DCPP VS. S.N. AND H.M. Â IN THE MATTER OF U.N.(FN-09-356-13, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED) ( 2017 )


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  •                              RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0409-15T1
    NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
    CHILD PROTECTION AND
    PERMANENCY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    S.N.,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    H.M.,
    Defendant.
    _________________________________________
    IN THE MATTER OF U.N.,
    A Minor.
    _________________________________________
    Submitted March 7, 2017 – Decided July 13, 2017
    Before Judges Koblitz and Sumners.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
    Docket No. FN-09-356-13.
    Joseph E. Krakora, attorney for appellant
    (John A. Albright, Designated Counsel, on the
    brief).
    Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
    attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz,
    Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alaina
    M. Antonucci, Deputy Attorney General, on the
    brief).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
    Guardian,   attorney   for   minor   (Charles
    Ouslander, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Defendant      S.N.      (Susan)1      appeals     from    the   fact-finding
    determination that she abused or neglected her eight-year-old
    adopted     son    U.N.      (Upton)       through     inadequate     supervision,
    establishing inconsistent discipline and poor boundaries, and
    failing     to    follow     advice    to       seek   psychological/psychiatric
    treatment for him.         The Law Guardian on behalf of the child urges
    us to affirm and, after a thorough review of the record and the
    trial judge's findings, we affirm substantially for the reasons
    reflected    in    the     October    4,    2013   written     decision   of     Judge
    Bernadette N. DeCastro.
    In 2011, Upton had immigrated to the United States from
    Pakistan, and was adopted by Susan and her husband, H.M. (Harry).2
    1
    We use first name pseudonyms to protect the privacy of parties
    and the minor child and for convenience. We mean no disrespect.
    2
    Despite being named as a defendant, Harry was not an alleged
    perpetrator of the abuse or neglect against Upton as Susan was his
    primary caretaker at the time of the Division's initial involvement
    2                                  A-0409-15T1
    The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division) first
    became involved with the couple in March 2012, when it received a
    referral that Upton arrived at school with facial injuries.                The
    Division's investigation determined that the allegations of abuse
    or neglect were unfounded because Upton fell off his bike.
    In October 2012, the Division received another referral that
    Upton arrived at school with two scratches on his cheek.                   The
    Division's investigation disclosed that the scratches were the
    result of Upton running away from Susan.         A short time later, the
    police were able to locate Upton and he was returned to Susan's
    care.   The Division determined that the allegation of physical
    abuse was unfounded.
    A third referral was made in November 2012, when the school
    nurse reported concerns about the type of supervision that Upton
    received   at   home    because   he   arrived   at   school   with    facial
    scratches.      The    Division's   investigation     disclosed   that     the
    injuries occurred when Upton, while accompanied by Susan, hit the
    side of his face when jumping on stairs.          Of more concern to the
    Division was finding that Upton had a habit of leaving home without
    with the family and the incidents thereafter, which gave rise to
    this appeal.     A few months prior to the Division's initial
    involvement, Harry was partially paralyzed and substantially
    disabled due to a stroke and heart attack, respectively. He passed
    away in March 2014.
    3                              A-0409-15T1
    permission to play in the neighborhood and engage with strangers.
    The    Division    found   that   allegations    of   physical    abuse    were
    unfounded,      but    recommended     Upton    receive    a    psychological
    evaluation due to concerns over his behavior.
    Dr. Jermour A. Maddux, Psy. D., subsequently evaluated Upton.
    He opined that Upton's reported lying, stealing, and running away
    from   home     were   "the   result   of   inadequate    supervision,     poor
    boundaries, inconsistent discipline and an unstable attachment."
    Dr.    Maddux     "strongly   recommended      that   [Upton]    be   referred
    immediately to individual psychological therapy with an expert in
    treating children with conduct disorders residing in permissive
    home environments."        He also recommended that Upton's parents be
    active participants with Upton's therapy, and receive parenting
    skills training concerning behaviorally disturbed children.
    Following Dr. Maddux's evaluation, the Division received the
    fourth and fifth referrals concerning Upton.             An anonymous person
    informed the Division that Upton was roaming the neighborhood
    streets alone at night, most often past midnight, and stealing
    mail from mailboxes and spraying an unknown solvent on cars.
    Jersey City police made another referral that Upton ran away from
    home and returned, and that he has a history of running away.
    During the Division's subsequent investigation, Susan acknowledged
    that she could not sleep or go to the bathroom without Upton
    4                               A-0409-15T1
    leaving     the    house,     and   she    was   so    overwhelmed   that    she   was
    contemplating sending Upton back to the Pakistani orphanage from
    where he was adopted.               Susan also mentioned that a stranger
    allegedly sexually assaulted Upton on an occasion when he left the
    home without permission.
    Susan agreed to be evaluated by Dr. Maddux, who opined that
    "her psychological functioning put [Upton's] psychological health
    in   sure   danger     of     becoming     impaired[]"     because    her   parental
    judgement is controlled by fear of guilt and Upton's threats.                      Dr.
    Maddux recommended that "[Susan and Upton] be referred to a program
    or   service       that     works   with     the      parent   and   the    child[.]"
    Additionally, he recommended that Susan "[c]onsider out of home
    individual        parenting    training     specifically       for   caregivers      of
    behaviorally-disturbed children[,]" which would help Susan develop
    a methodology for parenting that would improve Upton's behavioral
    issues.     Dr. Maddux further opined that due to Upton's history of
    physically assaulting Susan and Upton's threats to harm himself
    and her, "another adult figure reside with the family to provide
    caregiving assistance[,]" and that Susan be given information
    regarding "Mobile Crisis Response[.]"
    A sixth referral was received after Susan's arm was placed
    in a sling because Upton had pushed her.                 When she went to a local
    hospital for emergency care, she left Upton at home with Harry.
    5                                 A-0409-15T1
    In the ensuing investigation, the Division also learned that Upton
    sustained a broken leg from being hit by a car. Susan also advised
    that Upton threatened to kill himself with a knife, and repeatedly
    hits her injured arm.       Upton was removed from the home by a Dodd
    removal3 after Susan refused the Division's request to take or
    subsequently go with Upton to the hospital due to his suicidal
    ideations because she did not want to leave her disabled husband
    alone at home.
    After Upton's removal, the Division amended a previously
    filed verified complaint and filed an order to show cause seeking
    custody of Upton because Susan placed him at risk of harm, pursuant
    to   N.J.S.A    9:6-8.21(c)(4)(a)    or     (b),   by    failing   to   seek
    psychological counseling for his emotional and behavioral issues
    as    recommended      by      Dr.       Maddux,   and      not     seeking
    psychological/psychiatric assistance when he expressed suicidal
    ideations.     In addition, the Division sought a finding of abuse
    or neglect against Susan for leaving Upton with an inappropriate
    caretaker, her disabled husband, when she went to the hospital due
    to her injured arm.
    3
    A Dodd removal refers to the emergency removal of a child from
    the home without a court order, pursuant to the Dodd Act, which,
    as amended, is found at N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.82. Former Senate
    President Frank J. "Pat" Dodd authored the Act in 1974. N.J. Div.
    of Youth & Family Servs. v. N.S., 
    412 N.J. Super. 593
    , 609 n.2
    (App. Div. 2010).
    6                              A-0409-15T1
    Following an October 2, 2013 fact-finding hearing, Judge
    DeCastro found that Susan abused or neglected Upton "by subjecting
    him to a substantial risk of harm by failing to seek psychological
    treatment for her child's behavioral issues."               The judge reasoned
    that Susan's failure to follow Dr. Maddux's recommendation in
    February 2013, that she seek individual psychological therapy for
    Upton due to a high potential of harm, resulted in an escalation
    of his highly harmful behavior.            Upton continued to run away from
    home and interact with strangers, he was aggressive towards others,
    broke his leg from a car accident, was allegedly sexually abused,
    and threatened suicide.          Judge DeCastro furthered noted that Susan
    ignored the substantial risk of leaving Upton with her husband,
    who       could   not   supervise   the   child   because   he   was   primarily
    bedridden, amounted to "wanton and reckless" conduct because Susan
    was aware of Upton's dangerous conduct, thereby breaching her
    "minimum duty of care."             Almost two years later, another judge
    issued an order terminating the Title Nine litigation because the
    Division filed a complaint seeking termination of parental rights,
    which was granted.          That proceeding is not the subject of this
    appeal.
    To prevail in a Title Nine proceeding, the Division must show
    by    a    preponderance    of   the   competent,   material,    and   relevant
    evidence that the parent or guardian abused or neglected the
    7                              A-0409-15T1
    affected child.          N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b).      "This includes proof of
    actual harm or, in the absence of actual harm, the Division [is]
    obligated to present competent evidence adequate to establish the
    child   was    presently      in    imminent   danger    of   being    impaired
    physically, mentally or emotionally."          N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
    Servs. v. S.I., 
    437 N.J. Super. 142
    , 158 (App. Div. 2014) (citation
    omitted).
    Title Nine provides a child is "[a]bused or neglected" if he
    or she is one:
    whose physical, mental, or emotional condition
    has been impaired or is in imminent danger of
    becoming impaired as the result of the failure
    of his parent or guardian . . . to exercise a
    minimum degree of care (a) in supplying the
    child with adequate food, clothing, shelter,
    education, medical or surgical care though
    financially able to do so or though offered
    financial or other reasonable means to do
    so[.]
    [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).]
    The term "'minimum degree of care' refers to conduct that is
    grossly or wantonly negligent, but not necessarily intentional."
    G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 
    157 N.J. 161
    , 178 (1999) (citing
    Miller v. Newsweek, 
    660 F. Supp. 852
    , 858-59 (D. Del. 1987)).                       A
    parent "fails to exercise a minimum degree of care when he or she
    is   aware    of   the    dangers   inherent   in   a   situation     and     fails
    adequately to supervise the child or recklessly creates a risk of
    8                                   A-0409-15T1
    serious injury to that child."       
    Id. at 181.
      When determining
    whether a child is abused or neglected, the focus is on the harm
    to the child, and whether that harm should have been prevented had
    the guardian performed some act to remedy the situation or remove
    the danger.    
    Id. at 182.
    "Abuse and neglect cases 'are fact-sensitive.'"      Dep't of
    Children & Families, Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. E.D.-O.,
    
    223 N.J. 166
    , 180 (2015)(quoting Dep't of Children & Families,
    Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.B., 
    207 N.J. 294
    , 309 (2011)).
    We give considerable deference to the family court's factual
    determinations because it has "the opportunity to make first-hand
    credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the stand
    . . . [and] a 'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a
    review of the cold record."   N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
    v. E.P., 
    196 N.J. 88
    , 104 (2008) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth &
    Family Servs. v. M.M., 
    189 N.J. 261
    , 293 (2007)).    "Only when the
    trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of
    the mark' should an appellate court intervene and make its own
    findings to ensure that there is not a denial of justice."     
    Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div.
    of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 
    191 N.J. 596
    ,
    605 (2007)).
    Susan contends that Judge DeCastro's finding of abuse and
    neglect was not supported by substantial evidence, noting a lack
    9                           A-0409-15T1
    of objective evidence that she was willful or wanton with respect
    to Upton's imminent safety.      Susan maintains that Dr. Maddux did
    not conclude she was the cause of Upton's behavioral issues, and
    her rejection of Dr. Maddux's parenting strategy for her own
    methods, is a clear indication that she was not grossly negligent.
    She contends that leaving Upton in Harry's care for two hours
    while she sought urgent medical care for her arm does not establish
    that she was grossly negligent or reckless, or placed him in
    imminent and substantial danger.           She further argues that her
    decision not to seek emergency attention concerning Upton's threat
    to kill himself, did not create a substantial risk of harm because
    she reasonably perceived that the threat was not legitimate.
    Here, the record amply supports Judge DeCastro's findings.
    She found that despite Susan's admission of being overwhelmed in
    trying to care for Upton, Susan failed to pursue any of the
    recommendations   by   Dr.   Maddux   to   address   Upton's   significant
    behavioral issues.     While Susan did not cause Upton's behavioral
    issues, we agree with Judge Decastro that Susan's disregard of the
    Division's assistance constitutes abuse or neglect under the law.
    Affirmed.
    10                               A-0409-15T1