ANTHONY MASTROFILIPPO VS. BOROUGH OF LITTLEÂ FERRY(L-3552-12, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3819-15T2
ANTHONY MASTROFILIPPO and
DIANE MASTROFILIPPO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BOROUGH OF LITTLE FERRY, OFFICER
JOHN CLARK, OFFICER SAMUEL AGUILAR,
SERGEANT JAMES WALTERS, LIEUTENANT
SCOTT KRAL,1 MICHAEL CAPABIANCO,
GINO TESSARO,2 CHIEF RALPH VERDI and
DETECTIVE CRAIG HARTLESS,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
ANGELA OROZCO,
Defendant.
______________________________________
Submitted June 26, 2017 – Decided July 14, 2017
Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-
3552-12.
1
Improperly pled as "Crowl."
2
Improperly pled as "Tedesco."
Law Offices of Louis A. Zayas, L.L.C.,
attorneys for appellants (Louis A. Zayas, of
counsel and on the brief; Alex Lee, on the
brief).
Hanrahan Pack, L.L.C., attorneys for
respondents (Thomas B. Hanrahan, of counsel
and on the brief; Kathy A. Kennedy, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Anthony and Diane Mastrofilippo (plaintiffs) appeal from four
orders3 cumulatively dismissing the complaint pursuant to Rule 4:6-
2(e) against the Borough of Little Ferry (Borough), Officer John
Clark, Officer Samuel Aguilar, Sergeant James Walters, Lieutenant
Scott Kral, Michael Capabianco, Gino Tessaro, Chief Ralph Verdi,
and Detective Craig Hartless (collectively referred to as the
Borough defendants). We reverse the orders dismissing the
pleadings, remand for further proceedings on the discovery issue,
and affirm the administrative dismissal against Orozco.
Plaintiffs have had a history of conflict with their neighbor,
Orozco, and over time, this conflict expanded to the Borough
3
As to the Borough defendants, they appeal from an August 2,
2013 order denying plaintiffs' discovery motion and granting
Borough defendants' cross-motion for a protective order and to
dismiss counts one, two, three, and six of the complaint pursuant
to Rule 4:6-2(e); and an August 23, 2013 order denying plaintiffs'
motion to amend the complaint. As to defendant Angela Orozco,
plaintiffs appeal from a June 12, 2015 order denying their motion
to vacate an order administratively dismissing counts four and
five of the complaint for lack of prosecution; and an April 1,
2016 order denying reconsideration.
2 A-3819-15T2
defendants. Mr. Mastrofilippo filed an administrative complaint
against Lieutenant Kral because he was dissatisfied with
Lieutenant Kral's response to an altercation involving Mr.
Mastrofilippo. Lieutenant Kral had responded to Mr.
Mastrofilippo's call to police and allegedly told him "if you
don't like your neighbors why don't you sell your house and move
out of Little Ferry?" Lieutenant Kral later pulled Mr.
Mastrofilippo over for driving while using his mobile phone, but
then released him with a warning. Mr. Mastrofilippo had contacted
the Borough's Administrator, Mr. Capabianco, to report code
violations on Orozco's property. When the Borough issued Orozco
a violation, Orozco allegedly confronted Mr. Mastrofilippo and he
called the police. When the police arrived, Orozco told the police
that Mr. Mastrofilippo had allegedly sexually assaulted her (the
"underlying criminal case"). Mr. Mastrofilippo later emailed Mr.
Capabianco reporting more property violations by Orozco, but Mr.
Capabianco responded by informing Mr. Mastrofilippo of violations
on his property instead.
A municipal court judge held a probable cause hearing in the
underlying criminal case. The parties dispute the details of what
occurred between Mr. Mastrofilippo and Orozco. At the hearing,
Orozco testified that he harassed her sexually. The municipal
court judge found that probable cause existed, and the police
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arrested Mr. Mastrofilippo. The Bergen County Prosecutor's Office
subsequently dismissed the underlying criminal case.
In May 2012, plaintiffs filed this complaint against Orozco
and the Borough defendants. Plaintiffs alleged municipal
liability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Count One); malicious
prosecution (Count Two); false arrest (Count Three); defamation
per se by Orozco (Count Four); negligent property damage by Orozco
(Count Five); and loss of consortium (Count Six). Plaintiffs
filed a motion to compel production of personnel files and internal
affairs records of the Borough defendants. Defendants cross-moved
seeking a protective order and to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e). On August
2, 2013, the judge denied plaintiffs' motion and granted the
Borough defendants' cross-motion and dismissed Counts One, Two,
Three, and Six of the complaint.
Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint seeking to
plead three additional counts: conspiracy to file baseless
criminal charges under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Count Seven),
retaliatory prosecution in violation of plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Count Eight), and abuse
of process (Count Nine). On August 23, 2013, the motion judge
denied plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint. She also granted
the Borough defendants' cross-motion to dismiss the amended
4 A-3819-15T2
complaint against them. Plaintiffs appealed from both August
2013 orders, but we dismissed the appeal as interlocutory.4
On June 12, 2015, a different judge denied plaintiffs' motion
to vacate an administrative dismissal as to Orozco. He issued a
written decision concluding that plaintiffs' counsel failed to
submit a certification in support of the motion, and that the
court had dismissed plaintiffs' claims without prejudice against
Orozco in August 2012, well before the motion to vacate. On April
1, 2016, the same judge denied plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration of the June 12 order. In denying the
reconsideration motion on the merits, the judge concluded that
plaintiffs failed to show exceptional circumstances. He then
dismissed the claims against Orozco with prejudice.
On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the judge erred by granting
the Borough defendants' Rule 4:6-2(e) motions. They maintain
primarily that probable cause is a question for the jury and the
judge made findings of fact. Plaintiffs also contend that the
court erroneously denied their motions to amend the complaint,
compel discovery, and vacate the administrative dismissal as to
Orozco.
4
Mastrofilippo v. Borough of Little Ferry, No. A-0584-13 (App.
Div. Feb. 19, 2015).
5 A-3819-15T2
I.
We begin by addressing plaintiffs' contention that the judge
erred by dismissing their municipal liability, malicious
prosecution, false arrest, and loss of consortium claims. They
assert that the judge improperly relied on the finding of probable
cause in the underlying criminal case. At this stage, plaintiffs'
allegations, if proven, sufficiently state claims for these causes
of action.
We review a grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a cause of action de novo, applying the same
standard under Rule 4:6-2(e) that governed the trial court. See
Frederick v. Smith, 416 N.J. Super. 594, 597 (App. Div. 2010),
certif. denied, 205 N.J. 317 (2011). "[I]n reviewing a complaint
dismissed under Rule 4:6-2(e)[,] [the court's] inquiry is limited
to examining the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged on the
face of the complaint." Green v. Morgan Props., 215 N.J. 431, 451
(2013) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.,
116 N.J. 739, 746 (1989)). "[P]laintiffs are entitled to every
reasonable inference of fact[,]" and "[t]he examination of a
complaint's allegations of fact required by the aforestated
principles should be one that is at once painstaking and undertaken
with a generous and hospitable approach." Id. at 452 (third
alteration in original) (quoting Printing Mart-Morristown, supra,
6 A-3819-15T2
116 N.J. at 746). "[T]he test for determining the adequacy of a
pleading [is] whether a cause of action is 'suggested' by the
facts." Printing Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 746 (quoting
Velantzas v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 109 N.J. 189, 192 (1988)).
As to municipal liability, plaintiffs alleged that the
Borough defendants violated 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, which provides
that
[e]very person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress[.]
To establish a claim under this section, a plaintiff must prove
that the "defendants acted under color of state law and deprived
him of a well-established federal constitutional or statutory
right." Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 385 (2000).
Where the basis for a plaintiff's claim is Section 1983, false
arrest, or malicious prosecution, like here, the existence of
probable cause will generally be an absolute defense. Id. at 389.
7 A-3819-15T2
The judge weighed the soundness of the evidence considered
by the municipal court judge. In her statement of reasons, the
judge wrote:
In order to sustain a claim for municipal
liability ([Count One]), malicious
prosecution ([Count Two]), or false arrest
([Count Three]), plaintiff[s] bear[] the
burden of demonstrating that the criminal
proceeding and arrest was initiated without
probable cause . . . . Here, a municipal
judge made a judicial finding, based on the
testimony of Orozco, that probable cause
existed for the underlying charges. The court
finds, based on a review of Orozco's testimony
as set forth in plaintiff[s'] complaint, that
the municipal court's determination was
founded on sound evidence before it from which
a reasonable inference of probable cause could
be drawn . . . . Plaintiff[s have] not
overcome the rebuttable presumption that
probable cause existed for the municipal court
to initiate a criminal proceeding against him.
[(Emphasis added).]
The judge made findings of fact rather than limiting her
analysis to whether the complaint "ma[de] allegations which, if
proven, would constitute a valid cause of action." Kieffer v.
High Point Ins. Co., 422 N.J. Super. 38, 43 (App. Div. 2011)
(quoting Leon v. Rite Aid Corp., 340 N.J. Super. 462, 472 (App.
Div. 2001)). Importantly, when "the facts giving rise to probable
cause are themselves in dispute[,]" the jury is to decide if
probable cause existed. LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 93
(2009). Plaintiffs alleged that the Borough defendants acted in
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their capacity as policy-makers and law enforcement officials to
"falsely and maliciously" arrest Mr. Mastrofilippo, thereby
depriving him of his "rights to be free from malicious prosecution,
false arrest, and abuse of process, and his right to petition the
government and right to free speech."
Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim for malicious
prosecution. To establish malicious prosecution, a "plaintiff
must prove (1) that the criminal action was instituted by the
defendant against the plaintiff, (2) that it was actuated by
malice, (3) that there was an absence of probable cause for the
proceeding, and (4) that it was terminated favorably to the
plaintiff." Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381,
393-94 (2009) (quoting Helmy v. City of Jersey City, 178 N.J. 183,
190 (2003)). Malice is "the intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause," and a lack of probable cause alone is
insufficient to establish malice. Id. at 395-96 (quoting McFadden
v. Lane, 71 N.J.L. 624, 630 (E. & A. 1905)).
Plaintiffs alleged that Borough police officers "with
knowledge of the history between [p]laintffs and Orozco,
recklessly disregarded the inconsistencies in Orozco's
accusations, and charged [Mr.] Mastrofilippo in retaliation for
his complaints about the Police Department." Plaintiffs further
maintained that the Borough defendants actively encouraged Orozco
9 A-3819-15T2
to file charges against Mr. Mastrofilippo, that the municipal
court judge was misled into finding probable cause, and they point
out that the underlying criminal case was ultimately dismissed.
At this stage, we consider simply whether the cause of action is
suggested by the alleged facts, not whether the facts are true.
Plaintiffs have also stated a claim for false arrest. "To
state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a
plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2)
that the arrest was made without probable cause." James v. City
of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). There is no
dispute that Mr. Mastrofilippo was arrested. Plaintiffs
maintained, as discussed above, that the Borough defendants and
Orozco misled the municipal court judge into finding probable
cause.
The same is true for plaintiffs' loss of consortium claim.
A loss of consortium claim is "intended to compensate a person for
the loss of a spouse's 'society, companionship and services due
to the fault of another.'" Kibble v. Weeks Dredging & Constr.
Co., 161 N.J. 178, 190 (1999) (quoting Wolfe v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 224 N.J. Super. 348, 350 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 111
N.J. 654 (1988)). Plaintiffs alleged that the Borough defendants'
"actions have caused marital issues between [them]" and that
"[t]here is a lot of tension in the household[.]"
10 A-3819-15T2
II.
We also conclude that the court erred by denying plaintiffs'
motion to amend the complaint to include causes of action for
conspiracy, retaliatory prosecution, and abuse of process.
Rule 4:9-1 governs motions to amend the pleadings. Our
Supreme Court has construed this rule to "'require[] that motions
for leave to amend be granted liberally,' even if the ultimate
merits of the amendment are uncertain." Prime Accounting Dep't
v. Twp. of Carney's Point, 212 N.J. 493, 511 (2013) (alteration
in original) (quoting Kernan v. One Wash. Park Urban Renewal
Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 456 (1998)). The Court stated, however,
that
[o]ne exception to that rule arises when the
amendment would be "futile," because "the
amended claim will nonetheless fail and,
hence, allowing the amendment would be a
useless endeavor. [C]ourts are free to refuse
leave to amend when the newly asserted claim
is not sustainable as a matter of law. . . .
[T]here is no point to permitting the filing
of an amended pleading when a subsequent
motion to dismiss must be granted."
[Ibid. (second and third alterations in
original) (quoting Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins.
Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006)).]
Such is not the case here.
Plaintiffs should have been allowed to add a claim for civil
conspiracy. A civil conspiracy is defined as a
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combination of two or more persons acting in
concert to commit an unlawful act, or to
commit a lawful act by unlawful means, the
principal element of which is an agreement
between the parties to inflict a wrong against
or an injury upon another, and an overt act
that results in damage.
[LoBiondo, supra, 199 N.J. at 102 (quoting
Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 184 N.J. 161,
177 (2005)).]
The focus of a civil conspiracy claim is the underlying wrong
rather than the conspiracy itself. Banco Popular, supra, 184 N.J.
at 178. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the
Borough defendants "encouraged [Orozco] to fabricate allegations
of sexual misconduct" and "suppressed exculpatory evidence that
would have exonerated [Mr. Mastrofilippo]" in furtherance of the
conspiracy to file baseless charges against him, thereby depriving
him "of his constitutional rights to be free from false arrest,
malicious prosecution, and abuse of process."
Plaintiffs should also be allowed to add a claim for
retaliatory prosecution under Section 1983.
To prove the Section 1983 claim for
retaliation under the First Amendment, a
plaintiff must prove that: (1) "the activity
in question was protected"; (2) that "his
interest in the speech outweighs the state's
countervailing interest as an employer in
promoting the efficiency of the public
services it provides through its employees";
and (3) that "the protected activity was a
substantial or motivating factor in the
alleged retaliatory action."
12 A-3819-15T2
[Winters v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 212
N.J. 67, 89 n.5 (2012) (quoting Baldassare v.
New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir.
2001)).]
Plaintiffs alleged that the Borough defendants retaliated against
Mr. Mastrofilippo for complaining of property violations,
expressing his opinion about the Borough in a public newsletter,
and filing complaints against Borough personnel.
The same is true for plaintiffs' abuse of process claim. "To
be found liable for malicious abuse of process, a party must have
performed additional acts 'after issuance of process which
represent the perversion or abuse of the legitimate purposes of
that process.'" Hoffman v. AsSeenOnTV.com, Inc., 404 N.J. Super.
415, 431 (App. Div. 2009) (quoting Baglini v. Lauletta, 338 N.J.
Super. 282, 294 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 169 N.J. 607 (2001)).
"[P]rocess is not abused unless after its issuance the defendant
reveals an ulterior purpose he had in securing it by committing
further acts whereby he demonstrably uses the process as a means
to coerce or oppress the plaintiff." Ibid. (quoting Ruberton v.
Gabage, 280 N.J. Super. 125, 130 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 142
N.J. 451 (1995)).
Plaintiffs alleged that the Borough defendants encouraged
Orozco to file the complaint and were willfully indifferent to the
existence of exculpatory evidence. They argue that the Borough
13 A-3819-15T2
defendants' omission of investigative facts to ensure Mr.
Mastrofilippo's prosecution, excessive police presence at the
probable cause hearings, and Capabianco's targeting of Mr.
Mastrofilippo's property, sufficiently stated a cause of action
for abuse of process.
Courts may deny a motion to amend the complaint if the amended
complaint would be dismissed in a subsequent Rule 4:6-2(e) motion.
Prime Accounting Dep't, supra, 212 N.J. at 511. Here, the motion
judge dismissed plaintiffs' conspiracy claim, writing:
Plaintiffs alleged [the Borough defendants]
induced Orozco to file a criminal complaint
against plaintiff[s]. However, plaintiffs
fail to cite to any legal authority for the
proposition that [the Borough defendants] can
be held liable for conspiracy to file an
allegedly baseless criminal complaint . . .
where a judge has independently decided that
probable cause existed for an arrest.
The motion judge dismissed Count Eight, retaliatory prosecution
in violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983, stating "the United States Supreme Court 'has
never recognized a First Amendment right to be free from a
retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause.'" (quoting
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 665, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093, 182
L. Ed. 2d 985, 992 (2012)). She then dismissed plaintiffs' abuse
of process claim for the same reasons as the conspiracy and
retaliatory prosecution claims.
14 A-3819-15T2
The motion judge erred in dismissing the amended complaint
for the same reasons she erred in dismissing Counts One, Two,
Three, and Six above. The motion judge determined the existence
of probable cause instead of searching the allegations in the
amended complaint for valid causes of actions. Kieffer, 422 N.J.
Super. at 43. Plaintiffs' ability to sufficiently prove all the
elements to the causes of action in the pleadings will be left for
another day.
III.
Plaintiffs contend that personnel records and internal
affairs files of the named Borough defendants are highly relevant
and likely to lead to admissible evidence (1) of inadequate
training and supervision, and failure to discipline, to establish
municipal liability under Section 1983 and (2) that probable cause
was a pretext for false arrest and malicious prosecution.
We review a trial court's decision on discovery matters under
an abuse of discretion standard. Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New
Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371 (2011). "That is, '[w]e generally
defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless
the court has abused its discretion or its determination is based
on a mistaken understanding of the applicable law.'" Ibid.
(alteration in original) (quoting Rivers v. LSC P'ship, 378 N.J.
Super. 68, 80 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 296 (2005)).
15 A-3819-15T2
Here, the judge did not provide a sufficient explanation
supporting her order denying plaintiffs' motion to compel in her
statement of reasons, presumably because in the same order, she
dismissed the claims against the Borough defendants and thus, the
need for discovery became moot. The motion judge did note,
however, that there is a strong public interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of police personnel records and internal affairs
files. See State v. Kaszubinski, 177 N.J. Super. 136, 138 (Law
Div. 1980). Nevertheless, on remand, the court should address
more fully plaintiffs' motion to compel these records now that we
are reinstating the matter as to the Borough defendants.
Finally, we conclude that plaintiffs' remaining argument as
to Orozco is without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We therefore uphold the
orders dated June 12, 2015 and April 1, 2016.
We reverse the orders dismissing the pleadings, remand for
further proceedings on the discovery issue, and affirm the
administrative dismissal against Orozco. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
16 A-3819-15T2