RONALD BENTZ VS. TOWNSHIP OF LITTLE EGG HARBOR (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5878-17T1
RONALD BENTZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TOWNSHIP OF LITTLE
EGG HARBOR,
Defendant-Respondent.
____________________________
Submitted June 6, 2019 – Decided July 11, 2019
Before Judges Simonelli and Whipple.
On appeal from the Tax Court of New Jersey, Docket
No. 009763-2017, whose opinion is reported at 30 N.J.
Tax 530 (Tax 2018).
Ronald Bentz, appellant pro se.
Gilmore & Monahan, PA, attorneys for respondent
(Robin La Bue, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
amicus curiae New Jersey Division of Taxation
(Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Jamie M. Zug, Deputy Attorney General, on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Ronald Bentz owns property in the Township of Little Egg
Harbor. He is a veteran who served in the Navy from September 6, 1983 to
September 5, 1986. In 1986, he was stationed on a ship during the conflict
between the United States and Libya (the Libya conflict). He was honorably
discharged in September 1986, and his discharge certificate indicates he was in
"sea service." Effective September 6, 2016, the United States Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA) declared plaintiff 100% permanently disabled due to a
"wartime service-connected disability."
Plaintiff filed a claim for a disabled veteran's property tax exemption for
the 2017 tax year pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30(a). He stated, in part, he was
an honorably discharged disabled veteran with active wartime service during the
Grenada peacekeeping mission and the Lebanon peacekeeping mission.
N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) provides as follows, in pertinent part:
"Active service in time of war" means active service by
a person, while in the United States Armed Forces, at
some time during one of the following periods:
....
A-5878-17T1
2
The Grenada peacekeeping mission, on or after October
23, 1983, who has served in Grenada or on board any
ship actively engaged in patrolling the territorial waters
of that nation for a period, continuous or in the
aggregate, of at least [fourteen] days commencing on or
before November 21, 1983 or the date of termination of
that mission as proclaimed by the President of the
United States or Congress, whichever date of
termination is the latest, in such active service; . . .
The Lebanon peacekeeping mission, on or after
September 26, 1982, who has served in Lebanon or on
board any ship actively engaged in patrolling the
territorial waters of that nation for a period, continuous
or in the aggregate, of at least [fourteen] days
commencing on or before December 1, 1987 or the date
of termination of that mission, as proclaimed by the
President of the United States or Congress, whichever
date of termination is the latest, in such active service[.]
Plaintiff did not serve in the Grenada peacekeeping mission or Lebanon
peacekeeping mission, but his service during the Libya conflict occurred during
the same time as those missions. The Libya conflict is not included in N.J.S.A.
54:4-8.10(a).
The Township disallowed plaintiff's claim because he failed to meet two
statutory requirements: (1) "Active Duty in a qualified branch of the Armed
Forces of the United States 'in time of war'"[;] and (2) "Peacekeeping Missions
require a minimum of [fourteen] days service in the actual combat zone[.]" The
Ocean County Board of Taxation (Board) affirmed the disallowance.
A-5878-17T1
3
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Tax Court, challenging the
constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) under the Equal Protection Clause and
Supremacy Clause. On July 25, 2018, Judge Mala Sundar issued a
comprehensive written decision, finding the statute was constitutional. Bentz v.
Twp. of Little Egg Harbor, 30 N.J. Tax 530 (Tax 2018). The judge conducted a
broad historical review of the veteran's property tax exemption statutes and
determined the separation of powers doctrine bars judicial interference in
legislative functions. The judge found the New Jersey Constitution delegated
the Legislature with the sole discretion to define an event in time of war or other
emergency, and concluded the court lacked authority to graft the Libya conflict
into N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a).
Judge Sundar acknowledged that "the court can examine if in the
performance of the constitutionally delegated powers, the Legislature violated
the Constitution[,]" but found no such infirmity. Id. at 542. For one, the judge
found our Legislature has not abdicated its constitutionally delegated powers, as
is evident in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) and its amendments. Id. at 543 (citing Fisher
v. City of Millville, 450 N.J. Super. 610, 616-17 (App. Div. 2017) (recognizing
that the Legislature has actively amended N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) "keeping step
A-5878-17T1
4
with the Constitution's amendment to authorize Legislation covering events 'in
time of war or other emergency.'"), aff'g 29 N.J. Tax 91 (Tax 2016)).
Judge Sundar also rejected plaintiff's arguments that the non-inclusion of
the Libya conflict in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) violates the Supremacy Clause and
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff had argued
that N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) violated the Supremacy Clause because the federal
statutes pertaining to veterans are broader in scope as to a "time of war"
designation. The judge found this argument unpersuasive because "[o]nly the
State . . . imposes, or exempts from imposition, local property tax. . . . Therefore,
definitions for purposes of local property tax are not controlled by, or overridden
by, federal statutes relating to veteran's compensation or benefits." Id. at 547
(citing Twp. of Galloway v. Duncan, 29 N.J. Tax 520, 534 (Tax 2016)) (holding
that the Exemption Statute need not "defer to a technical definition or term of
art prescribed by military regulation or otherwise.").
As to the Equal Protection Clause, plaintiff argued he was entitled to the
same treatment as a disabled veteran of the Lebanon peacekeeping mission.
While Judge Sundar empathized with plaintiff's position, given that he actually
witnessed war and war-like conditions, as compared to a veteran of the Lebanon
peacekeeping mission, the judge rejected his argument for the simple reason that
A-5878-17T1
5
"veterans' preference laws do not involve a suspect class." Id. at 547-48 (quoting
Darnell v. Twp. of Moorestown, 167 N.J. Super. 16, 21 (App. Div. 1979)). As
the judge explained:
"[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require
that all persons be treated alike." As long as there is no
"suspect" class, or classification which is affected by
the legislation, "a legislative classification will be
presumed valid, even if it has the effect of treating some
differently from others."
A "classification involving veterans does not
result in 'invidious or irrational' distinctions among a
state's residents; does not affect a suspect or semi-
suspect class; and does not regulate fundamental
rights."
[Id. at 548 (alteration in original) (quoting Garma v.
Twp. of Lakewood, 14 N.J. Tax. 1, 15, 12 (Tax 1994)).]
Thus, Judge Sundar found the court must examine the alleged
unconstitutionality of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a), as applied to plaintiff, under the
rational basis scrutiny, under which the court must determine whether the
allegedly offensive legislation is rationally related to a legitimate State interest.
Ibid. (citing Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 681, 680 (2012))
(where the "subject matter [of a legislation] is local, economic, social, and
commercial [and] . . . a tax classification," it only need to pass rational basis
scrutiny); see also Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985)
A-5878-17T1
6
("When a state distributes benefits unequally, the distinctions it makes are
subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Generally, a law will survive that scrutiny if the distinction
rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.").
In addition to recognizing precedent has uniformly held that statutes
which treat veterans differently for purposes of certain benefits, pass the rational
basis muster, Bentz, 30 N.J. Tax at 549 (citing Ballou v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 75
N.J. 365 (1978); Fischer v. West, 11 Vet. App. 121, 123-24 (Ct. Vet. App.
1998)), the judge provided numerous potential legislative motivations that
would explain why the Legislature did not include the Libya conflict in N.J.S.A.
54:4-8.10(a), which were "'reasonably conceivable state of facts' [providing] 'a
rational basis for the classification.'" Ibid. (quoting Armour, 566 U.S. at 681).
The judge noted, for example:
It may be that our Legislature did not consider the
conflict with Libya for purposes of including it in the
[N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a)] because it was not federally
identified as a war or as an emergency due to the short
term, the quantum of armed personnel, costs or
damages involved, or because the 1986 [Executive
Order] imposed purely economic sanction or
embargoes, or because under federal law, it never
elevated to the level of a war for purposes of providing
veteran benefits.
[Ibid.]
A-5878-17T1
7
Ultimately, Judge Sundar acknowledged that "[t]he 'burden is on the one
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which
might support it.'" Id. at 550 (quoting Armour, 566 U.S. at 681). As plaintiff
had not negatived the above conceivable bases, and had merely asserted the
federal government treats veterans who served during the Libya conflict more
generously, which the judge found was not evidenced by federal legislation
governing veterans' benefits, plaintiff had not provided sufficient evidence to
overcome the presumptive constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30(a) and
N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a). The judge, thus, dismissed plaintiff's complaint.
We recognize that "judges presiding in the Tax Court have special
expertise; for that reason their findings will not be disturbed unless they are
plainly arbitrary or there is a lack of substantial evidence to support them."
Hackensack City v. Bergen Cty., 405 N.J. Super. 235, 243 (App Div. 2009)
(quoting Alpine Country Club v. Borough of Demarest, 354 N.J. Super. 387,
390 (App. Div. 2002)). While the tax court's factual findings are entitled to
deference, we need not defer to its interpretation of statutes or legal principles.
Advance Hous., Inc. v. Twp. of Teaneck, 215 N.J. 549, 566 (2013). We review
de novo an issue of statutory interpretation, such as the issue here. McGovern
v. Rutgers, 211 N.J. 94, 108 (2012).
A-5878-17T1
8
"The meaning of a tax statute must be discerned according to the general
rules of statutory construction." Presbyterian Home at Pennington, Inc. v.
Borough of Pennington, 409 N.J. Super. 166, 180 (App. Div. 2009). The court
examines the statute's plain language and, if the language is clear, interprets the
statute consistent with its plain meaning. Ibid. But, if the language is unclear,
the court must review the legislative history to determine the legislative intent.
Ibid.Courts construe tax exemptions narrowly. Metpath, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of
Taxation, 96 N.J. 147, 152 (1984). The taxpayer bears the burden of proving he
is entitled to an exemption. See Container Ring v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 1 N.J.
Tax 203, 208 (Tax 1980) ("One who claims exemption from a tax must bring
himself within the exemptions provision."), aff'd o.b., 4 N.J. Tax 527 (App. Div.
1981). "Statutory exemptions from taxation should be 'strictly construed against
those invoking the exemption.'" Advance Hous., Inc., 215 N.J. at 566 (quoting
Hunterdon Med. Ctr. v. Twp. of Readington, 195 N.J. 549, 569 (2008)). Any
doubt as to eligibility should be resolved against the person or entity claiming
the exemptions. Mal Bros. Contractor Co. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 124 N.J.
Super. 55, 61 (App. Div. 1973). Applying the above standards, we discern no
reason to reverse.
A-5878-17T1
9
N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30(a) authorizes a property tax exemption for a disabled
veteran who meets five requirements: (1) be a citizen and resident of New
Jersey; (2) "now or hereafter honorably discharged or released under honorable
circumstances"; (3) "from active service, in time of war"; (4) "in any branch of
the Armed Forces of the United States"; and (5) to be "declared by the [VA] or
its successor to have a service-connected disability . . . declared by the [VA] or
its successor to be a total or 100% permanent disability . . . sustained through
enemy action, or accident, or resulting from disease contracted while in such
active service . . . ." See also Wellington v. Twp. of Hillsborough, 27 N.J. Tax
37, 48 (Tax 2012). Appellant's failure to satisfy the "active service, in time of
war" requirement is at issue here.
N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) provides that "'[a]ctive service in time of war' means
active service by a person, while in the United States Armed Forces, at some
time during one of the following periods." The statutes then lists the wars,
conflicts, operations, missions, and timeframes during which a disabled veteran
must have served in order to qualify for a property tax exemption. The statute
includes two missions in which plaintiff would have needed to serve, given the
timeframe of his active service between September 6, 1983 and September 5,
1986: the Grenada peacekeeping mission and the Lebanon peacekeeping
A-5878-17T1
10
mission. N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a). Although plaintiff listed these missions in his
claim for a disabled veteran property tax exemption, he did not serve in either
of them. Thus, per the statutory framework, plaintiff did not satisfy the "active
service in time of war" requirement for entitlement to a disabled veteran's
proprety tax exemption, and the Township properly denied his claim.
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues the non-inclusion of the Libya conflict in
N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) impermissibly contravenes the purpose undergirding the
disabled veterans' property tax exemption, which is to provide property tax relief
to compensate veterans for their sacrifice, and allowance of the exemption
should not be restricted to those who served in the delineated wars, conflicts,
operations, and missions. However, we must defer to the Legislature's definition
of "active service in time of war," as that body has sole authority to define that
term by under the New Jersey Constitution. N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 3. Judge
Sundar touched on this argument in her prelude to analyzing plaintiff's
constitutional arguments, but we will expand on the point here.
As we recognized in Opderbeck v. Midland Park Board of Education, "[i]t
is not our job to engraft requirements [on a statute] that the Legislature did not
include. It is our role to enforce the legislative intent as expressed through the
words used by the Legislature." 442 N.J. Super. 40, 58 (App. Div. 2015)
A-5878-17T1
11
(alterations in original) (quoting Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 388
(2015)).
More specifically, as the Court of Errors and Appeals long ago held with
regard to another veterans' benefits statute:
[g]enerally, statutes of the character under
consideration would be liberally construed in favor of
the citizen who volunteers his services in time of war,
but it is not the judicial function to add beneficiaries to
those specified in the statutes. The specification of who
shall benefit and under what conditions is a legislative
function. Our function is to construe the statute as
written and to interpret the legislative intent, but we
cannot under the guise of interpretation extend a statute
to include persons not intended. We must regard the
statutes as meaning what they say and avoid giving
them any construction which would distort their
meaning. We have no legislative authority and should
not construe statutes any more broadly nor give them
any greater effect than their language requires.
[Adams v. Atlantic Cty., 137 N.J.L. 648, 652 (E. & A.
1948).]
N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30(a), and by extension N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a), have thus been
strictly construed by our courts.
For example, in Fisher, we made it clear that a local tax assessor's
adherence to the theater of operation definitions in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) is
mandatory, and the statute must be strictly construed, in line with the general
principal that "[t]ax-exemption statutes are strictly construed against those
A-5878-17T1
12
claiming exemption because of the compelling public policy that all property
should bear its fair share of the burden of taxation." 450 N.J. Super. at 618-19
(alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Carpenters Apprentice Training & Educ.
Fund v. Borough of Kenilworth, 144 N.J. 171, 177 (1996)).
The plaintiff in Fisher was a disabled veteran who served stateside during
Operation Enduring Freedom, 1 purportedly in direct support of her unit stationed
in a combat zone overseas. Id. at 613. She argued that "the series of
amendments [to N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a)] adding various conflicts over time was
intended to expand to availability of relief for military missions and
engagements, not just declared wars" and "the Legislature 'abandoned' the
requirement the military service occur 'in expressly-defined geographic
locales.'" Id. at 617. However, we squarely "reject[ed] the suggestion benefits
were intended to be extended without regard to geographic limitations" as
"inclusion of this geographic requirement [of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a)] was
purposeful." Ibid.Our decision in Township of Dover v. Scuorzo, 392 N.J. Super. 466 (App.
Div. 2007), further illustrates the point. In the consolidated case, the Tax Court
affirmed the grant of property tax benefits to an Army National Guard and an
1
Operation Enduring Freedom is included in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a).
A-5878-17T1
13
Air Force Reserve veteran notwithstanding their service was for training
purposes only and was not "active service in a time of war." Id. at 479-80. We
reversed, recognizing, as Judge Sundar did, that the Legislature is vested with
the authority to restrict eligibility for a disabled veteran's property tax exemption
to those who served in active service during a time of war; other New Jersey
veterans' benefits are restricted to those that served in active service; and
"eligibility for most federal veterans' benefits requires completion of active
service other than active duty for training in the National Guard or Reserves."
Id. at 478-80. Thus, in both cases, we declined to extend a disabled veteran's
property tax exemption to those not explicitly entitled to the same under
N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a).
Plaintiff cites Wellington for the principle that exposure to enemy action,
weapons, and resistance in warfare is what warrants a property tax exemption
for 100% disabled veterans. However, plaintiff fails to recognize the unique
circumstances of that case and that the disabled veteran there satisfied the
"active service in time of war" requirement. Id. at 52.
In Wellington, the plaintiff served in the Navy from September 1997 to
September 1999. 27 N.J. Tax at 42. He was stationed with a Marine Corps unit
during Operation Northern Watch/Southern Watch, and served as an advanced
A-5878-17T1
14
laboratory technician in a military laboratory in San Diego. 2 Ibid. As a result
of his duties, which involved handling chemical agents recovered from the
battlefield in Iraq, he developed Multiple Sclerosis, and the VA declared him
100% permanently disabled. Ibid. Like the issue here, "[t]he critical question
[was] whether [the] plaintiff served 'in the theater of operation' and 'in direct
support of that operation' while handling chemical agents at the Navy laboratory
in the United States." Id. at 50. The Tax Court judge answered that question in
the affirmative.
Despite referencing the general principal from Darnell, clung to by
plaintiff, that "[t]he purpose of the Constitutional provision allowing for the
disabled veteran's exemption is to 'compensate veterans for the experiences of
war and to encourage veterans to purchase property in this State[,]'" id. at 50-51
(quoting Darnell, 167 N.J. Super. at 18), a close reading of Wellington reveals
the disabled veteran's property tax exemption was awarded not merely because
the plaintiff was injured by enemy munitions, but because under the uniquely
broad definition of the theater of operation of Operation Northern Watch and
2
Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch are included in
N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a).
A-5878-17T1
15
Operation Southern Watch, the plaintiff had served within those theaters
notwithstanding that he served stateside. Id. at 48-49. As the Tax Court stated:
There is no dispute that [the] plaintiff did not serve in
the Arabian Peninsula or the Persian Gulf during
Operation Northern Watch/Southern Watch. His
military service took place in the United States.
N.J.S.A. 54:4–8.10(a), however, does not establish a
strict geographic service requirement for veterans who
served during Operation Northern Watch/Southern
Watch. According to the plain language of the statute,
veterans "who served in the theater of operation,
including in the Arabian peninsula and the Persian
Gulf, and in direct support of that operation" are
eligible for the exemption. N.J.S.A. 54:4–8.10(a). The
theater of operation is defined to "include" the Arabian
Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, but is not limited to
those areas. This is in contrast to other provisions of
N.J.S.A. 54:4–8.10(a) which define other military
conflicts to include only delineated geographic areas.
[Id. at 49.]
It is thus clear that, contrary to plaintiff's assertions here, it was the plaintiff's
satisfaction of the "active service in time of war" requirement in Wellington that
entitled him to benefits. Unlike Operation Northern Watch/Southern Watch, the
Libya conflict is not a delineated a "time of war" under N.J.S.A. 54:4 -8.10(a).
Plaintiff is not able to satisfy the "active service in time of war" requirement,
and under the deference owed to legislation generally, and tax exemption
statutes specifically, it is not our role to supersede the Legislature's authority.
A-5878-17T1
16
Out of respect for the Legislature's clear intention to impose a geographic
requirement within the "active service in time of war" definition in N.J.S.A.
54:4-8.10(a), and out of respect for our tripartite system of government, we must
affirm the disallowance of plaintiff's claim for a disabled veteran's property tax
exemption for failure to satisfy the "active service in time of war" requirement.
Plaintiff's constitutional arguments do not alter our conclusion. The Equal
Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, Section One, provides that "[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Plaintiff argues N.J.S.A.
5:4-8.10(a) violates the Equal Protection Clause because it treats disabled
veterans of the Libya conflict differently than disabled veterans of the Leban on
peacekeeping mission. "[H]owever, the Equal Protection Clause does not
require that all persons be treated alike. Rather, it requires that similar persons
be treated similarly, and that people of different circumstances be treated
differently." Garma, 14 N.J. Tax at 15. "[U]nless legislation creates an
inherently suspect classification, a legislative classification will be presumed
valid, even if it has the effect of treating some differently from others, so long
as it bears some rational relationship to a permissible state interest." Ibid.
A-5878-17T1
17
(alteration in original) (quoting Schneider v. City of East Orange, 196 N.J.
Super. 587, 594 (App. Div. 1984)).
We have plainly held that "veterans' preference laws do not involve a
suspect class." Darnell, 167 N.J. Super. at 21. As "a classification involving
veterans does not result in 'invidious or irrational' distinctions among a state's
residents; does not affect a suspect or semi-suspect class; and does not regulate
fundamental rights . . . the classification which is the subject matter of this
litigation need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to satisfy
federal equal protection requirements." Garma, 14 N.J. Tax at 12 ("confirming"
that veterans' classifications are "subject to rational basis review and not a higher
level of scrutiny").
Rational basis review asks whether the statute is "rationally related to the
achievement of a legitimate state interest." Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs.,
107 N.J. 355, 365 (1987). The "rational basis test 'is not a license for courts to
judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices,' and it does not
empower the judiciary to act as a super-legislature, judging the wisdom or
desirability of legislative policy." A.A. v. State, 384 N.J. Super. 481, 496 (App.
Div. 2006) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)). Rather, a tax
statute passes constitutional muster and overcomes allegations of equal
A-5878-17T1
18
protection violations if it has a rational basis, that is the "state policy furth ered
by the difference in treatment is 'plausible,'" and the "classification . . . [is]
justifiable 'on any reasonably conceivable state of facts[.]'" Verizon New Jersey
Inc. v. Borough of Hopewell, 26 N.J. Tax 400, 424-25 (Tax 2012) (first quoting
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992); then quoting Armour, 566 U.S. at
681).
Judge Sundar correctly recognized that "[p]recedent has uniformly held
that statutes which treat veterans differently for purposes of certain benefits,
pass the rational basis muster." Bentz, 30 N.J. Tax at 549 (citing Ballou v. Dep't
of Civ. Serv., 75 N.J. 365 (1978); Fischer, 11 Vet. App. at 123-24). Further, the
judge identified numerous potential legislative motivations that would explain
the non-inclusion of the Libya conflict from N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a), which were
"'a reasonably conceivable state of facts' [providing] 'a rational basis for the
classification.'" Ibid. (quoting Armour, 566 U.S. at 681). The judge stated, for
example:
It may be that our Legislature did not consider the
conflict with Libya for purposes of including it in
[N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a)] because it was not federally
identified as a war or as an emergency due to the short
term, the quantum of armed personnel, costs or
damages involved, or because the 1986 [Executive
Order] imposed purely economic sanction or
embargoes, or because under federal law, it never
A-5878-17T1
19
elevated to the level of a war for purposes of providing
veteran benefits.
[Ibid.]
Lastly, it is clear from the Legislature's continued amendment to N.J.S.A.
54:4-8.10(a), see L. 1991, c. 390, § 7; Statement to Assembly Veterans, Military
Affairs and Gaming Comm., Assembly No. 485, L. 1995, c. 406, to update the
specified war theaters and service dates in lock-step with federal regulation, see
38 U.S.C. § 101; 38 C.F.R. § 3.2, that the Legislature has not abdicated its
constitutionally delegated duty. The Legislature's non-inclusion of the Libya
conflict was intentional and purposeful, and that, by virtue of mirroring the
federal regulations, demonstrates rationality.
Furthermore, the Libya conflict is not included in other New Jersey
veterans' benefit statutes, which generally include the same periods included in
N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a), demonstrating that the Legislature's action cannot be said
to be arbitrary or without a rational basis. See N.J.S.A. 11A:5-1 (relating to
Veterans' Preference in Civil Service); N.J.S.A. 18A:66-2 (relating to pensions);
N.J.S.A. 43:15A-6 (same); N.J.S.A. 43:16A-11.7 (same); Scuorzo, 392 N.J.
Super. at 478-80 (finding these non-tax veteran benefit statutes as support for
strict interpretation of N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a)).
A-5878-17T1
20
As Judge Sundar stated, the "burden is on the one attacking the legislative
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it."
Bentz, 30 N.J. Tax at 550 (quoting Armour, 566 U.S. at 681); see Garma, 14
N.J. Tax at 12 (a challenge to a tax statute requires "the most explicit
demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination
against particular persons and classes" (quoting Regan v. Taxation with
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983))). Plaintiff has failed to attack any of
the potential, plausible bases for our Legislature's non-inclusion of the Libya
conflict in N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a). Notably, he has failed to produce any
evidence, or even raise the argument, that the Legislature intentionally
discriminated against him. See Chadwick 99 Assocs. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation,
23 N.J. Tax 390, 418 (Tax 2007) ("[I]t is only intentional discrimination that
violates equal protection, and . . . what is invalid is singling out an individual
and treating that individual differently than other persons of the same class.").
Thus, plaintiff's challenge to N.J.S.A. 54:4-8.10(a) under the Equal Protection
Clause fails.
A-5878-17T1
21
Plaintiff's challenge to the statute under the Supremacy Clause, Article
Six, Paragraph Two of the United States Constitution, 3 also fails. The
Supremacy Clause generally establishes that the federal constitution and federal
laws take precedence over state constitutions and state laws. However, the
superseding effect of federal laws is limited to only where Congress has
expressly stated that state law is pre-empted, Congress intends that federal law
occupy a given field, or the state law actually conflicts with federal law, for
example, if compliance with both state law and federal law is impossible or if
the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress." California v. ARC America Corp.,
490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
"Only the State (via its local government) imposes, or exempts from
imposition, local property tax. The federal government does not." Bentz, 30
N.J. Tax at 547; see also Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 30; Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
3
The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law
of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding.
A-5878-17T1
22
Auto Parts Co., 400 U.S. 356, 359 (1973). And, "[b]ecause Congress is not
presumed to desire displacement of 'the historic police powers of the States,'
preemption must be proved by 'clear and manifest evidence' of such an intent."
Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 25 N.J. Tax 519, 535 (App. Div.
2010) (citations omitted) (quoting Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J.
602, 615 (1999)).
Thus, as Judge Sundar held, "definitions for purposes of local property tax
are not controlled, or overridden by, federal statutes relating to veterans[']
compensation or benefits." Bentz, 30 N.J. Tax at 547 (citing Duncan, 29 N.J.
Tax at 534) (federal definitions or interpretations of "direct support" are not
controlling for purposes of N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30, and although N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.30
relies upon the VA for a determination of disability, it does not "defer to a
technical definition or term of art prescribed by military regulation or
otherwise"). Therefore, the Supremacy Clause is not even implicated, let alone
violated here.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of plaintiff's
remaining arguments, we conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-5878-17T1
23