W.S. VS. NJ DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES (DIVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH AND ADDICTION SERVICES) (RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2019 )


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  •                                       RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-5398-17T4
    W.S.,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    NEW JERSEY DEPARMENT
    OF HUMAN SERVICES,
    Respondent-Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Submitted May 13, 2019 – Decided July 18, 2019
    Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.
    On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Human
    Services, Division of Mental Health and Addiction
    Services.
    W.S., appellant pro se.
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
    respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
    General, of counsel; Shereen Rizk Youssef, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    W.S. appeals from Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital's (GPPH) final
    administrative decision to administer psychotropic medication to her without
    her consent. We affirm.
    On June 20, 2018, W.S. was involuntarily committed to GPPH after she
    repeatedly reported to police that she planned to cut her wrists and bleed out in
    the bathtub. Shortly after her admission, she kicked another patient due to
    paranoia, hostility, irritability and agitation. W.S.'s psychiatrist prescribed a
    treatment regimen that included the administration of psychotropic medications
    to address her destructive behaviors.
    However, W.S. refused to take the medication, denying mental illness and
    her need for medication. In accordance with written protocols developed by the
    State Department of Health, Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services
    (DMHAS),      W.S.'s   psychiatrist     prepared   an   Involuntary   Medication
    Administration Report (IMAR), documenting W.S.'s condition and the
    medications involved in the treatment plan. GPPH's Medical Director reviewed
    the IMAR, and scheduled a panel review hearing. The hearing panel was
    composed of three non-treating clinicians. W.S. received notice of the hearing,
    and a Client Services Advocate was appointed to assist her.
    A-5398-17T4
    2
    At the hearing, W.S.'s treating psychiatrist opined that involuntary
    medication was needed because she suffered from schizoaffective disorder, bi-
    polar type.   He explained that without medication her "paranoia, hostility
    irritability and agitation" would make her suicidal and cause her to be aggressive
    and assaultive. W.S. tersely claimed, "I don't need medication. I need my
    freedom." At the conclusion of the hearing, the panel determined that W.S.
    required medication.     After being provided with the required notice, she
    appealed the determination. The GPPH Clinical Director conducted a review
    and upheld the decision. This appeal followed.
    On appeal, W.S. confusingly asserts, "I unduly know that I am well
    because I am well in state of matters that appeal is from to me, that I know I will
    not proceduraly [sic] know I am not." Simply put, W.S.'s brief is woefully non-
    complaint with our court rules because it fails to make any coherent arguments
    to establish that the final administrative decision to administer psychotropic
    medication to her, without her consent, is not supported by the record and case
    law. See R. 2:9-9. In addition, she fails to include a "table of citation of cases,
    alphabetically arranged, of statutes and rules and of other authorities." R. 2:6-
    1(a)(3). Nevertheless, we address the merits of the appeal and affirm.
    A-5398-17T4
    3
    Our scope of review of an administrative agency's final determination is
    limited. In re Herrmann, 
    192 N.J. 19
    , 27 (2007). "[A] 'strong presumption of
    reasonableness attaches'" to the agency's decision. In re Carroll, 
    339 N.J. Super. 429
    , 437 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting In re Vey, 
    272 N.J. Super. 199
    , 205 (App.
    Div. 1993)). The burden is upon the appellant to demonstrate grounds for
    reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 
    347 N.J. Super. 544
    , 563 (App.
    Div. 2002).   To that end, we will "not disturb an administrative agency's
    determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency
    did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or
    unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In
    re Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 
    194 N.J. 413
    ,
    422 (2008).
    Applying this standard, we conclude that GPPH's decision to involuntarily
    medicate W.S. was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. GPPH followed
    the DMHAS involuntary medication policy and procedures. Its decision was
    based on the judgment of independent clinicians following a hearing and after
    an administrative appeal.
    Affirmed.
    A-5398-17T4
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-5398-17T4

Filed Date: 7/18/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/20/2019