IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT APPLICATION OF LUIS VELAZQUEZ (350-15, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-0788-16T1
    IN THE MATTER OF THE
    EXPUNGEMENT APPLICATION
    OF LUIS VELAZQUEZ.
    __________________________________
    Submitted July 18, 2017 – Decided July 28, 2017
    Before Judges Reisner and Suter.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. 350-
    15.
    Gluck Walrath, L.L.P., and John Nicholas
    Iannuzzi (Iannuzzi and Iannuzi) of the New
    York bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for
    appellant (Mr. Iannuzzi, of counsel and on the
    brief; Robyn B. Gigl, on the brief).
    Esther Suarez, Hudson County Prosecutor,
    attorney for respondent (Erin M. Campbell,
    Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    Petitioner Luis Velazquez appeals from the August 10, 2016
    order denying his application to expunge a conviction.              We reverse
    the order and remand for reconsideration.
    In 2005, petitioner pled guilty to third-degree receiving
    stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7 (the 2005 conviction).                 He was
    sentenced to two years of probation and fifty hours of community
    service, all of which have been satisfied.               In 2016, petitioner
    made application to expunge the 2005 conviction.                   See N.J.S.A.
    2C:52-2.      Petitioner contends the 2005 conviction interferes with
    his ability to obtain employment other than as a long-haul trucker.
    He would like employment in a job that does not involve so much
    travel away from his family.
    The    Hudson   County     Prosecutor    (the   Prosecutor)     initially
    opposed petitioner's expungement application because petitioner
    failed to list in his criminal history a 2012 guilty plea to the
    disorderly     persons    offense     of   shoplifting,      N.J.S.A.    2C:20-
    11(c)(4),     from    Marlboro    Township.       Petitioner       amended   the
    expungement application to include that guilty plea.                In addition
    to   the    2012   shoplifting    conviction    and   the   2005    conviction,
    petitioner listed two other offenses.           In 1997, he pled guilty in
    the Belleville Municipal Court to shoplifting, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-
    11(b)(2). In October 1996, petitioner was charged with the illegal
    use of slugs, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-18, and forgery, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1
    (the 1996 offenses).           For the 1996 offenses, petitioner was
    admitted     to    Pretrial    Intervention     (PTI),      and    successfully
    completed the program in November 1997.           See R. 3:28.
    Petitioner's amended expungement application was opposed by
    the Prosecutor, claiming that petitioner was not eligible under
    2                                A-0788-16T1
    N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(f) to expunge the 2005 conviction because of his
    past participation in PTI.
    Petitioner's application for expungement was denied by order
    dated August 10, 2016 without oral argument.            In the order, the
    court did not make any factual findings or provide legal authority
    other than listing three cases: State v. B.C., 
    235 N.J. Super. 157
    (Law Div. 1989); State v. Dylag, 
    267 N.J. Super. 348
     (Law Div.
    1993); In re Podias, 
    284 N.J. Super. 674
     (App. Div. 1995), certif.
    denied,   
    143 N.J. 517
       (1996).       Petitioner   did   not   have   the
    opportunity to respond to the objection lodged by the Prosecutor.
    On appeal petitioner raises the following issues:
    Point I: THE PROSECUTOR ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED
    THE STATUTE (The Issue Was Not Raised Below
    As Appellant Had No Opportunity To Respond To
    The Objections Raised By the Prosecutor)
    Point II:    APPELLANT'S 1996 ARREST WAS FOR
    DISORDERLY PERSON CHARGES (The Issue Was Not
    Raised Below As Appellant Had No Opportunity
    To Respond To The Objections Raised By the
    Prosecutor).
    Point III:     THE COURT BELOW ERRONEOUSLY
    DETERMINED   PETITIONER'S   APPLICATION    WAS
    BARRED (The Issue Was Not Raised Below As
    Appellant Had No Opportunity To Respond To The
    Objections Raised By the Prosecutor).
    We reverse and remand for reconsideration.
    When an application for expungement is made, the
    "petitioner has the burden to satisfy the
    requirements of the expungement statute[,]" by
    3                              A-0788-16T1
    a preponderance of the evidence.         If a
    petitioner satisfies that burden, the burden
    then shifts to the State to "demonstrate[] by
    a preponderance of the evidence that there is
    a statutory bar or that the petition should
    not be granted." If the State fails to satisfy
    its burden in opposition to the expungement
    petition, "[t]he petitioner is presumptively
    entitled to expungement[.]"
    [In   re   D.H.,   
    204 N.J. 7
    ,      18   (2010)
    (alterations     in    original)        (citations
    omitted).]
    The application was denied under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(f).         That
    statute provides:
    A petition for expungement filed pursuant to
    this chapter shall be denied when:
    . . . .
    f.   The   person  seeking   the   relief   of
    expungement of a conviction for a disorderly
    persons, petty disorderly persons, or criminal
    offense has prior to or subsequent to said
    conviction been granted the dismissal of
    criminal charges following completion of a
    supervisory treatment or other diversion
    program.
    [N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(f).]
    Petitioner contends the 1996 offenses involved the use of
    slugs and that there never was an indictment, even for the forgery
    charge.   As such, petitioner contends the charges should both be
    treated   as   disorderly   persons   offenses     for   purposes     of
    expungement.   Because the statute only prohibits expungements
    where petitioner participated in PTI for a criminal charge and the
    4                             A-0788-16T1
    1996 offenses should be treated as disorderly persons charges,
    petitioner contends he should be eligible for expungement of the
    2005 conviction, relying on B.C., supra, 235 N.J. Super. at 161
    (holding     that     "a    disorderly         persons   [conviction]      did    not
    constitute a 'criminal conviction' to the extent that it would
    deprive     someone    of    the   right       to   an   expungement"      (citation
    omitted)).
    The Prosecutor contends that because petitioner participated
    in PTI following the 1996 offenses, he is barred by N.J.S.A. 2C:52-
    14(f) from expunging the 2005 conviction. Moreover, the Prosecutor
    argues that forgery under N.J.S.A. 2C:21-1 is not a disorderly
    persons offense and petitioner could only enter PTI if charged
    with a criminal offense.           See R. 3:28.
    The record does not assist us in evaluating the nature of the
    2005 conviction.       The trial court decided the expungement petition
    on the papers without petitioner having the ability to present
    these arguments.       Furthermore, the court did not make any findings
    of   fact   or   explain     any   legal       conclusions.    See    R.    1:7-4(a)
    (requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law in a non-jury
    trial to be stated in "an opinion or memorandum decision, either
    written or oral").         The court cited to three cases, but it did not
    explain how or why they applied to this case.                        Thus, we are
    constrained to reverse the order, which denied expungement, and
    5                                 A-0788-16T1
    to remand the case for further proceedings.   On remand, the trial
    court should permit additional briefing on these issues and, if
    requested, permit oral argument.
    Reversed and remanded.   We do not retain jurisdiction.
    6                           A-0788-16T1
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A-0788-16T1

Filed Date: 7/28/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/31/2017