IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF ALICE M. MALSBERGER (2015-1696, BURLINGTON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2751-15T3
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    ESTATE OF ALICE M.
    MALSBERGER, DECEASED.
    ————————————————————————————
    Submitted March 9, 2017 – Decided July 14, 2017
    Before Judges Hoffman and Whipple.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Probate Part, Burlington
    County, Docket No. 2015-1696.
    Gary Stewart Seflin, attorney for appellant
    Lilia E. Lawler, Executrix of the Estate of
    Robert Rich (Trevor C. Serine, on the briefs).
    Bernetich, Hatzell & Pascu, L.L.C., attorneys
    for respondent Patricia White (Donald F.
    Browne, Jr., on the brief).
    J. Llewellyn Mathews, attorney for respondent
    Emanuel Pratsinakis.
    George N. Styliades, attorney for respondents
    Dionysis Nicholaou and Anna Nicholaou, join
    in   the   brief    of   respondent   Emanuel
    Pratsinakis.
    PER CURIAM
    The Estate of Robert Rich (appellant) appeals from a February
    18, 2016 Chancery Division order admitting to probate the proffered
    will (Proposed Will) of Alice M. Malsberger (Alice).               We affirm.
    I.
    The material facts are not in dispute.   Alice died on May 26,
    2015.   Following Alice's death, plaintiff Patricia White, a niece
    by marriage, found a handwritten document among Alice's personal
    papers in Alice's kitchen.   The handwritten documents stated:
    I'm Alice Malsberger – I wish to be cremated
    upon my death – along with my husband Joe –
    our ashes placed in a similar (illegible) and
    placed in mausoleum. I wish my estate be sold
    & divide in three and 1/3 granted to Fr.
    Emmanuel, one third to Patricia White, and one
    third to Dionysis & Anna Nicholaou. I want
    Pat White to be executrix. I intend to see a
    lawyer & to validate everything.
    On October 8, 2015, an investigation identified Robert Rich
    of Philadelphia as Alice's next of kin and sole intestate heir.
    The following week, plaintiff filed a verified complaint in the
    Probate Part seeking to admit the Proposed Will to probate.        On
    December 20, 2015, Rich died. On February 2, 2016, Rich's executor
    filed an answer to plaintiff's complaint, disputing plaintiff's
    allegations.
    All parties agreed the matter did not require discovery, and
    the handwriting on the Proposed Will belonged to Alice.       After
    hearing argument, Judge Paula Dow proceeded to "try the action on
    the pleadings and affidavits, and render final judgment thereon."
    R. 4:67-5.     On February 18, 2016, the judge issued an order
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    admitting the Proposed Will to probate, accompanied by an eight-
    page written opinion.      In pertinent part, the judge stated:
    In the present case, the [c]ourt finds that
    [Alice] intended for the handwritten document
    to constitute a will and simply intended to
    see a lawyer for any procedural formalities
    which were lacking.
    . . . .
    In sum, under analysis of both N.J.S.A. 3B:3-
    2(b) and N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3, the [c]ourt finds
    that [p]laintiff has met the burden by clear
    and convincing evidence of demonstrating that
    the purported will was written by [Alice] and
    was intended to constitute a valid last will
    and testament.
    This appeal followed.      Appellant challenges the findings and
    conclusions of the trial court, asserting the court abused its
    discretion by ignoring and misinterpreting the plain text of the
    Proposed Will.    We disagree.
    At issue is whether the Proposed Will sufficiently represents
    Alice's final testamentary intent to be admitted into probate
    under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3.      Since, as the parties agree, there is no
    genuine issue of material fact, the matter was ripe for summary
    judgment as involving only a question of law, Brill v. Guardian
    Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    142 N.J. 520
    , 529 (1995), to which we owe
    the motion court no special deference.     Manalapan Realty, L.P. v.
    Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995).
    3                             A-2751-15T3
    A.
    N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2 sets forth the technical requirements for
    writings intended as wills:
    a. Except as provided in subsection b. and in
    [N.J.S.A.] 3B:3-3, a will shall be:
    (1) in writing;
    (2) signed by the testator or in the
    testator's name by some other
    individual    in   the    testator's
    conscious presence and at the
    testator's direction; and
    (3)   signed   by  at   least   two
    individuals, each of whom signed
    within a reasonable time after each
    witnessed either the signing of the
    will as described in paragraph (2)
    or the testator's acknowledgment of
    that signature or acknowledgment of
    the will.
    b. A will that does not comply with subsection
    a. is valid as a writing intended as a will,
    whether or not witnessed, if the signature and
    material portions of the document are in the
    testator's handwriting.
    c. Intent that the document constitutes the
    testator's   will  can   be  established   by
    extrinsic evidence, including for writings
    intended as wills, portions of the document
    that are not in the testator's handwriting.
    Appellant   asserts   that    since   the   Proposed   Will   contains
    Alice's signature at the beginning of the writing, it is invalid.
    However, if Alice wrote her name at the beginning of the document
    4                                     A-2751-15T3
    and intended it to be her signature, it will suffice.   In re Estate
    of Siegel, 214 N.J.Super. 586, 592 (App. Div. 1987).
    As Judge Dow explained, Siegel is
    directly on point in the present case. As the
    parties stipulate that there is no issue as
    to   material    fact   regarding    [Alice's]
    handwriting, the [c]ourt finds that [Alice]
    intended the opening line, "I am Alice
    Malsberger[,]" to serve as a signature to the
    document, despite its placement at the top of
    the page. Accordingly, under N.J.S.A. 3B:3-
    2(b), the [c]ourt finds that the Proposed Will
    constitutes a valid will as both the writing
    and signature are in [Alice's] handwriting.
    B.
    A document that does not comply with the requirements of
    N.J.S.A. 3B:3-2(a) or (b) is nevertheless valid as a document
    intended as a will and may be admitted to probate upon satisfaction
    of N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3, which provides:
    Although a document or writing added upon a
    document was not executed in compliance with
    [N.J.S.A.] 3B:3-2, the document or writing is
    treated as if it had been executed in
    compliance with [N.J.S.A.] 3B:3-2 if the
    proponent   of   the   document   or   writing
    establishes by clear and convincing evidence
    that the decedent intended the document or
    writing to constitute: (1) the decedent's will
    . . . .
    In a case involving New Jersey's codification of the "harmless
    error" doctrine, we noted a writing need not be signed by the
    testator in order to be admitted to probate.     In re Probate of
    Will and Codicil of Macool, 
    416 N.J. Super. 298
    , 311 (App. Div.
    5                            A-2751-15T3
    2010).    To admit a writing into probate as a will under N.J.S.A.
    3B:3-3, we held:
    [T]he proponent of the writing intended to
    constitute such a will must prove, by clear
    and convincing evidence, that: (1) the
    decedent actually reviewed the document in
    question; and (2) thereafter gave his or her
    final assent to it. Absent either one of these
    two elements, a trier of fact can only
    speculate as to whether the proposed writing
    accurately reflects the decedent's final
    testamentary wishes.
    [Id. at 310.]
    We are unpersuaded by appellant's challenge to the probate
    of the Proposed Will on the ground that "the [d]ecedent did not
    intend the document to be her Final Will[,]" but only "the basis
    for a subsequent will that would be 'validated' by a lawyer." This
    contention overlooks the plain meaning of Alice's written words.
    Alice clearly stated her testamentary intent by providing precise
    instructions     of    a     testamentary       nature,     including      burial
    instructions, the appointment of an executor, and the liquidation
    and division of her estate to her designated beneficiaries.
    We   also   reject     appellant's    argument      that   Alice's    stated
    intention "to see a lawyer and to validate everything" precludes
    a finding of testamentary intent.              We agree with Judge Dow that
    Alice's   "comments,       taken   at   face    value,    simply   indicate      an
    intention to visit a lawyer to finalize a document with any
    6                                      A-2751-15T3
    required   formalities   and   does   not   invalidate   Alice's   present
    intention that the Proposed Will constitute a valid will."
    For the reasons expressed by Judge Dow in her cogent opinion,
    we are satisfied Alice's Proposed Will embodied her testamentary
    intention and was properly admitted to probate.
    Affirmed.
    7                                   A-2751-15T3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-2751-15T3

Filed Date: 7/14/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024