CRANIO ASSOCIATES, ETC. VS. STATE FARM INDEMNITY COMPANYÂ (L-2967-16, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-4422-15T1
    CRANIO ASSOCIATES
    a/s/o ADOLFO GARCIA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    STATE FARM INDEMNITY
    COMPANY,
    Defendant-Respondent.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Submitted June 6, 2017 – Decided July 14, 2017
    Before Judges Reisner and Rothstadt.
    On appeal from the Superior Court of New
    Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Docket
    No. L-2967-16.
    Julie Lefkowitz, attorney for appellant.
    Gregory P. Helfrich & Associates, attorneys
    for respondent (Joseph J. Trefurt, on the
    brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Plaintiff, Cranio Associates, a medical provider, appeals
    from the Law Division's June 3, 2016 order dismissing its complaint
    for frivolous litigation sanctions, R. 1:4-8, against defendant,
    State Farm Indemnity Company, in its capacity as the personal
    injury   protection     (PIP)      carrier    for   plaintiff's       patient.
    Plaintiff   claimed   it    was   underpaid   by    defendant   for    medical
    treatment   that   plaintiff      provided   to   defendant's   insured      and
    therefore pursued a PIP arbitration for additional payments.                 The
    dispute resolution professional (DRP) who considered the matter
    determined that because the limits of the patient's PIP coverage
    under defendant's policy had been exhausted, he could not consider
    a claim for additional sums.
    According to plaintiff, it was entitled to sanctions because
    defendant waited until the day before the scheduled arbitration
    to advise plaintiff and the DRP that the limits of the insured's
    PIP coverage had been exhausted.          Plaintiff sought sanctions from
    the DRP, who rejected the claim because he was without authority
    to consider it, and then from the court, by filing its complaint
    in the Law Division. Judge Charles E. Powers dismissed plaintiff's
    complaint, finding no legal basis to award sanctions under Rule
    1:4-8.   On appeal, plaintiff asserts defendant's "knowing defense
    of a PIP arbitration" while the "policy was exhausted" qualifies
    as "a frivolous defense, for the purpose of harassment or delay,"
    entitling   plaintiff      to   recover    sanctions   under    Rule     1:4-8.
    Moreover, because defendant did not contest plaintiff's claim
    other than by asserting the exhaustion of its policy's limits,
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    plaintiff was a successful claimant thereby entitled to an award
    of fees and other relief.    We disagree and affirm substantially
    for the reasons expressed by Judge Powers in the comprehensive
    rider attached to his June 3, 2016 order.
    Generally, we review "[a] trial judge's decision to [not]
    award attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 1:4-8," under an abuse of
    discretion standard.    McDaniel v. Lee, 
    419 N.J. Super. 482
    , 498
    (App. Div. 2011); see also United Hearts, L.L.C. v. Zahabian, 
    407 N.J. Super. 379
    , 390 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    200 N.J. 367
    (2009).   "Reversal is warranted when 'the discretionary act was
    not premised upon consideration of all relevant factors, was based
    upon consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or
    amounts to a clear error in judgment.'"     Ferolito v. Park Hill
    Ass'n, 
    408 N.J. Super. 401
    , 407 (App. Div.) (quoting Masone v.
    Levine, 
    382 N.J. Super. 181
    , 193 (App. Div. 2005)), certif. denied,
    
    200 N.J. 502
    (2009); see also Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 
    171 N.J. 561
    , 571 (2002).
    We conclude from our review that the judge properly exercised
    his discretion and dismissed plaintiff's complaint.        We find
    plaintiff's arguments to the contrary to be without sufficient
    merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.         R. 2:11-
    3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
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