts and conclusions of law on these discrete
    issues.
    33                         A-5469-14T3
    "[B]oth Rule 1:7-4 and Rule 2:5-1(b), specifically state that
    the court 'shall' set forth the facts and make conclusions of law
    to support the order or judgment."      Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fisher,
    
    408 N.J. Super. 289
    , 300-01 (App. Div. 2009).     These requirements
    were not met here as to the discrete open issues.        However, we
    note that the trial court's omission may have been understandable
    because the primary focus of the arguments to the motion judge
    instead concerned the key contractual issues.
    Rule 2:10-5 provides that "[t]he appellate court may exercise
    such jurisdiction as is necessary to complete the determination
    of any matter on review."        However, our original factfinding
    authority must be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases that
    are free of doubt.      Tomaino v. Burman, 
    364 N.J. Super. 224
    , 234-
    35 (App. Div. 2003), certif. denied, 
    179 N.J. 310
    (2004).
    This is not a case where original jurisdiction will result
    in a complete determination of the matter on review.     This appeal
    does not address a single, lingering issue.     See 
    Allstate, supra
    ,
    408 N.J. Super. at 302.       There is no indication of a risk of
    perpetual litigation, and it does not appear that the exercise of
    original jurisdiction is necessary to avoid lengthy or burdensome
    litigation.   See 
    id. Accordingly, we
    decline to exercise original
    jurisdiction to determine these remaining open issues.
    34                          A-5469-14T3
    We remand for the trial court to consider MCI's claims of
    unjust enrichment, tortious interference with contract, breach of
    the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, aiding and
    abetting, and civil conspiracy.    In doing so, we intimate no views
    on their resolution in the first instance.
    VI.
    In summary, viewing the pleading in a light most favorable
    to the respective nonmoving parties, we agree with the trial court
    that MCI is entitled to recover a commission from Urban Renewal
    and Renewal Willingboro under the open listing agreement for the
    ninety-nine-year lease of the property to D&D.       We also agree that
    the other defendants are not liable to MCI for a commission for
    that transaction. We vacate the trial court's damages calculation,
    however, and remand the matter for the trial court to conduct
    proceedings, with a plenary hearing if fact-finding necessitates
    it, to re-determine the appropriate amount of the commission under
    the open listing agreement.
    We concur with the trial court that MCI is not entitled to a
    commission for the ten-year sublease of the property to Strayer
    based on breach of contract or quantum meruit.
    Lastly, we remand the matter for proceedings to determine
    MCI's   additional   claims   of        unjust   enrichment,   tortious
    35                            A-5469-14T3
    interference with contract, breach of the implied covenant of good
    faith and fair dealing, aiding and abetting, and civil conspiracy.
    We direct the trial court to conduct a case management
    conference within thirty days to plan the remand proceedings and
    arrange for any additional briefing.         The trial court has the
    discretion to reopen discovery, to the extent that it determines
    any of these unresolved issues warrant doing so.
    We do not retain jurisdiction over the remanded issues.          Any
    party aggrieved by the trial court's post-remand rulings may seek
    appellate review through a timely-filed new appeal.
    Affirmed   in   part,   reversed   in   part,   and   remanded   for
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.            We do not retain
    jurisdiction.
    36                             A-5469-14T3