AIMEE K. IDAN VS. DANIEL IDAN (FM-07-1342-06, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2019 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1770-17T3
AIMEE K. IDAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANIEL IDAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted May 1, 2019 – Decided May 20, 2019
Before Judges Reisner and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
No. FM-07-1342-06.
Lane & Lane, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Daniel J.
Lane, of counsel and on the brief).
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Daniel Idan appeals from an October 30, 2017 order
summarizing a series of prior orders setting forth his weekly child support
obligations and ordering the Essex County Probation Division to adjust its
records to reflect the modifications set forth in the order. For the reasons set
forth below, we dismiss the appeal.
By way of background, over the past several years, defendant has filed
repeated motions seeking to modify his child support obligations. He has also
repeatedly sought reconsideration of the orders deciding the motions. For
purposes of this opinion we need not detail all of those orders and applications.
Suffice to say that on June 21, 2017, the Family Part entered an order denying
in part and granting in part defendant's motion for reconsideration of a January
30, 2017 order. Defendant did not appeal either from the January 30, 2017 order
or the June 21, 2017 order. Instead, he filed yet another motion, this time
seeking reconsideration of the June 21 order. The Family Part disposed of that
motion by order dated July 14, 2017, modifying defendant's child support
obligation to $92 per week, effective as of January 1, 2014.
Defendant had forty-five days to file an appeal from the July 14, 2017
order, but he did not do so. See R. 2:4-1(a). Nor did he file a motion for
reconsideration of the order, which would have tolled the time for filing a notice
of appeal. See R. 2:4-3(e). Instead, defendant's attorney sent the Family Part
judge a letter on July 28, 2017, asking that the July 14, 2017 order "be clarified
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for the benefit of the Probation Division." The letter set forth the specific
clarifications defendant was seeking. In response, the judge issued an order on
October 30, 2017, summarizing the prior orders with the clarifications requested
in defense counsel's letter. The order also directed the Probation Division to
adjust its records to reflect those "modifications" and recited that "[e]xcept as
clarified and summarized, herein, all other orders remain in full force and
effect."
Defendant's notice of appeal only listed the October 30, 2017 order, and
therefore that is the only order properly before us on this appeal. See R. 2:5-
1(e)(3)(i); 1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 368 N.J. Super.
456, 459 (App. Div. 2004). Defendant is barred from appealing that order,
because it gave him the relief his attorney's letter sought on his behalf. See State
v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347, 358-59 (2004) (addressing the doctrines of judicial
estoppel and invited error); CFG Health Sys., LLC v. Cty. of Hudson, 413 N.J.
Super. 306, 321 (App. Div. 2010). In fact, the judge actually signed the form of
order defendant's counsel submitted with the letter, adding only handwritten
notations specifying the prior order to which each clarification pertained. To
the extent defendant's appellate brief appears to be seeking relief from any of
those earlier orders, we decline to consider his arguments for two reasons. First,
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the prior orders are not listed in his notice of appeal. Second, an appeal from
those prior orders would be untimely. The October 30, 2017 order–which
simply summarized the prior orders with clarifications defendant requested–did
not revive defendant's long-expired right to appeal from the prior orders.
Dismissed.
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