STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. BRIAN G. GARRETT(8-15, CUMBERLAND COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2082-15T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.S.-A.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
Submitted April 25, 2017 – Decided May 3, 2017
Before Judges Fasciale and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No.
14-02-0303.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Deputy Public
Defender II, of counsel and on the brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Kathleen
S. Bycsek, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from his conviction for second-degree
sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b). Defendant contends primarily
that the court erred by denying his Miranda1 motion. We disagree
and affirm.
The police investigated defendant for allegedly sexually
assaulting his girlfriend's twelve-year-old daughter. The judge
conducted a two-day Miranda hearing and heard testimony from
Detective Daniel Kowsaluk, Detective Gabriel Carrasquillo, and
defendant. The parties dispute what the detectives and defendant
may have stated in the police station before defendant entered
into the interrogation room, and whether the police coerced
defendant into giving his statement by that purported
communication. We discern the pertinent facts from the transcript
of the Miranda hearing.
Detective Kowsaluk testified that he met with defendant
outside the interrogation room at the police station and asked him
in English if he would give a statement. He testified that
defendant said yes, but told him he felt more comfortable speaking
in Spanish. Detective Kowsaluk then called Detective Carrasquillo
for that purpose because he spoke Spanish. Detective Carrasquillo
testified that he did not communicate with defendant outside the
interview room.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).
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Defendant testified that Detective Kowsaluk, in English, told
him outside the interview room that all people make mistakes and
defendant had to speak with him. Defendant further stated that
before entering the interrogation room, Detective Carrasquillo
handed him a white card, which contained his Miranda rights.
According to defendant, Detective Carrasquillo told him that they
were not going to call the immigration authorities, but if
defendant talked to them, the judge and the prosecutor would "be
very happy with [him] and everything [would] be over." Defendant
explained that he decided to speak with the police because one of
the detectives looked upset.
Detective Carrasquillo and defendant then entered the
interrogation room and the detective began the interview. The
police recorded defendant's entire statement. After the alleged
conversations outside the interrogation room, and while being
fully video recorded in the room immediately before defendant gave
his statement, the detective read defendant his Miranda rights.
On his motion to suppress, defendant argued that before he
entered into the interrogation room the police coerced him to give
his statement about the incident. The judge found, however, that
the police did not so coerce defendant. He stated:
Defendant argues that prior to the interview
and outside of the presence of the camera, he
was pressured to speak with the detectives.
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This argument was . . . raised . . . for the
first time at the [Miranda] hearing. The
audio and video recording of [d]efendant's
statement do not substantiate this claim.
Defendant's demeanor and response to Detective
Carrasquillo's questions do not evidence signs
of pressure. In fact, there is nothing in
this record to support the claim that
[d]efendant was coerced prior to, during, or
after the interview.
The judge determined that defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his Miranda rights, denied the motion, and entered the
order under review.
Defendant then pled guilty to second-degree sexual assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b). The court followed the plea agreement and
sentenced defendant to a three-year prison term subject to the No
Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and Megan's Law,
N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23.
On appeal, defendant argues the following point:
THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED TO THE LAW
DIVISION FOR CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS,
WHICH ARE MISSING FROM THE OPINION, AND WHICH
ARE NECESSARY FOR RESOLUTION OF THE LEGAL
ISSUES BECAUSE THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT AND
POLICE WITNESSES DIVERGED ON MATERIAL ISSUES
OF FACT.
We uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's
disposition on a motion to suppress "so long as those findings are
supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State
v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009) (quoting State v. Elders, 192
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N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). Thus, appellate courts should reverse only
when the trial court's determination is "so clearly mistaken that
the interests of justice demand intervention and correction."
State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014) (quoting Elders, supra,
192 N.J. at 244). We give deference to a trial court's factual
findings when "the trial court [] had the opportunity to evaluate
the credibility of the witnesses who appeared and testified."
State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 565 (2011). Legal
determinations flowing from those findings, however, are subject
to de novo review. State v. Coles, 218 N.J. 322, 342 (2014).
Here, the judge heard testimony from the detectives and
defendant as part of a two-day Miranda hearing. The judge also
watched how each witness testified at the hearing, and viewed the
recording of defendant's statement in the interrogation room. The
judge found that defendant was not coerced "prior to, during, or
after the interview." He explained that defendant's demeanor
during the interview did not suggest that defendant was pressured.
The judge further found that defendant's responses to the
detective's questions did not demonstrate that the detectives
coerced defendant outside the interrogation room prior to the
interview. Although the judge did not expressly make a credibility
finding, he implicitly found Detective Carrasquillo credible. See
State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999) (holding that
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credibility determinations could be inferred from the account of
facts and witness testimony presented in a Municipal Court's
decision). We have no reason to disturb the judge's findings.
Affirmed.
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