STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. GREGORY S. FLETCHER (13-10-0911, CAPE MAY COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2017 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5494-15T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GREGORY S. FLETCHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted August 8, 2017 – Decided August 16, 2017
Before Judges Sabatino and Whipple.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Cape May County, Indictment No.
13-10-0911.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Stephen P. Hunter, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).
Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Carol M. Henderson,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel and on
the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from a June 23, 2016 judgment of conviction.
We affirm.
In November 1996, defendant was convicted of driving while
intoxicated (DWI), in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. On June 6,
2013, defendant was again convicted of DWI but was sentenced as a
first offender because it had been seventeen years since his first
conviction. Defendant's license was suspended for seven months.
On June 14, 2013, defendant was arrested for driving a motor
vehicle with a suspended license. Defendant was indicted on
October 1, 2013, in Cape May County for fourth-degree operating a
motor vehicle during a period of license suspension after a second
or subsequent DWI conviction. N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).
On October 14, 2014, defendant moved to dismiss the
indictment, which the motion judge denied. Defendant renewed his
motion on May 10, 2016, which was also denied, and defendant
entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal
the trial judge's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment.
On June 23, 2016, the judge sentenced defendant to the mandatory
term of 180 days in jail without parole pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:40-
26(b). The judge imposed appropriate fines and penalties and
stayed the sentence pending appeal. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant presents the following argument:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE DEFENDANT
CANNOT BE FOUND GUILTY OF VIOLATING N.J.S.A.
2C:40-26(b) FOR DRIVING WITH A SUSPENDED
LICENSE WHERE THE UNDERLYING DWI OFFENSE WAS
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TREATED AS A FIRST OFFENSE PURSUANT TO
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3).
Having considered this argument in light of the record and
applicable law, we affirm.
On June 14, 2013, eight days after the imposition of the
suspension of his license, defendant drove his car and was stopped
by a police officer. Because defendant had two DWI convictions,
he was indicted under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) for "operat[ing] a
motor vehicle during the period of license suspension . . . for a
second or subsequent violation of" N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.
Defendant argues because he was sentenced on his second DWI
conviction as if it were his first DWI offense under the step-down
provision of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3), he had not committed "a second
or subsequent" DWI and, therefore, should not have been charged
under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b). We disagree.
"Construction of any statute begins with a consideration of
its plain language." Merin v. Meglaki, 126 N.J. 430, 434 (1992)
(citing Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 128
(1987); Renz v. Penn Cent. Corp., 87 N.J. 437, 435 (1981)). "When
interpreting statutes, our 'overriding goal is to give effect to
the Legislature's intent.'" State v. Twiggs, 445 N.J. Super. 23,
28-29 (App. Div. 2016) (citing State v. D.A., 191 N.J. 158, 164
(2007)). The plain, statutory language is the best indicator of
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the legislative intent. State v. Perry, 439 N.J. Super. 514, 523
(App. Div.) (citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)),
certif. denied, 222 N.J. 306 (2015). "We thus read the text of a
statute in accordance with its ordinary meaning unless otherwise
specified." Twiggs, supra, 45 N.J. Super. at 28-29. In cases
where a plain reading of the statute "leads to a clear and
unambiguous result, then the interpretive process should end,
without resort to extrinsic sources." Ibid. (citing D.A., supra,
191 N.J. at 164).
Here, we consider two statutes, neither of which is ambiguous.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) provides:
A person who has been convicted of a previous
violation of this section need not be charged
as a second or subsequent offender in the
complaint made against him [or her] in order
to render him [or her] liable to the
punishment imposed by this section on a second
or subsequent offender, but if the second
offense occurs more than 10 years after the
first offense, the court shall treat the
second conviction as a first offense for
sentencing purposes and if a third offense
occurs more than 10 years after the second
offense, the court shall treat the third
conviction as a second offense for sentencing
purposes.
N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) and (c) state the following:
It shall be a crime of the fourth[-]degree to
operate a motor vehicle during the period of
license suspension in violation of [N.J.S.A.
39:3-40], if the actor’s license was suspended
or revoked for a second or subsequent
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violation of [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4(a)]. A
person convicted of an offense under this
subsection shall be sentenced by the court to
a term of imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the term of imprisonment
provided under [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6] and the
provisions of subsection e. of [N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1], if a person is convicted of a crime
under this section the sentence imposed shall
include a fixed minimum sentence of not less
than 180 days during which the defendant shall
not be eligible for parole.
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) provides the leniency in sentencing
afforded a second-time DWI offender under the step-down provision
is "for sentencing purposes" only, and the second offense is
considered just that, a "second offense." Moreover, as used in
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3), the phrase "for sentencing purposes" means
sentencing for violations of that provision of the DWI statute
only. See State v. Revie, 220 N.J. 126, 139 (2014) (citing State
v. Conroy, 397 N.J. Super. 324, 330 (App Div.), certif. denied,
195 N.J. 420 (2008)) (observing the step-down provision of N.J.S.A.
39:4-50(a)(3) applies to the imposition of a custodial sentence
under the DWI statute).
N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) punishes the crime of driving on a
suspended license and prescribes a mandatory 180-day jail term for
second-time DWI offenders. A second DWI offense is a prerequisite
to the mandatory 180-day incarceration period, but "[d]efendant
is not being punished under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) for his prior DWI
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. . . offenses; he is being punished for driving without a
license." State v. Carrigan, 428 N.J. Super. 609, 624 (App. Div.
2012), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 539 (2013).
The judge sentenced defendant in June 2013 as a first-time
offender, but his 2013 DWI conviction constituted his second DWI
conviction. During the period of license suspension following
defendant's second DWI, he drove, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-
26(b), and the trial judge correctly denied defendant's motion to
dismiss the indictment.
Affirmed. The stay of sentence previously granted by the
trial court shall dissolve within twenty days of this opinion.
The trial court shall expeditiously arrange for defendant to begin
his custodial term.
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